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FOREWORD
We welcome this year’s Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants
report and especially the fact that three more States
Parties have fulfilled their Treaty obligations for survey and
clearance. The record global clearance achieved in 2019 is
similarly to be applauded. In the ten years since the entry
into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) close
to one million submunitions have been destroyed during land
release operations. We are making solid progress towards
a world free of cluster munition remnants (CMR), even in the
most heavily contaminated States.
The main reason for improved programme performance
is the evidence-based survey that is being increasingly
employed to good effect. High-quality survey enables the
effective targeting of clearance and efficient use of resources.
Unless we deploy our resources in areas with confirmed
contamination, we are not fulfilling the objective of the CCM,
ultimately at the expense of affected populations. Every
affected State needs a good baseline so it can plan effectively.
Lao PDR, the country with more CMR on its territory than
any other, is in the process of a nationwide survey that
will, for the first time, produce a credible baseline of the
massive explosive threat from CMR. Moreover, operators
are destroying huge numbers of unexploded submunitions
handing precious land back to communities for safe use.
That is not to deny the critical challenges that our sector
still faces. The Coronavirus pandemic is impacting the mine
action sector, just as it is countless other sectors worldwide.
The extent of its impact on survey and clearance operations
in 2020 and beyond is unclear. But we do know that the
pandemic will make the poor poorer, increasing an already
growing inequality. Funding the critical work of survey and
clearance may become an even harder task in the years to
come. It is a fact that mine action and disarmament save lives
and enable development. But we know we are going to have
to work harder to make our case and convince donors to
remain committed to empower us to free affected countries
and territories from the hazardous legacy of CMR and
anti-personnel mine contamination.
This year’s research has shown, once more, that the sector
needs to improve its approach to, and understanding
of, diversity. It is time to not only advance gender
mainstreaming, but also to achieve measurable progess
on diversity. As operational demining organisations, we

Darren Cormack

Chief Executive Officer
Mines Advisory Group

know that this is an essential component of effective mine
action. It is key to ensuring that the benefits of mine action
employment and deployment accrue to all communities
and groups without discrimination, and that we, as a sector,
make the greatest possible contribution to peacebuilding.
The First Review Conference of the CCM in 2015 led
to clear commitments in the Dubrovnik Action Plan to
consider humanitarian and developmental needs during
implementation of the Convention. There was never a
question about what constituted completion; it was about
maximising the positive impact en route. Linking mine action
and development planning is now, rightly, the norm and
must remain central to our work in the decade leading to the
culmination of the Sustainable Development Goals in 2030.
The same needs to be true of mine action’s links to the
environment. It would be a profound mistake to see
disarmament and the environment as anything other than
interdependent. The mine action community must address
its impact on the environment, reducing travel emissions
and mitigating any negative impact from operations, while
also assessing where mine action can enhance environmental
protection and support conservation efforts. The sector
should also apply approaches and methods developed
for conflict sensitivity to environmental sensitivity, taking
bolder and more concrete steps to reduce the unintended
environmental consequences of releasing previously
contaminated land for safe and productive use.
This Convention has shown that being a State Party brings
benefits as it provides support to address the impact of CMR
– from clearance through to victim assistance. It has played
a role in drawing our organisations, and others, together
with this aim. With more than a dozen affected States outside
the Convention, there are great benefits in their joining the
collective success of the CCM. Let us work together over the
next five years and remain bold and committed to make the
goal of total global clearance of CMR an ever nearer reality.
As this publication was going to press, information was coming
to light of new use of cluster munitions in the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. We call on all parties to all armed conflicts to refrain
from any use of cluster munitions in order to protect civilians
as International Humanitarian Law demands.

PER HÅKON BREIVIK		

Director
Department for Mine Action and Disarmament
Norwegian People’s Aid

JAMES COWAN CBE DSO
Chief Executive Officer
The HALO Trust
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KEY FINDINGS
■

■

■

In the 10 years since the entry into force of the
Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in 2020, a
total of more than 766 square kilometres of cluster
munition-contaminated area has been cleared. During
survey, clearance, and spot task operations nearly
one million unexploded submunitions have been
destroyed. Countless lives and limbs have undoubtedly
been saved as a direct result, as well as the broader
contribution to development.
In 2019 alone, a global total of more than 130 square
kilometres was cleared of cluster munition remnants
(CMR), a new record, beating the previous high (in 2018)
by nearly 2km2. An impressive number of unexploded
submunitions, more than 132,000, were destroyed
during clearance, survey, and spot tasks in 2019 (slightly
less than in 2018). The true total area of clearance is
probably considerably greater, given that several States
not party have either not reported at all on clearance
progress or have done so only partially or inaccurately.
No State Party completed CMR clearance in 2019, but
in 2020, three States Parties to the CCM—Croatia,
Montenegro, and the United Kingdom—fulfilled their
Article 4 obligations, all within their original 10-year
treaty deadlines. Croatia and Montenegro both completed
clearance of known CMR-contaminated areas and the
United Kingdom1 confirmed that UK bombing data for the
Falkland Islands shows there is no evidence that cluster
munitions were dropped on the four remaining minefields
in Yorke Bay which the United Kingdom is clearing as
part of its Article 5 obligations under the Anti-Personnel
Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).

■

As at 1 October 2020, 25 States and three other areas
were confirmed or suspected to have CMR-contaminated
areas under their jurisdiction or control,3 an overall
decrease of two States on the previous year. While
Croatia, Montenegro, and the United Kingdom were
removed from list, Mauritania was added.
Thanks to the progress under the CCM to date, of the
110 States Parties to the CCM, only ten had cluster
munition-contaminated areas to release: Afghanistan,
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Chad, Chile, Germany,
Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, and Somalia.

■

Of the ten affected States Parties, only Lao PDR is
massively contaminated (defined as covering more than
1,000km2 of land), while heavy contamination exists in
Iraq (covering more than 100km2). In all other affected
States Parties, the extent of contamination is medium
or light.

■

As in previous years, the highest amount of clearance
took place in the world’s most CMR-contaminated State,
Lao PDR, with more than 45km2 of CMR-contaminated
area released through clearance (excluding commercial
clearance) along with destruction of more than 80,000
submunitions during survey, clearance, and spot tasks.
To help put the scale of this clearance achievement into
perspective, 45km2 is close to three times the size of the
city of Geneva. Very significant clearance also occurred
in States not party Vietnam and Cambodia.

■

No clearance was recorded or reported for 2019 in three
States Parties: Chile, Mauritania, and Somalia. While
Chile did not clear any CMR contamination in 2019, it
did cancel a significant amount of land found not to be
contaminated, which marks the first progress in Article
4 implementation since Chile became a State Party to
the CCM in 2011. As mentioned previously, Mauritania
reported discovering cluster munition-contaminated
areas in territory under its jurisdiction or control and
planned to investigate the contamination. But again in
2019, Somalia made no progress in survey specific to
CMR or clearance of submunitions.

■

In total, ten States Parties and one State not party have
been declared free of cluster munition-contaminated
area in the last 10 years.2 Mauritania, which had
reported fulfilment of its Article 4 clearance obligations
in 2013, was added back to the list of affected States
Parties after discovering cluster munition-contaminated
areas in territory under its jurisdiction or control.

1

The United Kingdom had not considered itself to have an obligation under Article 4 of the CCM and had reported that it considered that it had made every effort
to identify all cluster munition-contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control, prior to becoming a State Party to the CCM. It believes any remaining CMR,
if found to exist, to be residual.

2

States Parties: Croatia, Colombia, Rep. of Congo, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Montenegro, Mozambique, Norway, United Kingdom (see note 1 above), and Zambia
(Zambia completed CMR clearance in June 2010 prior to entry into force of the CCM on 1 August 2010). In addition, State not Party, Thailand, also completed
CMR clearance.

3

Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, DR Congo, Germany, Georgia, Iraq, Iran, Kosovo, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania,
Nagorno-Karabakh, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Vietnam, Western Sahara, and Yemen. States Parties to the CCM
are in bold; signatories are underlined; and other areas are in italics.
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■

As at 1 October 2020, only two of the ten affected States
Parties, Afghanistan and Mauritania, seemed likely to
meet their existing treaty deadlines without the need
for an extension.
With the exception of the two most heavily contaminated
States Parties, Lao PDR and Iraq, the remaining affected
States Parties (BiH, Chad, Chile, Germany, Lebanon, and
Somalia) should be in a position to fulfil their Article 4
obligations by the Third Review Conference of the CCM
in 2025. But it will require strong national ownership,
elaboration of concrete action plans, application of
efficient land release methodology, and sufficient and
sustained funding through to completion.
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■

In Mine Action Review’s assessment of national mine
action performance in 2019, two States Parties had
demining programmes rated as very good: Croatia
and Montenegro, both of which fulfilled their Article
4 obligations in July 2020, within their original treaty
deadlines. Four were assessed to be good: Afghanistan,
Germany, Lao PDR, and Lebanon. Programmes in BiH
and Iraq were ranked Average while in Chad, Chile, and
Somalia they were ranked as Poor. Only in BiH did the
scorings for 2019 decrease compared to the previous
year. The performance of State Party Mauritania has
not been scored due to the fact it only reported the
discovery of new CMR contamination in 2020.

OVERVIEW
SUMMARY OF PROGRESS
The year 2020 marks the tenth anniversary of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). Adopted on 30 May 2008, the
Convention entered into force as binding international law on 1 August 2010. Its implementation has encompassed sustained
action to rid the world of cluster munitions. Mine action programmes over the past decade have cleared a total of more than 766
square kilometres of cluster munition-contaminated area, with the destruction of nearly one million unexploded submunitions.
Countless lives and limbs have undoubtedly been saved as a direct result, as well as the broader contribution to development.
Significant progress was achieved in 2019 and the first half of 2020 in clearance of cluster munition-contaminated area
and the destruction of cluster munition remnants (CMR). The area cleared in 2019–130.1km2 –set a new record, beating
the previous high (in 2018) by nearly 2km2. An impressive number of unexploded submunitions, more than 132,000, were
destroyed during clearance, survey, and spot tasks in 2019 (slightly less than in 2018). In 2020, three States Parties to the
CCM–Croatia, Montenegro, and the United Kingdom–fulfilled their Article 4 obligations, all within their original 10-year treaty
deadlines. Croatia and Montenegro both completed clearance of known CMR-contaminated areas and the United Kingdom1
confirmed that UK bombing data for the Falkland Islands shows there is no evidence that cluster munitions were dropped on
the four remaining minefields in Yorke Bay which the United Kingdom is clearing as part of its Article 5 obligations under the
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).
In total, ten States Parties and one State not party have been declared free of cluster munition-contaminated area in the
last 10 years. Thanks to the progress to date, as at 1 October 2020, of the 110 States Parties to the CCM, only 10 had cluster
munition-contaminated areas to release: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Chad, Chile, Germany, Iraq, Lao PDR,
Lebanon, Mauritania, and Somalia. Aside from Lao PDR, where the extent of contamination is massive and Iraq, where
CMR contamination is heavy, the other affected States Parties should all be able to complete clearance within the next five
years. Mauritania, which had previously completed CMR clearance in 2013, reported in 2020 that it had discovered further
CMR-contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control.

GLOBAL CMR CONTAMINATION
As at 1 October 2020, 25 States and three other areas were contaminated by CMR globally, as listed in Table 1.
Asia (including the Middle East), is the most affected continent both in terms of the number of affected countries and the extent
of the CMR contamination, with 13 CMR-contaminated States. Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Lao PDR are all States Parties.
Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Georgia, Iran, Libya, Syria, Tajikistan, Vietnam, Yemen are all States not party.
Africa is the second most affected
region with seven States and Western
Sahara (the Sahrawi Arab Democratic
Republic) remaining contaminated with
CMR. Chad, Mauritania, and Somalia are
all States Parties to the CCM; Angola
and the Democratic Republic of Congo
are signatories; and South Sudan and
Sudan are States not party; along with
other area Western Sahara.2
In Europe, four States and Kosovo
and Nagorno-Karabakh are still
CMR-affected. The two States Parties
are BiH and Germany. Affected States
not party are Serbia and Ukraine,
as well as other areas Kosovo and
Nagorno-Karabakh.
In the Americas only one State Party,
Chile, remains affected by CMR.

Table 1: Global CMR contamination (at 1 October 2020)
States parties
Afghanistan
BiH
Chad
Chile
Germany
Iraq
Lao PDR
Lebanon
Mauritania
Somalia

Signatory states
Angola
DR Congo

10 states
parties

2 signatory
states

States not party
Azerbaijan*
Cambodia
Georgia*
Iran
Libya
Serbia
South Sudan
Sudan
Syria
Tajikistan
Ukraine
Vietnam
Yemen
13 states
not party

Other areas
Kosovo
Nagorno-Karabakh
Western Sahara

3 other areas

*Clearance believed complete in areas under government control.
1

The United Kingdom had not considered itself to have an obligation under Article 4 of the CCM and had reported that it considered that it had made every effort
to identify all cluster munition-contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control, prior to becoming a State Party to the CCM. It believes any remaining CMR,
if found to exist, to be residual.

2

The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is considered a State by the African Union but not by the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), who is the
depository of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
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Mauritania, which had reported fulfilment of its Article 4 clearance obligations in 2013, was added back to the list of
affected States Parties after discovering cluster munition-contaminated areas in territory under its jurisdiction or control.
Afghanistan added four previously unrecorded hazardous areas to the database in 2019, more than the amount of cluster
munition-contaminated areas released and resulting in a rise in the amount of contamination remaining, but remained on
course to meet its Article 4 deadline. In Tajikistan, the national estimate of CMR-contaminated area increased significantly
in 2019, up to more than 1.5km2.
In late September 2020, hostilities broke out again in Nagorno-Karabakh, between Azerbaijan and Armenia and
Armenian-supported forces in Nagorno-Karabakh, with reports that cluster munitions were again being fired into Stepanakert.
Amnesty International ascribed the new use to Azerbaijan.3 This raises concerns that significant new CMR contamination could
be added to pre-existing contamination in Nagorno Karabakh, in addition to the direct and significant risk to civilians arising
from the new use of cluster munitions.
Table 2 summarises what is known or reasonably believed about the extent of contamination in affected States Parties. It is
therefore an assessment by Mine Action Review of the extent of CMR contamination based on available evidence, as opposed
to the claims of governments or mine action programmes, some of which do not stand up to scrutiny.
Of the ten affected States Parties, only Lao PDR is massively contaminated (defined as covering more than 1,000km2 of land),
while heavy contamination exists in Iraq (covering more than 100km2). In all other affected States Parties, the extent of
contamination is medium or light.
There is no reliable estimate for global CMR contamination, although the total affected area certainly exceeds 2,500km2.
Table 2: Extent of CMR-Contaminated Areas in Affected States Parties (at 1 October 2020)
Massive
(>1,000km2)

Heavy
(100–1,000km2)

Medium
(5–99km2)

Light
(<5km2) or extent of contamination unclear

Lao PDR

Iraq

Chile

Afghanistan

Germany

BiH

Lebanon

Chad
Mauritania
Somalia

STATES THAT HAVE COMPLETED CMR CLEARANCE
In 2020, three States Parties, Croatia, Montenegro, and the
United Kingdom fulfilled their Article 4 obligations under
the CCM, bringing the total to 10 States Parties and 1 State
not party that have completed survey and clearance of
CMR-contaminated area in territory under their jurisdiction
or control in the last decade. State Party, Zambia, completed
CMR clearance in June 2010, ahead of the Convention’s entry
into force on 1 August 2010, and the remaining States Parties
all completed survey and clearance within their original
ten-year treaty deadlines (see Table 3).
As noted above, Mauritania has been removed from the list,
having newly reported the discovery of CMR-contaminated
area in territory under its control in 2020. Four of the States
that have fulfilled their Article 4 obligations are from Africa;
four are from Europe; two are from the Americas; and one
is from Asia –Thailand, the only State not party to have
completed CMR clearance on its territory.

Table 3: States Having Completed CMR Clearance Since
2010 (at 1 October 2020)
State

Date of Completion

Croatia

2020

Montenegro

2020

United Kingdom*

2020

Colombia

2017

Mozambique

2016

Norway

2013

Grenada

2012

Republic of Congo

2012

Guinea-Bissau

2012

Thailand**

2011

Zambia***

2010

Total

11 States

* The United Kingdom had not considered itself to have an obligation under Article
4 of the CCM and had reported that it considered that it had already made every
effort to identify all cluster munition-contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or
control, prior to becoming a State Party to the CCM.
** State not party to the CCM.
*** Completed CMR clearance in June 2010 prior to entry into force of the CCM
on 1 August 2010.

3

Amnesty International, “Armenia/Azerbaijan: Civilians must be protected from use of banned cluster bombs”, 5 October 2020, at: bit.ly/30DvCl3.
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Table 4: CMR Clearance in 2019
Area cleared
in 2019 (km2)

Submunitions
destroyed*

Afghanistan

1.65

273

-2.59

BiH

0.45

85

+0.01

Chad

0.84*

28*

+0.84

Chile

0

0

0

Croatia

0.05

186

-0.81

Germany

1.21

1,814

+0.45

Iraq

4.74*

9,905

-2.45

Lao PDR

45.77

80,140

+9.57

Lebanon

1.26

4,037

+0.11

0

0

N/A

0.27

64

+0.25

0

0

0

Sub-totals
(States Parties)

56.24

96,532

States not party
and other areas

Area cleared in
2019 (km2)

Submunitions
destroyed*

Cambodia

25.23

8,467

Vietnam

States Parties

Mauritania
Montenegro
Somalia

38.54

15,273

South Sudan

3.29

2,733

Yemen

3.12*

7,071

1.59

923

Western Sahara
Kosovo

1.26

156

Other programmes

0.87

1,137

73.90

35,760

130.14

132,292

Sub-totals (States not
party and other areas)
Grand Totals

Comparison to 2018
clearance (+/-km2)

Comparison to 2018
clearance (+/-km2)

Comment

*Based on data provided by
Mines Advisory Group (MAG).
CMR subsequently completed in
July 2020.
*Based on Mine Action Review
calculation.

Reported discovery of
CMR-contaminated areas in 2020.
CMR subsequently completed in
July 2020.

Comment

*Also includes clearance of mines
and other explosive ordnance.

+1.85

* Including destruction during spot tasks and survey.

As in previous years, the highest amount of clearance took place in the world’s most CMR-contaminated State, Lao PDR,
with more than 45km2 of CMR-contaminated area released through clearance (excluding commercial clearance) along
with destruction of 80,140 submunitions during survey, clearance, and spot tasks. To help put the scale of this clearance
achievement into perspective, 45km2 is close to three times the size of the city of Geneva in Switzerland. But very significant
clearance also occurred in States not party Vietnam and Cambodia. In Vietnam, more than 38km2 of CMR-contaminated area
was cleared (excluding clearance by Vietnam’s military) while in Cambodia the figure was over 25km2.
Chad provided an estimate of the size of cluster munition-contaminated areas and reported the first clearance of land
containing CMR in five years. In Iraq, land released through survey and clearance dropped in 2019 compared with the
previous year. Operators also confirmed 21.6km2 of CMR contamination in two governorates.
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OVERVIEW

CMR CLEARANCE IN 2019
In 2019, a total of 130.14km2 of CMR-contaminated area was cleared with the destruction of more than 132,000 submunitions
(see Table 4). This exceeds the previous year’s record clearance output of 128.3km2, but with a 2.6 per cent decrease in the
total number of submunitions destroyed.

While Chile did not clear any CMR contamination in 2019,
it did cancel a significant amount of land found not to be
contaminated, which marks the first progress in Article 4
implementation since Chile became a State Party to the
CCM in 2011. But again in 2019, Somalia made no progress
in survey specific to CMR or clearance of submunitions.
A planned review of survey records in the national database
by the Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) was
still ongoing as at August 2020.
In fact, though, given that several States not party have
either not reported at all on clearance progress or have done
so only partially or inaccurately, the global figure is likely
higher. Mine Action Review figures are, though, conservative,
to avoid exaggerating progress.

That said, in nearly all affected States, the COVID-19
pandemic had been impacting negatively to some degree
on mine action programmes in 2020, whether through the
mandatory halting of operations under national lockdown
rules, reduced operations due to distancing measures in
place to help prevent the spread of the virus, difficulties
in international staff returning to or visiting mine action
programmes due to travel restrictions, or other impacts.
Survey and clearance results for the year are therefore
likely to evidence a reduction in output, although the extent
of the impact is, as yet, unknown and will vary between
affected countries. The COVID-19 pandemic has, however,
also revealed the adaptability and resilience of the mine
action sector, with national authorities, operators, and
implementing partners striving to find ways to continue land
release operations, training, capacity development and more,
whenever possible and where required, remotely.

CMR CLEARANCE IN 2010–19

Clearance in 2010-19

The CCM was adopted in 2008 and entered into force in
2010. Table 5 summarises progress in clearance of cluster
munition-contaminated areas from 1 January 2010 to the
end of 2019. In total, the decade saw clearance of more
than 767km2 with the destruction of nearly one million
unexploded submunitions.

Figure 1 depicts the evolution of CMR clearance over the
course of the decade.
Figure 1: Annual CMR Clearance in 2010 to 2019
140

Clearance (km2)

120

Table 5: CMR Clearance in 2010–19

100

Year

Clearance (km2)*

Submunitions destroyed**

2019

130.1

132,292

2018

128.3

135,779

2017

95.4

153,007

40

2016

87.3

137,544

20

2015

69.3

120,899

2014

73.9

68,322

2013

30.9

54,781

2012

78.0

59,171

2011

55.0

52,845

2010

18.6

59,978

766.8

974,618

Totals

* Rounded to the nearest decimal place. ** Including destruction during spot tasks
and survey.
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As at 1 October 2020, only two of the ten affected States Parties seemed likely to meet their existing treaty deadlines without the
need for an extension. Afghanistan was on track to meet its March 2022 deadline while Mauritania should be able to complete
clearance before the expiry of its deadline of 1 August 2022, if the planned assessment of cluster munition-contaminated areas is not
too severely delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic. With the exception of the two most heavily contaminated States Parties, Lao PDR
and Iraq, the remaining affected States Parties (BiH, Chad, Chile, Germany, Lebanon, and Somalia) should be in a position to fulfil their
Article 4 obligations by the Third Review Conference of the CCM in 2025. But it will require strong national ownership, elaboration of
concrete action plans, application of efficient land release methodology, and sufficient and sustained funding through to completion.
Table 6: Progress in Implementing Article 4 Obligations
State Party

Article 4 Deadline

Status of progress

Implementation priorities

BiH

1 March 2021

18-month Article 4
deadline extension
requested to 1
September 2022

BHMAC should develop an effective evidence-based work plan
for the release of all remaining CMR-contaminated areas as
soon as possible and no later than 1 September 2022, including
the area that is also contaminated with depleted uranium.

Lebanon

1 May 2021

Five-year Article 4
deadline extension
requested to 1 May
2026

Lebanon should conduct evidence-based survey prior to
clearance, to ensure CMR-contaminated areas are released
as efficiently as possible. LMAC should also determine how
it plans to address CMR contamination in especially difficult
terrain, such as deep and very steep canyons and cliffs.

Chile

1 June 2021

One-year interim
Article 4 deadline
extension requested
to 1 June 2022

Chile should complete the restructuring of its national mine
action programme without delay and proceed as soon as
possible to conduct technical survey to further clarify the
extent of the remaining CMR contamination.

Afghanistan

1 March 2022

On track

Afghanistan should ensure it secures the required funding, if
necessary from national sources or alternative donors, in order
to maintain progress in survey and clearance and release all
known remaining CMR-contaminated areas before its deadline.

Mauritania

1 August 2022

On track

Mauritania should clarify whether the CMR-contaminated areas
it has reported are currently under its effective control. If so,
and they are also under its jurisdiction, the authorities should
proceed to undertake an assessment mission as soon as funding
and restrictions regarding COVID-19 permit. If, however, the
areas are under its effective control, but not also under its
jurisdiction, discussions need to be held as a matter of urgency
with others concerned, in particular Morocco and the Saharawi
Arab Democratic Republic.

Chad

1 September 2023

Unclear whether
on track

Chad should elaborate a completion strategy for Article 4
implementation, together with a clear annual work plan for the
survey and clearance of remaining CMR-contaminated areas.

Iraq

1 November 2023

Not on track

Iraq should seek to ensure that it secures sufficient funding and
capacity for survey and clearance of CMR to fulfil its Article 4
obligations. The United States and its NATO allies could provide
useful support to survey, planning, and clearance by providing data
on their cluster munitions strikes in the course of the Gulf Wars.

Germany

1 August 2025

Unclear whether
on track

Germany should continue to ensure it deploys adequate
demining capacity to meet its annual CMR clearance targets and
fulfil its Article 4 obligations before its extended deadline of 1
August 2025.

Lao PDR

1 August 2025

Not on track and
will require multiple
extensions to its
deadline

The National Regulatory Authority should strengthen
coordination and prioritisation systems to support the CMR
survey and clearance process, including elaboration of annual
sector-wide work plan. It should also streamline procedures for
issuing, amending, or renewing memoranda of understanding to
avoid inefficiencies and excessive delays.

Somalia

1 March 2026

Not on track

Somalia should elaborate a strategic plan for Article 4
implementation, including determining a comprehensive baseline
of CMR contamination and mobilising resources to release
contaminated areas.
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PROGRESS IN ARTICLE 4 IMPLEMENTATION
Table 6 summarises the current status of Article 4 implementation. Lao PDR and Germany were each granted a five-year
extension to their respective Article 4 deadlines in 2019; the first such extensions to Article 4 deadlines since the Convention
entered into force. BiH, Chile, and Lebanon were all seeking to extend their respective clearance deadlines at the Second
Review Conference of the CCM in November 2020.

Four States not party to the CCM—Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Tajikistan—should also be able to complete CMR clearance
on their respective territories in the next five years, along with other areas Kosovo and Western Sahara.

PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE IN AFFECTED STATES PARTIES
To help affected States Parties and their partners focus their capacity building and technical assistance efforts on areas of
weakness, and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of survey and clearance programmes, a performance scoring
system is used by Mine Action Review. The scoring criteria were developed in consultation with the Mine Action Review’s
Advisory Board Members (The HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)), and with
input from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), including the Gender and Mine Action
Programme (GMAP).
Mine Action Review assesses mine action programme performance in affected States Parties according to a set of seven core
criteria: Understanding of contamination; National ownership and programme management; Gender and diversity; Information
management and reporting; Planning and tasking; Land release system; and Land release outputs and Article 4 compliance.
In the scoring, additional weighting is accorded to Understanding of contamination; Land release system; and Land release
outputs and Article 4 compliance. An average is then calculated that determines the overall score. A score of 8 or more is
ranked Very Good. A score of 7.0–7.9 is ranked Good. A score of 5.0–6.9 is ranked Average. A score of 4.0–4.9 is ranked Poor.
A score of less than 4 is ranked Very Poor.
The text box on pages 9-10 outlines the seven programme performance criteria and key factors in detail. The results of the
scoring for 2019 are summarised in Table 7. The country-specific assessments of the seven criteria, which should be viewed
alongside the Recommendations for Action in the country reports, are intended as an implementation tool, offered in the spirit
of openness and constructive dialogue, to assist States Parties to identify and overcome challenges and fulfil their Article 4
obligations as efficiently as possible.
Table 7 scores and ranks performance
in affected States Parties for 2019.
Two States Parties – Croatia and
Montenegro – were ranked as Very
Good. Both States fulfilled their Article
4 obligations in July 2020, within their
original treaty deadlines. Programmes
in Afghanistan, Germany, Lao PDR,
and Lebanon were ranked as Good.
Programmes in BiH and Iraq were
ranked Average while in Chad, Chile,
and Somalia they were ranked as
Poor. No State Party had a ranking
of Very Poor for 2019, whereas in
last year’s report Chad, Chile, and
Somalia were all ranked as Very Poor.
Only in BiH did the scorings for 2019
decrease compared to the previous
year. The performance of State Party
Mauritania has not been scored for
2019, as it only reported discovery of
new CMR-contaminated areas in 2020
after previously completing clearance
in 2013.

Table 7: Mine Action Programme Performance in Affected States Parties
Score
(2019)

Score
(2018)

Change in
Score

Good

7.8

7.8

+/- 0

BiH

Average

5.4

5.7

- 0.3

Chad

Poor

4.3

3.3

+ 1.0

Chile

Poor

4.9

3.8

+ 1.1

Croatia

Very Good

8.3

7.8

+ 0.5

Germany

Good

7.2

6.9

+ 0.3

Iraq

Average

5.8

5.3

+ 0.5

Lao PDR

Good

7.1

7.0

+ 0.1

Lebanon

Good

7.5

7.1

+ 0.4

Montenegro

Very Good

8.1

6.6

+ 1.5

Somalia

Poor

4.0

3.9

+ 0.1

State Party

Ranking

Afghanistan
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Criterion

Key Factors Affecting Scoring

UNDERSTANDING
OF CLUSTER
MUNITION
CONTAMINATION

Has a national baseline of cluster munition remnant (CMR) contamination been established and is it up
to date and accurate?
If no national baseline, or only a partial or inaccurate baseline, exists, is survey and/or re-survey
being conducted or is it planned?
Are CMR-contaminated areas disaggregated from areas with other types of explosive ordnance
(e.g. other explosive remnants of war (ERW) or mines)?
Is CMR contamination classified into suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and confirmed hazardous
areas (CHAs), based on whether there is indirect or direct evidence of CMR respectively?
Is there a high ratio of CHAs to SHAs?

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

Is there a national entity, such as a national mine action authority, overseeing mine action?
Is there a national mine action centre coordinating operations?
Are the roles and responsibilities in mine action clear and coherent within the national programme?
Is the mine action centre adequately staffed and skilled?
Are clearance operators involved in key decision-making processes?
Does national legislation, or other suitable administrative measures, effectively underpin the mine
action programme?
Have the authorities created an enabling environment for mine action?
Has the government facilitated the receipt and efficient use of international assistance?
Is there political will for timely and efficient implementation of Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster
Munitions (CCM)?
Does the affected State contribute national resources to support the cost of the mine action centre
and/or survey and clearance of CMR-contaminated areas?
Does the affected State have a resource mobilisation strategy in place for Article 4 implementation?
Does the national mine action programme have a gender policy and implementation plan? Do the main
mine action operators have one?
Is gender mainstreamed in the national mine action strategy and national mine action standards?
Are women and children in communities affected by CMR-contaminated areas consulted during survey
and community liaison activities?
Are survey and community liaison teams inclusive and gender balanced, to facilitate access and
participation by all groups, including women and children?
Are the needs of women and children in communities affected by CMR-contaminated areas taken into
account in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance activities?
Are ethnic or minority groups in communities affected by CMR-contaminated areas consulted during
survey and community liaison activities?
Do survey, clearance, and community liaison teams include representatives from different ethnic or
minority groups, to facilitate access and participation by all groups?
Are the needs of ethnic or minority groups in communities affected by CMR-contaminated areas taken
into account in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance activities?
Is relevant mine action data disaggregated by gender and age?
Is there equal access to employment for qualified women and men in survey and clearance teams,
including for managerial level/supervisory positions?
Is there a national information management system in place (e.g. IMSMA), and is the data accurate
and reliable?
Are data collection forms consistent and do they enable collection of the necessary data?
Is data in the information management system disaggregated by type of contamination and method
of land release?
Is the data in the information management system accessible to all operators?
Are ongoing efforts being made to ensure or improve the quality of data in the mine action database?
Does the affected State Party to the CCM submit accurate and timely annual Article 7 reports on
Article 4 progress?
Are Article 4 extension requests of a high-quality and submitted in a timely manner?
Is the survey and clearance data reported by the affected State Party (e.g. in Article 7 reporting)
accurate and disaggregated by type of contamination (i.e. CMR from other ERW and landmines)
and method of land release?
Does the affected State Party report on progress in Article 4 implementation at the Meetings of States
Parties and is reporting accurate and consistent between reporting periods?
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Mine Action Review Criteria to Assess National Programme Performance of States Parties to the Convention
on Cluster Munitions

Criterion

Key Factors Affecting Scoring

PLANNING AND
TASKING

Is there a national mine action strategy in place and does it include realistic goals for land release?
Is there a realistic annual work plan in place for land release?
Are there agreed and specified criteria for prioritisation of tasks?
Are key stakeholders meaningfully consulted in planning and prioritisation?
Is clearance of CMR tasked in accordance with agreed prioritisation?
Are task dossiers issued in a timely and effective manner?
Where relevant, is there a plan for dealing with residual risk and liability? Is it realistic and sustainable?

(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 4
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Does the affected State have national mine action standards in place for land release?
Do the standards enable or impede efficient evidence-based survey and clearance?
Are national standards reflected in SOPs?
Are standards and SOPs periodically reviewed against IMAS and international best practice, in
consultation with clearance operators?
Is there an effective and efficient: i) non-technical survey capacity, ii) technical survey capacity,
iii) clearance capacity in the programme? Does this include national capacity?
Are areas being cleared that prove to have no CMR contamination?
Where relevant, is there national survey and clearance capacity in place to address CMR
contamination discovered after the release of CMR-contaminated areas or post completion?
Is there an appropriate range of demining assets (manual, mechanical, and animal detection systems)
integrated into land release operations?
Is there an effective quality management system in place for survey and clearance operations?
Where an accident has occurred within a mine action programme was there an effective investigation?
Were lessons learned shared between operators?
Is the affected State seeking to clear all CMR from territory under its jurisdiction or control, including
along national borders, in and around military installations, and in hard to access areas etc.?
Have national mine action authorities set a target date for the completion of CMR clearance and is this
within the State Party’s Article 4 deadline?
Is the target date for completion realistic based on existing capacity?
Is the target date sufficiently ambitious?
What were the outputs of survey and clearance of CMR-contaminated area in 2019, and were they
greater or lesser than the previous year and why?
Are survey and clearance outputs in line with plans and Article 4 obligations?
Is the affected State on track to meet the target completion date and/or Article 4 deadline?

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
In this year’s research, Mine Action Review has seen an
improvement in the availability and quality of information on
gender provided by national authorities and their implementing
partners, compared to last year when we started to ask
questions related to the gender sensitivity of mine action
programmes for the first time. Furthermore, in this year’s
assessment of programme performance for 2019, Mine Action
Review has also assessed diversity alongside gender, as
initially intended. While we have received some information on
measures national authorities are taking to consider diversity
in mine action programming, the information received on
diversity has lagged behind that on gender. It is essential
that diversity is also mainstreamed within mine action
programmes, alongside gender, especially in CMR-affected
countries where conflict has been on ethnic grounds.

10 Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2020

Some progress was registered in advancing gender and
diversity in CMR clearance programmes. In 2019, MAG
employed Chad’s first female deminer as a team leader,
overseeing survey and clearance tasks, conducting on-site
quality control and reporting data. She had been trained
in Benin to EOD [Explosive Ordnance Disposal] Level 3.
MAG also employed women in community liaison and
administrative functions.
Chile has taken steps to mainstream gender across the armed
forces with women working at all levels of the mine action
programme. However, the number of women employed in
demining in 2019 was just 4%. In a positive step, however,
Chile stated in its 2020 CCM Article 4 deadline extension
request that due to its awareness of the increasing importance
of the implementation of gender perspectives in the field of
disarmament, the Ministry of National Defense will promote
women to the teams that will conduct CMR clearance.

In early 2019, Lao PDR finalised a manual for trainers on
gender mainstreaming in the UXO Sector. The government
also partnered with the Association of South-East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) Regional Mine Action Center (ARMAC)
to deliver a Regional Workshop on Gender Equality and
Empowerment in mine action in October 2019, in Vientiane.
Of the 41 employees at the National Regulatory Authority
(NRA), 13 (31%) are women. Clearance operators in Lao PDR
have gender policies in place, disaggregate mine action data
by sex and age, and consult with women and girls during
survey and clearance operations.
In Lebanon, the Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC)
has taken action to mainstream gender in its mine action
programme, including through data disaggregation,
inclusive survey, and participation in courses at its regional
demining school. Gender and diversity considerations
are included in the National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25
and LMAC has appointed a new gender focal point who will
help mainstream gender-sensitive policies and procedures,
and monitor their implementation, in the mine action centre.
LMAC acknowledges in the strategy that mine action
“is a male-dominated environment and we have therefore
a particular responsibility to empower women and ensure
that we have a gender sensitive approach to our work”.

In BiH, where the legal description for gender equality in
employment is a minimum of 40% women, of the national
mine action centre (BHMAC)’s 171 employees, only 42 (25%)
were women. Of its 107 operations staff in the field, only
10 (9%) were women. In a welcome development, however,
two of the three members of the newly appointed Demining
Commission are women. The Civil Protection Administration
of Republika Srpska reported that nearly 22% of its staff
were female, including 20% of managerial/supervisory
positions, but this was the case in only 5% of operational
roles. Problems extend to international non-governmental
organisation (NGO) operators. NPA reported that the overall
gender split of its staff as at March 2020 was 118 men and
10 women, which represents only 8% female staff. Of its 82
operational staff deployed in the field, three medic positions
and one community liaison position are held by women. NPA
explained that it rarely received applications from women for
vacant operational roles.
In Germany, there is equal access to employment for qualified
women and men for EOD clearance, but women only make
up a small proportion of the sector, especially in terms of the
number of qualified female EOD technicians with a licence
for commercial EOD, who reportedly number fewer than 10.
This has in turn limited the number of women employed in
Germany’s CMR clearance operations at the former Soviet
military training area at Wittstock.
Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020
recognises gender and diversity as cross-cutting issues for
the national mine action programme. The Plan recognises the
importance of conducting context analyses in areas of mine
action operations to clarify important gender and diversity
issues, such as clan affiliation, movement patterns of local
populations, and barriers to participation for different gender
and age groups. But SEMA informed Mine Action Review
that it does not have an internal gender or diversity policy
or implementation plan. This is a significant gap that should
be filled, with the support of SEMA’s UN and NGO partners.

But in other affected States Parties, progress remains
extremely challenging. In Afghanistan, while women are hired
in community liaison and risk education, only one operator
has employed women in clearance and recruitment of women
in Afghanistan’s deeply conservative society continues to be
limited. The Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC)
employed only four women among its staff of 194 as at the
middle of 2019. That said, the mine action programme has
had a policy of including gender in mine action since 2014 and
set gender mainstreaming as one of four goals of its 2016–20
strategic plan.
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In Iraq, the Directorate for Mine Action (DMA) has had a
Gender Unit since 2017. It was led in 2019 by the deputy head
of the Planning Department and is said to encourage women
to apply for employment in mine action. The UN Mine Action
Service (UNMAS) conducted a baseline assessment of the
DMA’s gender policy and practice in 2019, which concluded it
had succeeded in raising awareness of gender both internally
and in other government institutions engaged in explosive
hazard management. Despite that progress, UNMAS
observed challenges remained for recruitment, promotion
and involving women in all levels of decision-making.
The Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency is also reported
to have established a Gender Committee in 2019 and
UNMAS reported developing terms of reference setting
out responsibilities and a reporting structure.

TEN YEARS OF THE CCM: KEY DEVELOPMENTS AND LESSONS
EVIDENCE-BASED LAND RELEASE METHODOLOGY
Unexploded submunitions, the mainstay of the CMR
threat, are located in cluster munition strike zones. Such
contamination, whether delivered by ground-based systems
or from the air, has a footprint (the area covered by the
submunitions when they hit the ground). The size of a
footprint from one cluster munition strike depends on a range
of factors (e.g. the type and age of the cluster munition used,
the method of delivery, soil conditions, vegetation, and terrain
fluctuations), but normally does not exceed a length of 300
metres and a width of 200 metres.
The survey of cluster munition-contaminated area is usually
simpler than is the case for mined area. Where, for example,
it is known that no mines are present, surveyors are typically
allowed to enter the suspected area with detectors to search
for unexploded submunitions. Moreover, unlike mines, all
submunitions contain a high amount of metal, making their
detection more straightforward, with fewer false positive
signals. Informal or emergency clearance without careful
recording of individual submunitions that have been removed
may, though, distort the footprint. Multiple overlapping
footprints may impede accurate identification of each of the
footprints. Bombing data have proven fairly accurate in some
contexts but less accurate or even non-existent in others.
Clearance should only be conducted where there is direct
evidence of cluster munition remnants. A set fade-out distance
is cleared outwards from each submunition found. Unexploded
submunitions should generally be destroyed in situ.

Since the adoption of the CCM, methodology for the survey
and clearance of CMR has significantly improved. The
scale and nature of cluster munition contamination in
South-East Asia, which dates back decades, necessitated
a more systematic evidence-based survey response
that confirms contamination based on direct evidence. A
specific methodology for identifying and confirming CMR
was developed, known as Cluster Munition Remnants
Survey (CMRS). CMRS is the application of all reasonable
effort, through non-technical survey and technical survey
procedures, to identify and define confirmed hazardous areas
(CHAs), based on direct evidence of CMR contamination.
CMRS results in a more accurate understanding of the scale
of contamination and the time and resources required for
clearance. Based on this data, authorities and operators are
able to make more informed decisions when planning for and
prioritising clearance operations.
Since it was first introduced in South-East Asia in 2008, the
CMRS process has, and continues to be, improved by sharing
successes and challenges in implementation and discussing
lessons learned. CMRS is being employed in Cambodia, Lao
PDR, and Vietnam. A modified form has, more recently, been
employed also in Iraq, Kosovo, and Tajikistan. In August
2019, a regional workshop on CMRS took place in Vietnam,
convened by the US Department of State, facilitated by NPA,
and attended by national authorities and operators from
Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam, as well as by GICHD. The
workshop helped to identify, develop, and share best practice
in South-East Asia.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
The Information Management System for Mine Action
(IMSMA) has become the de facto standard database for mine
action programmes. Of the 10 affected States Parties with
Article 4 obligations, eight use IMSMA. Of the remainder,
BiH is in the process of migrating from its own information
management system to IMSMA Core while Germany uses
its own information management system to record the
special distribution of CMR, including use of a Geographic
Information System (GIS). Afghanistan and Lebanon are both
in the process of upgrading from IMSMA New Generation
(NG) to IMSMA Core. Lao PDR has introduced IMSMA VPN,
which is now used by all international clearance operators,
and has helped improve the accessibility of data and the
speed and quality of data entry and the reporting process.
A sophisticated database does not, though, mean that the
data it contains are accurate and up to date. Accordingly, in
many affected States Parties, efforts are ongoing to correct
historical data and address missing records.
The importance of ensuring a high-quality information
management database is essential both for effective planning
and prioritisation of survey and clearance operations and
also for managing residual risk post-completion or after
CMR-contaminated areas have been released through survey
or clearance (see ‘Residual Risk and its Management’ below).
In keeping with their legal obligations under the CCM, all 10
affected States Parties submitted Article 7 transparency
reports in 2020, covering 2019, although several contained
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inaccuracies or inconsistencies. Either this was due to
different figures to those provided to Mine Action Review or
as a result of errors and inconsistencies within the Article
7 report itself. The quality of land release reporting under
Article 7 is not facilitated by the format of the CCM reporting
template, which could be improved. Proposed plans to
review and update the Article 7 template during the United
Kingdom’s presidency of the Tenth Meeting of States Parties
are welcome.
In this year’s Article 7 reporting, covering 2019, Chad failed
to clearly distinguish between CMR and other explosive
ordnance when reporting CMR survey and clearance.
BiH, Lao PDR, and Lebanon, did not disaggregate the
CMR-contaminated area released through technical survey
from that released through clearance, as best practice
requires. Germany again reported cumulative CMR clearance
output to date, rather than the annual clearance output
for the year, as the Convention requires. In reporting their
baseline of CMR contamination, several affected States
Parties do not report suspected hazardous areas and (SHAs)
and CHAs in a manner consistent with IMAS.
As in previous years, Mine Action Review continued to see
disparities between the 2019 land release data reported by
national authorities and data reported by clearance operators
directly. In some cases, such as in Iraq, the discrepancies
were significant.

Article 4 obligations are fulfilled when an affected State Party has completed clearance of all confirmed and suspected
CMR-contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control. However, this does not mean that every submunition (much less
every item of unexploded or abandoned explosive ordnance) has been found and destroyed. In States that were once heavily
contaminated, munitions will be found after completion has been declared. Affected States must plan for this and establish
sustainable, long-term national capacity to address contamination discovered post completion, and this must be commenced
well in advance of completion. Clearance depths need to be set that are appropriate to the context and should also be recorded
in information management databases for future reference. But changes in land use mean that submunitions may still be
discovered deeper than the stipulated national clearance depth in some instances.
Thus, the majority of States Parties with Article 4 obligations should already be taking measures to plan for capacity to address
residual risk, assessing where such capacity is best placed (be it with the armed forces, police, or civil protection, or another
appropriate entity). Failure to do so could result in significant cost, such as unnecessarily requiring international clearance
operators to address what should be dealt with nationally and creating a problem which is both predictable and avoidable.
Equally important is consideration of where the information management database will be housed, ensuring that when CMR
are discovered post completion or on land which has been released through survey or clearance, it is possible to see what,
if any, operations have been conducted on the location in question.

INTERNATIONAL MINE ACTION STANDARDS (IMAS)
The International Mine Action Standards have ensured that demining programmes can attain an acceptable standard of
competence, efficiency, and safety. These standards, which have been developed collaboratively, continue to evolve, and
promote minimum good practice – most recently in Minimum Data Requirements – which are an appendix to the IMAS on
Information Management.4
Fenix Insight, a UK-based mine action company, has developed a valuable online repository for IMAS. All of the
normative references in the IMAS (“shall”, “should”, and “may”) have been incorporated in a searchable database at
https://mineaction.net. The IMAS serve as an invaluable tool for helping national authorities develop their own national
mine action standards (NMAS) and standing operating procedures (SOPs) and Fenix’s online repository makes the IMAS
more accessible than ever, providing a valuable tool for the mine action sector.

COUNTRY COALITIONS AND OTHER COUNTRY-FOCUSED APPROACHES
Since the First CCM Review Conference in 2015, there has
been a growing appreciation of the importance of adopting a
country-focused approach to Article 4 implementation. In 2017,
Germany launched the concept of the Country Coalition during
its presidency of the CCM Seventh Meeting of States Parties.
Country-focused initiatives enable national authorities
and implementing partners in-country to collectively and
constructively discuss local progress and challenges to
Article 4 implementation. Regular in-country workshops
that bring together relevant stakeholders and present
progress reports and updates on Article 4 implementation
can help improve coordination and demonstrate strong
national ownership and political commitment to completion.
There is a common misconception that such forums already
exist in most affected States Parties; they do not. Whether
called “Country Coalitions”, as promoted under the CCM,
or “National Mine Action Platforms” (NMAPs), as promoted
under the APMBC, such forums should be established in
affected States Parties wherever there are multiple land
release actors.
A “Mine Action Forum” has been established in Lebanon in
close partnership between the Lebanon Mine Action Centre
(LMAC) and Norway, providing an informal platform for LMAC
to pursue dialogue and collaboration with donors, clearance
operators, and partner organisations, and to discuss

4

priorities and needs in cluster munition and mine survey and
clearance at the national level. It is an example of a Country
Coalition, but in the case of Lebanon it was agreed the forum
should be broadened to include landmines, and not just focus
on CMR. The GICHD facilitated the initial Mine Action Forum
workshops and the forum now meets twice a year, with the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) designated
as the secretariat to follow up and develop progress reports
between meetings. The Lebanon model is worth considering
by other CMR-contaminated States.
Fulfilment of Montenegro’s Article 4 obligations was
facilitated by the creation of a Country Coalition in 2018,
between Montenegro, Norway (as the lead support State/
donor), and NPA as the implementing partner. This Coalition
provided an excellent forum in which to effectively plan for
completion of clearance by Montenegro’s 1 August 2020
Article 4 deadline. The approach included establishment of a
joint working group to support the planning and prioritisation
of CMR tasks; a clear division of roles and responsibilities;
transparent discussions and sense of common ownership;
and an enabling environment for mine action. NPA supported
the capacity development of the national authorities through
refresher training on destruction of BLU-97 and MK118
Rockeye submunitions, and the development of new SOPs
for both non-technical and technical survey.

IMAS 05:10 on Information Management for Mine Action, IMAS, available at: bit.ly/3bRGIaP.
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RESIDUAL RISK AND ITS MANAGEMENT

THE SECOND CCM REVIEW CONFERENCE
The Second CCM Review Conference in Lausanne in
November 2020 is expected to adopt an Action Plan to
guide the work of the States Parties for the coming five
years. Fulfilling the obligations in Article 4 will be high on
the agenda. The Conference will need to consider extension
requests by BiH (which has requested an eighteen-month
deadline extension to 1 September 2022), Chile (a one-year
interim request to enable necessary technical survey to
occur) and by Lebanon. Lebanon has requested a five-year
extension, and in line with its new national mine action
strategy, now aims to complete clearance by the end of 2025.
Synergies between implementation of Article 4 of the CCM
and Article 5 of the APMBC are numerous. The APMBC’s
Oslo Action Plan benefitted from drawing many of the
positive developments in the Dubrovnik Action Plan adopted
at the CCM’s First Review Conference. In a similar way,
the Lausanne Action Plan has drawn on the developments
reflected in the Oslo Action Plan.
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As at 1 October 2020, all but three of the 110 States Parties
to the CCM (Cuba, Lao PDR, and Lebanon) are also States
Parties to the APMBC. Of the 10 CCM States Parties which
have CMR-contaminated areas and thus Article 4 obligations,
all but two (Chile, which completed anti-personnel clearance
in February 2020, and Germany) also have anti-personnel
mine contamination. States contaminated by both mines
and CMR typically address this under a single national mine
action programme, with one combined national strategic
plan, set of national standards, and information management
database. There is typically one group of donor stakeholders
and organisations undertaking land release.
The effective implementation of the two disarmament treaties
is thus best served by ensuring coherence between action
plans and initiatives such as the CCM Country Coalition or the
APMBC National Mine Action Platform. In this way, priorities
can be set in accordance with established humanitarian
and development criteria. Both treaties can and should be
implemented at the same time, in harmony not dissonance.

STATES PARTIES

COUNTRY

STATES PARTIES
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0.0
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0.2

0.0
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KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Afghanistan added four previously unrecorded cluster munition hazards to the database in 2019, more than the amount
of cluster munition-contaminated areas released and resulting in a rise in the amount of contamination remaining.
Clearance dropped significantly in 2019 from the previous year’s level, attributed by the Directorate of Mine Action (DMAC)
to funding constraints.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Afghanistan should ensure funding, if necessary from national sources or alternative donors, to achieve the earliest
possible completion of cluster munition remnants (CMR) clearance and fulfilment of Article 4 before its deadline.
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Criterion
UNDERSTANDING
OF CMR
CONTAMINATION

Score Score
(2019) (2018) Performance Commentary
9

9

Afghanistan has a small amount of known cluster munition-contaminated area to
clear to fulfil its Article 4 obligations although it continues to identify previously
unrecorded hazards, underscoring the possibility further areas for clearance will
emerge over time.

8

8

The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) is nationally managed but most
DMAC salaries and operations are funded by international donors and CMR clearance
has been funded by one donor, the United States.

6

6

DMAC is committed to mainstreaming gender which features in the 2016–20
strategic plan but national operators have made slow progress putting the plan into
practice. While women are hired in community liaison and risk education as well as
administrative positions, only one operator has employed women in clearance and
recruitment of women in Afghanistan’s deeply conservative society continues to be
limited. Mixed-gender explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) and survey teams
are, however, working across the country.

8

8

DMAC has an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New
Generation database and is preparing to upgrade to IMSMA Core with support from
the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). Operators
say DMAC’s data entry can be slow but it provides a range of reports and extensive
disaggregated information. Afghanistan routinely submits comprehensive Article 7
transparency reports, though often late.

8

8

DMAC’s national work plan for 2020 provided for clearance of all remaining seven
cluster munition-contaminated areas, subject to availability of funding and access
to tasks in conflict-affected areas. Two hazardous areas added in 2020 might also
be cleared in 2020 depending on funding. DMAC remains confident of completing
clearance by late 2021.

7

7

The MAPA has national mine action standards in Dari and English that are subject
to regular review. CMR survey and clearance are addressed in AMAS 06.02 (Battle
Area Clearance).

8

8

The amount of cluster munition-contaminated area released in 2019 dropped by one
third compared to the previous year, which DMAC attributed to lower funding. But it
remains confident of completing clearance by October 2021, several months ahead of
its Article 4 deadline of 1 March 2022.
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Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: GOOD

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■
■

Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority
(ANDMA)
Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■
■
■
■

Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC)
Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation
in Afghanistan (AREA)
Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA)
Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA)
Mine Detection Centre
Organisation for Mine Clearance and Afghan
Rehabilitation (OMAR)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■

Danish Demining Group (DDG)
The HALO Trust
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)

OTHER ACTORS
■
■

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
Afghanistan had more area affected by cluster munition remnants (CMR) at the end of 2019 than a year earlier after
non-technical survey resulted in the addition to the database of four hazardous areas in eastern areas covering almost
3.26km2. This raised the estimate of total CMR contamination to seven areas affecting more than 5.8km2 (see Table 1) , 41%
more area than at the end of 2018.1 DMAC added two more CMR-contaminated areas in Nangahar province to the database
in June 2020. These two confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) covered a total of 1.67km2. 2
Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area (at end 2019)
Province

District

Nangarhar

Pachier Agam

3

2,559,660

Paktia

Zurmat

4

3,259,627

7

5,819,287

Totals

CHAs

Area (m2)

The additions in 2019 and 2020 point to the continuing possibility survey will reveal additional previously unrecorded
contamination. DMAC reported assigning a survey team to check reports of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in remote
parts of Panjshir province.3
All remaining CHAs are said to contain remnants of the 1,228 cluster munitions containing some 248,056 BLU-97B
submunitions dropped by the United States between October 2001 and early 2002.4 Operators conducting demining and battle
area clearance tasks also report encountering scattered Soviet-era cluster munitions dropped during the decade-long war in
the 1980s.5
CMR make up only a small part of Afghanistan’s extensive explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination, which includes
a wide range of other unexploded ordnance (UXO). There are also hundreds of square kilometres of anti-personnel and
anti-vehicle mine contamination, including mines of an improvised nature (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020
report on Afghanistan for further information).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA),
originally established in 1989, is led by DMAC, which comes
under the Afghanistan National Disaster Management
Authority. DMAC fulfils the role of a national mine action
centre. From its headquarters in Kabul and seven regional
offices, DMAC manages and coordinates the work of national
and international implementing partners.
DMAC provides strategic planning and annual work plans,
sets priorities and standards, accredits operators, conducts
quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC), manages the
mine action database, and conducts resource mobilisation. It
coordinates closely with operators through technical working
groups that address planning and priority setting, survey,
mechanical clearance, risk education and victim assistance.
In 2018, it set up a separate technical working group to deal
with AIMs.6

The MAPA is nationally managed but in 2019 remained
almost entirely internationally funded. Since 2012, it has
transitioned from being a project of the United Nations Mine
Action Service (UNMAS) to national management, a process
formally completed with the transfer of the last positions
from UNMAS to DMAC in June 2018. The government paid
salaries of 13 members of DMAC’s total staff of 144 people.
Most of the remainder are paid by UNMAS and a small
number (27) by the international Voluntary Trust Fund
(VTF).7 The government earmarked a payment of AFS20
million (approximately US$250,000) for a humanitarian
mine clearance project for the first time in 2019 but lengthy
bureaucratic procedures meant the funding was not received
until 2020.8 The government pledged additional funding
of about US$500,000 in 2020 for demining operations in
Nangahar province’s Achin district.9
UNMAS continued to support DMAC in 2019 employing 32
national and 3 international staff in 2019 providing technical
advice, training, and capacity building. It expected to add
two more international and one national staff in 2020. It also
remained a major channel of funding, providing US$17.4
million to the MAPA through the VTF for projects including
survey, clearance, quality assurance, and risk education.10
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Progress in promoting gender and diversity, however,
appears to be slow. DMAC employed only four women
among its staff of 194 as of the middle of 2019 while the
MAPA employed only 167 women out of a total workforce of
6,772.12 Women work in operational as well as administrative
roles but employing women in field operations in particular
remains challenging in Afghanistan’s deeply conservative
society. Female deminers were employed for the first time in
2018 but operate in only one province, Bamyan. Mixed-gender
explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) and survey teams
are, however, working across the country.

The gender strategy and Afghanistan’s national mine action
standards (AMAS) for community liaison underscore the
importance of including women and girls as well as boys and
men in non-technical survey, and pre- and post-clearance
impact assessments and for equal access to employment
for women. The strategy called for implementing partners
(IPs) to identify forums in which to access under-represented
groups, including women and girls, and to ensure data
collection and reporting was disaggregated for gender and
age.13 The AMAS also refer to the importance of consulting
representatives of different groups, such as tribal and
religious leaders.14 EORE teams are required to include a
female and male trainer.15
DMAC has a technical working group on gender and diversity
working with IPs to promote implementation. DMAC’s review
of IP project proposals also ensures gender issues are
considered in operational planning. It operates a hotline
taking calls from affected communities which it said also
allows interests of minorities to be taken into account.16

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
DMAC operates an Information Management System for
Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation database (IMSMA
NG) database and continued working with the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in
2019 on cleaning up data as well as preparing to upgrade the
database to IMSMA Core. DMAC expected the transfer to be
completed in 2021.17 DMAC also worked with the GICHD on
installing the Mine Action Reporting System (MARS), a mobile
system designed for data entry in the field. DMAC conducted
two workshops with UNMAS and IPs to introduce the
system, which was due to go into service after IPs completed
field testing in 2020. DMAC had planned to introduce a
cloud-based data warehouse in 2020 but reported the project
was delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic.18

Afghanistan submits comprehensive Article 7 reports
annually and DMAC’s information department produces a
range of monthly, quarterly, and annual reports as well as
reports on request and maps.19 DMAC also holds monthly
data coordination meetings which IPs said had resulted
in improvements, but that entry of survey and clearance
data continued to be slow because of a shortage of trained
information management staff in DMAC.

PLANNING AND TASKING
DMAC’s strategic plan for 2016−20 sets out four basic aims20 but identifies mine clearance as an “overarching goal”.
Afghanistan’s Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request, drawn up with participation
of implementing partners, foresaw completion of clearance of all known mine and ERW contamination by the requested Article
5 deadline of 2023 and this remains a benchmark against which DMAC measures progress.
DMAC also sets annual work plan with more specific targets determined by a matrix of indicators that takes account of civilian
incidents, blockages caused by contamination, proximity to communities, and device types. For Afghan year 1398 (1 April
2019–30 March 2020), they included building capacity for tackling abandoned improvised mines, strengthening the quality
management system, setting up a research and development unit to explore the application of new technologies, investigating
new tools and methods for survey, finalising a policy on liability, and setting up a database to record details of all trained
deminers. 21 A shortfall in donor funding and insecurity ensures Afghanistan will not meet its APMBC Article 5 deadline but
DMAC still aims to complete CMR clearance within its CCM Article 4 deadline. 22
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GENDER AND DIVERSITY
The MAPA has had a policy of including gender in mine
action since 2014 and set gender mainstreaming as one
of four goals of its 2016–20 strategic plan. It states that
“achievable targets, reflecting prevailing circumstances
and conditions, will be adopted to support and encourage
progress wherever possible.”11

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Afghanistan has comprehensive national mine action standards that are International Mine Action Standard (IMAS)-compatible
and subject to regular review. CMR survey and clearance are addressed in AMAS 06.02 (Battle Area Clearance). 23

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Two national IPs cleared CMR in 2019. Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA) conducted five of the six tasks during the year
and Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC) the other.24 Most operators tackle some residual CMR in the course of clearing mined
and battle areas.
Only manual clearance of CMR is conducted in Afghanistan.

DEMINER SAFETY
No accidents occurred during cluster munition clearance in 2019 but insecurity continued to pose a major threat to the sector
and blocked access to many areas. The MAPA reported 22 security incidents in 2019 in the course of which three deminers
were killed and a fourth was injured. DMAC said the three deminers who died were killed in an airstrike while working on their
land. Fourteen deminers were abducted as part of extortion attempts by armed groups but later released unharmed after
negotiations by community elders. 25

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
Afghanistan released 2.72km2 of cluster munition-contaminated area in 2019, all of it through clearance. 26 However, of the
2.72km2 cleared, Mine Action Review considered 1.65km2 to be CMR clearance and 1.07km2 to be clearance of other ERW.

SURVEY IN 2019
No cluster munition-contaminated area was cancelled or reduced through survey in 2019. Instead, non-technical survey
identified four hazardous areas in the remote north-eastern areas covering a total of 3,259,627m2. 27

CLEARANCE IN 2019
Although DMAC reported a total of 2.72km2 for 2019, Mine Action Review does not consider the 1km2 of clearance by DAFA in
Nangarhar province as CMR clearance but as clearance of other ERW since only two submunitions were destroyed among total
destruction of 1,207 items of unexploded ordnance. The 1.65km2 considered by Mine Action Review as CMR clearance in 2019
was therefore a significant drop on the 4.24km2 cleared the previous year, a decline that DMAC attributed to reduced funding.
The 5.82km2 of clearance recorded in Afghanistan’s initial Article 7 Report (covering 2019)28 represented the total area of tasks
completed in 2019, including some started in 2018, and included area cleared in the previous year. 29
Contamination on the six tasks tackled in 2019, resulted in clearance of 86 submunitions, compared with 217 destroyed in 2018.
Another 187 remnants were destroyed in spot tasks, three times the number destroyed in spot tasks in 2018.30
Table 2: CMR clearance in 2019 (as reported by DMAC)31
Areas
cleared

Total subsurface
clearance (m2)

Submunitions
destroyed

UXO
destroyed

Takhar

1

160,655

3

81

DAFA

Nangarhar

1

1,072,230

2

1,205

DAFA

Takhar

4

1,488,370

81

210

6

2,721,255

86

1,496

Operator

Province

ATC

Totals
UXO = unexploded ordnance other than submunitions
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AFGHANISTAN

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR AFGHANISTAN: 1 MARCH 2012
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2022
ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

Afghanistan had more cluster munition-contaminated area
to clear at the start of 2020 than a year earlier following the
addition of four hazards to the database in 2019 bringing the
total to seven. DMAC added two more CHAs totalling 1.67km2
in June 2020. DMAC said it had received pledges of funding
from the United States for clearance of CHAs in Paktia and
from UNMAS for clearance of the CHAs in Nangahar.32 As
a result, DMAC remained confident that Afghanistan would
meet its March 2022 Article 4 deadline and set a target of
completing clearance by the end of October 2021.33
The main question marks over achieving that goal remained
funding and security. Afghanistan reported the United States
had agreed to fund clearance of the seven remaining cluster
munition-contaminated areas during 2020.34 It also expressed
the hope that peace negotiations between the government
and Taliban would help to facilitate access to cluster munition
hazards in areas of conflict.

1
2

Table 3: Five-year summary of CMR clearance
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2019

1.65

2018

4.24

2017

2.89

2016

0

2015

0

Total

8.78

Email from Fazel Rahman, Project Manager Operations, DMAC, 25 February
2020; and Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.

16

Ibid.

17

Emails from Fazel Rahman, DMAC, 25 February and 28 April 2020.

Emails from Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, Head of Planning and Programme,
DMAC, 31 August and 1 September 2020.

18

Email from Fazel Rahman, DMAC, 28 April 2020.

19

GICHD, Integrated Capacity Assessment Report, 5 July 2019 (draft), p. 16.

20

The four goals are to: 1) facilitate development; 2) integrate mine action
into other sectors such as health, education, agriculture and economic
development; 3) prevent and mitigate the effects of landmines through
clearance, risk education, victim assistance, advocacy and stockpile
destruction; and 4) mainstream gender and diversity.

3

Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.

4

Ibid.

5

Email from DMAC, 11 April 2018; Statement of Afghanistan, CCM
intersessional meetings (Clearance and Risk Education Session), Geneva,
15 April 2013.

6

Email from Abdul Qudos Ziaee, DMAC, 3 April 2019.

21

Email from Abdul Qudos Ziaee, DMAC, 3 April 2019.

7

Emails from Fazel Rahman, DMAC, 25 February and 20 July 2020.

22

Emails from Fazel Rahman, DMAC, 25 February and 28 April 2020.

8

Ibid. The funding was allocated for clearance of a total of 403,423m2 in two
districts of south-eastern Khost province.

23

Statement by Mohammed Shafiq, GICHD workshop, Geneva, 26 March 2019.

24

Email from Fazel Rahman, DMAC, 25 February 2020.

9

Email from Mohammed Shafiq Yousufi, DMAC, 20 July 2020.

25

Ibid.

10

Email from Sohaila Hashemi, Communications and Advocacy Officer,
UNMAS, 13 May 2020.

26

Ibid.

11

DMAC, “National Mine Action Strategic Plan 1395−1399 (2016−2020), State
Ministry for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Affairs, undated but
2016, p. 17.

27

Ibid.

28

Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.

29

Email from Fazel Rahman, DMAC, 27 September 2020.

12

GICHD, Integrated Capacity Assessment Report, 5 July 2019 (draft), p. 19.
DMAC reported that at the end of 2019 it employed 144 staff and total
manpower of MAPA humanitarian IPs amounted to 6,338. Email from Fazel
Rahman, DMAC, 25 February 2020.

30

Ibid.

31

Ibid.

32

Emails from Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, DMAC, 31 August and 1 September
2020.

33

Email from Fazel Rahman, DMAC, 25 February 2020; Article 7 Report
(covering 2019), Form F.

34

Email from Fazel Rahman, DMAC, 25 February 2020; Article 7 Report
(covering 2019), Form I.

13

DMAC, “Gender mainstreaming strategy of the Mine Action Programme of
Afghanistan”, undated but 2013, pp. 3−9.

14

GICHD, Integrated Capacity Assessment Report, 5 July 2019 (draft), p. 17.

15

Email from Fazel Rahman, DMAC, 25 February 2020.
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KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)’s new national mine action strategy for 2018–25 was adopted by the Council of Ministers in
January 2019. It included the operational goal of completing cluster munition remnants (CMR) clearance by BiH’s Convention
on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Article 4 clearance deadline 1 March 2021. However, BiH will not meet its clearance deadline and
submitted an 18-month deadline extension request to 1 September 2022, which will be considered by States Parties at the
Second Review Conference of the CCM in November 2020.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

BiH should adopt, without further delay, the amended demining law drafted in 2017.

■

BiH should implement the recommendations of both the 2015 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment, and the 2016 performance audit report of the Audit Office
of the Institutions of BiH,1 which remain valid. In particular, BiH should continue reforming and strengthening the
governance and management of the mine action programme.

■

The Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) should develop a detailed and costed Article 4 work plan,
with concrete milestones for the release of all remaining CMR-contaminated area, including the area that is also
contaminated with depleted uranium.

■

BHMAC should report more accurately and consistently on the extent of CMR contamination and on release of
CMR-contaminated areas. This should be done using the classification of suspected hazardous area (SHA) and
confirmed hazardous area (CHA), and by disaggregating CMR-contaminated area reduced through technical
survey from area released through clearance, consistent with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

■

BIH should fully embrace the “Country Coalition” approach, in partnership with Germany, which can provide
a forum for regular dialogue among all mine action stakeholders to strengthen coordination and identify and
overcome challenges.

■

BHMAC should strive to improve gender balance in the sector, at the least by meeting the target of 40%
female staff set by the 2003 Law on Gender Equality.
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Criterion
UNDERSTANDING
OF CMR
CONTAMINATION

Score Score
(2019) (2018) Performance Commentary
6

5

In 2019, BiH removed 3.6km2 of contamination from individually fired submunitions
from its CCM reporting (as this does not fall under the provisions of the Convention),
thereby reducing the contaminated area remaining to be addressed under its Article
4 obligation. BiH’s national baseline of CMR contamination is not classified into CHA
and SHA, consistent with IMAS.

6

7

National ownership of mine action in BiH falls under the responsibility of the
Demining Commission and BHMAC. BiH’s National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025
was adopted in January 2019, but as at August 2020, the amended demining law
(2017) was still awaiting parliamentary adoption. Governance of the national mine
action programme needs to be strengthened and Article 4 implementation better
coordinated to ensure early completion.

5

6

The National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 supports the 2003 Law on Gender Equality.
BHMAC has stated that, under its leadership, relevant actors will include gender in all
phases of all mine action activities. Two of the three members of the newly appointed
Demining Commission are women. However, within BHMAC’s own programme, and those
of clearance operators too, women make up only a small proportion of the total number
of staff, and an even smaller proportion of operations staff in the field.

5

6

BHMAC is in the process of migrating from its own information management system to
the new web-based system, IMSMA [Information Management System for Mine Action]
Core, with the support of UNDP and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD). BHMAC does not report accurately and consistently on the extent
of anti-personnel mine contamination or on survey and clearance output. BiH’s Article
7 report covering 2019, contained errors in table totals for both contamination and
clearance data. In addition, land released through technical survey was not disaggregated
from release through clearance in the BiH’s reporting, as best practice demands.

6

6

BiH adopted its National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 in January 2019, which
foresees fulfilment of Article 4 by 1 March 2021. However, BHMAC failed to effectively
plan for completion of CMR clearance early enough; and it appears to have been
accorded less priority than mine clearance, which does represent by far the greater
challenge in BiH. A “completion initiative” to address CMR contamination was finally
elaborated in 2019, with BiH Armed Forces, entity Civil Protections, and Norwegian
People’s Aid (NPA) tasked to release CMR-contaminated area. However, output has
not been sufficient for BiH to be able to meet its deadline. Furthermore, progress
in survey and clearance of CMR contamination in 2020 was being impacted by the
COVID-19 pandemic. BiH will not complete CMR clearance by its March 2021 Article 4
deadline and has requested an 18-month extension to 1 September 2022.

6

6

BHMAC has in place national standards and standing operating procedures (SOPs)
for survey and clearance of CMR, which are adapted to the local threat and context.
There is sufficient available capacity for survey and clearance of CMR, with the BiH
Armed Forces, entity Civil Protections, NPA, and other operators all accredited, but
release of CMR-contaminated area has been insufficiently prioritised and BiH will not
meet its March 2021 deadline.

5

5

The rate of CMR clearance has been unacceptably slow, with less than 1.75km2
of CMR-contamination cleared in the last five years. In comparison to landmine
contamination, CMR in BiH was far less extensive and could have easily been
addressed within the initial 10-year deadline given sufficient political will and
commitment. However, planning for CMR completion came too late to meet its
original Article 4 deadline and BiH has requested an extension to 1 September 2022.
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CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

■

The Demining Commission (representatives from three
ministries (Civil Affairs, Security, and Defence) elected
to represent BiH’s three main ethnic groups (Bosniaks,
Croats, and Serbs))
Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■
■

Armed Forces of BiH
BHMAC
Civil Protection Administration of Republika Srpska
Federal Administration of Civil Protection (FACP)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)

OTHER ACTORS
■
■
■

European Union Force Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR)
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
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UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
As at the end of 2019, BiH reported a total of 2.31km2 of
CMR-contaminated area (see Table 1), with no disaggregation
of CMR-contaminated area into CHA and SHA. 2 In its Article 4
deadline extension request, submitted in September 2020, it
was stated that CMR-contaminated area had been reduced to
below 2.14km2.3
This compares to 2.9km2 of contamination reported in
September 2019 at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties,4 and
contamination as at the end of 2018 of 6.3km2.5 The reduction
in the estimate of contamination since the end of 2018 is
mostly explained by the removal of 3.6km2 of contamination
from items projected in an improvised manner from BiH’s
baseline of CMR-contaminated area.6 This contamination was
the result of individually launched KB-1 submunitions fired
from modified AK-47 rifles,7 and was originally reported as
2.7km2,8 and then as 2.1km2, but was subsequently confirmed
as 3.6km2 through non-technical survey by Norwegian
People’s Aid (NPA) and BHMAC.9 When used in this way,
individual KB-1 submunitions do not fall within the definition
of a cluster munition covered by the CCM, and, as such, are
not governed by the treaty clearance obligations.10 BHMAC
included reference to this contamination in its National Mine
Action Strategy 2018–2025,11 and legitimately removed it from
its Article 7 transparency reporting covering 2019.
BiH’s remaining CMR to be addressed under Article 4 does,
however, include a CMR-contaminated area that also contains
depleted uranium, located in Japaga – Han Pijesak
in Republika Srpska.12

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by canton
(at end 2019)13
Canton

Area (km2)

Unsko-Sanski

0.07

Tuzlanski

0.41

Zenicko-Dobojski

0.41

Central Bosnia Canton

0.48

Neretva

0.04

Sarajevo

0.22

Canton 10

0.18

Total Federation BiH

1.81

Total Republika Srpska

0.49

Total

2.30

A total of 0.65km2 of remaining CMR contamination is in areas
which also contain mines.14
CMR contamination dates back to the conflicts of 1992–95
related to the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.15 A survey and initial general assessment of
cluster munition contamination was jointly conducted by
BHMAC and NPA in 2011, which estimated the total area
containing CMR at more than 12km2, scattered across 140
areas. This estimate was subsequently revised upwards
to 14.6km2 following the start of land release operations
in 2012.16 Of this, around 5km2 was deemed actually
contaminated and marked for clearance.17

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
BiH is also contaminated by unexploded ordnance (UXO) other than unexploded submunitions and by anti-personnel and
anti-vehicle mines (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on BiH for further information).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Demining Commission, under the BiH Ministry of Civil
Affairs, supervises the State-wide BHMAC and represents
BiH in its relations with the international community on
mine-related issues.18 The Demining Commission is composed
of representatives from three ministries (Civil Affairs,
Defence, and Security) elected to represent BiH’s three main
ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs). Whereas the
Minister for Civil Affairs remains ultimately responsible for
mine action, the Demining Commission is the strategic body
responsible for setting mine action policy, and it proposes
the appointment of BHMAC senior staff, for approval by the
Council of Ministers.19
According to a 2016 audit office report, however, “The
Commission has not developed a methodology on how to
monitor the work of the BHMAC”. 20 BHMAC, established by
a 2002 Decree of the Council of Ministers, is responsible for
regulating mine action and implementing BiH’s survey and
clearance plans. 21 BHMAC operates from its headquarters in
Sarajevo, and two main offices in Sarajevo and Banja Luka,
and eight regional offices (Banja Luka, Bihac, Brčko, Mostar,
Pale, Sarajevo, Travnik, and Tuzla). 22
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Since 2008, efforts have been made to adopt new mine action
legislation in BiH with a view to creating a stable platform for
mine action funding by the government and local authorities.
As at June 2020, however, an amended text from 2017 was
still awaiting parliamentary adoption. Clearer legislation on
liabilities related to mine action activities would be beneficial
to all mine action stakeholders in BiH.
The governance of BiH’s mine action programme needs
to be strengthened and would benefit from improved
communication and coordination with clearance operators,
including through the re-establishment of technical working
groups (TWGs), which provide a platform for operators to
discuss, learn from each other, and work in synergies on
matters related to operations. In addition, it is hoped that the
“Country Coalition” established between BiH and Germany, on
which there was an introductory meeting in February 2020, 23
will provide a forum for regular dialogue among all mine
action stakeholders, help demonstrate national ownership,
strengthen coordination of APMBC Article 5 and CCM Article
4 implementation, and identify and overcome challenges, and
monitor progress against the 2018–25 strategy.

STATES PARTIES

In its 2020 Article 4 extension request, BiH has said that
it requires funds totalling 4.5 million BAM (approximately
US$2.68 million) in order to fulfil its Article 4 obligations
by its requested deadline of 1 September 2022. Part of the
funding will be allocated from state budgets for the Armed
Forces of BiH and the entity Civil Protections, and part will
be sought from donors. 28

On 7 April 2020, it was announced that €10 million of
European Union EU funding under the Instrument for
Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) 2018–20 programme, which
had been intended for humanitarian demining, had been
diverted to COVID-19 and migration issues. The EU funds
had been intended for support of mine action in BiH, including
the procurement of protective equipment and supplies
for BHMAC’s work, the entity Civil Protections, as well as
financing of demining projects of priority areas. 27

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
The National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 specifies
that: “Under the leadership of BHMAC, relevant actors will
include gender and diversity into all phases of planning,
realisation and follow-up of all mine activities”. 29 The mine
action strategy considered and supported the 2003 Law on
Gender Equality in BiH, which includes equal treatment of the
genders and equality of opportunity, and prohibits direct and
indirect discrimination on the grounds of gender. The Law
on Gender Equality determines that equal representation
of men and women exists when the percentage of either
gender in bodies at all levels in BiH (State, entity, cantonal,
and municipality level) is at least 40%. BiH’s national mine
action strategy also considered the 2017 Gender Equality
Action Plan.30 However, as at August 2020, of BHMAC’s 171
employees, only 42 were women (25%).31 Of BHMAC’s 107
operations staff in the field, 10 were women (9%).32 BHMAC
reported that it has a gender and diversity policy and that
BHMAC upholds the Law on Gender Equality and routinely
includes it in the development of strategies and standards.33
BHMAC has reported that it consults all groups affected
by CMR, including women and children, during survey
and community liaison activities, and BHMAC’s survey
and community liaison teams are inclusive with a view to
facilitating this. BHMAC also reported that relevant mine
action data is disaggregated by gender and age.34 In a
welcome development, two out of three of the new members
of BiH’s Demining Commission, adopted on 30 April 2020,
are women.35 Except for one reference to the provision of
adequate gender- and age-sensitive mine risk education,36
there was no other mention of either gender or diversity
in BiH’s Article 4 deadline extension request submitted in
September 2020.

The Civil Protection Administration of Republika Srpska
reported that nearly 22% of its staff were female, including
20% of managerial/supervisory positions, but only 5%
of operational roles. It reported that during survey and
community liaison activities, it cooperates with the local
population, regardless of ethnicity; and where needed has
representatives from different ethnic groups.37
NPA reports promoting gender equality in all aspects of its
programme activities in BiH. Mixed gender representation is
an obligation for NPA teams conducting community liaison
and risk education.38 That said, NPA reported that the overall
gender split of its staff as at March 2020 was 118 men and
10 women, which represents only 8% female staff. Of its 82
operational staff deployed in the field, three medic positions
and one community liaison position are held by women. NPA
explained that it rarely received applications from women for
vacant operational roles.39 NPA says it is driving to achieve
a gender balance, and that the programme encourages
the employment of women, including into managerial and
operational staff positions. Five managerial positions in
the NPA BiH programme are held by women.40 During the
implementation of its activities, NPA teams organise meetings
with female representatives in smaller groups, to provide
a forum in which women may feel more comfortable to talk
about potentially contaminated areas in their community and
NPA’s interventions.41
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BHMAC is funded by the common institutions of BiH and
other institutions at State level. 24 BiH national State funding
also supports survey and clearance of CMR. Operations of
the BiH Armed Forces are supported by the State budget of
BiH, while the Government of the Federation of BiH finances
the operations of Federal Administration of Civil Protection
(FACP). 25 The Civil Protection Administration of Republika
Srpska is financed by the Government of Republika Srpska.26

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
As at June 2020, BHMAC was using its own information
management system, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine
Action Information System (BHMAIS), but with the support of
UNDP and the Geneva Institute for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD), and with financing from the EU, BHMAC was in the
process of migrating to Information Management System for
Mine Action (IMSMA) Core.42
The joint development of IMSMA Core in BiH began in 2019.
Data from the country assessment project was originally
expected to be transferred in March/April 2020 and the new
database operational by mid 2020.43 As at May 2020, however,
the transition from BHMAIS to IMSMA Core was only partially
complete and the target was then set for completion by the
end of the year.44 GICHD training in the new system was
also planned for BHMAC staff, and will take place once the
situation with COVID-19 permits.45 Once in place the database
should be sustainable, through the programme will still be
susceptible to potential challenges stemming from turnover
of key staff positions in the BHMAC IM department. 46

BHMAC does not report consistently on CMR contamination
by SHAs and CHAs, in a manner consistent with IMAS. In
addition, there are frequent inaccuracies in BHMAC reporting
on land release.
Information in BHMAC’s information management system
is made available to clearance operators.48 However, NPA
reported in March 2020 that data relating to CMR SHAs was
being reviewed, with its support, and that BHMAC data on
CMR-contaminated areas was neither accurate nor up to date.49
In its September 2019 Article 4 extension request BHMAC did,
however, provide more detailed information on the location
and size of the remaining CMR-contaminated area.50
BiH submitted a CCM Article 7 report covering 2019, but
failed to submit an Article 7 report the previous year,
covering 2018.

In addition, UNDP has developed a Geographic Information
System (GIS) mobile application, which was also expected to
be released in the course of 2020.47

PLANNING AND TASKING
In 2017, BiH developed a new national mine action strategy
for 2018–25, with support from the GICHD, which addresses
all mine and cluster munition remnant contamination. The
previous BiH Mine Action Strategy for 2009–19 guided mine
action in BiH, but did not mention CMR clearance specifically.
The new strategy 2018–25 was formally adopted in January
2019.51 Strategic goal three of the strategy on survey and
clearance, includes a commitment to complete CMR clearance
obligations by 1 March 2021, in line with BiH’s CCM Article 4
deadline.52 However, the strategy did not contain an action
plan or concrete milestones towards completion of CMR
clearance.53 The strategy was due to be revised in 2020
and 2023, to consider progress and adjust for any changes
in context.54
There was a “completion initiative” plan, agreed with BHMAC,
the BiH Armed Forces, the FACP, and NPA, which aims to
complete clearance of all remaining CMR-contaminated areas
by 1 March 2020.55 The completion initiative received support
from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Swiss
Government, and Norwegian cooperative COOP Norge SA.56
However, progress in implementing the completion initiative
was slowed by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and as
a result of the failure of the Council of Ministers to appoint
a Demining Commission to renew demining accreditations,
including those of the BiH Armed Forces, the FACP, and
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NPA.57 The COVID-19 pandemic significantly impacted survey
and clearance operations, which were paused in the Spring
and only recommenced in mid 2020. It also impacted BHMAC,
which worked at reduced capacity.58 Furthermore, the
completion initiative did not include the CMR-contaminated
area with depleted uranium contamination,59 which is,
however, still covered under BiH’s Article 4 obligations.
The completion plan fell behind schedule and BiH will not
fulfil its Article 4 commitments before the March 2021
deadline. BHMAC has requested to extend its deadline by
18 months to 1 September 2022. The extension request,
submitted for consideration and approval by States Parties in
November 2020, included a work plan for release of remaining
CMR-contaminated areas,60 but it lacks concrete milestones.
The six CMR-contaminated areas, totalling 651,480m2, which
also have anti-personnel mine contamination, will be cleared
of mines first and then of CMR.61
The 2020 Article 4 extension request also includes reference
to the CMR task that has contamination from depleted
uranium, but does not say how BiH intends to address
this task.62
According to BHMAC, cluster munition-contaminated areas
are prioritised for clearance based on agreement with local
communities and municipalities.63
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STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
In 2016, the Demining Commission formally adopted three revised chapters of the national mine action standards (NMAS)
on land release, non-technical survey, and technical survey, drafted in cooperation with EU technical assistance through
the Land Release pilot project, UNDP, and the GICHD.64 The Demining Commission adopted new standards for CMR at the
beginning of 2017.65
In 2015, BHMAC adopted a new national SOP for non-technical survey of areas suspected to contain CMR, based on NPA’s own
SOP.66 In October 2016, BHMAC made updates and improvements to national SOPs for CMR clearance and technical survey,
also based on NPA’s SOPs.67 In April 2018, the new SOP for non-technical survey was adopted by the Demining Commission.68
BHMAC reported that survey or resurvey of hazardous areas suspected to contain CMR is conducted as standard, as part of
all land release operations.69 According to NPA, national mine action standards in BiH are suitably adapted to the local threat
and context, and enable efficient evidence-based survey and clearance of CMR.70

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Land release operations on CMR-contaminated area in 2019
were conducted by non-governmental organisation NPA;
entity Civil Protections; and the BiH Armed Forces.71 In its
Article 4 deadline extension request, BHMAC said that the
remaining CMR contamination will be released by these
same entities. However, it also stated that CMR operations
can be performed by Centar za humanitarno razminiranje,
Detektor, In Demining NGO, and Stop Mines NGO, and that
these organisations could be accredited and engaged, if
and when a tender is issued for removal of the remaining
CMR contamination.72
BHMAC asserts that the BiH Armed Forces and the FACP are
equipped with necessary demining equipment and capable,
trained personnel for CMR clearance.73 However, both have
suffered from logistical challenges and equipment deficits in
the past, which prevent them from working at full capacity.74
Since 2010, NPA has increasingly focused on building the
capacity of the Army’s Demining Battalion. This involves
transfer of knowledge through operational planning of
clearance and technical survey operations; direct operational
support; and provision of mine detection dogs (MDDs) and
equipment, among other things.75 The BiH Armed Forces
require ongoing support to secure personal protective
equipment, batteries for detectors, and fuel for demining
machinery, since the Army’s own complex procurement
system often cannot ensure delivery in time.76 In August
2020, the Demining Battalion received a donation of 180
demining visors from the US government, enabling 18
manual clearance teams to be equipped.77
As at June 2019, two of the thirty-four BiH Armed Forces’
ten-strong demining teams (eight deminers, plus a team
leader and a medic) were specialised and deployed in CMR
clearance.78 Under the completion initiative, a third team was
equipped for CMR survey and clearance operations, thanks
to the provision by NPA of eight magnetic detectors, under
a Swiss-funded contract. NPA also loaned the Demining
Battalion its Digger D-250 and provided direct operational
support for mechanical ground preparation.79 The Demining
Battalion also receives support from Austria, France, Italy,
and the United States, as well as European Union Force
Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR), which alone provides
90% of total support.80 Furthermore, deminers in the BiH
Armed Forces are forced to stop demining at the age of 38
(this upper limit, until recently, had been 35). This results in
experienced deminers being forced to retire at a very early
age and results in a high turnover of personnel.81

The Civil Protection Administration of Republika Srpska
conducts survey and clearance of mines, CMR, and other
explosive remnants of war (ERW). One manual clearance
team, of eight deminers, was used for technical survey of
CMR in 2019, as well as for mines.82
In 2019, NPA deployed two manual teams (each with 10
clearance personnel), for technical survey and clearance of
CMR-contaminated area in BiH.83 As mentioned above, since
2010, NPA has also focused on building the capacity of the
Armed Forces Demining Battalion.
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) received operational
accreditation in April 2017, and began demining in May 2017,
but is engaged in landmine survey and clearance only.
The Demining Commission is responsible for considering
the periodic re-accreditation of field operators, following the
recommendation from BHMAC. Any delay in the appointment
of the Demining Commission can therefore impact the
re-accreditation process and have a knock-on impact on
survey and clearance operations.84 This was the case from
late October 2019, when the previous Demining Commission’s
term expired, until 30 April 2020, when the new Demining
Commission was put in place and accreditations could again
be renewed or approved. The delay in appointing the new
Demining Commission negatively impacted CMR operations,
in some instances preventing the initiation of CMR clearance
at the start of the demining season.85
Quality control (QC) and quality assurance (QA) is conducted
by BHMAC.86
No animal detection systems or mechanical assets were used
in CMR survey or clearance operations in BiH in 2019. This
is despite the fact that in 2017, BiH announced that technical
survey and CMR clearance would also be conducted with the
use of special detection dogs (SDDs), through NPA.87
In 2014, NPA successfully piloted using SDDs for technical
survey and clearance of CMR-contaminated areas.88 It
recommended the use of detection dogs in technical survey
(both targeted and systematic investigation).89 However,
as at August 2020, BHMAC had yet to make the necessary
amendments to the national standards.
No cluster munition-contaminated area was reported to have
been released by the FACP in 2019.90
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of 0.72km2 of CMR-contaminated area was released in 2019: 0.27km2 through technical survey and 0.45km2 through
clearance, during which 85 submunitions were destroyed. No area was cancelled through non-technical survey.91

SURVEY IN 2019
In 2019, 0.27km2 of CMR-contaminated area was reduced through technical survey, as reported by BHMAC to Mine Action
Review and included in BHMAC’s Article 4 deadline extension request.92 In BiH’s Article 7 report, however, the amount of land
released in 2019 was reported as a combined total of technical survey and clearance (see Table 2), rather than disaggregated
and reported separately, as Article 7(1)(i) of the CCM and international best practice require.93 No CMR-contaminated area was
cancelled through non-technical survey in 2019.

CLEARANCE IN 2019
In 2019, 0.45km2 of CMR-contaminated area was cleared, as reported by BHMAC to Mine Action Review and included in
BHMAC’s Article 4 deadline extension request.94 In BiH’s Article 7 report, however, the amount of land released in 2019 was
reported by BiH as a combined total of technical survey and clearance (see Table 2), rather than disaggregated and reported
separately, as best practice requires.95
A total of 85 unexploded submunitions and 13 items of other UXO were destroyed during technical survey and clearance
(see Table 2).96
The 2019 land release output was, overall, a slight decrease on 2018, when a combined 0.75km2 was released (0.44km2 through
clearance and 0.31km2 through technical survey).97
Table 2: CMR-contaminated area released through technical survey and clearance in 201998
Canton

Area cleared (m²)

Submunitions destroyed

Other UXO destroyed

Neretva

388,504

57

8

Tuzlanski

187,866

4

0

576,370

61

8

Total Republika Srpska

144,063

24

5

Totals

720,433

85

13

Total Federation BiH

BHMAC reported that all cluster munition-contaminated area cleared in 2019 contained CMR.99

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR BIH COUNTRY: 1 MARCH 2011
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2021
ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: NO (MUST SEEK EXTENSION TO DEADLINE)

Under Article 4 of the CCM, BiH is required to destroy all CMR
in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible,
but not later than 1 March 2021. BiH will not meet this
deadline and has requested an Article 4 deadline extension
to 1 September 2022 for consideration at the Second CCM
Review Conference in November 2020.100
The rate of CMR clearance has been unacceptably slow, with
less than 2km2 of CMR-contamination cleared in the last five
years (see Table 3).
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Table 3: Five-year summary of CMR clearance
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2019

0.45

2018

0.44

2017

0.27

2016

0.10

2015

0.23

Total

1.49

STATES PARTIES

BiH’s September 2020 Article 4 deadline extension request includes reference to the CMR task in the municipality of Han
Pijesak, in the Republika Srpska, which also contains depleted uranium munitions remaining from NATO air strikes. However,
it does not provide details of how BiH plans to address this contamination.101 The presence of depleted uranium complicates
CMR clearance as deminers must be adequately trained and protected against exposure to the uranium. Previously, in
February 2020, BHMAC had said it was discussing the possibility of assistance from NATO to clear this area.102
Given the relatively small scale of CMR contamination in BiH, especially compared to the far greater contamination from mines,
BiH could have completed clearance within its original 10-year Article 4 deadline, had there been greater political will, national
ownership, and commitment from BHMAC, the Demining Commission, and their superiors in the government.

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
The National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–2025 includes a section on management of residual contamination, which requires
the development of a strategy for the management of residual contamination by 2022.
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CHAD

CLEARING CLUSTER
MUNITION REMNANTS
2020

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 SEPTEMBER 2023
UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA
CLUSTER MUNITION
CONTAMINATION: LIGHT
NATIONAL ESTIMATE

146,638M

2

SUBMUNITION
CLEARANCE IN 2019

0.84KM

2

(BASED ON DATA PROVIDED BY
MINES ADVISORY GROUP, MAG)

SUBMUNITIONS
DESTROYED IN 2019

28

(BASED ON DATA
PROVIDED BY MAG)

Area of Land Released (km2)
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by MAG)
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0.51

0.4
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provided
by MAG)

0.3
0.2
0.1
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Clearance

Technical
Survey

0.0

0.0

0

Non-Technical
Survey

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Chad provided an estimate of the size of cluster munition-contaminated areas and reported the first clearance of land
containing cluster munition remnants (CMR) in five years. The clearance was conducted by Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and
Humanity and Inclusion (HI). European Union (EU) funding supported work by the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) to
clean up the national mine action database and improve reporting.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Chad should elaborate a completion strategy for Article 4 implementation, together with an annual work plan
for the survey and clearance of remaining CMR-contaminated areas.

■

Chad should introduce national standards specific to CMR survey and clearance.

■

Chad’s Ministry of Economy and Planning should develop a resource mobilisation strategy for the mine
action sector.

■

Chad’s national mine action authority should disaggregate CMR from other explosive ordnance in reporting
results of survey and clearance.

mineactionreview.org 31

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion
UNDERSTANDING
OF CMR
CONTAMINATION

Score Score
(2019) (2018) Performance Commentary
4

3

Chad has for the first time reported the estimated extent of cluster
munition-contaminated area. The basis for the estimate and the full extent of CMR
contamination, however, remained unclear.

3

3

Chad’s mine action authority coordinates the sector and carried out some
restructuring to increase effectiveness in 2019 but government financial support
is limited to paying staff salaries and some administrative costs while operations
depend wholly on donor funding.

4

4

Gender issues do not appear in Chad’s national plans but women are employed in a
number of roles, including in managerial- and supervisory-level positions, though
mainly in office support functions, risk education, and victim assistance.

5

3

The National Commission for Demining (HCND)’s mine action database has benefitted
from FSD’s support through extensive data clean-up and improvements to reporting
forms but official data and reporting of CMR survey and clearance do not clearly
distinguish between CMR and other ordnance. Chad has submitted Article 7 reports
for each of the past five years.

3

3

Chad shows intent to tackle its explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination,
including CMR, but has not developed a strategy for fulfilling its Article 4 obligations.

5

5

Chad has International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)-compatible national standards
but none specific to CMR survey or clearance.

5

2

Chad reported release of cluster munition-contaminated areas for the first time in
five years but inconsistencies in reported results left uncertain the precise extent.

4.3

3.3

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 4
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: POOR

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

National Commission for Demining
(Haut Commissariat National de Déminage; HCND)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

HCND

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■

OTHER ACTORS
■
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Humanity and Inclusion (HI)
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)

None

STATES PARTIES

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by region
(at end 2019) 4
Province
Borkou

CHAs

Area (m2)

2

2,782

Ennedi

1

143,856

Totals

3

146,638

Chad’s cluster munition contamination dates back to conflicts
with Libya, which occupied northern areas between 1980
and 1987. Chad stated in 2012 that while the precise extent
of CMR contamination was not known, it was certain cluster
munitions had been used in the Fada region and highly likely
they had been used in other parts of the north.5 Chad also
reported that, after Libyan troops withdrew in 1987, members
of the French Sixth Engineers Regiment found and destroyed
CMR around former Libyan positions and it suspected
additional contamination remained in the Tibesti region.6
Chad said there was heavy CMR contamination in palm
groves around Faya Largeau, which had caused many
casualties.7 In January 2015, four children (three girls
and one boy) were reportedly injured after handling a
submunition in Faya Largeau.8 Also in 2015, MAG identified
and destroyed a limited number of CMR, including two empty
RBK-250-275 cluster bomb containers in the Tibesti region
and an AO-1-SCh submunition in the Borkou region.9

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Chad’s mine action programme is coordinated by the National Commission for Demining (HCND), which comes under the
Ministry of Economy and Development Planning.10 The HCND is responsible for preparing a national demining strategy, annual
work plans, and proposing a budget to support them.11 The National Demining Centre (Centre National de Déminage, CND),
which earlier conducted clearance operations, appears to have been dissolved.
Government funding for mine action is limited to payment of salaries for national staff.12 Threats by former deminers over
non-payment of salaries prevented some planned survey and clearance activities from proceeding in 2018.13 The long-running
strike by deminers included threats by former personnel that have prevented operations in areas of Tibesti earmarked for
survey and clearance.14
A June 2019 decree provided for re-organisation, resulting in four main divisions covering: Operations and Logistics, Planning,
Administrative and Financial Affairs and Human Resources.15 Operators say constant changes in coordination staff have
hampered efficiency.16 They also report lengthy delays obtaining the permits required to import equipment as well as in other
bureaucratic procedures.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Gender was not discussed in Chad’s latest Anti-Personnel Mine
Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request
and recruitment of female staff is not a priority for the HCND,
which has undergone drastic downsizing in the past two years
and still faces demands for back pay from staff.
Nine women were among the 207 personnel working
for the HCND in 2019; they were employed in a range of
management, administrative, and field roles. They included
the HCND’s assistant director, the administration and finance
assistant director, and the head of risk education.17 The
lack of women in HCND’s operational staff limited options
for international operators whose deminers are seconded
from HCND. As a result, HI employed women in managerial
and administrative roles, including its country director,
a human resources coordinator, and assistant finance
director.18 The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD) is advising HI’s programme in Chad on the
mainstreaming of gender and diversity in their activities.19

In 2019, MAG employed Chad’s first female deminer as a team
leader, overseeing survey and clearance tasks, conducting
on-site quality control and reporting data. She had been
trained in Benin to EOD [Explosive Ordnance Disposal] Level
3. MAG also employed women in community liaison and
administrative functions. 20
Operators report that risk education targeted all members of
the community and that the resulting data was disaggregated
by gender. 21 MAG community liaison teams conduct focus
group discussions with women, since they are better placed
to provide information on contamination in some areas such
as wadis where they collect water and firewood. Discussions
led by a female community liaison officer identify women’s
priorities for mine action interventions. 22
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UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
Chad informed the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM)
signing conference in 2008 that it had “vast swathes of
territory” contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance,
including cluster munitions,1 but the extent remains unknown.
Chad identified 146,638m2 of cluster munition-contaminated
area in 2019, almost entirely located in the northern Ennedi
region (see Table 1). 2 In addition, some cluster bomb
containers were spotted in the Wouda area of Borkou in
March 2019, the first such items reported since 2015.3

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The HCND uses an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database but poor maintenance meant data
available from it was unreliable because of lost reports and duplication. A clean-up of the database undertaken by FSD under
the EU-funded PRODECO project that started in 2017 has now resulted in cancellation of large numbers of duplicate entries. 23
FSD also supported data entry and correction and the production of maps of SHAs, and helped to compile tables for Chad’s
APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request. IMSMA forms were reviewed, updated, and approved at a workshop in 2019.
With FSD support, the HCND also introduced standardised forms to be used by operators for weekly and monthly reporting. 24
But data and reporting of progress and output in CMR survey and clearance by the national authorities do not clearly
distinguish between CMR and other ordnance. Chad has submitted Article 7 reports for each of the past five years.

PLANNING AND TASKING
Chad does not have a strategic plan for cluster munitions. Chad has said it plans to conduct non-technical survey in 2020–21
to identify the location of cluster munition containers in Tibesti and Ouaddaï regions and to clear any contamination found in
those areas. 25
Since September 2017, Chad’s mine action programme has focused mainly on implementing the four-year (2017–21) EU-funded
mine action project (PRODECO), which is being implemented by a consortium of three international operators and one national
operator. 26 HI was due to focus on survey and clearance in the Borkou and Ennedi regions; MAG was to work in the Tibesti and
Lake Chad regions; and FSD would provide training and support for information management, while Secours Catholique et
Développement (SECADEV) would address victim assistance. 27
Those objectives subsequently changed due to insecurity in Tibesti, which prevented MAG from gaining access and forcing
it to redirect its demining teams to the Lake Chad area in the west of the country. The HCND acknowledged in its APMBC
Article 5 deadline extension request that mine action in Chad had lacked a strategic vision, operational planning, and effective
coordination, resulting in a loss of confidence locally and internationally. 28

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Chad has national mine action standards that are International Mine Action Standard (IMAS)-compliant but has no
CMR-specific standards.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The HCND is Chad’s biggest demining operator, employing a total staff of 320 people in 2019, of whom 113 were seconded to
HI and MAG. 29 The HCND informed Mine Action Review that combined mine and ERW operational capacity at the end of 2019
amounted to four manual demining teams with 72 personnel, two non-technical survey teams with six personnel, and two
teams operating two mechanical assets with a total of seven personnel. Other capacity included two EOD teams with a total of
16 technicians.30 Additional national EOD capacity is available from the Chad armed forces’ combat engineering battalion, which
received training in demining and improvised explosive device (IED) clearance in May 2019 from two French army engineers.31
The mine action component of the PRODECO programme funded by the EU was the only demining operation active in Chad in
2019. HI, the PRODECO consortium lead agency, operated with a total staff of 76 people. These included 35 deminers in three
multi-task teams and a survey team of five people who conducted survey and clearance of mined areas in the Kirdimi and
Faya districts of Borkou province.32 The HCND said it would remain in the province in the first half of 2020 and work in Ennedi
throughout the year.33 HI is understood to have used drones fitted with infrared cameras to conduct survey34 but provided no
further details.
MAG worked with three 12-strong teams of manual deminers, four community liaison staff, and 24 support staff focused on
clearance and risk education in northern Chad’s Borkou region, including road clearance to enable communications between
towns in the north. MAG was supposed to have operated in Tibesti but was prevented from doing so by local conflicts. In
consultation with the HCND and HI, it identified alternative areas and carried out an exploratory mission to Borkou in March
2019 before starting operations in June. In 2020, MAG expected to shift operations to Ennedi region.35
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FSD, working with four international and five national staff in 2019, focused on building capacity in the national authority with
particular attention to information management, operations management, quality assurance, logistics, and administration.
In 2019, FSD also supported production of maps, tables, and analysis for Chad’s APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request.37
The HCND’s work plan for 2020 also called for FSD support for non-technical survey and technical survey in Salamat, Sila,
and Wadi Fira.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
The HCND reported release of 4,658,723m2 to Mine Action Review in 2019. Of this, 520,801m2 was said to have been reduced
through technical survey and 4,137,922m2—close to 90% of the total area—was released through clearance.38 That result,
however, appeared to combine release of cluster munition tasks and battle area clearance (BAC). It was also inconsistent
with Chad’s Article 7 Report, which recorded release of a total of 4,332,954m2.39

SURVEY IN 2019
Chad’s Article 7 report recorded cancellation of 100m2
through non-technical survey and reduction of 29,727m2
through technical survey.40 This was not consistent with
reports from operators.
MAG reported that it had reduced an area of 510,506m in the
course of technical survey in Borkou region during 2019.41
The HCND reported to Mine Action Review area reduction of
520,801m2.42 MAG agreed that it reduced a total of 520,801m2
but said the cluster munition-contaminated area reduced
through technical survey amounted to 510,506m2.43
2

Table 2: Reduction through technical survey in 201944
Region

Operator

Borkou

MAG

Area reduced (m2)
510,506

Total

510,506

CLEARANCE IN 2019
Chad cleared cluster munition-contaminated area for the first time in five years in 2019 but how much it released was unclear.
Official data put areas released through clearance variously at 4.14km2 (reported by the HCND to Mine Action Review)45 and
4.3km2 (reported in Chad’s Article 7 report).46 Those figures, however, appear to represent all BAC, rather than solely clearance
of CMR. MAG said it cleared a total area of 3,780,512m2, of which 837,453m2 contained CMR. In the process, MAG destroyed 28
submunitions, the only CMR destroyed in 2019.47

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CHAD: 1 SEPTEMBER 2013
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 SEPTEMBER 2023
UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

Chad conducted modest survey and clearance in 2019 which
represented significant progress after years without any
movement on cluster munitions (see Table 3), but inconsistencies
in data prevented a precise determination of the extent.
The absence of any comprehensive or baseline data on the
extent of CMR contamination in Chad also prevents a clear
understanding of prospects for achieving completion within
its Article 4 deadline. Chad needs to accelerate survey
and clearance but lacks a clear strategy for optimising
deployment of the limited capacity and resources available.
A major concern is the future of international donor support.
Mine action operations currently depend on a single donor,
the EU, and its funding through the PRODECO project, which
is due to expire in 2021.

Table 3: Five-year summary of CMR clearance
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2019

0.84*

2018

0

2017

0

2016

0

2015

0

Total

0.84

* Based on MAG data
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As part of the PRODECO programme, 10 HCND deminers were sent to the Centre de Formation au Déminage Humanitaire
(CPADD) in Benin for training. Of those, nine qualified for EOD Level 3, the first time Chadian deminers have qualified at this
level. Two other HCND staff qualified as quality assurance officers.36
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KEY DEVELOPMENTS
In 2019, Chile released cluster munition remnant (CMR)-contaminated area for the first time since becoming a State Party
to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in 2011, cancelling through non-technical survey 32.27km2 found not to be
contaminated. In July 2020, Chile submitted a revised request for a one-year interim extension to its CCM Article 4 deadline.
In its extension request, Chile provided information on the cluster munition-contaminated area and its survey and clearance
capacity, detailing a plan to conduct technical survey in 2021, if sufficient resources can be secured. Chile will then submit
a follow-on extension request, which will include a plan for clearance.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Chile should prioritise and complete the restructuring of its national mine action programme without delay,
to ensure that the necessary management structure is in place to support the survey and clearance of
CMR-contaminated areas.

■

Chile should ensure that it dedicates sufficient resources to complete technical survey by its new interim
Article 4 deadline.

■

Chile should submit a more detailed annual work plan once technical survey has been completed, including the
actual capacity the Army, Navy, and Air Force plan to deploy at each of the four sites per year and annual targets
for land release.

■

Chile should elaborate a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion
UNDERSTANDING
OF CMR
CONTAMINATION

Score Score
(2019) (2018) Performance Commentary
5

3

Chile conducted non-technical survey in 2019 on the military ranges with cluster
munition remnants (CMR) contamination and cancelled approximately one third of
the total area. The contamination figure is still likely to be an overestimate as some
clearance has already been carried out by the military.

4

3

The Division of International Relations of the Undersecretary of Defence manages
the implementation of the CCM. CMR survey and clearance will be carried out by
the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units of the Army and Navy, and the recently
created Air Force EOD unit. Technical coordination will be the responsibility of the
new Defence Disarmament Commission which, as at September 2020, had still to be
established. Chile carries out and funds all of its own mine action activities.

6

6

Chile has taken steps to mainstream gender across the armed forces with women
working at all levels of the mine action programme. However, the number of women
employed in demining in 2019 was just 4%. Chile should take the next steps and
formulate a mine action-specific gender policy.

6

6

Chile uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database
it updated in 2017. Chile has submitted CCM Article 7 reports annually since 2012.
In January 2020, Chile submitted an initial draft Article 4 deadline extension
request to 2026, but in July 2020 it submitted a revised request, seeking an interim
one-year extension to 2022, for consideration by States Parties at the Second Review
Conference.

5

3

Chile has a National Plan for Demining and Clearing Military Polygons 2020–26 that
includes goals for CMR survey and clearance. Chile included plans for technical
survey of CMR-contaminated areas in 2021 in its revised extension request, as well
as basic information on its survey and clearance capacity and an estimated budget
to complete CMR clearance.

5

5

Chile says it is guided by the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). It has
designated survey and clearance responsibility for the CMR-contaminated areas
to specific units within the Army, Navy, and Air Force with non-technical survey
capacity deployed in 2019.

4

2

Chile conducted non-technical survey of the CMR-contaminated areas for the first
time in 2019, resulting in the cancellation of 32km2. Chile has stated that technical
survey will also be conducted but cautioned that it is resource dependent. It is
expected that Chile may be able to fulfil its clearance obligations quicker than
expected if the CMR-contaminated area can be further reduced.
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Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: POOR

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

■

Division of International Relations, Undersecretary
of Defence (Subsecretaría de Defensa, División de
Relaciones Internacionales)
National Demining Commission (Comisión Nacional
de Desminado, CNAD)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■

Demining Units of the Army Corps of Engineers
Demining Unit of the Navy Demining Unit of the Air Force
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INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

OTHER ACTORS
■

None

STATES PARTIES

Contamination is the consequence of deployment of cluster munitions on military training ranges. Since the reported extent
represents the total area of military land used for training, and cluster munitions were only deployed in the impact areas or target
areas, it is very likely that the actual extent of the contamination is still significantly smaller than the revised estimate. Chile has
reported that, according to military procedures, clearance of unexploded submunitions or other unexploded ordnance (UXO)
present in these areas has been conducted after use so it is unclear how much CMR contamination remains. The contaminated
areas remain within military enclosures so are inaccessible to the public. In Arica and Parinacota, MK-II LAR 160 cluster munition
rockets were used, while in Tarapacá and Magallanes and Antártica Chilena CB-250K cluster bombs were dropped.3
Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by province (at end 2019) 4
Province

Military range

SHAs

Area (m2)

Arica and Parinacota

Pampa Chaca Este

1

30,560,000

Tarapacá

Delta

1

28,291,563

Tarapacá

Barrancas

1

2,669,542

Magallanes and Antártica Chilena

Punta Zenteno

Totals

1

3,090,019

4

64,611,124

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Chile is also affected, to a limited extent, by other UXO. On 27 February 2020, Chile declared itself free of anti-personnel mines,
meeting its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020
report on Chile for further information).5

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The national mine action programme is managed by the National Demining Commission (Comisión Nacional de Desminado,
CNAD), which is chaired by the Minister of Defence. Chile’s obligations under the CCM have, so far, been the responsibility of
the Division of International Relations of the Undersecretary of Defence.6 It was initially planned that CNAD would assume
responsibility for coordinating the demining units from the Armed Forces that would conduct survey and clearance of CMR.
Under national law, however, CNAD may only manage the survey and clearance of anti-personnel mines and it was determined
that a new body should be created to coordinate clearance of CMR and other ERW.7 A Defence Disarmament Commission (CDD)
will be created and will act as an advisory body to the Ministry of Defence and as an inter-ministerial coordinator of Chile’s
responsibilities under the CCM, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), and the APMBC. The DDC will have
a Disarmament Work Unit (UTD) which will act as the national mine action centre.8
Chile is funding all its survey and clearance operations. For 2019, it budgeted approximately US$205,000 for explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) training and non-technical survey of CMR-contaminated areas.9 In its latest Article 7 report and
revised Article 4 extension request, Chile is seeking financial assistance of approximately $1.4 million from the international
community to replace and service demining equipment between 2021 and 2023. Chile has stated that it has made this request
due to social challenges within Chile, such as those resulting from the COVID-19 outbreak.10 Chile has estimated that it will
require approximately $10.5 million to complete clearance of CMR. In 2020, no financial resources have been allocated to CMR
survey or clearance due to the COVID-19 outbreak. It is hoped that national financial resources will be allocated in January
2021 to conduct technical survey next year, but it is not yet known if this will occur.11

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
While there is no specific gender policy within CNAD, Chile’s policy of integrating women into the armed forces has been in
place since 2000. As at May 2019, 14.4% of total armed forces personnel were female. In 2016, restrictions on the type of
military positions a woman could hold were lifted and legislation was adopted to modify the military grading system, allowing
women to be promoted in the same way as men. Women have been working in demining in Chile since 2004 across all types
of roles, including as deminers and in managerial/supervisory roles.
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CHILE

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
Chile reported that at the end of 2019 it had almost 65km2 of cluster munition remnant (CMR)-contaminated area in three of
its fifteen provinces (see Table 1).1 This is a huge decrease from the almost 97km2 recounted in its previous Article 7 report
submitted at the end of March 2019. 2

In 2007, the first woman was appointed as Manual Demining Section Commander in Arica. In May 2018, a woman was appointed
as Demining Company Commander in Arica. Chile has made it easier for women to work in the sector by, for example, adapting
demining equipment to better suit female specifications, providing childcare, and eliminating the gender wage gap.12 Chile
reported that in 2019 of the 246 personnel carrying out roles within the demining units ten were women (4%). This included
two demining section commanders and four women in support roles (one medic, two nurses and one paramedic).13 In a positive
step, Chile stated in both its 2020 CCM Article 4 deadline extension requests that due to its awareness of the increasing
importance of the implementation of gender perspectives in the field of disarmament, the Ministry of National Defense will
promote women to the teams that will conduct CMR clearance.14

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Since 2003, Chile has been using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). During 2017, Chile upgraded
to Version 6 of IMSMA after starting the MARS (Mine Action Reporting System) application that replaced IMSMA Mobile.
This application has, CNAD says, equipped Chile with high-quality geographic information to support decision-making
around clearance.15 This system was deployed in 2019, along with non-technical survey, to calculate the area of possible
CMR contamination.16
Chile has submitted its CCM Article 7 transparency report every year since 2012. The past two Article 7 reports were the
first to contain plans and updates on CMR survey and clearance. In January 2020, Chile submitted a first Article 4 deadline
extension request to June 2026. Then in July 2020, Chile submitted a revised, interim request for a one-year extension to June
2022, with a plan to submit another extension request once the estimate of remaining contamination has been established.

PLANNING AND TASKING
Chile stated in its July 2020 extension request that it will conduct technical surveys to further clarify the extent of the
remaining CMR contamination during 2021. Chile will then formulate a plan for clearance of CMR that is dependent upon
the results of the technical survey.
The four military ranges with CMR contamination are the responsibility of different military EOD units (see Table 2).
Table 2: Military units responsible for the release of CMR-contaminated areas17
Military range

Unit responsible

Pampa Chaca Este

UDH Arica (Army)

30,560,000

Delta

UDH Calama (Army)

28,291,563

Barrancas

UDH FACH (Air Force)

2,669,542

Punta Zenteno

UDH POMTA (Navy)

3,090,019

Total

Estimated area (m2)

64,611,124

The National Plan for Demining and Clearing Military Polygons 2020–2026 includes a set of provisions to comply with Chile’s
obligations under the CCM, the APMBC, and the CCW. The plan is aimed at the implementing partners within the armed forces
and government agencies.18 In its 2019 work plan, the National Directive for the Execution of Demining Activities, Chile included
plans for non-technical survey of CMR-contaminated areas.19
In 2019, Chile trained 20 personnel in EOD Level 220 and 21 personnel in EOD Level 321 and conducted non-technical survey
of the areas suspected to contain CMR. 22 Information for the non-technical survey was derived from a desk assessment
of military records of cluster bomb deployment and subsequent clearance; interviews with relevant parties; and a visual
inspection of the terrain. 23
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CHILE

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Chile is guided by the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). 24 In addition to the IMAS, Chile also follows the provisions
and regulations as set out in the “Humanitarian Demining Manual of the Chilean Army” and the “EOD Procedures Manual”. 25

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Survey and clearance of explosive ordnance is conducted by the EOD Units of the Army Corps of Engineers, the Navy and
the Air Force. In 2019, only non-technical survey was conducted, with four units totalling eleven personnel deployed for
the purpose. 26

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
In 2019, Chile deployed four military EOD units to the suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), which cancelled 32.27km2 of SHAs
through non-technical survey. No clearance of CMR-contaminated area took place. 27 In 2018, no survey or clearance of
CMR-contaminated area took place.

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CHILE: 1 JUNE 2011
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2021
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE EXTENSION SOUGHT (INTERIM ONE-YEAR EXTENSION REQUESTED): 1 JUNE 2022

Under Article 4 of the CCM Chile is required to destroy all
anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction
or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 June
2021. It will not meet this deadline and submitted a request
in July 2020 for an interim one-year extension to its Article
4 deadline, until 1 June 2022, in which it plans to complete
technical survey of CMR-contaminated areas. Chile submitted
this interim request due to uncertainty over the availability of
financial resources for CMR survey and clearance due to the
impact of COVID-19, which has damaged the national economy
and diverted resources to other areas. In addition, as at
July 2020, Chile was restructuring the national mine action
programme, a process that it says will need to be completed
before any land release can take place. 28

Table 3: Five-year summary of CMR clearance
Year

Area cleared (m2)

2019

0

2018

0

2017

0

2016

0

2015

0

Total

0

In 2019, for the first time since becoming a State Party to the
CCM in June 2011, Chile conducted non-technical survey of the
CMR-contaminated area, cancelling approximately one third of
the total estimated area. Chile has reported that the military
ranges which are contaminated with CMR had previously been
cleared following weapons deployment. However, as it is not
known whether previous clearance of CMR contamination
was conducted according to international standards, Chile is
required to undertake technical survey and clearance to meet
its Article 4 obligations to make “every effort” to identify and
clear all cluster munition-contaminated areas.

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
As at August 2020, Chile had not provided information on whether it had a plan in place for dealing with residual risk following
completion. It is expected that this capacity will come from the Chilean military.
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CROATIA

CLEARING CLUSTER
MUNITION REMNANTS
2020

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 AUGUST 2020
REPORTED FULFILMENT OF ARTICLE 4 OBLIGATIONS

KEY DATA
1,000,000

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT

2018
2019

CLUSTER MUNITION
CONTAMINATION:
COMPLETED CLEARANCE OF ALL
KNOWN CMR-CONTAMINATED AREAS

SUBMUNITION
CLEARANCE IN 2019

SUBMUNITIONS
DESTROYED IN 2019

45,563M 186

Area of Land Released (m2)
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45,563
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Clearance

Technical
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Non-Technical
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KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Croatia has reported fulfilling its Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Article 4 obligations, completing clearance of
remaining cluster munition remnants (CMR) on 10 July 2020, several weeks ahead of its 1 August deadline. Completion in
time was the result of strong national ownership and political will, national funding, and effective planning. While Croatia
has cleared all known CMR-contaminated areas, remnants may be discovered post completion (residual contamination),
and, as of writing, Croatia was planning for a sustainable capacity and systems to address this possibility.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Croatia should ensure that sustainable capacity and systems are in place to address any residual CMR threat that
may be discovered.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion
UNDERSTANDING
OF CMR
CONTAMINATION

Score Score
(2019) (2018) Performance Commentary
9

8

On 10 July 2020, Croatia completed clearance of its last known CMR. As recently
as 2019, however, areas of previously unrecorded CMR contamination continued to
be discovered and Croatia recognises the importance of managing the residual risk
from CMR.

9

9

Croatia demonstrated strong national ownership and political will to complete
fulfilment of its Article 4 obligations within its initial 10-year deadline, and with 100%
national funding for CMR survey and clearance operations in 2019. In January 2019,
Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) and the Office for Mine Action (OMA) were
integrated within the Civil Protection Directorate under the Ministry of Interior.

4

5

Gender policies and implementation regarding mine action in Croatia are addressed
under the national Gender Equality Act, which includes guidelines on gender equality
and regulates against gender-based discrimination. However, the proportion of
women employed in mine action, both at Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC
and in the commercial demining companies, is extremely low. In addition, CROMAC
survey data are not disaggregated by sex and age.

9

9

Croatia has an information management system that is compliant with the
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and which allows disaggregation by type
of contamination and method of land release. Croatia provided regular, accurate, and
consistent updates on its progress in Article 4 implementation at CCM meetings and
in its Article 7 reports.

9

9

Croatia has elaborated a new national mine action strategy, which it expected to
adopt by the end of 2020 to replace the previous strategy that expired in 2019. In
addition, Croatia had annual operational work plans for CMR survey and clearance.

8

7

The 2015 law on mine action encompasses national mine action standards. CMR
clearance in Croatia was focused on confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and Croatia
maintained sufficient demining capacity to enable it to release remaining known CMR
contamination in July 2020, ahead of its Article 4 deadline.

9

8

On 10 July 2020, Croatia completed clearance of the last known CMR-contaminated
area, fulfilling its Article 4 commitments ahead of its 1 August 2020 deadline. In
2019, the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC cancelled all remaining cluster
munition-contaminated area in Lika-Senj country and a further 45,563m2 was cleared
by commercial operators in Sisak-Moslavina county, before completing land release
operations in 2020. Croatia is planning how it will deal with residual risk and liability.
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Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: VERY GOOD

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

Ministry of Interior, in which CROMAC and OMA were
integrated within the Civil Protection Directorate,
effective as at January 2019

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

Forty-four commercial demining companies are
accredited for mine and CMR clearance operations.
Of these, five were engaged in CMR clearance operations
in 2019: Alfa Razminiranje, Fas, Fas-pro, Fossio, Loco,
and Taurus
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INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

OTHER ACTORS
■

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD)

STATES PARTIES

At the end of 2019, Croatia had only three remaining
confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) containing CMR, covering
a total area of 33,079m2, across four counties (see Table 1).3
This compared to reported contamination a year earlier of
less than 266,116m2.4 During 2019, the county of Lika-Senj
was declared free of CMR, through non-technical survey by
the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC.5 All remaining
cluster munition-contaminated area was then released in
2020, ahead of Croatia’s 1 August 2020 deadline. However,
small areas of previously unrecorded CMR contamination
continue to be discovered, such as the 10,911m2 of previously
unrecorded CMR contamination added to the database
in 2019, and Croatia recognises the possibility of further
unforeseen CMR findings.6

Table 1: Cluster munition- contaminated area by county
(at end 2019)7
County

CHAs

Area (m2)

Šibenik-Knin

1

19,551

Sisak-Moslavina

1

10,952

Zadar

1

2,576

Totals

3

33,079

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Croatia is heavily contaminated by unexploded ordnance (UXO) other than submunitions and by anti-personnel mines
(see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on Croatia for further information on the mine problem).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
In August 2018, the Croatian government formally concluded
that some 54 government agencies, including Croatian Mine
Action Centre (CROMAC) and the Office for Mine Action (OMA),
were to be integrated within existing state administration
bodies. This was formally concluded through two pieces of
legislation enacted in December 2018 and which entered into
force on 1 January 2019.8 As a consequence of these laws,
CROMAC and OMA ceased to exist as separate government
entities and CROMAC became an “operational sector”
within the Civil Protection Directorate, under the Ministry
of Interior.9 The main rationale for this was said to be “the
establishment of a more relevant and operationally wider
national institution (Civil Protection Directorate) that could
more efficiently and effectively tackle all of the aspects of
civil protection in the Republic of Croatia, including mine
action activities”.10
Prior to 2019, both CROMAC (established in 1998 as the
umbrella organisation for mine action coordination),11 and the
OMA (created in 2012 as a government focal point for mine
action),12 had operated as independent entities.

A new law on mine action was adopted by the Croatian
parliament on 21 October 2015.13 While the 2015 Law, which
was initiated by the OMA with the text drafted by the Ministry
of Interior, marked an improvement in certain respects
(for instance, by permitting land release through technical
survey), there were concerns that the new law would impede
efficient and effective mine action.14
Regarding accreditation, the Ministry of Interior now
provides three separate permits: approval for manual
mine detection; approval for mechanical mine detection;
and approval for operations by mine and explosive detection
dogs (MDDs and EDDs). This replaces the former unified
accreditation licence.15
In 2019, some €70,000 was spent on survey and clearance
of CMR-contaminated area. Funding for CMR land release
operations is said to have been fully resourced in Croatia’s
annual demining plan.16

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
As an integral part of the Ministry of Interior, the Civil Protection Directorate implements the Gender Equality Act (Official
Gazette 82/08 and 69/17), which establishes national guidelines for gender equality, regulates against gender-based
discrimination, and creates equal opportunities for men and women, including with regard to employment.17
According to the national authorities, women, men, boys and girls are all effectively consulted during survey and community
liaison activities.18 CROMAC survey data are not, however, disaggregated by sex and age.19
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CROATIA

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
Croatia was contaminated with unexploded KB-1 and Mk-1
submunitions by the conflicts in the 1990s that followed the
break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.1 It
completed clearance of its last known CMR contamination on
10 July 2020, thereby fulfilling its obligations under Article 4
of the CCM. 2

Within the Civil Protection Directorate of the Ministry of Interior, CROMAC employs 91 people, of whom 12 (13.2%) are women.
As at April 2020, no women were employed in managerial or supervisory level positions in CROMAC. Furthermore, CROMAC’s
27 deminers and 2 auxiliary workers were all men. 20
As at 30 March 2020, there were 45 accredited commercial demining companies, employing 443 deminers. Only six deminers
(1.4%) were female and of the 131 work-site leaders/deminers, just one was a woman. Of the 78 auxiliary workers, 6 (7.7%)
were female. 21

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
For the purpose of information management, CROMAC established a mine information system (MIS), which is said to be
compliant with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and customised to meet CROMAC’s needs. The MIS uses
databases and a geographic information system (GIS) to deliver a fully integrated information management system. 22
Croatia submitted accurate and consistent annual Article 7 transparency reports and provided valuable updates on its
progress in Article 4 implementation at the CCM meetings of States Parties.

PLANNING AND TASKING
Croatia’s national mine action strategy for 2009–19 was drafted by CROMAC with the agreement of concerned ministries,
the OMA, the National Protection and Rescue Directorate, and local administration and self-administration bodies whose
responsibility covers regions with hazardous areas. 23 The strategy, which was adopted by the Croatian Parliament, included
among its main goals the completion of mine clearance by 2019, which was not achieved. 24
The Ministry of Interior has elaborated a new strategy, covering 2020–26 which it expected to be adopted by the Croatian
Parliament by the end of 2020, assuming no unforeseen events. 25
Based on approved funding, the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC drafts annual work plans, which are submitted to
the responsible ministries and other State bodies for comment and approval. 26 All CMR-contaminated areas were said to be
cleared in accordance with county and State priorities. 27

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
The 2015 law eliminated the need for standing operating procedures (SOPs), as all aspects of mine action were defined
in detail. 28 National mine action standards are also encompassed within it. 29
CMR clearance in Croatia was focused on releasing CHAs. In 2019, submunitions were discovered and destroyed in all
CMR-contaminated areas that were cleared.30

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Non-technical survey in Croatia is conducted by the Civil
Protection Directorate – CROMAC. In 2019, it had one
non-technical survey team with two personnel, for survey of
cluster munition-contaminated areas.31 In 2018, CROMAC had
deployed nine non-technical survey personnel.32 The decrease
was the result of personnel employed by CROMAC not being
taken on by the Ministry of Interior following CROMAC’s
integration within the Civil Protection Directorate at the start
of 2019. Some of the survey personnel previously employed by
CROMAC were retired or moved to other companies.33
In 2019, 44 commercial companies were accredited to
conduct mine and CMR clearance.34 Of this, five companies
were engaged in CMR clearance operations in 2019 (see Table
2).35 Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are barred from
competing for commercial tenders as CROMAC views their
subsidy by other funds as unfair.36
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Table 2: Clearance capacity (at end 2019)37
Operator

Manual teams

No. of deminers

Alfa Razminiranje

1

9

Fas

2

18

Fossio

1

9

Loco

1

9

Taurus

1

7

Totals

6

52

STATES PARTIES

CROATIA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of 243,948m2 of CMR-contaminated area was released in 2019, of which 45,563m2 was cleared and 198,385m2
was cancelled through non-technical survey. No CMR-contaminated area was reduced through technical survey in 2019.
In addition, almost 10,911m2 of previously unrecorded CMR contamination was added to the database in 2019.38
Croatia completed clearance of all known CMR contamination on 10 July 2020.39

SURVEY IN 2019
In 2019, 198,385m2 was cancelled through non-technical survey in Lika-Senj county (see Table 3), resulting in the county
becoming free of CMR. This was a significant increase on 2018, when 16,436m2 of CMR-contaminated area was cancelled
by non-technical survey.40 No CMR-contaminated area was reduced through technical survey in 2019 or 2018.41
In addition, 10,911m2 of previously unrecorded CMR contamination was added to the database in 2019.42
Table 3: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 201943
County

Operator

Lika-Senj

Civil Protection Directorate - CROMAC

Area cancelled (m²)
198,385

Total

198,385

Cancellation through non-technical survey in 2019 was the result of comprehensive analysis of the location of previous CMR
and containers in the surrounding area, which were precisely defined, in addition to new information and data collected in the
local community.44

CLEARANCE IN 2019
In 2019, Croatia cleared 45,563m2 of CMR-contaminated area in Sisak-Moslavina county, destroying 186 KB-1 submunitions and
1 other item of UXO (see Table 4).45 This was a significant decrease in output on 2018, when 860,308m2 of CMR-contaminated
area was cleared, destroying a total of 571 KB-1 submunitions.46
Table 4: CMR clearance in 201947
County

Operator

Sisak-Moslavina

Alfa Razminiranje, Fas, Fas-pro,
Fossio, Loco, and Taurus

Area cleared (m2)

Submunitions destroyed

45,563

186

45,563

186

Totals
All cluster munition-contaminated areas cleared in 2019 were found to have CMR.48

As part of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks and the continued “less arms, fewer tragedies” programme, the
Croatian police (under the Ministry of Interior), and in partnership with the UNDP, also collected 12 submunitions, 103
anti-personnel mines, and 38 anti-vehicle mines, along with items of UXO and abandoned explosive ordnance. All munitions
were transported to Croatian military facilities and destroyed.49

PROGRESS IN 2020
Clearance of all remaining known CMR contamination was completed on 10 July 2020.50 Detailed results of survey and
clearance in 2020 have not yet been provided.
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ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CROATIA: 1 AUGUST 2010
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 AUGUST 2020
REPORTED HAVING FULFILLED ARTICLE 4 OBLIGATIONS ON 10 JULY 2020

Croatia completed CMR clearance on 10 July 2020, fulfilling
its obligations under Article 4 of the CCM, three weeks
ahead of its 1 August 2020 deadline. In its communiqué to
the Implementation Support Unit of the CCM, dated 31 July
2020, Croatia said that “due to the pandemic COVID-19, the
Declaration of Compliance is still being finalized and will be
officially transmitted at a later stage”.51
Croatia cleared a total of approximately 3.55km of
CMR-contaminated area over the past five years (see Table 5).
Challenges to CMR clearance were posed by rocky, forested,
and mountainous areas, which prevented use of demining
machines. In addition, use of demining machinery is not
permitted in areas designated as protected for conservation.52
2

Table 5: Five-year summary of CMR clearance
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2019

0.05

2018

0.86

2017

1.01

2016

1.20

2015

0.43

Total

3.55

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
In 2019, the Civil Protection Directorate continued research cooperation and discussions with the Geneva Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) on the issue of national survey and clearance capacity to address explosive ordnance
discovered after the release of contaminated areas or post completion (i.e. residual contamination). In August 2019, a joint
study entitled “National capacities and residual contamination in Croatia” was published, documenting progress so far and
highlighting the importance of a participatory and transparent long-term strategic planning progress.53 The integration of
CROMAC within the Ministry of Interior, which took effect from January 2019, is reported to be one of the first steps to deal
with residual risk and liability, and it is believed that this will elevate the importance of the issue within the Ministry of
Interior.54 The integration also means that the challenge of residual risk will be handled within the responsibilities of the
Ministry of Interior – Police Directorate EOD teams and the Civil Protection Directorate – CROMAC.55
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STATES PARTIES

CROATIA

1

Article 7 Report (covering 2017), Form F.

26

Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 23 May 2019.

2

Written communiqué by Croatia to the CCM Implementation Support Unit,
31 July 2020.

27

Emails from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 10 June 2015; and Slavenka Ivšić,
Civil Protection Directorate, 23 May 2019.

3

Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Head of Unit, Civil Protection Directorate,
Ministry of the Interior, 8 April 2020; and CCM Article 7 Report (covering
2019), Form F.

28

Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 13 May 2016; and Article 7 Report
(covering 2015), Form A.

29

Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 13 May 2016.

4

Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 23 May 2019; and
Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form F.

30

Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 8 April 2020.

31

Ibid.

32

Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 23 May 2019.

33

Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 8 April 2020.

5

Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.

6

Emails from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 23 May 2019 and
8 April 2020; and Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.

7

Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 8 April 2020; and
Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.

34

Ibid; and APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Section 4.1.

35

Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 8 April 2020.

Act on Amendments to the Act on Mine Action (OG No. 118/2018) and Act on
Amendment to the Act on the Government (OG No. 116/2018).

36

Interview with Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, Sisak, 14 April 2014.

37

Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 8 April 2020; and
APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Section 4.1.

38

Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 8 April 2020.

39

Written communiqué by Croatia to the CCM Implementation Support Unit,
31 July 2020.

8
9

Emails from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 23 May 2019 and
8 April 2020; and Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form J; and Article 7
Report (covering 2019), p. 1.

10

Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Section 4.1.

11

CROMAC, “National Mine Action Strategy of Croatia 2009–2019”, Zagreb,
June 2009, p. 2.

40

Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 23 May 2019; and
Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form F.

12

Interviews with Dijana Pleština, (then) Director, OMA, in Geneva, 23 May 2012
and 10 April 2014; and email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 4 July 2013.

41

Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 8 April 2020; and
Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.

13

OG No. 110/15; and Article 7 Report (covering 2017), Form A.

42

Ibid.

14

Interviews with Neven Karas, CROMAC; and Tomislav Ban, Assistant
Director and Head of Sector for Operational Planning and Programming,
CROMAC, Sisak, 18 May 2017.

43

Ibid.

44

Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.

15

Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 24 August 2016.

45

16

Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 8 April 2020; Article
7 Report (covering 2019), Form I.

Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 8 April 2020; and
Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.

46

17

Article 7 Report (covering 2017), Form C; Statement of Croatia, APMBC
Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7 June 2018; and email from Davor Laura,
CROMAC, 6 April 2018.

Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 23 May 2019; and
Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form F.

47

Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 8 April 2020; Article
7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.

18

Ibid.

48

Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 8 April 2020.

19

Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 17 April 2020.

49

Ibid.; Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.

20

Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 8 April 2020.

50

21

Ibid.

Written communiqué by Croatia to the CCM Implementation Support Unit,
31 July 2020.

22

CROMAC website, “CROMAC’s Mine Information System”, accessed
26 June 2018.

51

Written communiqué by Croatia to the CCM Implementation Support Unit,
31 July 2020.

23

2018 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 25.

52

Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 23 May 2019.

24

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V Article 10
Report (covering 2015), Form B.

53

GICHD, “National capacities and residual contamination in Croatia”, August
2019, at: bit.ly/2EwKcTt.

25

Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 8 April 2020; and
Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Section 4.6.

54

Emails from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 23 May 2019 and
8 April 2020.

55

Email from Slavenka Ivšić, Civil Protection Directorate, 8 April 2020.
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ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 AUGUST 2025
UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

KEY DATA
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KEY DEVELOPMENTS
In 2019, Germany made solid process in clearance of cluster munition remnants (CMR) at the former military testing facility
at Wittstock. Working with a capacity of 120 personnel, 1.21km2 of contaminated area was cleared in 2019, a 60% increase on
output in the previous year. In addition to submunitions, the site is also contaminated with a range of other explosive ordnance
which has to be cleared along with the CMR.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Germany should assess ways in which it can speed up release of cluster munition-contaminated area, to ensure
that it fulfils its Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Article 4 obligations before its extended deadline of
1 August 2025. This could involve amending national legislation to allow international contractors to conduct
clearance more quickly.

■

For ease of reference, Germany should ensure that its annual Article 7 transparency report includes the amount
of CMR contamination remaining at the end of the reporting period and the annual clearance output, rather than
(or in addition to) the original CMR contamination and the cumulative clearance output.
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Criterion
UNDERSTANDING
OF CMR
CONTAMINATION

Score Score
(2019) (2018) Performance Commentary
8

8

Germany has a good understanding of the extent of its sole CMR-contaminated area
in a former Soviet military training area at Wittstock in the east of the country. Due
to the lack of detailed data on the former testing of weapons at the site, and the
significant amount of other unexploded ordnance (UXO), Germany has not been able
to more accurately determine the extent and density of CMR.

8

8

There is now strong national ownership and commitment to release the sole
CMR-contaminated area. Roles and responsibilities for clearance are clear, coherent,
and entirely funded by the federal government, albeit at a relatively high cost.
German law prevents the contracting of overseas commercial clearance operators
or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) for CMR clearance.

7

7

There is equal access to employment for qualified women and men for explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD), including of CMR, though women only make up a small
proportion of the sector in Germany, particularly in EOD positions. At Wittstock,
two woman hold an EOD licence, and a further eight female UXO specialists are
engaged operationally – an increase on the previous year. The on-site project
management and clearance supervision company employs one female engineer
and three male engineers.

7

6

Germany has reported on progress to survey and clear CMR contamination in both
its Article 7 reports and in its Article 4 deadline extension request. The request
submitted and granted in 2019 was of a high quality, with clear annual milestones
for clearance, through to Article 4 completion. However, in its Article 7 reporting,
Germany should reduce the annual contamination baseline of CMR contamination,
which has remained at 11km2 for several years, to reflect land released annually
clearance as work progresses. In addition, Germany should report annual clearance
output in its Article 7 reporting, as the CCM requires, and not solely cumulative
clearance output to date.

8

8

Germany has a completion plan in place to address the remaining CMR
contamination, with realistic annual clearance goals, based on forecast capacity
and output.

7

7

Germany is restricted from conducting technical survey or from using mechanical
assets, due to the high level of explosive ordnance contamination at the site, which
includes different types of UXO, with varying spatial distribution of contamination,
resulting from overlapping contamination from multiple weapon types.

6

5

In 2019, Germany requested and was granted a five-year extension to its Article 4
clearance deadline until 1 August 2025. It plans to complete CMR clearance before
the end of 2024, based on existing capacity and subject to available burnt area for
clearance, favourable weather conditions, and the density of the contamination
discovered. In 2019, it cleared 1.21km2, a 60% increase on the previous year, but still
below the annual target in its Article 4 deadline extension request.

7.2

6.9

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 4
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: GOOD

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

The Wittstock site is administrated and project managed
by the Federal Forestry Agency as a subdivision of the
Institute for Federal Real Estate (BImA), with support
from the Central Office of the Federal Government for
UXO Clearance and a consulting engineer.

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

OTHER ACTORS
■

None

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

■
■

Commercial UXO clearance contractors: Röhll
Munitionsbergung GmbH (Brandenburg (Havel)) and
Schollenberger Kampfmittelbergung GmbH (Celle)
On-site project management/clearance supervision
company
Destruction of CMR and other ordnance is the ultimate
responsibility of the Brandenburg state explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) agency: KMBD.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
As at the end of 2019, Germany reported 8.56km2 of remaining
cluster munition-contaminated area at a former Soviet
military training area at Wittstock, Brandenburg, in former
East Germany.1
In its latest Article 7 transparency report, covering calendar
year 2019, Germany reported approximately 11km2 of area
suspected to contain CMR, unchanged from the original
contamination level, despite clearance in 2017–19. However,
while Germany did not specify the amount of remaining CMR
contamination as at the end of 2019 in its Article 7 report, as
required under the CCM, it did report the cumulative CMR
clearance output at Wittstock to-date (2.44km2), allowing
calculation of the remaining contaminated area as at the end
of 2019. 2
A wide range of Soviet-era submunitions have been found
at Wittstock: AO-1 SCh, AO-1 M, AO-2.5, AO-2.5 RTM, AO-10
SCh, ShOAB-0.5, PTAB-1, PTAB-1 M, PTAB-2.5 M, PTAB 2.5 TG,
PTAB-10.5, ZAB 1-E, ZAB 2.5M, ZAB 2.5 S, and ZAB 2.5.3
CMR were discovered “by chance” at Wittstock and declared
in June 2011, first at the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
(APMBC) intersessional meetings and then a week later at
the CCM intersessional meetings.4 From 2011 to early 2014,
suspected CMR contamination was reported to total 4km2.5
In August 2014, however, Germany reported that the total
suspected hazardous area (SHA) was actually 11km2.6 The
increased estimate was ascribed to discovery of submunitions
during non-technical survey across a wider area than
previously reported.7 According to Germany, the dense
vegetation cover and the special hazards posed by CMR and
other explosive ordnance did not allow for technical survey.8
The entire Wittstock site, which extends over 120km2, is
heavily contaminated with various kinds of unexploded
ordnance (UXO), in varying special distribution and overlapping
contamination, as a result of use of the site for military training
purposes in 1945–93.9 The 11km2 of CMR contamination is in
the area of a mock airfield within the site, which was used by
the air force for bombing practice; by the army for artillery
firing exercises; as well as for general military exercises and
training. Usage involved a wide range of munitions over a
period of four decades. Only general information on historical
use of cluster munitions at the site is available and the degree
of contamination from submunitions and other UXO is not
known for a large part of the hazardous area.10

In early October 2011, ownership of Wittstock was transferred
from the military to the federal government authority in
charge of real estate, Institute for Federal Real Estate (BImA).
BImA implemented a risk education programme that included
marking the perimeter and preventing civilian access to the
area, based on a “danger prevention plan”.11 Once safely
released, the site is due to remain part of a “nature protection
area” in the Kyritz-Ruppiner-Heide, managed by BImA as part
of the Europa NATURA 2000 site, under the European Union
(EU) Habitats Directive.12
Persistent delay in initiating clearance of CMR at Wittstock
until March 201713 was ascribed to extensive preliminary
work needed to prepare the area for CMR clearance. Due
to the dense vegetation in the contaminated area, Germany
opted to burn the area in sections, to ensure an unobstructed
view of the ground.14 Preparation for burning and clearance
in turn necessitated a desk study and creation of an
evacuation and access road network in 2013–15, to make the
SHA accessible for clearance operators.15
This was followed in 2015–16 by the creation and maintenance
of an internal site-wide system of firebreaks surrounding
and subdividing the area suspected to be contaminated
with CMR, to prevent uncontrolled forest fires during
prescribed burning of the CMR-contaminated area.16 Owing to
contamination from large items of UXO, the fire-breaks were
created using an unmanned, remote-controlled caterpillar by
an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) contractor in 2016.17
This was completed in 2016, with the exception of a small
forested area on the eastern edge of the SHA.18 In total, 14
ShOAB-0.5 explosive submunitions were discovered during
site preparation, which lasted until the end of 2016.19
The prescribed burning of the first sections of the SHA
started in 2017 and will continue periodically to prepare land
for clearance. It requires special meteorological conditions to
keep the fire under control, and, as such, prescribed burning
can only take place on a few days each year. 20

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Germany has full national ownership of its land release efforts. The Wittstock site is administrated and project managed by
the Federal Forestry Agency as a subdivision of the BImA. The BImA is an institution incorporated under public law and which
is wholly owned by the federal government. 21 The Federal Forestry Agency’s responsibilities include project coordination
and control, risk management, and budget planning. Support is provided by the Central Office of the Federal Government
for UXO Clearance and a consulting engineer. 22 Commercial UXO clearance contractors are contracted and managed by the
local branch of the Federal Forestry Agency, Bundesforstbetrieb Westbrandenburg.23 The Regulatory Agency of the County
of Ostprignitz-Ruppin is responsible for public security under the police law of the federal state of Brandenburg. 24
In Germany, the clearance and disposal of UXO is a security task that is under the control of the police and administrative
legislation and is therefore the responsibility of the respective federal states. Almost all federal states have set up a
corresponding state agency for EOD for these tasks. In Brandenburg, this is the KMBD (an abbreviation for, in English, the
Brandenburg state war material disposal service), which is part of the Brandenburg police. Under German legislation, the
federal government is not allowed to maintain an agency for EOD. 25 Contracting foreign companies for CMR clearance in
Wittstock is also not possible under German law. 26 This limits Germany’s ability to upscale demining capacity by preventing
the contracting of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or overseas commercial expertise.
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GENDER AND DIVERSITY
There is equal access to employment for qualified women and men for EOD clearance in Germany, but women only make
up a small proportion of the sector, especially in terms of the number of qualified female EOD technicians with a licence for
commercial EOD, who reportedly number fewer than 10.30 At Wittstock, two woman hold an EOD licence (required under
the state law on explosives), and a further eight were working operationally as UXO specialists in 2019 (up from one woman
holding a licence and 5 female UXO specialists working operationally in 2018).31 The on-site project management and clearance
supervision company employs four engineers: one woman and three men.32

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Germany uses its own information management system to record the special distribution of CMR, including use of a
geographical information system (GIS).33
Germany provides regular updates on its progress in Article 4 implementation, both in its annual Article 7 reports and in
statements at the Meeting of States Parties. However, in its Article 7 report for 2019,34 Germany again reported cumulative
clearance output for 2017–19, rather than the annual clearance output for the year, as the Convention requires.
Germany submitted a detailed, comprehensive, and timely Article 4 deadline Extension Request, which was considered
and granted by States Parties at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in September 2019. The request detailed progress in
addressing CMR contamination, identified the extent of contamination remaining, and included a detailed and costed work
plan covering the additional time sought, with measurable benchmarks for the extension period.

PLANNING AND TASKING
Germany has developed a national plan for the release of the CMR-contaminated area, as detailed in its extension request, with
annual milestones for the release of areas confirmed or suspected to contain CMR. Based on current clearance projections of
1.5–2km2 per year, CMR clearance is currently expected to be completed by the end of 2024, with associated documentation to
be finalised in 2025.35
A project coordination committee meets on a weekly basis with its core members and monthly with an extended group, to
assess the status of clearance progress as well as the quality of clearance, costs, and milestones compared to the project
plans. Fortnightly reports are disseminated to document clearance and progress.36
Nature conservation requirements limit the controlled burning to a maximum of 200–300 hectares (2–3km2) annually, which,
for safety reasons, is limited to few days per year. Germany plans to burn approximately 250 hectares (2.5km2) per year, to
build up a reserve of burnt areas for clearance.37 In 2019, an adequate amount of heathland was burned, to guarantee sufficient
area for CMR clearance operations in 2020 and 2021.38
Germany planned to clear some 1.2–1.4km2 of CMR-contaminated area in 2020.39 Detailed planning of the specific sections of
the CMR-contaminated area to be cleared is not possible beyond annual planning, because it is determined by the location of
areas that have been burnt, which in turn is contingent on weather conditions on the day of burning.40
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All CMR clearance costs are, though, paid for by the federal BImA. National funding to complete CMR clearance has been fully
secured and is said to cover unforeseen cost increases. Clearance costs were expected to increase from 2021, due to price
inflations expected as part of the new tender planned for commercial UXO clearance. 27 CMR clearance costs have increased
from more than €1.6 million in 2017, to over €9.5 million in 2018, and over €11.5 million In 2019, 28 reflecting the upscaling of
clearance operations. As at October 2018, total forecasted clearance costs to address CMR contamination at Wittstock were
estimated to be more than €67 million, of which €60 million was budgeted for clearance by commercial contractors; €3 million
for engineering costs; and €4.3 million for the disposal of ordnance. 29

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
CMR clearance in Germany is conducted in accordance
with German federal legislation and legislation of the state
of Brandenburg, occupational safety standards of the
German Statutory Accident Insurance Association (Deutsche
Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung, DGUV), and the construction
technical guidelines on UXO clearance of the federal
government (Baufachlichen Richtlinien Kampfmittelräumung
des Bundes). According to Germany, federal and state
legislation is binding and takes precedence over the application
of international health and safety or technical standards.41
The “Guidelines for the Clearance of Unexploded Ordnance
on Federal Properties” are the legal basis for the clearance
of UXO on federal government properties and thus apply to
action on the Wittstock site. In addition, site-specific work
instructions, approved by the KMBD, include detection of
UXO (instruments and their use); handling of submunitions
and other UXO (on-site transport, storage, and disposal);
and documentation.42

The entire area suspected to be contaminated with CMR
has been divided into 50 x 50 metre boxes, each of which
is subject to prescribed burning, followed by sub-surface
clearance.43 CMR clearance started in an area where the
occurrence of CMR was known from earlier finds, and was
conducted outwards in 50 x 50 metre boxes. According to
Germany, to date CMR have been found in almost every
parcel cleared, and therefore technical survey has not been
deemed useful thus far. Germany has declared that if, during
future clearance, areas are often encountered which do not
contain CMR, the method of land release will be changed
to technical survey.44 The smallest target for detector
sensitivity for clearance has been defined as a half sphere
of a ShOAB-0.5 submunition.45
Under state regulation on war material
(“Kampfmittelverordnung”), the transport and disposal
of explosive ordnance in Brandenburg state is the sole
responsibility of the KMBD.46

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In Germany, site clearance (search, discovery, identification,
recovery, and preparation for handover to state agencies
for demolition) is typically conducted by commercial
contractors that meet the requirements of the law on
explosives. There are reportedly only around 1,500 people
working in commercial ordnance clearance in Germany;
mostly small enterprises, which are active regionally.47
Two commercial UXO clearance contractors won the
public tender for CMR clearance at Wittstock: Röhll
Munitionsbergung GmbH (Brandenburg (Havel)) and
Schollenberger Kampfmittelbergung GmbH (Celle). On-site
project management and supervision are provided by a
separate company, which includes a consulting engineer.48
As previously mentioned, disposal, whether through
destruction or other means, is conducted by the KMBD.49
CMR clearance commenced at Wittstock in March 2017, with
nine personnel, which increased to forty in the summer of
2017, and to one hundred in April 2018. As of June 2018,
capacity stood at 120 personnel, with an average daily
clearance rate per person of between 50m2 and 60m2.50
Capacity as at the end of 2019 remained at 120 personnel.51

There are staff shortages for deminers in Germany, in
particular for the specially licenced team leaders required
by German law.52 The 150 demining personnel planned
for deployment at Wittstock represent around 10% of the
overall EOD personnel available in Germany.53 In its Article 4
deadline extension request, Germany has assumed an annual
effective clearance capacity of 140 demining personnel, who
will each work 225 days a year.54 While the current capacity
of 120 is a significant increase since demining operations first
started in 2017, it is still less than 140 personnel clearance
capacity projected in Germany’s extension request.55
Germany did, however, expect to bring on board additional
clearance personnel in 2020, increasing capacity to 135
deminers and then up to 140.56
Subsurface CMR clearance at Wittstock is conducted only
manually. According to federal guidelines, while mechanical
clearance would be possible for clearance of CMR, it is not
possible at Wittstock due to the presence of large quantities
of air-dropped and shaped-charge munitions, which would
pose a hazard to both the operators and the equipment.57

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of 1.21km2 of CMR-contaminated area was cleared in 2019, with the destruction of 1,814 submunitions, all detonated in
situ. No area was released by survey.58

SURVEY IN 2019
No CMR-contaminated area was cancelled through non-technical survey or reduced through technical survey in 2019 or in the
previous year.59

CLEARANCE IN 2019
Germany cleared 1.21km2 of CMR-contaminated area in 2019 and destroyed 1,814 submunitions.60 Clearance output in 2019 was a
significant increase on the previous year, when 0.76km2 of CMR-contaminated area was cleared and 1,537 submunitions destroyed.61
The increase is due to a continued increase in personnel during 2018, which then remained constant throughout 2019.62
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CMR clearance is subject to internal quality control (QC) by the commercial contractors and to external quality control by
an independent engineering company of between 10% and 20% of each 50 x 50 metre clearance box.64

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR GERMANY: 1 AUGUST 2010
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 AUGUST 2020
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 AUGUST 2025
UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

Under Article 4 of the CCM, Germany is required to destroy
all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as
possible, but not later than its extended deadline of 1 August
2025. Germany has said that it is on track to complete CMR
ahead of its Article 4 deadline.65
After extensive and lengthy preliminary work for preparation
of the site for clearance, including survey and a creation of a
fire protection system, Germany finally began CMR clearance
in March 2017. A total of 2.44km2 of CMR contamination
has been cleared since clearance of CMR contamination at
Wittstock commenced (see Table 1).
Table 1: Five-year summary of CMR clearance
Year

Area cleared (km )

2019

1.21

2018

0.76

2017

0.47

2016

0

2015

0

Total

2.44

2

Potential obstacles that could impact Germany’s ability
to meet its new deadline of August 2025 include the very
high levels of CMR and other UXO contamination, including
different spatial distributions and potentially higher levels
of contamination than expected and addressed to date.67
Germany’s clearance plan also assumes that a sufficient
amount of controlled burning is able to take place to meet the
planned clearance output, which has so far been the case.
There is also the potential for the planned clearance schedule
to be negatively impacted due to metrological conditions,
in particular, extended periods of frost, resulting in frozen
ground that cannot be cleared.68
As previously mentioned, there are also challenges posed in
acquiring suitably qualified personnel for clearance, which
could potentially lead to staffing shortfalls. EU procurement
requirements will likely require new tendering of the
clearance at Wittstock in 2020, which could further impact
the number of personnel available.69 Germany confirmed that
a new tender for CMR clearance was planned in 2020.70
As at September 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had not
had any specific impact on Germany’s CMR clearance
operations. Germany has, however, taken measures to adapt
its clearance programme since early February/March 2020,
including by ensuring that:
Employees of the two demining companies are only
allowed to meet in justified exceptional cases.
Permanent clearance teams have been formed within the
two companies. Personnel exchanges are only possible in
exceptional cases.
The clearance teams use separate and permanently
assigned rest and sanitary facilities. These are
disinfected after use.
Most project meetings take place via video conference.

Germany predicts it will take between five years (meaning
completion of clearance in 2023) and six years (completion
of clearance in 2024), based on the estimated 980 hectares
(9.8km2) of remaining CMR contamination as at the end of
2018, and an estimated annual clearance capacity of 140
personnel, working 225 days per annum, at a clearance
rate of 50–60m2 per person per day. This corresponds
to clearance of 1.5–2km2 per annum. Reporting and
documentation relating to clearance efforts are predicted
to be finalised in 2025.66

■

While clearance output of 1.21km2 in 2019 was a significant
increase on the previous year, when 0.76km2 was cleared,
it still fell short of Germany’s planned clearance output,
indicating that Germany may be falling behind target on its
planned Article 4 implementation.

In addition, the usual measures (such as social distancing
rules and public health rules) are observed and their
compliance is monitored. Germany does not expect the
COVID-19 pandemic to affect the output of clearance
operations in 2020. If COVID-19 were to be brought onto the
site, it is assumed that due to the separation of clearance
teams, operations would only be partially affected. However,
Germany also noted that the further course of the pandemic
in Germany cannot be predicted.71

■

■

■
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Of the 1.21km2 cleared in 2019, nearly 0.36km2 was cleared by Röhll Munitionsbergung (Brandenburg (Havel)) and more than
0.85km2 by Schollenberger Kampfmittelbergung GmbH (Celle). In addition to the 1,814 submunitions destroyed, 16,780 items
of other UXO (grenades, rockets, fuses, etc.) and 18 metric tons of fragments were also found and destroyed during CMR
clearance operations in 2019.63
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Clearance
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KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Land released through survey and clearance dropped in 2019 compared with the previous year. Operators also confirmed
21.6km2 of contamination in two governorates.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Iraq should report comprehensively on cluster munition remnants (CMR) survey and clearance, providing data
disaggregated by operator and region for Federal Iraq and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI).

■

Iraq should provide an annual work plan setting out goals for survey and clearance.

■

The Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) should develop a resource mobilisation strategy for tackling cluster
munition contamination.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion
UNDERSTANDING
OF CMR
CONTAMINATION

Score Score
(2019) (2018) Performance Commentary
6

5

Iraq continues to find CMR contamination not previously recorded in the database
underscoring the limitations of initial survey conducted after the 2003 war, but
improved survey is generating more accurate data on CMR hazards.

6

6

The DMA is responsible for planning, tasking, and coordinating mine action but is
overshadowed by powerful government ministries. CMR operations are concentrated
in southern governorates overseen by the Regional Mine Action Centre-South
(RMAC-S), which has engaged constructively with operators on land release
methodologies and priorities.

5

5

The DMA has engaged with international organisations to strengthen gender
diversity in mine action but progress remains slow. Demining operators employ
women in administrative and support roles and community liaison, but opportunities
for employing them in clearance operations depend on regional social norms that
vary according to locality and are particularly limited in the main CMR-affected
governorates in the south.

5

5

Iraq’s mine action authorities operate Information Management System for Mine
Action (IMSMA) data management systems but cumbersome procedures and
reporting gaps can leave operators without access to timely or reliable data. CMR
data, however, are concentrated in the RMAC-S database where operators have
reported improving access and accuracy. Iraq submits regular Article 7 reports
but KRI data is lacking.

6

5

Planning and tasking for survey and clearance of cluster munition affected areas
has benefitted from good coordination between RMAC-S and operators.

7

6

After testing and applying a new technical survey methodology in operations in
2018, based on the Cluster Munition Remnant Survey (CMRS) in south-east Asia,
Federal Iraq adopted it as a national standard in 2019 citing the benefits for accurate
mapping, planning, and clearance.

5

5

Although output dipped in 2019, Federal Iraq has released significant amounts of
CMR-affected areas through survey and clearance.

5.8

5.3

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 4
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■
■
■

Higher Council of Mine Action
Directorate of Mine Action (DMA)
Iraq Kurdistan Mine Action Agency

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■
■
■
■

Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Interior (Civil Defence)
Al Khebra Company for Demining
Al Waha Demining Company
Baghdad Mine Action Organisation
Ta’az Demining Company
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INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■

Danish Demining Group (DDG)
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)

OTHER ACTORS
■

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

STATES PARTIES

Table 1: Cluster munition- contaminated area in Federal Iraq (at end 2018 and 2019) 4
Province

Contamination at end 2018 (m2)

Contamination at end 2019 (m2)

N/R

15,726

Anbar
Babylon
Basrah
Diyala

N/R

290,701

27,851,470

30,512,131

20,076

20,076

Kerbala

2,107,444

2,107,444

Kirkuk

3,418,306

3,418,306

Missan

1,353,148

795,825

101,647,074

83,689,469

Muthanna
Najaf

5,321,629

5,010,038

Ninewa

N/R

4,157,090

Thi Qar

45,433,774

45,188,393

Qadissiya

3,966,337

3,137,824

Wassit

N/R

299,143

Totals

191,119,258

178,642,166

N/R = Not reported

Federal Iraq’s contamination dates back to the Gulf War of 1991 and the United States (US)-led invasion of Iraq in 2003,
following the path of allied forces advance from the south to Baghdad. Coalition aircraft also struck Iraqi army positions
in the northern governorate of Kirkuk. The most heavily affected areas are the southern governorates of Basrah, Muthanna,
and Thi Qar, which account for nearly 90% of Iraq’s CMR contamination. The most commonly found items there are BLU-63
and BLU-97 submunitions. Other CMR found in the area include BLU-61 and M42 submunitions.5

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Cluster munitions, however, make up only a modest part of Iraq’s overall landmine and explosive remnants of war (ERW)
contamination. Four southern governorates alone have close to 1,000km2 of minefield and substantial areas affected by
ERW. Central and northern areas liberated from Islamic State have hundreds of square kilometres affected by mines of
an improvised nature and the KRI reports more than 200km2 of known mined area as well as ERW contamination in areas
bordering Turkey that have yet to be surveyed because of insecurity.6 See Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020
report on Iraq for further information on the mine problem.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The mine action programme in Iraq is managed along regional lines. The DMA represents Iraq internationally and oversees
mine action for humanitarian purposes in Federal Iraq, covering 15 of the country’s 19 governorates.7 Mine action in the KRI’s
four governorates is overseen by the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA), which reports to the Council of Ministers
and is led by a director general who has ministerial rank.
FEDERAL IRAQ
The inter-ministerial Higher Council of Mine Action,8 which reports to the Prime Minister, oversees and approves mine action
strategy, policies, and plans. The DMA “plans, coordinates, supervises, monitors and follows up all the activities of mine
action.” It draws up the national strategy and is responsible for setting national standards, accrediting, and approving the
standing operating procedures (SOPs) of demining organisations and certifying completion of clearance tasks.9
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UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
Federal Iraq reported CMR contamination of 178.64km2 at the end of 2019 (see Table 1), around 7% less than at the end of
2018,1 despite operators newly identifying hazardous areas in two governorates covering 21.6km2. 2 The KRI also has CMR
contamination but the extent is unknown. Iraq provided no data for the KRI but Mines Advisory Group (MAG) conducted CMR
clearance in three Kurdish governorates in 20193 and some areas close to the border with Turkey have yet to be surveyed.

The DMA said it asked the government for $30.6 million
a year for survey and clearance10 but has not reported
how much it received or provided details of government
expenditure on any aspect of mine action.
Coordinating the planning, tasking, and information
management among all the actors has remained a significant
challenge. As a department of the Ministry of Health and
Environment, the DMA has less authority than the politically
powerful Ministries of Defence and Interior, which manage
significant explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and mine
clearance capacity, as well as the Ministry of Oil. Additionally,
the DMA’s status is not formally established by law.11`
Rapid turnover of directors has also hampered management
and policy continuity. Essa al-Fayadh, who was at least the
tenth director since 2003, was transferred to a different office
in February 2019. Deputy Minister of Health and Environment,
Kamran Ali, took over as acting director of the DMA until
June 2019 when Khaled Rashad Jabar al-Khaqani, a former
DMA director, was reappointed to the position. As of June
2020, his appointment had still not been confirmed. The
DMA, meanwhile, appointed a new operations manager in the
second half of 2019 and changes in Iraq’s political leadership
in 2020 raised the possibility of further management changes.
The DMA oversees three Regional Mine Action Centres (RMACs):
■
■
■

North: covering the governorates of Anbar, Diyala,
Kirkuk, Nineveh, and Salah ad-Din.
Middle Euphrates (MEU): Babylon, Baghdad, Karbala,
Najaf, Qadisiyah, and Wassit.
South: Basrah, Missan, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar.

RMAC South, located in Basra City, maintains its own
database and is responsible for tasking operators in its area
of operations. RMAC North and MEU were located in Baghdad
but RMAC North also opened a satellite office in Mosul in
August 2019.12
Federal Iraq’s spending on the DMA and mine action
is unknown. The sector remains heavily dependent on
international donor funding, most of it channelled through
UNMAS and bilateral funding to clearance operators. In
the past two years, the Iraqi government and donors have
given priority to tackling massive contamination by mines of
an improvised nature in areas liberated from Islamic State,
leaving scant resources for tackling ERW contamination in
others areas of Iraq, including the substantial CMR threat in
the south.
KRI
IKMAA functions as a regulator and operator in the KRI.
It reports directly to the Kurdish Regional Government’s
Council of Ministers and coordinates four directorates in
Dohuk, Erbil, Garmian, and Sulimaniya (Slemani). Financial
constraints halved salaries for all staff for the last three
years and resulted in a number of posts being left vacant,
but in 2019 payment of salaries resumed and IKMAA
planned to fill vacant posts.13
IKMAA did not respond to requests for information about
its capacity, priorities, and operating results.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
The Iraq National Strategic Mine Action Plan specifically
refers to gender equality and gender mainstreaming
within mine action activities as objectives of an effective
programmatic response.14 Most operators employ women
in administrative office roles, many also have a significant
representation of women in community liaison and risk
education functions, and some also employ women in
clearance teams, including as team leaders. The extent to
which women participate varies significantly according to
cultural sensitivities in different parts of the country.15
The DMA has had a Gender Unit since 2017. It was led in
2019 by the deputy head of the Planning Department16 and
is said to encourage women to apply for employment in
mine action.17 UNMAS developed terms of reference for the
Gender Unit and designed and implemented a training plan.
It also developed the Gender Unit’s first Action Plan laying
out activities designed to mainstream gender throughout
the DMA. Additional support provided by UNMAS included
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two training workshops for risk education, planning
teams on developing gender-sensitive indicators and
mainstreaming gender issues in their activities. IKMAA also
reportedly established a Gender Committee in 2019 and
UNMAS reported developing terms of reference setting out
responsibilities and a reporting structure.18
UNMAS conducted a baseline assessment of the DMA’s
gender policy and practice in 2019, which concluded it had
succeeded in raising awareness of gender both internally
and in other government institutions engaged in explosive
hazard management. Despite that progress, UNMAS
observed challenges remained for recruitment, promotion
and involving women in all levels of decision-making. UNMAS
observed that “a highly patriarchal society, male dominated
work force and general misunderstanding of what exactly
‘gender in mine action’ means in the day to day practical
application of activities, continues to hinder widespread
changes in mind sets and behaviours”.19

STATES PARTIES

Federal Iraq’s mine action database is located at the DMA’s
Baghdad headquarters. RMAC-S maintains a database in
Basrah, receiving reports from demining organisations in its
area of operations, which is synchronised with Baghdad’s at
intervals determined by the volume of data to be uploaded. 20
Operators are required to submit results to DMA in hard copy
in Arabic delivered by hand every month. DMA then uploads
results manually into the database. The procedure meets
Iraqi legal requirements, which do not recognise electronic
copies, but can cause delays of several months before results
of survey and clearance are uploaded. As a result, operators
say task orders issued by the DMA have often lacked the
most up-to date information. 21

The DMA gave operators access to an online dashboard
presenting mine action data and in 2019 introduced an Online
Task Management System which it claimed as the first in the
world and through which operators can request IMSMA data
relating to specific tasks. Operators said the utility of these
tools was limited by the slow entry of operating results into
the database, the variable quality of data, depending on the
source, and the patchy availability of information on land use
and livelihoods, which is useful for planning and prioritisation
but is not shared systematically. 23
There were big discrepancies between official data (reported
by RMAC-S and in Iraq’s Article 7 report covering 2019) and
results reported by NPA, which appear to reflect delays by
the national authorities in uploading data to the national
database. Furthermore, Iraq’s Article 7 report covering 2019
did not include clearance of CMR-contaminated area by MAG
in the KRI.

In March 2019, RMAC-S started receiving data reports
electronically as well as in hard copy. Improvements in
cluster munitions survey are strengthening the quality of
available data through RMAC-S database. In the mine action
sector in general, operators report limited access to data and
expressed concern about the limited quantity and quality of
data available with task orders. 22

PLANNING AND TASKING
Iraq does not have a strategic plan for clearance of CMR. Few resources have been available for survey and clearance as a
result of the priority given to clearance of areas liberated from Islamic State occupation. 24 Against that background, RMAC-S
said it gave priority to survey to better define contamination and clearance of areas that are close to communities, which have
experienced recent casualties, or where contamination hinders development projects. 25

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Iraq has national mine action standards for mine and battle area clearance (BAC), non-technical survey, and technical survey
but they were written in 2004–05, exist in Arabic only and do not specifically address cluster munitions. However, the DMA has
applied the Cluster Munition Remnant Survey (CMRS) methodology to CM operations since 2018, and in 2019 adopted CMRS as
a national standard citing the benefits it has delivered for survey, planning and clearance. 26

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Iraq provided no information on national organisations engaged in survey or clearance of CMR in 2019 but in Federal Iraq
clearance is undertaken by the Army and the Ministry of Interior’s Civil Defence and all demolitions are conducted by the Army.
In Federal Iraq, donors supported only two international organisations tackling CMR. Danish Demining Group (DDG), working
in Basrah governorate operated with a total staff of 40, including two BAC teams with 24 deminers and two four-person survey
and quality control teams, 27 operations were affected by the suspension of its registration by the NGO Directorate in May 2019,
resulting in the stand down of operations teams for several months. 28
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)’s Basrah-based operation employed a total of 96 staff, including 6 BAC teams with 57 personnel
and two non-technical survey and one technical survey teams, working mainly in Basrah and Muthanna governorates. 29 In the
KRI, only MAG reported working on CMR tasks.30
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The DMA and IKMAA maintain databases using Information
Management System for Mine Action New Generation (IMSMA
NG) with technical support from iMMAP, a commercial service
provider based in Erbil and working under contract to the
United States (US) Department of State’s Office of Weapons
Removal and Abatement (WRA).

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
Iraq reported release in Federal Iraq of 30.67km2 of CMR-contaminated areas in 2019, including 24.48km2 through survey
and 6.2km2 through clearance.31 The total was close to 30% less than the previous year, which Iraq attributed to funding and
capacity constraints. In addition, and not included in Iraq’s Article 7 report, almost 0.4km2 was cleared by MAG in the KRI,
albeit without finding any CMR.
On assessment of the data, Mine Action Review believes that in 2019 no more than an estimated 4.74km2 of CMR-contaminated
area was cleared by international and national operators (see Table 5).

SURVEY IN 2019
Iraq reported releasing 24,478,323m2 through a combination of non-technical and technical survey in 2019. It said all the
release occurred in the southern governorates managed by RMAC-South but gave no other details.32
NPA confirmed 19.88km2 as CMR-contaminated in 2019, a little over half of it in Muthanna governorate and the rest in Basrah33
and DDG identified confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) affecting 1.7km2 in Basrah.34 The two operators released a total of
15.2km2 through non-technical and technical survey (see Table 2), with DDG cancelling 11.2km2 through non-technical survey
in Basrah and NPA reducing 4.1 km2, most of it in Muthanna.35
Table 2: CMR-contaminated area released through survey by international NGOs in 201936
Operator

Governorate

Area cancelled through NTS (m²)

Area reduced through TS (m2)

DDG

Basrah

11,227,925

0

NPA

Basrah

0

169,098

Muthanna

0

3,468,431

Missan

0

426,913

11,227,925

4,064,442

Totals

CLEARANCE IN 2019
Federal Iraq reported release of 6.2km2 through clearance in 2019, 14% less than in 2018, a decline attributed to lack of
capacity and meagre funding. A reported total of 9,905 CMR were destroyed during clearance in 2019. Big discrepancies
between official data (see Table 3) and results reported by NPA (see Table 4) appear to reflect delays by the national
authorities in uploading data to the national database. Mine Action Review believes that in 2019 no more than 4.74km2
of CMR-contaminated area was cleared by international and national operators (see Table 5).
Iraq’s Article 7 transparency report for 2019 did not include KRI data. The clearance that MAG reported conducting in the
KRI is believed to have raised the total area released by Iraq to around 6.6km2 (see Table 3) but did not lead to destruction
of any cluster munition remnants.37
Table 3: CMR clearance in 2019 (as reported by the national authorities)
Region
Federal Iraq

Authority
38

RMAC South

Operator
Al-Khebra

Federal Iraq total
KRI

39

MAG

Totals
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CMR cleared

24,046

8,999

Civil Defence

692,840

DDG

123,535

NPA

5,040,698

Taaz
RMAC MEU

Area cleared (m2)

Baghdad Mine Action

2,654
311,705

6

6,195,478

9,905

385,005

0

6,580,483

9,905

STATES PARTIES

Operator

Governorate

DDG

Basrah

NPA

Basrah, Missan, Muthanna

Area cleared (m²)

Submunitions
destroyed

AP mines
destroyed

Other UXO
destroyed

116,005

25

0

0

Sub-totals
MAG

Diyala, Dohuk, Sulaymaniyah (KRI)

Totals

International operators active in Federal Iraq recorded
less clearance than the amount attributed to them by the
DMA. This is especially the case with NPA (see Table 4).
DDG reported clearance of 116,005m2 with the location of
25 CMR in Basrah governorate in 2019, marginally less than
the previous year.41 NPA’s clearance also dipped to 3.2km2
in 2019, down 15% from the previous year, but the density
of contamination in the tasks it tackled, particularly in
Muthanna, meant that it found more than double the number
of CMR. The levels of contamination identified in Muthanna
prompted the Army, which is responsible for all demolitions
of explosive ordnance, to assign an EOD officer permanently
to NPA’s operations for that purpose.42

3,206,523

1,533

36

886

3,322,528

1,558

36

886

385,005

0

0

385

3,707,533

1,558

36

1,271

Table 5: CMR clearance in Iraq in 2019 (Mine Action Review
calculation)
Operator

Area cleared (m²)

DDG

116,005

NPA

3,206,523

MAG

385,005

Al-Khebra

24,046

Civil Defence

692,840

Taaz

2,654

Baghdad Mine Action

311,705

Total

4,738,778

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR IRAQ: 1 NOVEMBER 2013
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2023
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE

Under Article 4 of the CCM, Iraq is required to destroy all
CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as
possible, but not later than 1 November 2023. The extent
of Federal Iraq’s CMR contamination alone ensures that it
will not complete clearance by its Article 4 deadline in three
years’ time. How much longer it will need will depend on
the levels of funding received from the government and
international donors. Their priority in the last three years
has been tackling dense mine contamination in areas
liberated from Islamic State.
The rate of clearance continued to fluctuate in 2019, dropping
14% in Federal Iraq in 2019. But despite the limited capacity
available for CMR operations, Iraq has released more than
90km2 through survey and clearance in the last three years,
underscoring the potential for accelerating progress towards
fulfilling Iraq’s treaty obligations if donor support enables
more capacity to be deployed for cluster munitions survey
and clearance. The United States and its NATO allies could
provide useful support to the process of survey, planning and
clearance by providing data on their cluster munitions strikes
in the course of the Gulf Wars.43

Table 6: Five-year summary of CMR clearance
Year

Federal Iraq (km2)

KRI (km2)

Totals (km2)

2019

4.3

0.4

4.7*

2018

7.2

0

44

7.2

2017

4.4

0.3

4.7

2016

2.9

0.2

3.1

2015

8.2

0.6

8.8

27.0

1.5

28.5

Totals

* Based on Mine Action Review calculation
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Table 4: International NGO CMR clearance in 2019 (as reported by the operators) 40

1

Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.

21

Interviews with operators in Iraq, 28 April–6 May 2019.

2

Emails from Marie-Josée Hamel, Regional Programme Advisor – Middle
East, Danish Demining Group (DDG), 31 May 2020; Gus Guthrie, Country
Director, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 11 May 2020.

22

Ibid.

23

Emails from international operators, April–June 2020.

24

Statement of Iraq to the Ninth Meeting of States Parties to the CCM,
Geneva, 2 September 2019.

3

Email from Portia Stratton, Country Director, MAG, 20 June 2020.

4

Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.

25

5

Interview with Nibras Fakhir Matrood, Director, DMA RMAC-S, and Haitham
Fattah Lafta, Operations Manager, RMAC-S, Basrah, 29 April 2019; and with
Mats Hektor, Project Manager, NPA South Iraq, Basrah, 28 April 2019.

Interview with Nibras Fakhir Matrood and Haitham Fattah Lafta, RMAC-S,
Basrah, 29 April 2019.

26

Email from Haitham Fattah Lafta, RMAC-S, 12 August 2020.

27

Email from Mohammed Qasim, Programme Manager, DDG Basrah,
29 April 2019.

28

Email from Marie-Josée Hamel, DDG, 31 May 2020.

29

Emails from Gus Guthrie, NPA, and Chris Ramsden, Project Manager NPA
South, 11 August 2020.

30

Email from Portia Stratton, MAG, 28 June 2020.

31

Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.

32

Ibid.

33

Email from Gus Guthrie, NPA, 11 May 2020.
Email from Marie-Josée Hamel, Regional Programme Advisor – Middle
East, DDG, 31 May 2020.

6

Interviews with Nibras Fakhir Matrood and Haitham Fattah Lafta, RMAC-S,
Basrah, 29 April 2019; and Siraj Barzani, Director General, IKMAA, in Erbil,
9 May 2019.

7

DMA presentation to 2015 Mine Action Country Planning Workshop for
Iraq, Istanbul, 13 May 2015; Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD), “Capacity Development Support to National Mine Action
Authorities in Iraq, Phase 1: Initial Assessment Mission”, February 2012.

8

The council is led by the Prime Minister and includes representatives of the
ministries of defence, interior, oil, and environment, as well as the National
Security Adviser and the head of IKMAA.

9

“Document of roles and responsibilities”, undated but 2019, received by
email from the DMA, 13 May 2019.

34

10

Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 Report (covering
2019), p. 71.

35

Emails from Gus Guthrie, NPA, 11 May 2020, and Marie-Josée Hamel, DDG,
31 May 2020.

11

Interviews with the DMA, Baghdad, 3 and 5 May 2019.

36

Ibid.

12

Interview with Gus Guthrie, NPA, in Geneva, 12 February 2020.

37

13

Interview with Siraj Barzani, IKMAA, Erbil, 9 May 2019.

Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F; email from Portia Stratton, MAG,
28 June 2020.

14

National Strategic Mine Action Plan, pp. 12, 18, 20, and 30.

38

Email from Haitham Fattah Lafta, RMAC-S, 11 August 2020; Article 7 Report
(covering 2019), Form F.

15

Interviews with mine action stakeholders in Iraq, 28 April–6 May 2019.

39

Email from Portia Stratton, MAG, 28 June 2020.

16

Email from Shinobu Mashima, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 6 April 2020.

40

17

Email from Peter Smethers, Programme Manager/Country Director, FSD,
20 April 2020.

Emails from Marie-Josée Hamel, DDG, 31 May 2020; Gus Guthrie, NPA,
11 May 2020; and Portia Stratton, MAG, 28 June 2020.

41

Email from Marie-Josée Hamel, DDG, 31 May 2020.

18

Email from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 6 April 2020.

42

Email from Gus Guthrie, NPA, 11 May 2020.

19

Ibid.

43

Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form J.

20

Interview with Nibras Fakhir Matrood, DMA RMAC South, Basrah,
29 April 2019.

44

MAG reported 27,663m2 of clearance for 2018.
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CLEARING CLUSTER
MUNITION REMNANTS
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ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 AUGUST 2025
LAO PDR WILL REQUIRE MULTIPLE EXTENSIONS BEFORE REACHING COMPLETION

KEY DATA

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT
(excluding
commercial
demining)

50

NO RELIABLE ESTIMATE OF
CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATION

SUBMUNITION
CLEARANCE IN 2019

SUBMUNITIONS
DESTROYED IN 2019

45.77KM 80,140
2

(EXCLUDING COMMERCIAL
CLEARANCE)

Area of Land Released (km2)

CLUSTER MUNITION
CONTAMINATION: MASSIVE

45

(INCLUDING 36,313 DESTROYED
DURING SPOT TASKS)

45.77

40
35

36.20

30
25

2018
2019
* Non-technical survey (NTS) and technical
survey (TS) are conducted in Lao PDR, but are
focused on finding evidence of cluster munition
contamination as part of a nationwide survey.
The output of the Cluster Munition Remnants
Survey (CMRS) being undertaken in Lao PDR
is the creation of evidence-based confirmed
hazardous areas (CHAs).

20
15
10
5

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0

Clearance

Technical
Survey*

Non-Technical
Survey*

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
The national programme in the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic (Lao PDR) continued to make solid progress in the
destruction of cluster munition remnants (CMR) in 2019. Lao
PDR was granted a five-year extension to its Article 4 deadline
at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on
Cluster Munitions (CCM). Based on data from national and
international operators, land release by clearance in 2019 was
a 26% increase on the previous year, at more than 45.6km2,
largely thanks to greater capacity resulting from new funding.

Evidence-based survey methodology is now being applied
routinely to identify confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs).
Efforts were also ongoing to clean up historical errors in data
records and strengthen information management systems
and processes. However, the Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) process for international clearance operators remained
excessively time-consuming and burdensome, resulting in
avoidable delays to land release operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Procedures for issuing, amending, or renewing MoUs
should be streamlined to avoid inefficiencies and
excessive delays.

■

The NRA should prioritise the development of a
planning and prioritisation system to support the
CMR survey and clearance process.

■

Cooperation and coordination between clearance
operators should be further strengthened. In
particular, the National Regulatory Authority (NRA)
should ensure that UXO Lao data from historic tasks,
which is not already on the database, be made readily
available to international operators to help inform
survey and clearance operations.

■

The NRA and clearance operators should
strengthen coordination with provincial, district,
and village‐level authorities during implementation
and planning of CMRS and clearance, incorporating
gender considerations.

■

Lao PDR should elaborate annual sector-wide
work plans for survey and clearance of CMR, in
collaboration with its implementing partners.

■

Lao PDR should establish a country coalition,
to bring together all stakeholders on a quarterly
basis to discuss progress and challenges in
Article 4 implementation.

■

The NRA should ensure the Information Management
System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database is
comprehensive and up to date, especially given the
increased volume of data resulting from the ongoing
nationwide cluster munition remnants survey (CMRS).
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion
UNDERSTANDING
OF CMR
CONTAMINATION

Score Score
(2019) (2018) Performance Commentary
7

7

Lao PDR does not yet have a reliable estimate of CMR contamination, but is
undertaking a nationwide survey that should produce an evidence-based assessment
of the full extent of CMR contamination. At least 2,873 villages are believed to be
affected by CMR.

6

7

In 2019, a new Director was appointed both to the NRA and to national clearance
operator, UXO Lao. There is strong national ownership from the NRA and mine
action in Lao PDR is also firmly linked to the government’s sustainable development
planning. However, MoU procedures continued to remain complex and heavy,
causing notable delay and significantly impeding the implementation and expansion
of survey and clearance.

7

7

In early 2019, Lao PDR finalised a manual for trainers on gender mainstreaming in the
UXO Sector. The government also partnered with the Association of South-East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) Regional Mine Action Center (ARMAC) to deliver a Regional Workshop
on Gender Equality and Empowerment in mine action in October 2019, in Vientiane.
Clearance operators report having gender policies in place or are in the process
of implementing such policies, consult with women and girls during survey and
clearance operations, and disaggregate mine action data by sex and age.

6

6

Lao PDR submitted its CCM Article 4 extension request on time and it was granted
at the Meeting of States Parties in September 2019. There are ongoing efforts to
correct historical data in IMSMA and to improve information management systems
and processes to ensure the quality and transparency of data, especially given the
increased volume of data resulting from the ongoing nationwide CMRS. IMSMA
VPN has been introduced, and is now used by all international clearance operators,
which has helped improve the accessibility of data and the speed and quality of data
entry and the reporting process. The National Mine Action Standard (NMAS) on IM
was reviewed and updated in 2019, but might only be formally approved once other
relevant chapters of NMAS have also been updated.

6

6

In its 2019 Article 4 extension request, Lao PDR outlined a work plan for the five-year
extension period, with three potential clearance output estimates, each with
measurable benchmarks, dependent on the level of funding and capacity obtained.
Unfortunately, there was no sector-wide annual work plan for Lao PDR for 2019, as
there had been for 2018, but one was being elaborated collectively in 2020 for 2021.
No comprehensive national-level guidance on the prioritisation of clearance tasks
exists, but a project began in 2019 to create a nationwide prioritisation matrix.

8

8

Lao PDR’s UXO Survey Standards, which specify the minimum standards and
requirements for the survey of all cluster munition-contaminated areas, are well
adapted to the local threat and context and adopt an evidence-based land release
methodology, in line with international best practice. Land release operations in Lao
PDR are conducted by a range of implementing partners, which includes the national
operator UXO Lao; international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), HALO Trust,
HI, MAG, and NPA; commercial clearance operators; and teams of the Lao Army.

8

7

Lao PDR remains focused on the continued nationwide CMRS of CMR contamination,
with the amount of CHA identified increasing by at least 17%, compared to the
previous year. At the same time, clearance output of international clearance
operators in 2019 increased by more than 25% compared to 2018, largely due
to an increase in clearance capacity thanks to DFID funding.

7.1

7.0

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 4
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: GOOD

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■
■

National Regulatory Authority (NRA) Board
National Regulatory Authority (NRA)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■

UXO Lao
Humanitarian teams of the Lao People’s Army
Commercial operators

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■
■
■

OTHER ACTORS
■
■
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The HALO Trust
Humanity and Inclusion (HI)
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
Commercial operators

■

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Tetra Tech

STATES PARTIES

As at the end of 2019, survey had been conducted in 1,966 villages in ten of the most contaminated provinces, resulting in
10,838 CHAs, totalling over 1,115.5km2 of CMR-contaminated area (see Table 1).6 The nationwide survey is ongoing and has
yet to be completed in any province.7 The amount of CHA is expected to continue to increase and may double or even triple
over the next five years.8 As at the end of 2018, 9,284 CHAs had been identified totalling 858km2.9
Table 1: CMR survey results (at end 2019)10
Province

No. of villages

No. of CHAs

Total area (km2)

144

1,429

133.36

Bolikhamxai

24

11

0.90

Champasak

93

297

14.62

Attapeu

Houaphanh
Khammouane
Luang Prabang

72

345

36.49

111

477

82.35

59

205

22.24

Saravan

527

2,066

92.17

Savannakhet

320

3,558

156.68

Xekong

210

1,225

84.11

Xiengkhouang
Totals

406

1,225

492.61

1,966

10,838

1,115.53

In both its 2019 Article 4 deadline extension request and its Article 7 transparency report covering 2019, Lao PDR estimated
that the total CMR contamination is approximately 8,470km2, a figure unchanged since its September 2011 clearance statement
to the CCM Second Meeting of States Parties. As stated above, this figure is, however, increasing as the nationwide survey
progresses and the survey will help determine the extent of cluster munition contamination more accurately.11
Lao PDR certainly has the world’s highest level of contamination by unexploded submunitions as a result of the Indochina
War of the 1960s and 1970s. The United States conducted one of the heaviest aerial bombardments in history, dropping more
than two million tonnes of bombs between 1964 and 1973,12 including more than 270 million submunitions (known locally as
bombies). The failure rate is not known, but Lao PDR reports it may have been as high as 30 percent, and an estimated 80
million submunitions are thought to have remained unexploded at the end of the war.13
During the period of its Article 4 extension request (2020–25), Lao PDR will focus survey on the most heavily contaminated
provinces currently being surveyed, but the remaining affected provinces will also need to be surveyed in order to quantify
the extent of CMR contamination nationwide.14 According to the co-chairs of the UXO Sector Working Group, the United States
and UNDP, significant and efficient planning will be needed if the national survey is to be completed during Lao PDR’s five-year
extension period.15
Through non-technical survey at the village level, the current baseline of CMR contamination is being established through
inclusive consultation with women, girls, boys, and men, including, where relevant, from minority groups.16
According to Lao PDR’s 2019 Article 4 deadline extension request, between the time Lao PDR became a State Party to the CCM
on 1 August 2010 (when the Convention as a whole entered into force) and the end of 2018, a total of 41,088 hectares (410.9km2)
was cleared, with the destruction of 518,368 submunitions. This includes clearance by humanitarian operators, commercial
operators, and humanitarian clearance teams of the Lao Army.17

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Lao PDR also has extensive contamination from other explosive remnants of war (ERW), including both air-dropped and
ground-fired unexploded ordnance (UXO), though the extent of contamination is not known. Clearance operators have
reported the presence of at least 186 types of munition in Lao PDR. These range from 20lb fragmentation bombs to 3,000lb
general-purpose bombs, as well as artillery shells, grenades, mortars, and rockets.18 Lao PDR is also contaminated, but to
a much lesser extent, by anti-personnel mines and anti-vehicle mines (See Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020
report on Lao PDR for more information).
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UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
Lao PDR does not yet have a reliable estimate of CMR contamination,1 but is undertaking a nationwide CMRS that should
produce an evidence-based assessment of the full extent of CMR contamination. 2 US bombing data indicate 70,000 individual
target locations across Lao PDR.3 Fourteen of the country’s eighteen provinces are contaminated: Attapeu, Bolikhamxay,
Champasak, Houaphanh, Khammouane, Luang Prabang, Oudomxay, Phongsaly, Saravan, Savannakhet, Vientiane Capital,
Vientiane Province, Xekong, and Xiengkhouang.4 Of these, nine are heavily affected: Attapeu, Champasak, Houaphanh,
Khammouane, Luang Prabang, Saravan, Savannakhet, Xekong, and Xiengkhouang.5

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The NRA, created by government decree in 2004 and active
since mid 2006, has an interministerial board composed
of representatives from government ministries and is
chaired by the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare.19 The
Prime Minister of Lao PDR approved a new decree, “On the
Organisation and Operations of the National Regulatory
Authority for UXO in Lao PDR” in February 2018. The decree
defines the position, role, duties, rights, organisational
structure, and the working principles and methods of the
NRA. 20 A new Director of UXO Lao was appointed in 2019.
The NRA acts as the coordinator for national and international
clearance operators and serves as the national focal point
for the sector. This includes overall management and
consideration of policy, planning, projects, and coordination
of the implementation of the national strategy nationwide,
as well as NRA planning and coordination functions at the
provincial and district levels. 21 Effective coordination is
particularly needed to help prioritise clearance of the huge
number of CHAs already in the database as a result of the
ongoing CMRS. 22 A new Director of the NRA was appointed
in June 2019. 23
Lao PDR contributed $30,911 towards rental of the NRA office
in 2019 and training of UXO Lao deminers. It also makes
in-kind contributions to mine action through tax exemptions
for visas, and importing vehicles and equipment for
humanitarian operators. 24 Clearance operators are, however,
required to pay visa fees for expatriates and the previous tax
concession of tax exemption for international experts was
removed from all MoUs after 2018. 25
The Lao government adopted UXO clearance as a ninth
Millennium Development Goal in 2010, targeting removal
of all UXO from priority agricultural land by 2020. 26 This
target has not been met, and the nationwide survey to
establish the baseline of CMR, including contamination
in priority agricultural land, is ongoing. Subsequently,
during the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
summit in September 2016, Lao PDR launched sustainable
development goal (SDG) 18, “Lives Safe from UXO”, which
focuses on freeing the country from UXO. The Eighth National
Socio-Economic Development Plan (2016–20) also reflected
the importance of UXO clearance for realising Lao PDR’s
development targets. 27 In its annual report, the government
said that focus in 2019 had been on implementing the
UXO Sector National Strategic Plan, Safe Path Forward II,
2011–2020 in order to further the achievement of the Eighth
National Socio-Economic Development Plan. Priority was
also given to the implementation of the Poverty Eradication
Plan, as well as the SDG 18. In addition, the NRA focused on
the priority development areas, development projects, and
improved agricultural land for Lao ethnic groups. 28
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
provides programmatic and technical support to the NRA
and UXO Lao, including with regard to information sharing
and coordination, albeit at a reduced capacity compared
to previous years. 29 Further capacity development in
information management, quality management, and
operations support, is provided primarily to UXO Lao, and to
a lesser extent the NRA, through a United States (US)-funded
grant manager, Tetra Tech.30 In 2020, the Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) is providing
support to the development of Lao’s new national strategy,
information management, and risk management.31
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There is a UXO Sector Working Group (SWG), led by the
chair of the NRA board, and co-chaired by UNDP and the
US Ambassador in Vientiane, which meets annually and
brings together key stakeholders, including donors, to
share information and enhance coordination and resource
mobilisation.32 The most recent SWG meeting was convened
in August 2020.33 The NRA planned to diversify the sources of
funding throughout the extension period, including engaging
the private sector and non-institutional donors. The Lao
government also planned to approach new potential donors,
such as China, India, and Russia.34
International clearance operators have good cooperation and
coordination with the NRA at the national level but also at
provincial and district levels. Lack of resources and capacity
of some of the provincial NRAs can, however, impact their
ability to fulfil their roles. Humanitarian clearance operators
are involved in key decision-making processes by the NRA,
including though participation in Technical Working Groups
(TWGs).35 There have been four TWGs, namely: for survey
and clearance, information management, UXO/mine risk
education, and victim assistance. The TWGs, which are held
regularly, are designed to promote information sharing and
progress in the four thematic aspects.36 In addition, following
the Second Regional CMRS workshop in 26–30 August
2019, convened by the US Office of Weapons Removal and
Abatement (WRA), a fifth, separate CMR survey working
group was established, involving clearance operators, and
other key stakeholders.37 The survey working group has
been collecting data on the depth at which CMR are found.38
The United Kingdom Department for International
Development (DFID) grant in 2019 has helped to strengthen
cooperation and coordination between clearance operators,
with monthly coordination meetings held with HALO, Mines
Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA).39
Lao PDR also conducted two exchange to Cambodia and
Vietnam in September 2019 and February 2020, which were
considered very useful by all three national authorities.40
Operators were consulted during the elaboration of Lao PDR’s
2019 CCM Article 4 extension request.41 When commenting on
the extension request in September 2019, the CCM Article 4
Analysis group recommended the establishment of a country
coalition in Lao PDR to enhance coordination in implementing
the work plan included in its extension request.”42
Despite some efforts by the NRA to clarify the procedure for
MoUs, MoU procedures in Lao PDR remain lengthy, complex,
and labour-intensive. They continue to cause significant delay
and impede the implementation and expansion of survey
and clearance, including by preventing the procurement
and import of equipment.43 Operators are required to report
and secure approval for completed projects before an MoU
for a new project can be approved. The lack of an MoU
prevents expansion of operations or procurement of new
equipment.44 Typically it takes a minimum of six months for
an MoU to be approved; sometimes it is significantly longer,
and the process may even take several years to complete.
Unfortunately, some donor funding could not be spent in 2019
due to delays in the MoU process and had to be returned
to the donor.45 Furthermore, even after formal approval
of an MoU, operators may still experience challenges
importing necessary equipment46 or small items of additional
equipment, which require time-intensive MoU amendments.47
NPA reported that it took nine months to get three trucks and
two 4x4 vehicles released from customs, even with an MoU.48
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GENDER AND DIVERSITY
While the NRA has yet to develop a gender and diversity
policy, gender is integrated into all core UXO documents
including work plans and the national strategy, and relevant
mine action data is disaggregated by sex and age. Women
are consulted in group discussions as part of survey and
clearance activities, but the needs of women and children
had yet to be fully taken into account for prioritisation and
planning. Of the 41 employees at the NRA, 13 (31%) are
women, including three of the nine NRA Officers.51
Following the establishment of a partnership in 2018 between
UN Women, the NRA, and the Lao Women’s Union on how
to promote gender rights in the UXO sector, a “Manual for
Trainers on Gender Mainstreaming in the UXO Sector, Lao
PDR” was piloted during a workshop in December 2018 and
published in 2019.52
In partnership with government of Lao PDR, ARMAC
delivered a Regional Workshop on Gender Equality and
Empowerment in ASEAN Mine/ERW Action in October 2019,
in Vientiane. The two-day workshop, funded by Canada, with
training led by the GICHD, brought together representatives
from 10 ASEAN member States to share their experience
and approaches to incorporating gender equality and
perspectives into their national mine action programmes.
Participants were encouraged to analyse their work through
a gender lens to consider how projects and activities are
implemented and how the priorities and capabilities of
women, girls, boys, and men and other diverse groups are
accounted for in programme development and design.53
The HALO Trust, HI, MAG, and NPA all reported having gender
policies in place, and that they disaggregate mine action data
by sex and age, and consult with women and girls during
survey and clearance operations.54
HALO reported that all its teams are gender balanced and
there is equal access to employment for qualified women and
men in HALO’s survey and clearance teams in Lao PDR. As
at the end of 2019, HALO Laos employed 222 female national
staff (42%) out of a total of 526, of whom 189 (85%) were
employed in operational roles in survey and clearance teams.
Of the programme’s 20 most senior managerial positions,
half were filled by women.55
HI provides equal opportunities to employment for qualified
women and men in its survey and clearance teams in
Lao PDR, and trains and promotes women to managerial
positions. HI has mixed non-technical survey teams, with
employees of different ethnic origins and persons with
disability, including UXO survivors. It has a commitment to
ensure that 50% of staff trained/recruited are women, and
in 2019–20 was conducting in-house EOD-2 training that
involves three women and three men recruited in 2018 for
the Houaphanh project. Overall, women account for half of
HI’s survey and clearance personnel in Lao PDR and half of
managerial level/supervisory positions.56

MAG employed a weighted application system during its
recruitment process for the new DFID grant in early 2019, in
order to prioritise groups in Lao society that are traditionally
disadvantaged. It devised a scoring system for use during the
newly introduced electronic shortlisting process, awarding
points for indicators of disadvantage (e.g. single parents/
widows, ethnic minorities, those from flood-affected villages,
low level of education, and women), helping ensure more
members of disadvantaged groups were interviewed. The
shortlist scores were also considered alongside the interview
scores, helping to offset the disadvantage that individuals
with low literacy or little interview experience face. Overall,
women account for 37% of operational roles in MAG’s survey
and clearance teams in Lao PDR and 44% of managerial
level/supervisory positions (26% of operational managers
and 50% of support managers).57
NPA’s Lao PDR programme has a Gender Action Plan
2019–20 and in November 2019 a one-day workshop on
gender mainstreaming and equality was held for all 350
NPA field staff in Pakse. The training provided staff with
an introduction to gender mainstreaming in mine action,
including promoting women’s leadership in the UXO sector.58
NPA also prioritises ethnic and language minorities, and
women, as part of its recruitment process. While NPA survey
and clearance teams are gender inclusive, they are not
yet gender balanced. In 2019, women made up over 26% of
NPA Lao PDR’s staff members, an increase from 2018. This
included 79 women (27%) in a total of 296 operational staff,
9 women (22%) in a total of 40 support staff, and 2 women
(25%) in a total of 8 expatriate staff members. Approximately
30% of managerial positions in the programme were held
by women.59
UXO Lao ensures that all groups affected by CMR
contamination, including women and children, are consulted
during its survey and community liaison activities. This
requirement is included in its standing operating procedures
(SOPs). UXO Lao also ensures its survey and community
liaison teams are inclusive and gender balanced, to facilitate
access and participation from all groups.60 UXO Lao reported
that it offers employment opportunity to all and is trying
to increase the number of women in survey and clearance
teams and in management positions.61 UXO Lao said that it
advocates for equality in the workplace and that its human
resource policies encourage female applicants at all levels,
and has one female unit chief. Of its 1,396 staff employed,
371 (27%) are female, of whom 74% work in the field: seven
as team leaders and three as specialist explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD) personnel.62
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Donors have urged the Government of Lao PDR to facilitate the MOU process, however guidelines continued to change for
each MoU process. The NRA acknowledged delays and accepted that improvements could be made on the part of the national
and local authorities involved in the MoU process. However, the NRA has said previously that some of the delays are due to
incorrect reporting or a failure to follow correct MoU guidelines by clearance operators.49 MoUs for The HALO Trust and NPA
were finally signed on 21 June 2019.50 MoUs with Humanity and Inclusion (HI) and MAG were signed previously.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The national IMSMA database has several data problems,
including incorrect or incomplete historical data (mainly that
of UXO Lao data stored as hard-copy documents in provincial
UXO Lao offices); missing data from the migration to IMSMA;
and delays in entering corrected data into the database.63
The NRA has identified the need for better quality control of
data in the IMSMA database.64 It is reported to be continuing
to improve data quality, focusing again on the quality of forms
and correcting data errors in 2020.65 It has also stressed that
upgrading information management systems will be crucial
given the greatly increased volume of data resulting from
the ongoing nationwide CMRS.66 The TWG on information
management met quarterly in 2019.67
A 2017 report by Sterling International, the former US
contractor before Janus and Tetra Tech, said analysis of data
in the NRA IMSMA database found errors affecting up to 9,300
entries, or 14% of the 67,000 entries on the database. Sterling
believed that the errors could affect 22% of the area recorded
in the database as cleared or technically surveyed. The
errors included operators’ misreporting of coordinates and
mistaken entry of reports into IMSMA. Other errors included
use of the wrong GPS format or the wrong map datum. The
result was to put many tasks in the wrong location. Sterling
found that the errors occurred mostly with UXO Lao’s work,
and mostly between 2004 and 2010, but that it affected
“many” organisations.68 Efforts to correct historical data
within IMSMA (including incorporation of correct current
data) are ongoing. It is also important that village-level data
corrections made by operators during the nationwide CMRS
are updated in IMSMA in a timely manner.69
When the organisation conducting the CMRS is different to
the one holding historical records, the nationwide CMRS
demands good cooperation and timely sharing of data
relating to villages between clearance operators. This
pertains to historical information on EOD roving tasks, area
clearance, and accident data.70 Communication between
international operators and UXO Lao is continuing to improve.
However, while UXO Lao does provide its data on historical
tasks to international operators to help inform desktop
studies before sending in survey teams, data is often slow
to be made available.71 Delays in the timely provision of
historical data by UXO Lao are understood to be partly
connected to the lack of an appropriate and clear structure
for the granting of permissions for data sharing at the
provincial level. UXO Lao reported that it is not permitted to
share corrected data not in IMSMA directly with operators,
unless approval is granted by the NRA.72

With capacity development support from NPA, revisions to
the Information Management (IM) NMAS were submitted
to the NRA for consideration in 2019, and will be formally
approved once other relevant chapters of NMAS have also
been updated. IM SOPs for the NRA, including IM process
maps and guidelines, were also drafted and submitted
for translation into Lao as well. The UXO sector is said
to be positive about the revised draft IM NMAS which
better defines the minimum requirements, and roles and
responsibilities of different organisations in IM.73
International clearance operators believed there was scope
for the data gathering forms to be strengthened to also
ensure socio-economic and impact data is also available
for use in planning and prioritisation.74 As at May 2020, final
proposed revisions to IMSMA forms had been accepted
by the NRA, but not officially approved yet. Collection of
socio-economic data started in June 2020,75 but as at August
operators had still to receive any revised IMSMA forms with
added socio-economic data.
Following additional NPA capacity development in 2019
under DFID funding, four provincial authorities in the south
are now in a position to access and use the IMSMA database.
The same training package and approach was also used to
conduct IMSMA training in the remaining 11 provinces by
the NRA.76
Operators reported that data submitted to the NRA were
typically updated in a timely manner and accurately.77 IMSMA
VPN was tested from July to September 2018, with technical
support from NPA, and was considered successful and
subsequently rolled out. As at August 2020, all operators,
except for UXO Lao, were using IMSMA VPN.78 It has helped
improve the accessibility of data, the speed and quality of
the data entry, and the reporting process, with crosschecks
raising any discrepancies for correction.79 However, IMSMA
is still not fully accessible to operators, who can only access
their own data in the system and have to formally request the
additional data.80
Expanding the use of IMSMA to support survey planning and
the review of all historical operational data (both electronic
and paper), will help ensure that non-technical survey is
followed up by robust technical survey operations.81 In
addition, the information management system in Lao PDR
must also be equipped to record operator conclusion reports,
in order to know how many villages have been surveyed.82
The NRA’s IM unit has a system in place to record conclusion
reports, but not all operators submit the information.83
Lao PDR provides regular updates on its progress in Article
4 implementation, both in its annual Article 7 transparency
reporting and in statements at the CCM meetings of States
Parties. It submitted a timely CCM Article 4 deadline
extension request, which was granted at the CCM Ninth
Meeting of States Parties in September 2019.
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Safe Path Forward II was reviewed in June 2015, when the
NRA set a number of specific targets for the remaining five
years up to 2020.84 Many of these were superseded in March
2016 when the NRA issued a landmark paper committing to
time-bound nationwide non-technical and technical survey
through the CMRS project, with a view to producing Lao
PDR’s first baseline estimate of CMR contamination.85 There
was a corresponding multi-year work plan 2016–20 for
implementation of the Safe Path Forward II strategy,86 which
called for spending on clearance of $57 million, and targeted
clearance for 2017−21 of 45km2 a year, considerably in excess
of previous clearance rates.87
A new national strategic plan for the UXO Sector is being
elaborated for 10 years, in line with SDG 18 under the 2030
SDG agenda.88 A GICHD-facilitated strategy stakeholder
workshop, planned for March 2020 in Vientiane, unfortunately
had to be postponed due to the COVID-19 outbreak. As a
result of continued travel restrictions related to COVID-19,
the GICHD was planning to support the NRA by facilitating an
online strategy stakeholder workshop before the end of 2020.
This workshop will result in a “theory of change” approach
that will provide the foundation for Lao PDR’s new national
strategy.89 Through its US-funded agreement between Tetra
Tech and the NRA, the United States is continuing to “support
the Lao Government as it formulates its 10-year National
Strategic Plan for the UXO Sector, a plan that will map the
path to achieving SDG 18 – the elimination of UXO as a barrier
to national development by 2030.”90
In a positive development, a first-ever sector-wide annual
work plan for Lao PDR for 2018 was developed in an inclusive
manner with input from all relevant stakeholders and
subsequently approved by the NRA Board.91 Unfortunately,
stakeholders were not bought together to help inform
elaboration of the annual sector-wide work plan for 2019, in
the same way as for 2018, reportedly due to lack of budget.
Instead the ministry collected the data to inform the 2019
plan.92 A consultative workshop was, however, held in June
2019 to support the development of the sector-wide work
plan for 2020;93 and a workshop was also held in September
2020 with all stakeholders, including UXO Lao and the four
international NGOs, to discuss elaboration of a sector-wide
work plan for 2021.94
In 2018, Lao PDR began a national CMRS baseline survey,
with funding from the United States, and the baseline
survey is ongoing. The first phase of the survey involves six
province-wide surveys (in Attapeu, Champasak, Saravan,
Savannakhet, Xekong, and Xiengkhouang) by HALO Trust,
MAG, and NPA of all villages suspected or confirmed as
CMR-contaminated, according to the NRA’s village list.95 In
September 2018, Lao PDR announced that three additional
contaminated provinces would be added to the national
survey plan in 2019 and another five provinces in 2020–21,
with the aim to have 14 provinces fully surveyed by end of
2021.96 However, survey has fallen behind schedule.97

According to Lao PDR’s 2019 Article 4 deadline extension
request, “all sector activities are implemented in order to
achieve SDG18 “Lives Safe from UXO”, to remove the UXO
obstacle to national development and the activities should
be implemented in line with the strategic documents and
policies”.98 The UXO Sector has been further integrated into
the national development agenda, such as the National Policy
on Rural Development and Poverty Eradication, including the
National Socio-Economic Development Plan (2016–20), on the
approval of priority development areas.99
WORK PLAN ESTIMATES FOR THE EXTENSION REQUEST
PERIOD (2020–25)
Lao PDR’s CCM 2019 Article 4 extension request includes
a five-year work plan for survey and clearance, with
progress dependent on the level of funding it secures.
There will be a strong concentration on survey during the
extension period, with a focus on the six most contaminated
provinces to be completed as soon as possible, followed by
the others. Clearance will take place simultaneously with
survey activities.100
Based on existing capacity, over the five-year period of
Lao PDR’s extension (1 August 2020–31 July 2025), 25
non-technical survey teams will survey 1,463 cluster
munition contaminated villages (292 villages per year), at a
total cost of US$4.5 million and 76 technical survey teams
would survey 2,873 villages at a predicted total cost of
US$38 million (US$7.6 million per year). Re-survey is to be
conducted as required, if new evidence of CMR is reported
and found.101
As at the end of 2018, more than 9,284 CHAs, equivalent
to 858km2 in size, had already been identified through the
ongoing CMRS and entered into IMSMA, representing several
years of clearance efforts based on current clearance
capacity. The NRA predicts that the number of CHAs
containing CMR will significantly increase during the five-year
period of the extension request, at a rate far faster than the
CMR-contaminated areas can be cleared.102
In its 2019 Article 4 extension request, Lao PDR outlines
three different estimates for CMR clearance, based on three
different scenarios for available resources. The first outlines
predicted clearance output based on existing resources
during 2020–25; namely 108 teams, with a total clearance
output of 50km2 per annum, at a cost of US$12.5 million per
year. This would result in clearance of 250km2 at a cost of
$62.5 million, during the five-year extension request period.103
This seems highly ambitious, based on current output.
The second estimate predicts clearance output based on the
additional resources needed to address the 800km2 of CHA
already recorded in IMSMA as at end of 2018. This would see
annual clearance output incrementally increased from 60km2
per annum in 2020 to 280km2 per annum in 2024, with total
clearance output of 800km2 during the five-year extension
request period, at a total cost of US$200 million.104
The third estimate predicts clearance based on the additional
resources needed to address 1,600km2 of CHA, which
includes the further 800km2 of CHA predicted to result from
CMRS during the five-year extension request period, at a total
cost of US$400 million.105
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PLANNING AND TASKING
As part of efforts to implement the CCM Vientiane and
Dubrovnik Action Plans, the Lao Government adopted
“Safe Path Forward II, 2011–20”, a 10-year national strategy
for the UXO sector. The strategy’s goal is “to reduce the
humanitarian and socio-economic threats posed by UXO to
the point where the residual contamination and challenges
can be adequately addressed by a sustainable national
capacity fully integrated into the regular institutional
set-up of the Government.”

Prioritisation of clearance is a critical step in the land
release cycle and a key component of an integrated
survey and clearance programme, especially given the
large and increasing number of CHAs produced by the
ongoing nationwide CMRS. However, at present, there is no
comprehensive national-level guidance on the prioritisation
of clearance tasks and prioritisation systems and criteria
vary markedly between the operators.106 The co-chairs
of the UXO Sector Working Group, the United States and
UNDP, believe a prioritisation plan will need to be developed
for the entire UXO Sector, including both commercial and
humanitarian operators.107 The sector would benefit from the
strengthening of the capacity and participation of the NRA at
the provincial level and of district officers from the Labour
and Social Welfare authorities. Operators also stressed the
need for community participation in the process.108 The NRA
acknowledges difficulties in sector planning and prioritisation
by local authorities.109 Prioritisation workshops commenced
in 2019 and continued into 2020, and a plan was currently
being developed.110

Under the new DFID contract which commenced in 2019,
NPA is assisting the NRA in developing national capacity and
creating a nationwide prioritisation matrix, with input from
fellow DFID consortium partners, HALO Trust and MAG.111
However, due to a delay in the MoU process and the resulting
reduction in the implementation timeframe of the DFID
capacity development project, the planning and prioritization
outputs of the DFID-related work plan were reduced.112
Clearance operators expected the issue of a nationwide
prioritisation matrix to gather further traction during 2020.
As at August 2020, the prioritisation matrix was still being
elaborated.113
At the micro level, prioritisation of clearance tasks in Lao
PDR is in part dictated by the wet and dry seasons. During
the dry season, operators are able to access and clear paddy
fields, while in the wet season, they focus on clearing grazing
and community land.114

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
The “Lao PDR UXO Survey Standards” (UXO Survey
Standard No. 21/NRA) specify the minimum standards
and requirements for the survey of all cluster
munition-contaminated areas in Lao PDR.115 The standards
were developed in a participatory manner with assistance
and input from the mine action community in Lao PDR and
were completed in September 2017, before being officially
approved by chair of the NRA on 4 July 2018.116 The standards
are said to conform to the International Mine Action
Standards (IMAS)117 and are fully reflected in the SOPs
of clearance operators, who reported that they are well
adapted to the local threat and context.118

The survey approach has been strengthened over the last
couple of years, with more emphasis on the importance
of desk assessment of historical data and comprehensive
non-technical survey. Technical survey is only carried out
based on CMR evidence points and is also conducted on
whole villages.124 Technical survey works outwards from
the initial evidence point, searching no less than 50% of each
50 metre by 50 metre box with a detector, with emphasis on
finding a submunition. As soon as a submunition is found,
technical survey moves to the adjacent boxes. If cluster
munition fragments are found, searching must continue until a
submunition is found or at least 50% of the box is covered.125

The NRA plans to formally review the national standards at
least every three years, in collaboration with stakeholders,
to ensure they evolve to meet changing circumstances and
the introduction of new technologies and methodologies.119
MAG said that the NRA had planned to review and revise the
national standards in 2020, in collaboration with NGOs, but
this was postponed due to the impact of COVID-19.120

Operators continue to refine their cluster munition survey
methodology in a bid to accelerate operations, including using
the technique of “skipping boxes”, in which teams finding
CMR in one survey box skip one or more of the immediate
neighbouring boxes and then survey the next box. Skipping
boxes is permitted in the national survey procedure, and
where appropriate has now become standard practice for
technical survey teams, where the focus is on identifying the
boundaries of CHAs.126

Prior to 2014, UXO operators in Lao PDR primarily carried
out general survey on areas intended for clearance and
roving clearance tasks, based on request and reports from
villagers.121 CMRS has resulted in clearance being directed
to cluster munition strikes, across land boundaries where
necessary, and away from the clearance of areas with low
or no CMR contamination. There has been a significant
improvement in the number of CMR destroyed per hectare
cleared since 2015.122 As part of the new CMRS procedure,
and the corresponding national standard, non-technical
survey is to be carried out on whole villages (i.e. all land
within a village boundary), not just individual areas of
land, with the aim to identify evidence points for follow-on
technical survey. An additional aim during survey is to
correct errors or omissions in historical data in IMSMA
or in operator files.123
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CHAs are established based on red boxes and include a
50-metre fade-out from the place submunitions are found
during technical survey, unless fade-out extends into
inaccessible or commercial concession areas (responsibility
for survey and clearance in commercial concession areas is
then that of the concession holder).127
According to the national survey standards, clearance
must only be conducted in CHAs, unless either “official
agreements with the NRA permit a dispensation” or “the UXO
clearance is being paid for by a client and 100% clearance
without survey is a requirement of the agreement”.128
The NRA maintained the need to retain some flexibility to
accommodate donor stipulations which sometimes require
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Except in the case of permanently inaccessible land or
commercial concession areas, CHAs that are incomplete or
have not been created using the technical survey process
are not to be entered into IMSMA.131 Interpretation and
understanding as to what constitutes “inaccessible” is not
clearly defined and can vary between clearance operators,132
but according to the national survey standards, dense
vegetation and seasonal flooding are not valid reasons for
the non-completion of technical survey.133 Clearance teams
deployed to CHAs are required to have the knowledge and
necessary equipment to operate in difficult areas such as
steep hillsides and dense jungle terrain, which requires strong
monitoring mechanisms to ensure that the physical obstacles
do not reduce the quality of the survey and clearance work.134
The minimum clearance depth in Lao PDR depth is 25cm,
which is intended to capture all surface and shallow CMR
contamination.135 There is said to be recognition of the need
for a review of the minimum survey and clearance depth,
which currently stands at 25cm. Reviewing empirical data on
the depths of submunitions found and their condition (i.e. the
degradation factor), would support any review process.136
With regard to completion of CHAs/cluster munition
footprints, international clearance operators reported
difficulty conducting CMRS in certain areas, due to national
security or restrictions to access land due to cultural
sensitivities and beliefs.137 Furthermore, in technical survey
tasks in areas of massive contamination, with overlapping
strikes, it is not always possible to continue to fade-out, as
the confirmed areas extend too far.138

HI has suggested that as CMRS can be time consuming,
clearance could replace CMRS earlier where it is well
established that there is CMR contamination, as clearance
would cover the entire CHA anyhow, including a 50m buffer
zone.139 Similarly, in places with severe contamination, UXO
Lao is in favour of having the option to forego survey and
move directly to clearance.140
Based on the areas in which it is operational, NPA
reported that typically CHAs cover the strike area and
submunitions are not being found outside of CHAs polygons
during clearance;141 an indication of the effectiveness of
evidence-based survey.
MAG uses Evidence Point Polygon (EPP) mapping
methodology to support CMRS planning. The technique,
pioneered by MAG, uses historical and ongoing operational
data from GPS-recorded EOD spot tasks involving
submunitions to plot what are termed Initial CHAs (iCHAs).
Within the boundaries of iCHAs, including fadeout, no
technical survey is required, resulting in time and resources
efficiencies. However, in order to be effective, this technique
relies on accurate and reliable EOD spot-task data, which is
not always available. In areas where MAG is applying EPP
mapping, it uses its own EOD data.142
According to the NRA, understanding of the CMRS process,
especially at the local and field levels, is sometimes limited.143
Stakeholders across the mine action sector in Lao PDR
agreed on the importance of strengthening coordination with
village authorities as an integral component of the survey
process, ensuring that communities understand and accept
the results of survey. It is especially important that villagers
fully understand that, despite demolition of UXO during
the CMRS process, CHAs identified through survey remain
hazardous until full clearance has taken place, which may
not be for many years.144

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Land release operations in Lao PDR are conducted by a range of implementing partners, which includes humanitarian
operators such as the national operator UXO Lao; international NGOs, HALO Trust, HI, MAG, and NPA; commercial clearance
operators; and humanitarian teams of the Lao People’s Army.145
With regard to survey capacity in 2019: The Lao Army 58 (humanitarian demining unit) deployed one non-technical survey
team, totalling five personnel and four technical survey teams totalling twenty-eight personnel;146 HALO deployed 2
non-technical survey teams, totalling 4 personnel and 15 technical teams, totalling 134 personnel;147 HI had 1 non-technical
survey team of 2 personnel and 1 technical survey team of 6 personnel;148 MAG had 4 non-technical survey teams, totalling
19 personnel and 22 technical survey teams, totalling 176 personnel;149 NPA had 24 CMRS (non-technical survey and
technical survey) teams totalling 120 survey personnel (5 searchers per team, excluding team leaders);150 and UXO Lao
had 10 non-technical survey teams totalling 42 personnel (including team leaders) and 16 technical survey teams totalling
177 personnel (including team leaders).151
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full clearance of UXO in non-CHAs, for development projects
such as schools, and there is an official procedure for such
instances.129 In late 2016, the Prime Minister issued Order
No. 43/PM, which stipulates that development projects in
provinces and districts affected by UXO must undergo survey
and clearance before project implementation, and these
development projects must also allocate funding for survey
and clearance.130

Table 2: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2019152
Operator

Manual teams

Total clearance personnel

5

45

45

20

218

0

HALO’s clearance capacity increased from
4 to 20 teams from June 2019, due to the
DFID funding. Medics are included as HALO
has technician medics.

2

10

0

In addition, two drivers are trained in clearance.

MAG

30

240

2

MAG’s clearance capacity increased in both
Xieng Khouang (11 new teams) and Khammouane
(12 new teams) provinces, due to DFID funding.
Mechanical assets refer to two JCBs.

NPA

9

108

0

From January-June seven teams were
deployed, with two additional teams deployed
from July with DFID funding.

85

850

2* 10 members for each team (1 team leader,
1 deputy team leader, 1 medic, 1 driver, and
6 deminers). *Two Komatsu tracked excavators
that have been fitted with an attachment to crush
BLU-26s and other small submunition types.

Lao Army 58
HALO

HI

UXO Lao

Total

Machines Comments
Capacity increased to 7 teams from
November 2019.

More than 1,471
clearance personnel

N/K = not known

UXO Lao, the oldest and largest clearance operator in Lao
PDR, is a government organisation operating under the
Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare,153 operating in nine
provinces (Attapeu, Champasak, Houaphanh, Khammouane,
Luang Prabang, Savannakhet, Saravan, Xekong, and
Xiengkhouang).154 In Luang Prabang, UXO Lao operates with
funding from Norway and management support from NPA.155
A new Director of UXO Lao was appointed in 2019.
The HALO Trust’s survey and clearance efforts are focused
on Savannakhet province, where in 2019 it operated in
the districts of Nong, Phin, Sepon, and Vilabouly, and also
expanding operations into Atsaphantong and Phalanxai.156
HI is conducting survey and clearance in Houaphanh
province, where it also provides capacity building support
to the provincial NRA, through provision of equipment and
training in information management and quality management.
HI also conducted a needs assessment mission in Phongsaly
Province with the NRA in October 2019, and implements
projects in Champasak, Savannakhet and Vientiane
Provinces, relating to other fields (such as disability
inclusion and health and rehabilitation).157
MAG is the largest international survey and clearance
operator in Lao PDR, and is operational in Xiengkhouang
province, in the north, where it is conducting technical survey
of all villages as part of the nationwide survey project and
Khammouane province in the south where its main focus
in 2019 was on surveying 30 priority villages in Boulapha
district, one of the most heavily contaminated areas in Lao
PDR.158 In addition to its own teams, MAG subcontracted
two NPA technical survey teams from September 2018 to
February 2019, in a six-month project under the Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs grant to carry out CMRS in
Khammouane province.159 As at March 2019, MAG had
assumed all of the activities under the project and was
conducting both survey and clearance.160
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NPA is operational in the four southern and heavily
contaminated provinces of Attapeu, Champasak, Saravan,
and Xekong. It expanded operations into Champasak from
July 2019. As mentioned above, NPA was also subcontracted
by MAG to carry out CMRS in Khammouane for six months,
after which MAG conducted follow-on clearance of the CHAs
created by NPA. This joint, fixed-term project was completed
in February 2019. NPA also acts as the project coordinator
for Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ bilateral support
to Lao PDR, through UXO Lao’s operations in Luang Prabang,
in the north of the country.161 In addition to its survey and
clearance operations, NPA supports capacity development of
the NRA and UXO Lao. NPA increased capacity development
support in 2019 under new DFID funding, in particular with
respect to information management.162
The capacity of the Lao armed forces was increased from
five to seven humanitarian demining teams in November
2019, funded by the Lao PDR Ministry of Defence.163 According
to the NRA, the humanitarian clearance teams of the Lao
Army are a valuable asset, conducting survey and clearance
in the same way as national and international clearance
operators, and with good coordination between the NRA
and the army. In addition, the army was being trained to
use IMSMA. Lao Army teams (completely separate to the
humanitarian teams) not coordinated by the NRA started
clearance of UXO to enable construction work on the $6
billion Laos-China high speed railway.164
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The use of drones is now permitted to assist CMR operations in Lao PDR, but requires several separate certifications and
licenses before approval for an MOU can be sought from the NRA.168 MAG secured a drone permit in late 2019, but as of June
2020 was not yet using the drone for survey or clearance operations.169 HI had yet to secure approval from local authorities
for the use of drones to secure disposal sites and EOD spot tasks, but was continuing efforts.170

DEMINER SAFETY
One member of MAG staff was injured in an accident in September 2019 when a BLU3B fuse which was thought to be scrap
metal exploded. The quality management (QM) team of the NRA investigated the accident, using an accident collection form.
The incident was also thoroughly investigated in line with MAG’s SOPs and the findings were shared with the NRA, and other
operators were briefed on the incident.171

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
According to NRA figures, total release of CMR in 2019 through humanitarian clearance was nearly 46km2, with the destruction
of 42,085 submunitions. A further 19km2 was released through commercial clearance, with the destruction of 1,742
submunitions. See table 4 below.172 In addition, 36,313 submunitions were destroyed during spot tasks and survey.173
The total combined number of submunitions destroyed during non-technical survey, technical survey, clearance, and spot
tasks in 2019 was reported as 80,140.174

SURVEY IN 2019
A total of more than 245.82km2 of CHA containing CMR was identified in 2019 (see Table 3);175 an increase on the equivalent
210km2 of CHA containing CMR identified in 2018 (but which excluded the Lao Army 58 data, which was not available).176 For
the purposes of reporting, the 5,195 submunitions destroyed during non-technical survey and 24,591 submunitions destroyed
during technical survey in 2019 are already included in the 36,313 submunitions destroyed during spot tasks, in the NRA’s
annual UXO sector report for 2019.177
Table 3: Technical survey of CMR-suspected area in 2019178
Operator

Area surveyed
(m2)

Area identified
(m2)

Submunitions
destroyed

Bombs
destroyed

Other UXO
destroyed

Mines
destroyed

Lao Army 58

1,857,500

387,500

72

0

0

0

HALO Trust

41,907,500

13,223,202

2,860

32

648

1

1,567,500

783,750

92

0

8

0

HI
MAG

164,213,561

167,610,011

13,352

0

33

0

NPA

64,593,000

22,648,964

3,153

4

260

0

UXO Lao

60,575,325

41,169,405

5,062

2

1,172

0

334,714,386

245,822,832

24,591*

38

2,121

1

Totals

* Already included in clearance data totals
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From October 2018 to March 2019, Russian and Lao armed forces worked in partnership to survey and clear 1km2 of land
in Bolikhamxay province, with equipment supplied by Russia. The partnership project is part of a broader framework
of cooperation between the governments and armed forces of the two countries.165 During October 2018 to March 2019,
servicemen from the International Mine Action Centre of the Russian Armed Forces completed joint tasks with members of the
U-58 mine clearance team of the Laos People’s Army. Russia reporting clearing just over 1km2 in Lao PDR, during which 344
items of explosive ordnance were destroyed. As part of the same project, it also reported training 20 deminers from the Lao
PDR Army and provided demining equipment.166 The partnership has continued and in 2020 the Russian and Lao Armed Forces
were conducting a joint project in Xiengkhouang province.167

As at June 2020, HI had identified 44 suspected minefields in 19 villages, during non-technical survey in Houamuang district of
Houaphanh province, where it is currently operating.179 HI was forced to suspend technical survey of CHAs in early 2019, due to
the discovery of landmines during clearance of CHAs. Technical survey of the suspended CHAs only recommenced in late 2019,
in areas identified as safe from mines, for example where land was in agricultural use. HI also developed a new “clearance
while surveying” (CWS) procedure, to allow for safe release of CMR contamination in areas where there is a potential risk of
landmines. CWS involves the commencement of full clearance from the CMR evidence point.180 HI believes that the NRA should
coordinate and organise training, and adjust the standards accordingly, with regard to CMRS in areas also affected by mines.
In 2019, NPA nearly doubled the amount of land covered by technical survey, compared to 2018 (when survey only started
in June, due to the delay in adopting the national standard). It concluded survey in 270 villages in 2019, compared to 70
the year before.181

CLEARANCE IN 2019
In 2019, a total of nearly 45.77km2 of CMR contamination was cleared by humanitarian NGOs and the humanitarian demining
teams of the Lao Army, with the destruction of 42,085 submunitions (see Table 4).182 This is an increase in the area released
through clearance, compared to the equivalent 36.7km2 cleared in 2018 (but which excluded the Lao Army 58 data, which
was not available).183
A further 19.30km2 was cleared by commercial operators and non-humanitarian teams of the Lao Army, with the destruction
of 1,742 submunitions (see Table 4).184
Table 4: CMR clearance by humanitarian clearance operators in 2019 (NRA data)185
Area cleared
(m2)

Submunitions
destroyed

Bombs

Other UXO
destroyed

Mines
destroyed

692,304

245

0

430

0

2,070,187

1,047

2

653

0

499,043

714

1

14

1

MAG

9,869,304

6,485

7

1,142

0

NPA

4,017,895

3,924

0

300

0

28,620,390

29,670

20

8,542

3

45,769,123

42,085

30

11,081

4

4,207,087

0

0

6

0

11,266,445

20

22

37

0

Milsearch

415,181

295

0

82

0

MMG

884,987

76

5

265

0

OUMMA

205,833

1,339

0

0

0

Operator
Humanitarian
clearance
operations

Lao Army 58
HALO Trust
HI

UXO Lao
Sub-totals
Commercial
clearance
operations

Lao Army
AusLao

2,324,658

12

0

5

0

Sub-totals

PL

19,304,191

1,742

27

395

0

Grand Totals

65,073,314

43,827

57

11,476

4

In addition, a further 36,313 submunitions were destroyed
during spot tasks and/or during non-technical survey and
technical survey by the Lao Army 58 (217 submunitions),
HALO Trust (5,111 submunitions), HI (1,644 submunitions),
MAG (15,600 submunitions), Milsearch (8 submunitions), NPA
(6,224 submunitions), and UXO Lao (7,509 submunitions), along
with 113 bombs, 9,958 other items of UXO, and 34 mines.186
According to Lao PDR’s Article 7 report, a total of nearly
65km2 was cleared in 2019 (see Table 5), across 14 provinces,
with the destruction of nearly 79,400 CMR, in addition to 40
mines, 170 big bombs, and 21,055 items of other UXO, during
clearance, technical survey, and spot tasks.187 However, as
occurred in previous years, this total includes clearance
by the Lao Army (separate to the humanitarian teams) and
commercial companies, including many tasks which did
not contain CMR. Clearance reported in the provinces of

76 Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2020

Luangnamtha and Xaisomboun, which are not reported as
being of CMR by Lao PDR, suggests this might be the case
for 2019 data too. The figures reported in Lao PDR’s Article 7
report differ slightly to those reported in the NRA’s 2019 UXO
Sector Annual Report.188
The amount of land cleared by UXO Lao in 2019, was a
slight decrease on the previous year,189 while HALO, MAG
and NPA all increased the amount of area cleared in 2019,
compared to the previous year, due to increased clearance
capacity as a result of DFID funding. HALO Trust increased
clearance output by around 300% (thanks to an increase
from four clearance teams in December 2018 to 20 teams by
the end of 2019);190 MAG increased clearance output by 200%
compared to 2018;191 and NPA by over 60% compared to the
previous year, which it also attributed to more efficient use of
detectors and improvement in team management.192

STATES PARTIES

All clearance organisations in Lao PDR are required to have
a documented internal QM system, covering both quality
assurance (QA) and quality control procedures (QC).194
External QM inspections of clearance organisations are
carried out by the NRA.195 However, the NRA’s QM capacity
is extremely limited, with only two QM teams to cover
sector-wide clearance.196 The NRA has been seeking funding
to increase its QM capacity to four teams.197

Table 5: CMR clearance by province in 2019198
Province

Area cleared (m2)

Attapeu

9,020,372

Bolikhamxay

9,948,568

Champasak

3,002,498

Houaphanh

1,911,402

Khammouane

7,518,270

Luangnamtha

534,070

Luang Prabang

1,153,362

Oudomxay

3,574,921

Saravan

3,081,318

Savannakhet

9,998,173

Vientiane Province

1,250

Xaisomboun

280,680

Xekong

3,056,369

Xiengkhouang

11,869,645

Total

64,950,898

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR LAO PDR: 1 AUGUST 2010
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 AUGUST 2020
ARTICLE 4 EXTENDED DEADLINE: 1 AUGUST 2025
LAO PDR WILL REQUIRE MULTIPLE EXTENSION REQUESTS BEFORE REACHING COMPLETION

Under Article 4 of the CCM, Lao PDR is required to destroy
all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon
as possible, but not later than 1 August 2025, having been
granted a five-year extension (the maximum that can be
requested per extension request under the CCM) in 2019.
Based on current capacity and output, Lao PDR will not
reach completion by its deadline and will require multiple
extensions to its Article 4 deadline. According to the NRA,
based on current resources and land release practices,
“progress towards reaching a residual level of contamination
as provided for in the CCM is decades away”.199
As at end of 2019, 1,115.5km2 of CHA had already been
identified through the ongoing nationwide CMRS, 200 and
as the baseline survey continues the area of confirmed
contamination/CHA is expected to continue to increase
rapidly. An estimate of the true extent of CMR contamination
will not be known until the nationwide CMRS is completed. 201

Table 6: Five-year summary of CMR clearance
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2019

45.77

2018

36.20

2017

33.02

2016

30.17

2015*

41.30

Total

186.46

*2014–15 were transition years from request-based to evidence-based clearance,
and so include a higher proportion of clearance of land that did not contain CMR.

Clearance of CMR in Lao PDR will take many years and will
require long-term national capacity and funding. According to
Lao PDR’s 2019 Article 4 extension request, annual clearance
output based on current capacity and resources available
is approximately 50km2 per year on average, 202 but annual
humanitarian clearance output over the last five years has
been significantly less (see Table 6).
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During 2019, NPA piloted the use of new Vallon large-loop
detectors for cluster munition survey and clearance as
part of efforts to expand the UXO/mine action toolbox and
efficiency of operations. Sixty staff were fully trained on the
use of these detectors in the field, and initial results showed
considerable increases in land release output of up to 50%
in certain areas (especially paddy fields). As such, the use
of large loop detectors will be expanded throughout NPA’s
programme in 2020.193

The NRA has highlighted the challenges in balancing
resources for survey and clearance. While nationwide CMRS
is essential to quantify the extent of actual contamination
in Lao PDR, there is also a need for follow-on clearance in
priority areas, which also demands significant resources. 203
Commencement of DFID-funded clearance operations in
Lao PDR in 2019 has helped increase clearance output of
HALO Trust, MAG, and NPA. In addition, the United States
has planned to support increased clearance capacity of
both international clearance operators and UXO Lao, 204
which MAG and NPA reported will result in an increase
in their clearance capacity in 2021. 205
In its Article 7 report covering 2019, Lao PDR reports the
need to expand and increase the capacity of the Lao PDR
Army teams. 206 It is only in the past few years that the
Government of Lao PDR has allocated funds in its budget for
UXO clearance, directed to the Lao Army dedicated teams. 207
Lao PDR has identified several challenges in Article 4
implementation. These include insufficient funding (in
particular to the NRA and UXO Lao), and the need to
strengthen coordination and collaboration among sector
stakeholders in order to increase effectiveness and efficiency
of the mine action sector in Lao PDR. 208 Existing clearance

capacity is not sufficient to address the area of CHA identified
for clearance through the ongoing nationwide CMRS.
Furthermore, because the number of CMR found per hectare
during clearance is now much higher, thanks to application of
evidence-based land release methodology, more explosives
are needed for the destruction of CMR. This increases
operational costs as explosives in Lao PDR are reportedly
among the most expensive in the region. 209
In addition to insufficient clearance capacity, in its Article 7
report covering 2019, Lao PDR also cites mountainous terrain;
unpredictable funding; and outdated clearance equipment
as other challenges (e.g. in distinguishing between CMR and
scrap metal) and the national authorities highlight the need
for more advanced clearance equipment and vehicles. 210
As mentioned previously, and currently impacting HI’s
operations in Houaphanh province, discovery of mines
during CMRS significantly impedes operations. 211 Other
operational challenges in clearance tasks include heavy rains
during the wet season; high scrap-metal contamination and
fragmentation from other UXO; difficulty accessing tasks due
to flooding and vehicles getting stuck in the mud; and the
proximity of high-voltage pylons and power lines. 212

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Lao PDR is still determining the extent of its baseline of CMR contamination and is many years from completion, but planning
for sustainable national capacity to address previously unknown cluster munition contamination following completion
(i.e. residual contamination) will be essential.
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KEY DEVELOPMENTS
The Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC) continued to make strong progress in releasing cluster munition-contaminated area
in 2019. Lebanon has requested a five-year extension to its Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Article 4 deadline, and in
line with its new National Mine Action Strategy for 2020–25, is aiming to complete clearance of known cluster munition remnant
(CMR) contamination by the end of 2025. As part of efforts to re-survey all cluster munition-contaminated areas by the end of
2020 to help inform Article 4 planning, LMAC cancelled 1.90km2 in 2019.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

LMAC should complete non-technical re-survey of all remaining cluster munition-contaminated areas, to help
more accurately determine its baseline of contamination.

■

Evidence-based non-technical and technical survey should routinely be used to confirm and identify the area of
actual CMR contamination prior to clearance.

■

The integration and consolidation of the LMAC and Regional Mine Action Centre (RMAC) databases and servers
should be completed as soon as possible.

■

LMAC should ensure consistent application of national mine action standards (NMAS) across the country with
respect to metal detection requirements and the interpretation of metal-free.

■

LMAC should determine how it plans to address CMR contamination in especially difficult terrain, such as deep
canyons and very steep cliffs.
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Criterion
UNDERSTANDING
OF CMR
CONTAMINATION

Score Score
(2019) (2018) Performance Commentary
7

6

LMAC conducted a significant amount of non-technical survey in 2019, as part
of efforts to complete re-survey of all CMR tasks by the end of 2020. This will
further improve the accuracy of LMAC’s estimate of CMR contamination, following
its database review and readjustment of the CMR baseline in 2018. The baseline,
however, still includes CHAs with an estimated standard size of 10,000m2 (for
hazardous areas recorded without defined boundaries), whose true size may differ
markedly. For the purposes of Article 4 planning LMAC has increased the standard
sized area estimation by 250% to factor in fadeout.

9

9

LMAC continued to demonstrate effective programme management in 2019,
maintaining biannual Mine Action Forum meetings as an effective mechanism in
which to discuss challenges with, coordinate, and present progress in Article 4
implementation to all relevant stakeholders. It also held quarterly technical working
groups (TWG) meetings. Regrettably, due to political and financial unrest in Lebanon,
none of the 50 billion Lebanese Pounds (approximately US$33 million) for CMR
clearance over five years (2019–23), was allocated in 2019. However, the capacity
of LMAC, which is nationally funded, was increased with the establishment of the
RMAC in the north-east and to meet the increased demand for training courses.

7

7

LMAC has taken action to mainstream gender in its mine action programme,
including through data disaggregation, inclusive survey, and participation in courses
at its regional demining school. Gender and diversity considerations are included in
the National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25 and LMAC has appointed a new gender
focal point who will help mainstream gender-sensitive policies and procedures, and
monitor their implementation, in the mine action centre.

7

7

During 2019, efforts continued to integrate RMAC’s information management
database with the LMAC server and to fully synchronise the two databases. LMAC is
also in the process of migrating to Information Management System for Mine Action
(IMSMA) Core and is checking and cleaning data as part of the process.

8

8

LMAC has a new National Mine Action Strategy for 2020–25. The new strategy, which
was elaborated with support from the EU-funded UNDP project, in a participatory
approach with all stakeholders, includes an objective to complete clearance of all
known cluster munition-contaminated areas by the end of 2025.

8

8

Revised NMAS adopted in 2018 became effective from the start of 2019. Further
revisions to the standards were made in late 2019 to incorporate updates in IMAS
related to improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD) and risk assessment. They
include enhancements such as a reduction of the required clearance depth for CMR,
improvements to the fadeout specifications, and, for the first time, use of technical
survey for CMR tasks. Land release methodologies for CMR are now more efficient
as a result of these changes. In addition, LMAC has increased its non-technical capacity
and it now permits organisations to conduct non-technical survey of their tasks prior
to initiating clearance.

7

6

In 2019, LMAC cancelled nearly 1.9km2 of cluster munition-contaminated area, as part
of efforts to complete re-survey of CMR tasks by the end of 2020. This was significantly
more cancellation than the previous year. Clearance output of more than 1.2km2 in 2019
was a modest increase on output in 2018, as remaining clearance tasks are increasingly
occurring on more difficult terrain. Lebanon has submitted a request for a five-year
extension to its Article 4 deadline to 1 May 2026, and plans to complete clearance by the
end of 2025.
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Overall Programme Performance: GOOD

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■
■
■

Lebanon Mine Action Authority (LMAA)
Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC)
Regional Mine Action Centers (RMAC-N and RMAC-RB)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■

Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)/Engineering Regiment (ER)
Lebanese Association for Mine and Natural Disaster
Action (LAMINDA)
Peace Generation Organization for Demining (POD)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■

DanChurchAid (DCA)
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)

OTHER ACTORS
■
■
■
■

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2019, Lebanon had 814 confirmed hazardous
areas (CHAs) containing CMR covering a total area of almost
9km2 (see Table 1).1 This is a decrease in CMR contamination
compared to the end of 2018, when 864 CHAs were confirmed
to contain CMR, over a total area of more than 11.8km2, 2 and
is mostly due to cancellation and clearance of CMR in 2019.
Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by province
(at end 2019)3
Province
Beqaa
Janoub and Nabatiyeh (South)
Jabal Loubnan (Mount Lebanon)
Shimal (North)
Totals

CHAs

Area (m2)

98

602,715

657

8,016,896

57

322,370

2

20,000

814

8,961,981

In 2018, Lebanon reviewed its baseline of CMR contamination
and changed the way it reflects clearance data. According
to LMAC, a significant problem had been a difference in the
way land release figures were recorded between the RMAC
and LMAC. In many cases, actual clearance output of tasks is
greater than the original task size recorded in the database,
due to large fade-out requirements.4 Upon task completion,
LMAC was reducing its initial baseline by the original
task size in the database, whereas RMAC was adding the
additional cleared area in excess of the task size to the initial
database and then reducing the whole size of the clearance
task from the database. LMAC has now corrected the national
CMR baseline retrospectively to reflect its approach.5
Also as part of its 2018 database review process, LMAC
decided to change the standard size of CHAs with no
defined boundaries (and in which there is no mine threat),
to 10,000m2, based on the fadeout distance for cluster
munition clearance and LMAC’s experience to date.6 But
operators have found that the standardised 10,000m2 (per
task) area is in some instances an overestimate and in other
instances an underestimate of the actual task size.7 LMAC,
however, believes that this is the best approach for this type
of hazardous area and to be conservative in its Article 4
planning it has increased the size of these areas by 250% to
factor in fadeout.8

The accuracy of the baseline is further complicated by the
fact that clearance undertaken in the aftermath of the 2006
cluster munition strikes was not conducted in accordance
with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and
was mostly limited to rapid surface clearance.9 This included
emergency clearance undertaken by the Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF) in and around infrastructure, schools, and
roads, and clearance contracted out to non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), commercial operators, and
government groups by the UN Mine Action Coordination
Centre – south Lebanon (MACC-SL), which assumed the role
of coordinating CMR clearance in 2007, in cooperation with
the National Demining Office (now known as LMAC).10
LMAC’s recent efforts to adjust its database baseline to one
that more accurately estimates total CMR contamination
is a positive step, but the true size of these clearance tasks
will vary and is hard to estimate without survey.11 It is,
therefore, also extremely positive that LMAC is re-surveying,
through non-technical survey, all remaining CMR tasks,
which it hoped to complete by the end of 2020.12 In addition,
technical survey will be required on tasks where the exact
location of CMR contamination is not known and with a view
to locating evidence points (i.e. submunitions), from where
to start clearance.13
Previously, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) undertook a
pre-clearance non-technical survey of 443 CMR clearance
tasks between September 2013 and April 2014,14 which
resulted in MAG recommending 96 tasks for cancellation,
covering an estimated 2.8km2.15 LMAC decided to cancel
51 of these, totalling an area of 1.7km2.16 The remaining
tasks now being cancelled, where appropriate, as part of
the non-technical survey project in 2019 and 2020,17 and
where required, are subject to technical survey to determine
whether or not CMR contamination actually exists.18
CMR contamination is largely the result of the conflict with
Israel in July–August 2006. During the conflict, Israel fired an
estimated four million submunitions on south Lebanon, 90%
of which were dispersed in the last 72 hours of the conflict.19
An estimated one million submunitions failed to explode. 20
Some Israeli bombing data have been provided — most
recently through UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) — but
has proved to be very inaccurate. 21 In addition, some CMR still
remain from earlier conflicts with Israel in 1978 and 1982, 22
and there is a small amount of new CMR contamination on the
north-east border with Syria, resulting from spill-over of the
Syrian conflict onto Lebanese territory in 2014–17. 23 Types of
submunitions found in Lebanon include AO-2.5 RT, BLU-18,
BLU-26, BLU-61, BLU-63, M42, M43, M46, M77, M85, MK118,
and MZD-2. 24 Some areas contain unexploded submunitions
resulting from both ground-launched and air-dropped cluster
munitions, which can further complicate the picture. 25

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Lebanon is also contaminated by other unexploded ordnance (UXO), booby-traps, and anti-personnel mines (see Mine Action
Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on Lebanon for more information).
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LMAC, part of the LAF, is based in Beirut. Since 2009, the
RMAC-N, based in Nabatiyeh, which is a part of LMAC, has
overseen operations in south Lebanon and western Beqaa,
under LMAC supervision. 27 At the end of 2018, a new regional
centre, RMAC-RB, was established in the north-east of
Lebanon in the village of Ras Baalbek, to oversee the mine
action operations in this region. 28 To a large extent LMAC has
a well-functioning capacity, but, as they are army officers,
the senior management of LMAC and RMAC are typically
routinely rotated (every couple of years), which can hamper
development and continuity in the management of the three
mine action centres. 29 The current director of LMAC started
in March 2019, replacing his predecessor who had served
as director for two years.30 LMAC increased its capacity in
2019 with the establishment of RMAC-RB and to meet the
increased demand for training courses.31
A new standing operating procedure (SOP), developed
for LMAC in 2020, was reported to be in its final stage of
approval as at March 2020. This SOP specifies the roles of
each section of LMAC and clarifies the responsibilities and
cooperation between sections. It is hoped that it will help
new LMAC staff and reduce the impact of staff rotations.32
UN Development Programme (UNDP) personnel, funded
by the European Union (EU), are also seconded to
LMAC, providing support for capacity building, including
transparency reporting, strategic reviews, Information
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database entry,
community liaison, and quality assurance (QA). In 2019, there
was one team of six UNDP personnel supporting LMAC.33
EU funding for UNDP institutional support to LMAC, which had
been due to finish at the end of 2019, but which would have
resulted in a gap in capacity development,34 was extended for
the first six months of 2020. During this period, UNDP was
providing expertise and support on operational efficiency,
prioritisation, research into clearance in difficult terrains, and
risk education for Syrian refugees.35 With regard to difficult
terrain, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD) will also partner with LMAC on a study
that was expected to start in the third quarter of 2020.36
In addition, UNDP also mobilised funds for the first half of
2020 from the Norwegian Embassy, in order to: assist with
the strengthening of national capacity to document and
prioritise clearance operations in line with Mine Action Forum
recommendations; help LMAC to meet its national, regional,
and international obligations and coordination functions and
ensure follow-up of Mine Action Forum action points; and to
support LMAC in effectively communicating its results and
establishing partnerships.37 LMAC will seek to extend UNDP’s
support beyond the second quarter of 2020.38

A “Mine Action Forum” has been established in Lebanon in
close partnership between LMAC and Norway. The forum was
the result of a two Lebanon-focused workshops, the first of
which took place in November 2016, convened by Norway and
the Netherlands in their capacity as CCM Co-Coordinators
on clearance, and facilitated by the GICHD. The second
workshop, in January 2018, convened in partnership between
Norway and LMAC, resulted in the establishment of the Mine
Action Forum. The forum meets twice a year, with UNDP
designated as the secretariat to follow up on action points
and develop progress reports.39 It provides an informal
platform for LMAC to continue open dialogue and information
sharing between the national authorities, implementing
partners, and donors, on priorities and needs for the
survey and clearance of cluster munitions and landmines
in Lebanon.40 It is an example of what a “Country Coalition”
under the CCM could look like, but in the case of Lebanon
it was agreed the forum should be broadened to include
landmines, and not just CMR.
As of writing, the most recent Mine Action Forum was held
on 22 January 2020, during which LMAC presented and
discussed the new 2020–25 national mine action strategy,
operational efficiencies, and a new explosive ordnance risk
education (EORE) project.41 LMAC also presented its Article
4 deadline Extension Request plan at the January 2020 Mine
Action Forum meeting.42
The Mine Action Forum in Lebanon has resulted in better
coordination and greater transparency as well as on
enhancements to land release methodology, enshrined in the
revised NMAS. These measures have all served to strengthen
donor confidence and mobilise additional resources.43
There is good coordination and collaboration between
LMAC/the RMAC and clearance operators, with the operators
consulted before key decisions are taken.44 International
clearance operators reported that an enabling environment
exists for mine action in Lebanon, with no obstacles regarding
visas for international staff, approval of memoranda of
understanding (MoUs), or the importation of equipment.45
A technical working group (TWG) was established in March
2018, under the auspices of LMAC, based on recommendations
of the Mine Action Forum and following the release of the
revised NMAS. The TWG, which meets quarterly, provides
a useful forum for LMAC/the RMACs to meet collectively
with clearance operators to review and discuss field issues,
including implementation of revisions to the NMAS, identify
issues, and suggest further NMAS revisions and potential
ways to improve operational efficiencies.46
As in the previous year, Lebanon reported contributing
US$9 million annually in 2019 towards mine action in
Lebanon (for both mine- and CMR-related work): to support
costs associated with the running of LMAC (facilities and
staff); the LAF Engineering Regiment companies working in
demining (four teams, two of which work on CMR; in addition
to mechanical and mine detection dog (MDD) support); risk
education; and victim assistance.47
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Established in 1998 by the Council of Ministers, the Lebanon
Mine Action Authority (LMAA) is the responsibility of the
Ministry of Defence and is chaired by the Minister of Defence.
The LMAA has overall responsibility for Lebanon’s mine
action programme. In 2007, a national mine action policy
outlined the structure, roles, and responsibilities within the
programme, and LMAC was tasked to execute and coordinate
the programme on behalf of the LMAA. 26

In addition, the Lebanese government had committed an
additional 50 billion Lebanese Pounds (approximately
US$33 million) to CMR clearance over five years (2019–23),
to increase the number of CMR clearance teams and help
meet Article 4 obligations under the CCM. Corresponding
clearance contracts with DanChurchAid (DCA), LAMINDA and
POD were finalised at the end of 2018, but signature by the
Minister of Defense was delayed due to the announcement
of a new government at the end of January 2019. NGOs took
the decision to go ahead and begin CMR clearance operations
in February 2019, using their own funds. However, they
subsequently elected to stop operations after three months,
pending formal signature of the clearance contracts by the
Minister of Defence.48 Unfortunately, due to political and
financial unrest in Lebanon, the clearance contracts were
not signed and none of pledged additional national funding
was spent during 2019.49 LMAC is expecting that an average

of US$3 million national funding for CMR clearance will be
allocated to CMR clearance yearly,50 less than half of what
had been previously pledged.
A Regional School for Humanitarian Demining in Lebanon
(RSHDL) has been established in partnership between
Lebanon and France, with technical mine action support
provided by a French military officer, to support the
development of the curriculum on explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD, levels 1, 2, and 3) in compliance with IMAS.51
The Regional School became operational in 2017, enabling
civilian and military personnel from Arab and other
countries to benefit from an array of courses and workshops
on demining.52 In 2019, it provided training to national,
regional, and international participants, including courses on
non-technical survey, EOD, operational efficiency, and gender
and diversity.53

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
The gender and diversity-related policy applied at LMAC
is that of the LAF military rules. According to LMAC, all its
personnel are familiar with these rules and the specific
provisions related to gender equality and inclusion,
safeguarding, and behavioural codes.54
LMAC reported that it has taken several actions to
mainstream gender in its implementation plan, including
through inclusive policies, data disaggregation in risk
education and victim assistance, and participation
in courses at the RSHDL.55 In agreement with LMAC,
the GICHD conducted a gender and diversity capacity
assessment mission to Lebanon in July 2019. The aim was
to reinforce a sustainable national capacity for gender and
diversity mainstreaming in the LMAC and contribute to the
achievement of gender equality and inclusion.56 In August
2019, LMAC reported that it had appointed a new gender focal
point, who will help mainstream gender-sensitive policies
and procedures and monitor their implementation in the mine
action centre and across the national programme.57
Lebanon’s new National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, approved
by the LMAA in June 2020, includes considerations on gender
and diversity.58 Of the five objectives in the new strategy, the
fifth states that, “The specific needs and perspective of women,
girls, men and boys from all groups of society are considered,
in order to deliver an inclusive HMA [mine action] response”.
LMAC also acknowledges in the strategy that mine action
“is a male-dominated environment and we have therefore a
particular responsibility to empower women and ensure that
we have a gender sensitive approach to our work”.59 Gender
and diversity considerations will be further detailed in LMAC’s
strategic implementation plan, which was being elaborated in
the course of 2020, to support the new strategy.60
Of LMAC’s 157 personnel, 16 (10%) are female. The number
of staff at LMAC is determined by the LAF headquarters but
LMAC states that it consistently requests that the percentage
of women be increased.61 With respect to operational roles,
two women work for the operations section and one woman is
a member of the non-technical survey team. With respect to
managerial/supervisory level positions at LMAC, six women
work in management and five in information technology (IT).62
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LAMINDA did not report the percentage of female deminers,
but did report that women are employed in LAMINDA’s
clearance teams and that one female staff member is in a
managerial position, as clearance team leader.63
MAG, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), and POD all reported
having gender policies in place.64
MAG reported that it consults women during survey and
community liaison activities; that all its community liaison
teams are mixed; and that its data is disaggregated by sex
and age. Overall, women account for 16% of operational roles
in MAG’s survey and clearance teams in Lebanon, and 28%
of managerial level/supervisory positions.65
NPA is in the process of developing an implementation plan
for its organisational gender policy for Lebanon, based
on recommendations from the GICHD. It reported making
progress in encouraging more women to apply, resulting in a
5% increase in the proportion of women hired for operational
roles. NPA planned to conduct training in gender equality,
safeguarding, and code of conduct in 2020.66 NPA reported
that its survey and community liaison teams are gender
balanced, and 20% of employees in operational roles in NPA’s
survey and clearance team in the south are women as are
32% in its Arsal operations, which commenced in 2018. A total
of 20% of NPA’s managerial level/supervisory positions are
held by women. NPA disaggregates data by sex and age.67
Women and children are consulted during survey and
community liaison activities.68 According to LMAC, Lebanon’s
baseline of CMR contamination has been developed over
many years. As per Lebanon’s NMAS, non-technical survey
teams consult with women, girls, boys, and men, including,
where relevant, minority groups, in order to make sure all
available information is included.69
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Furthermore, LMAC is migrating from its current version
of IMSMA (New Generation) to IMSMA Core, which it hopes
will help facilitate the production of clearer reports that can
be translated into dashboards for stakeholders, including
donors, to monitor and follow.73 As at March 2020, migration
of data to IMSMA Core had begun, but the process takes
time.74 In the process of migration, LMAC has discovered
some overlap between its records of Dangerous Areas
and minefields. Non-technical survey teams are therefore
checked these overlaps on the ground and the database
clean-up was completed in July 2020.75 LMAC personnel will
receive GICHD training on IMSMA Core and LMAC planned to
launch it by the end of 2020.76
Operators believe that IMSMA Core will enable better direct
access to data, which will enhance understanding of broader
CMR contamination and assist in identifying tasks where
further non-technical and technical survey could be valuable.77

Disclaimed areas in the database are those for which
the owner of the land has not granted permission for
implementing agencies to conduct land release operations. In
such cases, the land owner has to sign a personal disclaimer
taking full responsibility for any kind of explosive remnant of
war (ERW) hazard including CMR on the land. LMAC is trying
to end the disclaimers, the records of which were mainly
taken before 2009. There is a high probability that the sites
will be cancelled during the re-survey currently in process,
when the owners are found to be using the land. If clearance
is required, survey and community liaison teams, along
with local authorities, will encourage landowners to allow
clearance in order to ensure the land is free from hazards
and will provide assurance of measures that will be taken to
prevent disruption to the use of the land.78 According to its
2020 Article 4 deadline extension request, there were 116
disclaimed areas on the database, totalling 338,932m2.79
Lebanon’s latest revision of NMAS, allows technical survey
of CMR-contaminated areas. By May 2019, LMAC had updated
data forms to allow for the correct reporting of land reduced
through technical survey.80 However, NPA reported some
initial confusion over terminology when reporting on the
output of non-technical survey.81
According to LAMINDA, there are now daily reporting sheets
for items and clearance.82 MAG started work on “survey123”
in 2019, during which it reviewed data forms and data flow,
in preparation for the launch of the project in the second half
of 2020.83

PLANNING AND TASKING
In September 2011, LMAC adopted a strategic mine action plan
for 2011–20.84 The plan called for clearance of all CMR by 2016
and for completion of mine clearance outside the Blue Line by
2020. Both goals were dependent on capacity, but progress
fell well short of planning targets, which were not met.
LMAC has developed a new National Mine Action Strategy
for 2020–25, with support from the EU funded UNDP project,
in a participatory approach with national and international
implementing agencies, mine action NGOs, UN agencies, and
donors.85 One of the objectives of the new strategy is to complete
clearance of all known cluster munition contaminated areas by
the end of 2025.86 The new strategy was signed by the LMAA in
June 2020. A mid-term and final external review are planned, as
well as annual reporting on progress.87 LMAC is also elaborating
a strategic implementation plan for 2020–25, based on the new
strategy and in collaboration with implementing partners, to
operationalise the new strategy with objectives, outputs, and
indicators. LMAC expected to complete the implementation plan
in August 2020. LMAC also plans to develop annual plans.88
Lebanon submitted a request to extend its Article 4 deadline,
which will be considered by States Parties at the CCM Second
Review Conference in November 2019. Clearance operators
were consulted by LMAC on the extension request, including
in a workshop prior to the request being elaborated.89
Lebanon has requested a five-year extension to 1 May 2026,
but aims to complete clearance by the end of 2025, in line
with its new strategy.

LMAC planned to complete re-survey (non-technical) of all
remaining CMR tasks by the end of 2020 and prior to the start
of the new extension period (May 2021). It estimates that after
cancellation of uncontaminated areas, approximately 8.7km2
of CMR-contaminated area will require clearance (including
technical survey, where appropriate). The projected
clearance rates in Lebanon’s extension request are based on
an average of the last three years and while LMAC anticipates
that application of the new, more efficient, methodologies
adopted will increase this average, it also expects that any
gain will be offset by the more difficult terrain of land which
now remains to be cleared.90
Table 2 outlines the predicted annual clearance output and
capacity up to the end of 2025. Planned output takes into
account fadeout and the possible increase in the area to be
cleared in the 10,000m2 sites, using a factor of 2.5.91 LMAC
plans to conduct technical survey, where appropriate, but
has not provided predictions of the amount of area expected
to be reduced through technical survey.
Table 2: Planned CMR clearance and capacity 92
Year
Cleared m
Teams

2

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

1.9

1.9

1.9

1.5

1.5

26

26

26

21

21
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
During 2019, efforts continued to integrate RMAC’s
information management database with the LMAC server
and to synchronise the two databases.70 Harmonisation and
consolidation of the LMAC and RMAC databases will enable
IMSMA reports to be sent directly to LMAC for approval,
improving the accuracy and efficiency of the process. The
integration will also help better protect data while decreasing
maintenance costs.71 As at March 2020, harmonisation of the
two databases had been completed and servers installed to
maintain the database, but LMAC was awaiting resolution of a
technical issue to ensure the two servers are properly linked.72

Reprioritisation is needed, as most of the remaining tasks fall between priorities 2 and 3, and reprioritisation has not occurred
for some time.93 According to LMAC, increased urbanisation; clearance of the Blue Line; spill-over from Syria creating new
contamination, including improvised explosive devices (IEDs); and the sudden increase in residents, have combined to result
in a change to overall clearance priorities. LMAC plans to work with operators to develop an updated prioritisation approach,
including focusing on the socio-economic impact of contamination.94
LMAC will use updated information from the non-technical re-survey of CMR tasks to reprioritise tasks based on humanitarian
and socio-economic impact.95

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Lebanon developed its first NMAS in 2010.96 Adopting a
consultative and constructive approach with its implementing
partners, in 2017, LMAC initiated a project, supported by
UNDP and other partners, funded by the EU, to revise and
harmonise national standards with IMAS, as well as to add new
modules not present in the original standards.97 The revised
NMAS, formally approved in March 2018, have a solid focus
on land release and evidence-based decision-making, in line
with the IMAS, and based on recommendations and analysis
of operational data. Notable enhancements in relation to
battle area clearance (BAC) included reduction of the required
clearance depth of CMR from 20cm to 15cm changes to
fadeout, and were made effective from 1 January 2019.
The minimum fade-out distance from any pertinent evidence
point is agreed with LMAC, depending on the topography of
the task. In the absence of an agreed fadeout, the default is a
50-metre radius from the last evidence point.98 In addition, and
of particular significance, the new NMAS now allow technical
survey to be used for CMR tasks. In 2019, standards on the use
of explosives detection dogs (EDDs) for technical survey were
incorporated into IMAS, following a successful trial in 2018.99
These changes to the NMAS should significantly improve the
efficiency of CMR land release in Lebanon, potentially by as
much as 30%, according to LMAC.100
Historically, clearance tasks assigned to operators by LMAC
were typically deemed to already reflect non-technical survey
data, and LMAC did not formally permit operators to conduct
additional survey on assigned tasks prior to clearance.101
In the last couple of years, LMAC has increasingly begun to
rely on non-technical survey and technical survey to more
accurately define the presence or absence of an explosive
threat.102 In 2019, extensive non-technical survey was
conducted by LMAC, in addition to some non-technical survey
by MAG, and LMAC aimed to have re-surveyed all CMR tasks
by the end of 2020 in order to have a clearer estimation of the
remaining contamination for Article 4 planning.103
Results from non-technical survey will also help determine
which tasks, on a case-by-case basis, are appropriate for
technical survey (systematic or targeted).104 As the use
of EDDs for technical survey requires special operating
conditions (temperature, wind speeds, levels of vegetation
etc.), manual technical survey will also be applied on a
case-by-case basis. Each decision over the percentage and
type of technical survey has to be approved by the operations
section head in LMAC.105
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LMAC has also agreed with the NGO operators the option
for each to have a non-technical survey team to re-survey
each new task prior to starting clearance. As at March
2020, the NGOs had non-technical survey teams or were
negotiating with donors to establish them,106 and where
necessary, clearance operators are now permitted to conduct
non-technical survey prior to clearance operations.107
Furthermore, operators now have an opportunity to discuss
specific land release considerations with LMAC for assigned
clearance tasks, which arise during the pre-clearance
assessment stage of operations. Such discussions might
result in the refining of the task size or approved land release
specifications (e.g. use of technical survey, for all or part of
the task, rather than full clearance).108 International NGOs
see collaboration between LMAC and clearance operators
on application of evidence-based non-technical survey
and technical survey, where needed, as being essential to
targeted clearance.109
Further updates made to Lebanon’s NMAS in late 2019,
which included the introduction of a new NMAS (07.14)
on Risk Assessment and a new standard (09.31) on IED
Disposal (IEDD), which were adopted in March 2020.110 With
regard to technical survey, the NMAS no longer specifies a
minimum percentage of area over which technical survey
must be conducted, which permits LMAC to reduce technical
survey when appropriate, especially on the Blue Line
minefields and for CMR.111 The NMAS also allows for areas
under full clearance to be reduced (or in part reduced),
based on information gathered during clearance, as well
as for the original task boundaries to be changed based on
experience during clearance. Changes were also made to
the NMAS (09.31) on demolitions.112 A continuous review of
the national standards is executed based on field expertise
and recommendations from implementing agencies and on
updates of the IMAS.113
NPA noted that a more uniform approach is needed to the
enforcement of NMAS across Lebanon, citing an example of
LMAC QA teams issuing non-conformity reports when any
metal is found subsequent to clearance, while the NMAS
requires metal to be removed only if it is larger than the
respective test-piece.114
NPA has found that there can also be a relatively large time
lag between completion of clearance and final handover
of land back to the community, an issue which, it believes,
should be explored and addressed.115
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In 2019, CMR clearance was conducted by international operators DCA, MAG, and NPA; and national operators POD and
LAMINDA. Clearance capacity fluctuated throughout 2019, but totalled around 25 NGO clearance teams.116 In addition, the
Engineering Regiment of the LAF also conducted CMR clearance in 2019.117
The LAF Engineering Regiment has two BAC teams and in addition, three of the Engineering Regiment and Combat Engineering
companies cover rapid-response callouts across Lebanon.118 The LAF has seven MDD teams119 for technical survey and for
use as a secondary asset supporting clearance, but none of these is used for CMR. Through the Engineering Regiment, LMAC
provides mechanical assistance to clearance operators that lack this capacity.120 In Lebanon, machines are mostly used as
secondary assets to support clearance teams (e.g. for ground preparation, rubble removal, or for fadeout); in areas where
manual clearance is difficult; and for technical survey and low threat hazardous area (LTHA).121 Often, however, the terrain is
not suitable for machines.
Table 3: Operational CMR clearance capacities deployed in 2019122
Manual teams

Total clearance
personnel*

Dogs and
handlers

Machines**

DCA

3

N/K

0

0

LAMINDA

3

24

0

0

LAF/ER

2

16

0

1

Operator

Comments***

MAG

12

72

0

3

1 mechanical team

NPA

4

24

0

0

NPA does not deploy dogs for clearance,
but does have 2 EDDs and 2 handlers
deployed for technical survey

POD
Totals

4

44

0

0

28

180

0

4

* Clearance personnel may also conduct technical survey. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters. *** Clearance teams also work on technical survey tasks.
N/K = not known.

With respect to non-technical survey capacity, in 2019, there were six non-technical survey teams:123 LMAC had three teams;124
MAG had two teams, with a total of four personnel;125 and NPA had one team with three personnel.126
With respect to technical survey, MAG has one team of five personnel127 and NPA had one technical survey team of four
personnel (including 2 EDD dog handlers and two manual searchers).128 NPA’s technical survey team is now fully integrated
into NPA operations and is being tasked by the RMAC as follow-up to previous non-technical survey, to confirm CMR
contamination prior to areas being tasked for clearance.129 NPA reported that it was moving towards a multi-task approach
to be able to respond to changing priorities and operational constraints.130
NPA believes that EDDs could be beneficial in technical survey to help reduce areas containing low density ERW (including
CMR) and IED contamination in north-east Lebanon, on the border with Syria.131 One of the advantages of using EDDs is that
dogs detect explosives, not metal, which can help speed up the technical survey process by avoiding unnecessary excavation
of the scrap-metal signals that are generated by manual detectors. In addition to NPA’s technical survey with EDDs, MAG and
NPA are both conducting manual technical survey.132
As part of non-technical survey on the north-east border of Lebanon, contaminated during spill-over of the Syrian conflict in
2014–17, drones were used for the first time, and proved very helpful in helping inform survey efforts.133

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of nearly 3.3km2 of CMR-contaminated area was released in 2019, of which nearly 1.3km2 was cleared, over 0.1km2 was
reduced through technical survey, and nearly 1.9km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey.134
In addition, nearly 0.3km2 of new CMR contamination was added to the database in 2019,135 which was mainly discovered by
shepherds in mountainous areas, resulting in rapid response tasks.136

SURVEY IN 2019
In 2019, almost 1.90km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey (see Table 4) and a further 0.12km2 was reduced through
technical survey (see Table 5). In addition, nearly 0.27km2 was identified as being CMR-contaminated.137
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Non-technical survey output in 2019 marked a significant
increase compared to 2018, when 20,314m2 of newly
suspected area in the Arsal region on the north-east border
with Syria was cancelled through non-technical survey.138
The increase in non-technical survey output in 2019 was
the result of an increased emphasis on re-surveying CMR
tasks, to help inform planning for Lebanon’s 2020 Article 4
extension deadline request.139
Of the total CMR contaminated area cancelled in 2019,
359,505m2 was cancelled by MAG in the south of Lebanon
and the remainder by LMAC non-technical survey teams.140
Technical survey output in 2019 was broadly comparable to
2018, when 103,000m2 was reduced through technical survey.141
NPA is using EDDs for technical survey of CMR tasks, but
this requires special conditions (wind speeds, temperature,
vegetation levels, etc.), and while it helps to reduce some
areas where no evidence of CMR is found, output is relatively
low.142 It reported days lost for technical survey due to harsh
weather conditions in early 2019; the use of strong smelling
pesticides on land preventing the EDD from operating
effectively; and an injury to one of the dogs for an extended
period in 2019. In 2019, NPA only deployed EDD for technical
survey in south Lebanon, but it planned to expand their use
to the north-east in 2020.143

Table 4: Cancellation through non-technical survey
in 2019144
Province

Area cancelled (m²)

Bekaa

880,154

Mount Lebanon

210,062

North

0

South of Lebanon

807,020

Total

1,897,236

Table 5: Reduction through technical survey in 2019145
Operator

Area cleared (m2)

Area reduced (m2)

MAG

55,260

53,700

NPA

16,900

30,100

POD

7,710

35,290

79,870*

119,090

Totals
* Included in clearance table data.

CLEARANCE IN 2019
Lebanon reported clearing more than 1.26km2 of CMR-contaminated land in 2019, destroying in the process 4,037 submunitions
(see Tables 6 and 7).146 This includes 289 submunitions destroyed during rapid response/EOD spot tasks.147 Clearance during
the year was a modest increase over the 1.15km2 of CMR-contaminated land cleared in 2018.148 Clearance rates are influenced
by the type of terrain and the depth of CMR, which in some locations is deeper than 15cm.149 Additionally, there were 31 less
working days in 2019, compared to 2018, because of the internal unrest.150
According to LMAC, all cluster munition-contaminated areas cleared in 2019 were found to have CMR.151 MAG reported that it
cleared one cluster munition-contaminated area task in the South and 11 in north-east Lebanon, in which no submunitions were
found.152 LMAC clarified that all CMR tasks in the north-east are located where CMR had been destroyed by the LAF. In the south,
CMR clearance tasks are also located where CMR have been found previously, including through LAF rapid response.153
Table 6: CMR clearance by region in 2019154
Province

Area cleared (m²)

Bekaa

Submunitions destroyed*

517,264

Mount Lebanon

50,535

South of Lebanon

693,233

Totals

1,261,032

4,037

* Figures include items destroyed during technical survey.

Table 7: CMR clearance in 2019 by implementing agency155
Operator

Area cleared (m²)

Submunitions destroyed*

DCA

98,721

1,515

LAF

11,160

159

LAMINDA

99,792

287

MAG

630,271

254

NPA

161,095

1,135

POD
Totals

259,993

687

1,261,032

4,037

* Figures include items destroyed during technical survey.
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Tables 6 and 7 include the destruction of 1 submunition
by NPA and 129 by POD during spot tasks in 2019, and
159 submunitions destroyed by the LAF in rapid-response
missions.156
NPA reported a decrease in clearance, compared to 2019,
due to the increased difficulty of tasks (thick vegetation,
steep and rocky terrain, and high metal content), as well
as 20 operational days lost (compared to 2018) due to
poor weather and protests, including the blocking of
roads to hospitals.157
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LEBANON

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR LEBANON: 1 MAY 2011
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 MAY 2021
FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (FIVE-YEAR EXTENSION REQUESTED): 1 MAY 2026

Under Article 4 of the CCM, Lebanon is required to destroy
all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon
as possible, but not later than 1 May 2021. Lebanon will not
meet this deadline and submitted a request for a five-year
extension for consideration at the Second CCM Review
Conference in November 2020.
Originally, clearance of CMR-contaminated land had been
expected to be completed by the end of 2016, in accordance
with the 2011–20 national strategy.158 However, meeting
this target was contingent on securing the number of BAC
teams needed, which did not happen, and progress against
the strategy fell well behind schedule.159 Progress was also
hindered by the historical lack of non-technical survey and
technical survey, which often resulted in inefficient land
release and unnecessary clearance of uncontaminated land.
LMAC aims to complete clearance by the end of 2025, in line
with objective 4 of Lebanon’s Mine Action Strategy 2020–25.160
This is, however, contingent on LMAC securing the same level
of international funding it has received over the last three
years and on the government of Lebanon contributing the
envisaged US$3 million of annual national clearance funding
for the first three years of the extension period. The extension
request also assumes that there will be no additional
contamination; that the political and security situation in
Lebanon will remain stable; and that operations will not be
affected by that or other factors.161
Lebanon has cleared approximately 7.41km2 of cluster
munition-contaminated area in the last five years (see Table 8).
In its 2020 Article 4 extension request, Lebanon is using the
same average clearance rates as in previous three years,
despite the fact that new methodologies should increase
this average. This is intended to compensate for the difficult
terrain in many of the remaining area, which will slow down
the rate of clearance.162
Table 8: Five-year summary of CMR clearance
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2019

1.26

2018

1.15

2017

1.41

2016

*1.90

2015

1.69

Total

7.41

* In addition, a further 99,641m2 of re-clearance was conducted.

There is a concern that funding in some cases risks being
diverted from BAC towards other objectives, such as mine
clearance on the Blue Line, or clearance in the north-eastern
border with Syria.163 Furthermore, LMAC reported that
donors mostly look to fund clearance of high-impact sites,
whereas many of the remaining CMR tasks are viewed as
moderate or low impact. LMAC is, however, encouraging
donors to maintain funding to help it complete CMR clearance
and its CCM Article 4 obligations.164 With national capacity
(LAF teams) only, LMAC calculated that it would take until
2048 to reach Article 4 completion.165
A significant challenge in Lebanon’s Article 4 implementation,
is posed by “difficult terrain” such as deep and very steep
canyons and cliffs where survey and clearance are almost
impossible to conduct using current methods and assets
and represent additional risk to searchers and MediEvac.
LMAC recognises that suspected or confirmed cluster
munition-contaminated areas on difficult terrain need to be
released in order to comply with its Article 4 obligations.166
According to LMAC, there are two types of scenarios related
to the challenge of difficult areas, which may require different
approaches from an Article 4 compliance perspective:
i) CHAs in which all known CMR contamination has already
been cleared, but where part of the normal 50 metre fade-out
falls within an area of difficult terrain; and ii) CHAs or SHAs
located within difficult terrain, given the footprint of known
cluster munition strikes.
In relation to the first scenario, LMAC considers that in cases
where its quality management procedures can determine,
with confidence, that all evidence of CMR contamination
has been identified and removed, then the deployment of
additional clearance assets into inaccessible areas where
no evidence of contamination exists may be unnecessary.
Regarding the second scenario, where the footprint of the
cluster munition strike covers part of a difficult terrain, this is
registered in the database as CHA and requires clearance.167
LMAC plans to undertake a study, in partnership with GICHD,
to find a solution on how to address this terrain and satisfy
the requirements of the CCM.168
The COVID-19 pandemic impacted the whole of Lebanon’s
mine action programme and all operations were suspended
from 12 March for more than two months. After the relaxation
of general mobilisation measures by the government of
Lebanon, a TWG meeting was held and the phases for
restarting operations and necessary safety measures
relating to COVID-19 were developed and adopted. Operations
resumed in early May 2020, under the new guidelines
and safety measures, and as at July 2020 NGO clearance
operators were fully operational.169
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PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
According to LMAC, a tolerable level of residual risk will remain, as areas not previously identified as containing CMR may
be found in the future. LMAC appreciates the importance of the need to start the process to build a sustainable national mine
action capacity that can deal with the residual contamination post Article 4 compliance. According to LMAC, the strategic
implementation plan which will support the new National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, will address an exit strategy and
long-term risk management and capacity.170
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KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Having previously declared fulfilment of its Article 4 obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in
September 2013 at the Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Mauritania reported in its CCM Article 7 transparency report covering
2019 that it had discovered previously unknown cluster munition-contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control. Once
circumstances regarding the COVID-19 pandemic permit, the National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development
(Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD) plans to conduct an assessment of suspected
and confirmed cluster munition-contaminated areas, along with newly reported mined areas, with the support of Norwegian
People’s Aid (NPA).

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Mauritania should clarify whether the cluster munition-contaminated areas in question are currently under
Mauritania’s effective control. If so, and they are also under its jurisdiction, the authorities should proceed to
undertake an assessment mission with NPA as soon as funding and restrictions regarding COVID-19 permit.
If, however, the areas are under Mauritania’s effective control but not under its jurisdiction, discussions need
to be held as a matter of urgency with others concerned, in particular Morocco and the Saharawi Arab
Democratic Republic.

■

Mauritania should confirm whether the identified areas are newly discovered or if any of the areas were already
recorded as contaminated but were previously thought to be not under Mauritania’s jurisdiction or control.

■

Mauritania should report more accurately and consistently on the extent of cluster munition remnant (CMR)
contamination, including using the classification of suspected hazardous area (SHA) and confirmed hazardous
area (CHA) in a manner consistent with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
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CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

National Humanitarian Demining Programme for
Development (Programme National de Déminage
Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

OTHER ACTORS
■

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)

Army Engineer Corps

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
Having previously declared fulfilment of its Article 4
obligations in September 2014 at the Fourth CCM Meeting
of States Parties, in 2019 Mauritania reported newly
discovered cluster-munition-contaminated areas.1 These
areas are reported to be located in the “Tighert 2” region
of Tires-Zemmour in the north of Mauritania, which borders
Western Sahara. In Form F of its latest CCM Article 7
transparency report, the locations of the areas are listed as
Boudheir, Boukhzame, Dhar el kelba, Elmetlani, Lekhneigue,
Lemreir, and Tamreiket. Based on the testimonies of local
people, the authorities have estimated that contamination
covers a total area of 36km2. According to Mauritania,
submunitions are visible on the ground and many camels
have been killed, with the last discovery of submunitions
occurring on 21 November 2019. 2 It is unclear how the size
of the contaminated areas have been determined.
In Annex 1 of its Article 7 report, Mauritania also lists
Oudyatte Bouzeyanne and Oudyatte Lekhyame as
cluster-munition-contaminated locations (in addition to those
mentioned in Form F), declaring that the size of the area for
each site is unknown.3 The map in Annex 1 of the Article 7
report appears to show a huge polygon within which are all
of the suspected or confirmed hazardous areas. Therefore,
CMR contamination, if confirmed, is likely to cover an area
significantly less than 36km2.4
Prior to reporting discovery of new contamination in 2019,
Mauritania had previously declared the completion of CMR
clearance in 2013.5 Contamination resulted from use of MK118,
BLU-63, and M42 cluster munitions during the 1975–78 conflict
over Western Sahara. Contamination was located in the
northern border areas, around the village of Bir Moghrein in
the region of Tiris Zemmour.6 In Mauritania’s first CCM Article
7 report, submitted in 2013 and covering 2012, it was reported
that CMR contamination totalled 10km2, covering eight areas
north of the village of Bir Moghrein in the north-east of the
country.7 Following survey by NPA in 2013, the estimated area
was revised substantially downwards.8
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Mauritania reported that it previously cleared a total of over
1.96km2 of cluster-munition-contaminated area in 2014, with
the destruction of 1,246 submunitions, across nine locations:
Agwachin, Aldouik, Ayadiyatt, Bir Mariam, Eweineget, Gharet
El hemeid, Oudeyatt bozeyan, Oum Edhbaitt, and Teghert.9
However, based on its technical and non-technical survey,
NPA revealed that after cancellation through non-technical
survey of 70,000m2 of area suspected to contain CMR in
2012, the total area confirmed to contain CMR, and which
was subject to clearance in 2013, actually totalled 2.4km2.
Clearance covered the same nine sites listed above.10
It is unclear whether all of the newly identified
cluster-munition-contaminated areas are under Mauritania’s
effective control, and, if so, whether they are also under
its jurisdiction. If the areas are under Mauritania’s effective
control but not under its jurisdiction, Mauritania will
need to discuss this as a matter of urgency with others
concerned, in particular Morocco and the Saharawi Arab
Democratic Republic.
Mauritania has also reported discovering anti-personnel mine
contamination.11 Please see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the
Mines 2020 report on Mauritania for more information.
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Mauritania’s national budget for demining and related activities in 2019 was MRU 3 million (approx. US$75,000). It is
seeking an additional US$300,000 of international assistance to conduct non-technical survey, technical survey, marking,
awareness-raising campaigns, and quality management.14

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
It is not known if the PNDHD has policies in place relating to gender and diversity in its mine action programme, and gender
and diversity are not referenced in Mauritania’s Article 7 report.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The national mine action database is held at the PNDHD. As at December 2017, Mauritania had strengthened its information
management capacity by providing additional training to an information management specialist and migrating to Version 6 of
the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) software.15
In its Article 7 report covering 2019, Mauritania did not disaggregate cluster-munition-contaminated areas into CHAs and SHAs,
in line with best practice and IMAS.

PLANNING AND TASKING
According to its latest Article 7 report under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), submitted in 2020, part of the
international cooperation and assistance sought by Mauritania is to support its efforts to draft a new mine action strategy, to
replace the existing strategy which was expiring in 2020.16

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Survey and clearance operations are conducted in accordance with the Mauritanian National Mine Action Standards (NMAM),
which are said to accord with IMAS. The NMAM include standards on non-technical survey, technical survey, mine clearance,
and quality control (QC). The NMAM, were adopted in 2007. They were revised with the help of the Geneva International Centre
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and in partnership with operators, most notably NPA in 2010, and were translated into
Arabic in 2011.17 The NMAM are supposed to be reviewed once every three years.18

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In accordance with a 2006 decree, all clearance activities were conducted by the Army Engineer Corps operating under the
PNDHD. In 2011, NPA signed a memorandum of understanding with Mauritania to provide support for both mine clearance
and battle area clearance (BAC) in the country. NPA subsequently worked in Mauritania both as an operator and in a
capacity-building role as a technical advisor for PNDHD until the end of 2015.19
The PNDHD has requested NPA’s support in 2020 to conduct an assessment mission to determine the details of mined areas
discovered since its declaration of APMBC Article 5 completion in November 2018. As part of the planned mission, NPA will
also investigate the newly discovered cluster-munition-contaminated areas, as well as the mined area. 20
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The PNDHD, which was created in 2000, coordinates mine action operations in Mauritania.12 Since 2007, the programme
has been the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior and Decentralisation, with oversight from an interministerial
steering committee.13 The PNDHD has its headquarters in the capital, Nouakchott, and a regional mine action centre (RMAC)
in Nouadhibou.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
Mauritania did not release any cluster munition contaminated area in 2019.

SURVEY IN 2019
Mauritania did not release any cluster-munition-contaminated area through survey in 2019.

CLEARANCE IN 2019
Mauritania did not release any cluster-munition-contaminated area through clearance in 2019. Mauritania’s CCM Article
7 report includes reference to submunition(s) being discovered in November 2019, but does not specify how many were
discovered and whether they were destroyed. 21

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR MAURITANIA: 1 AUGUST 2012
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 AUGUST 2022
UNCLEAR WHETHER ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

Under Article 4 of the CCM, Mauritania is required to destroy all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as
possible, but not later than 1 August 2022.
Mauritania had previously reported completing clearance of CMR in 2013, almost nine years before its treaty deadline. In its
declaration of Article 4 compliance, Mauritania stated that as of 9 September 2013 it had made every effort to identify all areas
under its jurisdiction or control contaminated by CMR, and that as of that date it had cleared and destroyed all CMR found, in
accordance with Article 4(1) of the CCM. 22
Mauritania plans to conduct an assessment mission, with the support of NPA, as soon as restrictions due to COVID-19 permit,
in order to obtain additional information on the mined areas and inform its APMBC Article 5 planning. 23 The assessment
mission will presumably also cover investigation of CMR-contaminated areas, as envisaged by NPA. 24 The PNDHD requires
international funding and cooperation to address contaminated areas in northern Mauritania. 25
Mauritania is seeking international assistance to enable it to mark the confirmed and suspected “dangerous zones”, clear
contaminated areas, and destroy items of unexploded ordnance found. It is looking to train and capacity build PNDHD staff;
renew office equipment (IT, furniture); renew marking and demining equipment; and carry out awareness campaigns, marking
operations, demining and demolition, as part of a five-year plan. 26

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Mauritania has reported under the APMBC that it “will remain committed to dealing with any residual contamination” for
mines, 27 but no details have been provided on its plans to establish a long-term sustainable national capacity to address
either previously unknown mined areas or CMR-contaminated areas, following completion.
Previously, PNDHD had reported that one of the main aims of Mauritania’s work plan for 2017–20 was to establish a strategy
for residual contamination. 28
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CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.

2

Ibid.

3

Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Annex I.

4

Ibid.

5

Declaration of Compliance with Art. 4(1)(a) of the CCM, submitted by Mauritania, 3 September 2014.

6

Ibid.

7

Article 7 Report (covering 2012), Form F.

8

Article 7 Report (covering 2013), Form F; and Declaration of Compliance with Art. 4(1)(a) of the CCM, 3 September 2014.

9

Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.

10

Email from Melissa Andersson, Country Director, NPA, 13 May 2015.

11

Third Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline Extension Request, received June 2020.

12

Decree No. 1960/MDAT/MDN establishing the PNDHD, 14 August 2007; and Third APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, received June 2020, p. 2.

13

Decree No. 001358/MDAT establishing the Steering Committee of the PNDHD, 3 September 2007; and Third APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request,
received June 2020, p. 2.

14

Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form I.

15

APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2017), Form D.

16

APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2019), pp. 13–14.

17

Email from Alioune O. Mohamed El Hacen, PNDHD, 17 April 2011; and Third APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, received June 2020, pp. 5 and 8.

18

Third APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, received June 2020, pp. 5 and 8.

19

Emails from Alioune ould Menane, PNDHD, 1 September 2016; and Melissa Andersson, NPA, 12 September 2016 and 13 March 2017.

20

Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 20 May 2020.

21

Ibid.

22

Declaration of Compliance with Art. 4(1)(a) of the CCM, submitted by Mauritania, 3 September 2014.

23

Third APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, received June 2020, pp. 1 and 10; and APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2019), p. 9.

24

Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 4 August 2020.

25

Third APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, received June 2020, p. 10; and CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form I.

26

CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.

27

Third APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, received June 2020, p. 3.

28

Email from Alioune ould Menane, PNDHD, 23 July 2018.

mineactionreview.org 99

MONTENEGRO

CLEARING CLUSTER
MUNITION REMNANTS
2020

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 AUGUST 2020
REPORTED FULFILMENT OF ARTICLE 4 OBLIGATIONS

KEY DATA
CLUSTER MUNITION
CONTAMINATION: MEDIUM
COMPLETED CLEARANCE OF ALL
KNOWN CMR-CONTAMINATED AREAS

SUBMUNITION
CLEARANCE IN 2019

SUBMUNITIONS
DESTROYED IN 2019

0.27KM 64

Area of Land Released (km2)

0.6

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT

0.5

2018
2019

0.51

0.49

0.4

0.3

0.27
0.2

0.1

0.02

2

0.09

0.02

0

Clearance

Technical
Survey

Non-Technical
Survey

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Montenegro has fulfilled its Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Article 4 obligations, having completed clearance of
remaining cluster munition remnant (CMR) contamination on 20 July 2020, and Montenegro declared it had fulfilled its
Article 4 obligation as at 21 July, ahead of its 1 August deadline. Completion was facilitated by the creation of a “Country
Coalition”, in which Norway, as the lead support State/donor, partnered with Montenegro, with Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
as the implementing partner. This Coalition enabled effective planning and completion of CMR clearance by Montenegro’s
Article 4 deadline.
Land release operations re-started in October 2018, implemented, with the support of NPA, by the Department for UXO
[Unexploded Ordnance] within the Directorate for Emergency Situations. Operations had been scheduled to be completed by
the end of April 2020, but this was delayed by two and a half months due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Montenegro should ensure sustainable national capacity is in place to address any CMR discovered since its
Article 4 fulfilment, both in terms of its information management database and its survey and clearance capacity.
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Criterion
UNDERSTANDING
OF CMR
CONTAMINATION

Score Score
(2019) (2018) Performance Commentary
9

7

Montenegro completed clearance of all known CMR contamination in July 2020.
This was achieved following re-commencement of land release operations in
October 2018, following earlier non-technical survey in 2012–13.

8

6

The Country Coalition, formed in 2018 between Montenegro, Norway (as the lead
support State/donor), and NPA as the implementing partner, provided an excellent
forum in which to effectively plan for completion of clearance by Montenegro’s 1
August 2020 Article 4 deadline. The Directorate for Emergency Situations, within the
Ministry of Interior, was responsible for overseeing CMR survey and clearance, and
provided an enabling environment with strong national ownership. While national
resources (both technical and financial) were relatively limited, Montenegro did
provide funding for its UXO team and for quality management of CMR operations.

7

7

The capacity of the national mine action programme in Montenegro was small,
but there was a gender policy in place. NPA’s survey and clearance personnel
were seconded from its programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina and while all NPA
operations staff deployed in Montenegro were male, NPA’s Programme Manager was
a woman and there was one additional female member of staff. Women and children
are consulted during survey activities, and data are disaggregated by sex and age.

6

5

There is no national information management system in place, such as the
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). While Montenegro
did report disaggregated CMR contamination data and land release data to Mine
Action Review, in its CCM Article 7 transparency report it did not disaggregate CMR
contamination data into suspected hazardous area (SHA) and confirmed hazardous
area (CHA) or disaggregate land reduced through technical survey from land
released through clearance.

8

8

There was no national mine strategy in place, but a joint working group was
established and the Ministry of Interior and NPA elaborated a work plan to plan and
prioritise CMR survey and clearance operations and achieve fulfilment of Article 4
by its deadline of 1 August 2020.

8

7

While no national mine action standards exist, CMR survey and clearance operations
were conducted in accordance to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and
to national standing operating procedures (SOPs). Evidence-based survey was used
to release uncontaminated land and confirm CMR contamination prior to clearance.
Explosive detection dogs (EDDs) were deployed for three months in 2019, to support
manual technical survey. Survey and clearance capacity was sufficient to enable
Montenegro to complete CMR clearance in July 2020, ahead of its deadline.

9

6

Montenegro completed CMR in July 2020, ahead of its Article 4 deadline. A total
of 1.27km2 of CMR contaminated area was released in 2019 through non-technical
survey, technical survey, and clearance, and remaining CMR contamination was
released in 2020. Montenegro has a sustainable national capacity to address any
residual CMR discovered post-completion.

8.1

6.6

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 4
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: VERY GOOD

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

The Directorate for Emergency Situations,
Ministry of Interior

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)

OTHER ACTORS
■

None

The Department for UXO (within the Directorate
for Emergency Situations)
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
Clearance of remaining known CMR contamination was
completed on 20 July 2020 and Montenegro declared it had
fulfilled its Article 4 obligation on the following day, 21 July.
At the end of 2019, contamination had totalled almost 0.5km2
(two confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) totalling 0.2km2
and two suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) totalling nearly
0.3km2), in Golubovci municipality.1 Prior to re-starting
land release operations in October 2018, remaining
CMR contamination had stood at almost 1.72km2 across
three municipalities (Golubovci, Rožaje, and Tuzi). 2 The
contamination was identified during detailed non-technical
survey conducted between December 2012 and April 2013.
During the survey, NPA made 87 polygons of SHAs and CHAs
across 11 locations in three municipalities. Contamination
was found to affect five communities.3 Due to snow, it
was not possible to survey two suspected areas of CMR
contamination during the 2012–13 survey, at Bogajice and
Murino in Plav municipality.4
Having secured new funding from Norway, CMR land release
operations re-started in late 2018 and hazardous areas were
re-surveyed through non-technical survey, prior to tasking of
technical survey and clearance.5 As part of the non-technical
survey, the two sites in Plav municipality, inaccessible during the
earlier non-technical survey because of snow, were cancelled.6
Montenegro became contaminated with CMR in 1999 during
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing of
Yugoslavia as part of the war over Kosovo. NATO air strikes
in Montenegro between March and June 1999 included use of
22 cluster munitions of four different types: AGM-154A JSOW
guided missiles, BL755s, CBU-87/Bs, and MK-20 Rockeye
IIs. These scattered a total of some 4,000 submunitions
(BLU-97A/B, BL755, MK-1, and MK118).7 In addition, there was
CMR contamination in Rožaje, which was the result of the
dumping of cluster munitions by the Yugoslav army.8

Some unexploded submunitions were collected by Yugoslav
army units immediately after the NATO air strikes. This
initial clearance was carried out in haste, without applying
international standards for explosive remnants of war (ERW)
clearance, and for the most part only visible submunitions
were destroyed.9 Following Montenegro’s independence,
CMR removal was conducted by the Ministry of Interior in
response to notifications from the public.10
CMR clearance according to international standards was
only carried out in one of the three affected municipalities
in Montenegro. In 2007, UXB Balkans, a commercial operator
from Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), conducted clearance
operations in two locations within the communities of
Besnik and Njeguši (in the municipality of Rožaje). In total,
some 378,000m2 was cleared with the destruction of 16
MK-1 submunitions.11
Montenegro’s initial CCM Article 7 transparency report
had declared that, as at 27 January 2011, “there are no
contaminated areas in Montenegro.”12 In July 2011, however,
the director of the Regional Centre for Divers’ Training and
Underwater Demining (RCUD) confirmed that unexploded
submunitions had been found in 2007.13 Montenegro informed
a CCM intersessional meeting in 2012 that clearance by
military units after the air strikes in 1999, during which
more than 1,800 submunitions were collected, had not been
conducted “fully according to humanitarian mine action
standards” and that it planned to conduct a survey to assess
the remaining threat.14 This led to the 2012–13 NPA survey
described above.15

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR
Montenegro is also heavily contaminated with multiple types of ERW from the First and Second World Wars, with items of UXO
discovered daily throughout the country, on land as well as in rivers and the sea.16

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Directorate for Emergency Situations, established in 2006 by the Ministry of Interior, is responsible for mine action
in Montenegro, performing the role of a national mine action centre.17 Prior to 2017, due to lack of human resources and
equipment, the role of the national mine action centre had previously been undertaken by RCUD, which was set up in 2002.18
In December 2017, NPA organised a workshop in cooperation with the Ministry of Interior of Montenegro’s Directorate for
Emergency Situations, on the “Application of standard operating procedures for technical survey and clearance of areas
contaminated with cluster munition remnants with special emphasis on internal and external quality control”. The aim of the
workshop was to familiarise Directorate staff with standing operating procedures (SOPs) relating to technical survey and
clearance of CMR and to train them on how to undertake quality control (QC) of those operations. The five participants from the
Directorate successfully completed the training.19 The Directorate is responsible for external quality monitoring and issuing of
QC certificates in operations on CMR-contaminated area. 20 In addition, in 2018, personnel from the Directorate were trained by
NPA in non-technical survey. 21
A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed in July 2018 between the Ministry of Interior and NPA for a Norwegian
funded project to complete CMR clearance. The partnership took the form of a Country Coalition, a concept launched under
Germany’s presidency of the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in 2017. Norway, as the lead support State/donor, partnered
with the Montenegrin national authority, with NPA as the implementing partner. The aim of the Country Coalition was to achieve
fulfilment of Montenegro’s Article 4 clearance obligations by its August 2020 deadline, and cooperation and collaboration
between the Directorate for Emergency Situations, its UXO Department, and NPA were both effective and professional.
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All activities performed by the Ministry of Interior team, including destruction of submunitions and external QC, were
nationally funded. 24

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
National authorities in Montenegro reported that a gender policy is in place, and that procedures for conducting non-technical
survey include ensuring a gender-balanced approach to survey teams and consulting with all members of the community,
including women and children. 25
There is equal access to employment for qualified women and men in survey and clearance teams in Montenegro, and women
account for 20% of operational roles, and 30% of managerial level/supervisory positions. 26
Implementing partner NPA has a gender equality policy in place and provided coaching and support for key staff on the
policy in 2019. While NPA’s Programme Manager and Administration Officer in Montenegro were both women, its survey
and clearance team were seconded from NPA’s programme in BiH and were all men. 27
Relevant data was disaggregated data by sex and age by both the Ministry of Interior and NPA. 28

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
There is no national information management system in place, such as the information management system for mine action
(IMSMA). NPA is supporting the Department for UXO within the Directorate for Emergency Situations in providing all data
from the CMR programme to the Ministry of Interior, upon completion. 29
Although Montenegro submitted its Article 7 transparency report (covering 2019) in a timely manner, the quality and accuracy
of information on CMR contamination, as well as on survey and clearance outputs, could be improved. In its Article 7 report,
the total area of remaining CMR contamination was not separated into SHAs and CHAs, and land reduced through technical
survey in 2019 was not disaggregated from release through clearance, even though this data was available and was reported
to Mine Action Review.30

PLANNING AND TASKING
RCUD and NPA signed an MoU in December 2012 under which NPA agreed to fund and implement a two-phase project
— the “Cluster Munition Convention Completion Initiative for Montenegro”. This involved first, non-technical survey, and
then, technical survey and clearance of areas where the presence of CMR was confirmed. NPA agreed to set up a database
and to develop capacity for non-technical survey and quality management.31 The non-technical survey was completed but
funding for the second phase of the project involving technical survey and clearance, originally expected to start in 2013
and continue throughout 2014,32 was not secured.
In May 2018, in a welcome development, Norwegian government funding was secured for the CMR survey and clearance
operations necessary for Montenegro to release remaining CMR-contaminated areas and fulfil its CCM Article 4 obligations.
An MoU between the Ministry of Interior and NPA was signed in July with CMR land release operations beginning in October
2018. There was a work plan in place aimed at completion of Montenegro’s Article 4 clearance obligations by its 1 August
2020 deadline, and plans for realisation of the CMR completion project were entered into the medium-term work plan of the
Montenegro government.33
Following the signature of the MoU, a joint working group was established to support the planning, prioritisation, and
collaboration for CMR tasks.34 Criteria for prioritising CMR-contaminated areas for clearance were agreed between the
national authorities and NPA,35 designed to enable access based on national priorities, including aviation needs, geographic
locations and linkages, and weather conditions.36
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The approach included establishment of a joint working group to support the planning and prioritisation of CMR tasks;
a clear division of roles and responsibilities; transparent discussions and sense of common ownership; and an enabling
environment for mine action. 22 NPA provided capacity development support to national authorities regarding refresher
training on destruction of BLU-97 and MK118 Rockeye submunitions, and the development of new SOPs for both
non-technical and technical survey. 23

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
In March 2018, the Directorate for Emergency Situations reported that it had prepared a rule book on the destruction of
UXO and was currently working on drafting national mine action legislation.37 In February 2019, it reported that mine action
legislation was in place.38
No national standards exist for survey and clearance of CMR in Montenegro, but operations were conducted according to
the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and to national SOPs developed for non-technical survey, technical survey,
clearance, and use of explosives detection dogs (EDDs).39 Aviation security procedures require that SOPs for CMR survey
and clearance operations at Podgorica airport be adapted to meet specific international standards.40

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The Department for UXO within the Directorate for Emergency Situations has only five staff, who are primarily dedicated to
clearance of UXO other than submunitions, which comprises the bulk of ERW contamination in Montenegro.41 Due to lack of
funding, responsibility for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) has remained with the police. 42
Having previously completed a nationwide non-technical survey in April 2013, NPA, re-started CMR land release operations
in October 2018, thanks to Norwegian government funding.43
Non-technical survey capacity in 2019 totalled four personnel, comprising one NPA staff,44 working with three trained
personnel from the Ministry of Interior.45 NPA technical survey/clearance capacity in 2019 comprised six deminers. Two EDDs
and two dog handlers, supported by a team leader, were also deployed by NPA for three months, working alongside the manual
team for technical survey.46
In late February 2019, Ministry of Interior/NPA received a thermal camera drone for six months, to assist with non-technical
survey.47 The Ministry of Interior worked with NPA to support thermal drone testing in Montenegro, which was conducted in
July and December 2019. In addition, representatives from Montenegro also participated in a global thermal drone workshop
held by NPA at the Ministry of Interior in Podgorica, in October 2019.48

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of 1.27km2 of CMR contaminated area was released in 2019, of which almost 0.27m2 was cleared, over 0.51m2 was
reduced through technical survey, and almost 0.49m2 was cancelled through non-technical survey.49

SURVEY IN 2019
A total of more than 1km2 of CMR-contaminated area was released through survey in 2019, all in the municipality of Golubovci.
Of this, nearly 0.49km2 was cancelled through non-technical survey by the joint Ministry of Interior/NPA team and over 0.51km2
was reduced through technical survey.50
While Montenegro did report disaggregated data to Mine Action Review, it did not disaggregate land reduced through technical
survey from land released through clearance in its Article 7 report covering 2019, in which technical survey output was
reported as clearance.51
Survey output in 2019 was a significant increase compared to 2018, when 15,163m2 of CMR-contaminated area was cancelled
and 92,190m2 reduced.52
During non-technical survey in 2019, one previously unrecorded area of CMR contamination, totalling 51,000m2, was added to
the database.53

CLEARANCE IN 2019
In 2019, NPA cleared nearly 0.27km2 of cluster munition-contaminated area in the municipality of Golubovci, during which
64 submunitions were found by NPA and destroyed by the Ministry of Interior. All areas cleared in 2019 contained CMR.54
Montenegro did not disaggregate land reduced through technical survey from land released through clearance in its Article 7
report covering 2019, and so reported, incorrectly, the full 782,305m2 as clearance.55
NPA achieved 92% of clearance planned in 2019, due to challenges encountered in the clearance tasks at the airport, which
included civil and military restrictions, high levels of metal contamination, soil type, and required pausing of operations due
to flights.56
Clearance in 2019 marked an increase on 2018, when 17,430m2 of cluster munition-contaminated area was cleared.57
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PROGRESS IN 2020
Clearance of the all remaining known CMR contamination was completed on 20 July 2020, in the municipality of Tuzi,58
and Montenegro declared it had fulfilled its Article 4 obligation as at the following day.59 Between January and July 2020,
the remaining 343,185m2 of cluster munition-contaminated area was released (of which 92,945m2 was cancelled through
non-technical survey; 194,200m2 was reduced through technical survey; and 56,040m2 was cleared), during which 15
submunitions were destroyed.60

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR MONTENEGRO: 1 AUGUST 2010
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 AUGUST 2020
FULFILLED ARTICLE 4 OBLIGATIONS ON 21 JULY 2020

CMR clearance was completed on 20 July 2020 and
Montenegro declared it had fulfilled its obligations under
Article 4 obligation of the CCM as at 21 July, ahead of
its 1 August 2020 deadline.61 In its communiqué to the
Implementation Support Unit of the CCM, dated 29 July
2020, Montenegro said that “the official declaration of
compliance will be submitted as soon as it is finalised.”62
Following completion of earlier non-technical survey in 2013,
land release operations only recommenced in Montenegro
in October 2018, supported by the establishment of the
Country Coalition between Norway, Montenegro, and NPA.
It had been expected that CMR clearance operations would
be completed by 30 April 2020, but progress was impacted
by the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused clearance
operations to be suspended from 16 March to 1 June 2020.63

Table 1: Five-year summary of CMR clearance
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2019

0.27

2018

0.02

2017

0

2016

0

2015

0

Total

0.29

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION		
According to NPA, Montenegro has a sustainable national capacity in place to address CMR discovered following Article 4
completion, with respect to information management as well as for survey and clearance.64
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KEY DEVELOPMENTS
In 2019, Somalia again made no progress in implementing its obligations under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions
(CCM). No overview of the extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants (CMR) exists. No survey specific to CMR was
conducted and no clearance of CMR was reported again in 2019, as in previous years. A planned review of survey records in
the national database by the Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) was still ongoing as at August 2020.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Somalia should ensure timely survey and clearance of CMR in accordance with its CCM obligations, alongside
efforts to address mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) other than CMR.

■

Somalia should elaborate a plan for Article 4 implementation, including determining a comprehensive baseline
of CMR contamination.

■

Somalia should commit resources to mine action operations.

■

SEMA’s status within the Federal Government of Somalia should be officially recognised and national resources
budgeted annually for its operating costs.

■

Continued efforts should be undertaken to support SEMA to manage the Information Management System for Mine
Action (IMSMA) database. Regular updates from the database should be shared with all implementing partners.

■

Somalia should elaborate a new National Mine Action Strategic Plan, updating the National Mine Action Strategic
Plan 2018–2020 (which had still to be formally endorsed by the Federal Government as of writing).

■

Somalia should develop a resource mobilisation strategy and initiate dialogue with development partners on
long-term support for mine action, including to address CMR.
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ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE
Criterion
UNDERSTANDING
OF CMR
CONTAMINATION

Score Score
(2019) (2018) Performance Commentary
3

3

No baseline of CMR contamination has been established.

4

4

A new director of SEMA was appointed in 2019 and SEMA continued to receive
capacity development support. However, there is a lack of national ownership as
the Federal Government of Somalia has still not formally recognised the Authority
as a government institution or funded its operations.

5

5

Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 includes provisions on
gender and diversity. SEMA has advocated action on gender and diversity within
survey and community liaison teams. However, there are challenges to achieving
gender mainstreaming within Somalia as a patriarchal society. Clan affiliation is
also an important consideration when considering diversity.

6

5

SEMA has assumed full ownership and responsibility for the national mine action
database, however, it has been reported that the database is neither up to date
nor accurate. Somalia submitted its initial CCM Article 7 report in October 2019.
In mid-September 2020, Somalia submitted its Article 7 report covering 2019.

5

5

Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 was still awaiting
final approval as at June 2020. SEMA met with operators in 2019, to discuss
setting indicators for planning and prioritisation. Operators reported that while
improvements had been made in tasking by SEMA the process would benefit
from it taking greater ownership.

5

5

A process to revise Somalia’s National Technical Standards and Guidelines was due
to be completed in 2019 but was still awaiting approval as of writing. The current
standards are not deemed to meet the requirements for Somalia.

2

2

No CMR contamination was surveyed or cleared again in 2019, and no progress
towards addressing CMR contamination has been reported in the past six years.
Somalia is not currently on track to meet its Article 4 deadline of 2026.

4.0

3.9

(20% of overall score)

NATIONAL
OWNERSHIP AND
PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT
(10% of overall score)

GENDER AND
DIVERSITY
(10% of overall score)

INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
AND REPORTING
(10% of overall score)

PLANNING
AND TASKING
(10% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
SYSTEM
(20% of overall score)

LAND RELEASE
OUTPUTS AND
ARTICLE 4
COMPLIANCE
(20% of overall score)

Average Score

Overall Programme Performance: POOR

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■
■

Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA)
Mine Action Department, within the Somaliland
Ministry of Defence (formerly the Somaliland Mine
Action Centre, SMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

Federal Member States (FMS) NGO consortium
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INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■
■
■
■

The HALO Trust
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
Ukroboronservice
Danish Demining Group (DDG)

OTHER ACTORS
■

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

STATES PARTIES

In 2013, dozens of PTAB-2.5M submunitions and several
AO-1-SCh submunitions were found within a 30km radius
of the town of Dolow on the Somali-Ethiopian border in
south-central Somalia.4 CMR were also identified around the
town of Galdogob in the north-central Mudug province of
Puntland, further north on the border with Ethiopia.5 More
contamination was expected to be found in south-central
Somalia’s Lower and Upper Juba regions.6
Submunitions have been sporadically found in previous
years, including most recently in 2017, when UNMAS
reported that it was shown two photos of the body of a
BL755 submunition being used in what it assessed to be an
improvised explosive device (IED) in Kismayo, Lower Juba
region.7 Previously, three reports of CMR were made in 2016:
several BL755 submunitions were reportedly found near
Bu’ale, Middle Juba region in January, which were claimed by
Somali media to have been recently used; a modified BL755
submunition was found in Bardera (Baardheere), Gedo region
in March; and one PTAB-2.5M submunition was reportedly
found in Dinsoor, Bay region in September.8 In 2015, UNMAS
reported that eight reports were submitted in September
from Rabdhure, in Bakool region of South West state,
showing empty RBK-250-275 cluster bomb containers, which
can contain both AO-1-Sch and PTAB-2.5M submunitions.9

The Ethiopian National Defence Forces and the Somali
National Armed Forces are thought to have used cluster
munitions in clashes along the Somali-Ethiopian border
during the 1977–78 Ogaden War.10 The Soviet Union supplied
both Ethiopia and Somalia with weapons during the conflict.
PTAB-2.5 and AO-1-Sch submunitions were produced by the
Soviet Union on a large scale.11
In January 2016, Somali media reports alleged that the
Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) had used cluster munitions
during an intensive bombing campaign in Gedo region, in
response to an attack on KDF forces at an African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) base in El Adde in which 150
Kenyan soldiers were reportedly killed.12 Photos appeared to
show that the KDF used United Kingdom (UK)-manufactured
BL755 submunitions in the area of Bu’ale, and subsequently
it was reported that al-Shabaab had discovered unexploded
submunitions of the same BL755 type, which it used in IEDs.13
A UN Monitoring Group investigated whether Kenyan forces
had used cluster munitions but was unable to conclude
that the KDF had dropped the BL755 submunitions during
airstrikes on Gedo in January 2016. It noted, however, the
absence of reports of unexploded BL755 submunitions among
legacy unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination in Somalia.
Kenya denied using cluster munitions in the January 2016 air
campaign, calling the Monitoring Group’s report “at best, a
fabricated, wild and sensationalist allegation”.14

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Somalia is contaminated with ERW other than CMR, primarily as a result of conflict in 1990–2012. Contamination exists across
its three major regions: south-central Somalia (including Mogadishu), Puntland (a semi-autonomous administration in the
north-east), and Somaliland (a self-proclaimed, though unrecognised, state that operates autonomously in the north-west).
Landmines along the border with Ethiopia, mainly as a result of legacy minefields, also exist in south-central Somalia.
Contamination in Somaliland consists of mines and ERW (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on
Somalia and Somaliland for further information of the mine problem).15

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Mine action management in Somalia continues to be divided into two geographical regions: south-central Somalia and
Somaliland. The respective centre responsible for mine action in each of these areas is SEMA in Somalia and the Mine Action
Department within the Somaliland Ministry of Defence.
SEMA maintains a presence across Somalia through its five Federal Member States (FMS): the Puntland State Office, Galmudug
State Office, Hirshabelle State Office, South West State Office, and Jubaland State Office.16 Under each of the five states is an
independent consortium of national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) implementing mine action activities.
SEMA was established in 2013 as the mine action centre for Somalia. But due to a lack of parliamentary approval of draft
legislation on its mandate, SEMA has not received funding from the Federal Government of Somalia since the expiry of its grant
in 2015.17 Salaries at SEMA have been covered by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) from 2017 onwards and NPA has committed
to do so until SEMA is granted parliamentary approval, pending available funding in 2021–22, which has ensured SEMA’s
survival.18 UNMAS supported SEMA state offices with operational incentives from January to March 2020.19 As at August 2020,
a UNDP project to support SEMA with capacity development, project implementation and salaries was under discussion. 20
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UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
The extent of CMR contamination in Somalia is unknown.
There were no reports of previously unrecorded CMR
contamination being added to the database in 2019.1 However,
according to SEMA, CMR are suspected in areas along the
border with Kenya, in the north of Jubaland state. It stated
that in the old version of the national database managed by
the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), five areas
suspected to contain CMR contamination were recorded
in Jubaland and that verification of this information was
ongoing. 2 No further survey of CMR-contaminated areas
has been possible in recent years, primarily due to lack
of funding, according to SEMA.3 There is no reported CMR
contamination in Somaliland.

A new director of SEMA was appointed towards the end of
2019, the third in as many years, although outside of this
position staff turnover within SEMA is relatively low. NPA
expressed concern about the lack of commitment from the
Federal Government of Somalia to mine action and the impact
that it may have on fundraising efforts by operators if no
serious efforts are being made by the Somali government
towards official approval or financial support of SEMA. 21
In 2019, as part of the United Kingdom Department for
International Development (DFID)-funded consortium project
with The HALO Trust, who provide technical training and
support with quality assurance (QA) to SEMA, NPA continued
its capacity development work with SEMA. In 2019, key
activities included supporting information management
and operational planning, providing QA and quality
control (QC) training, support in donor liaison and treaty
meetings, support for quarterly coordination meetings and
workshops, and providing training in financial, administrative
and logistical procedures. In addition to SEMA capacity
development support, NPA also trained the non-technical
survey, explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) and
community liaison capacity of the local SEMA implementing
partners in Puntland and Galmudug.22

PUNTLAND
The SEMA Puntland State Office, formerly known as PMAC,
was established in Garowe with UN Development Programme
(UNDP) support in 1999. Since then, on behalf of the regional
government, the Puntland State Office has coordinated mine
action with local and international partners, throughout
2019 the implementing partners were NPA and the Puntland
Risk Solution Consortium.24 It runs the only police explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) team in Puntland, which is
responsible for collecting and destroying explosive ordnance.25
SOMALILAND
The Mine Action Department within the Somaliland Ministry
of Defence manages mine action in Somaliland. 26 The HALO
Trust has reported an enabling environment for mine
action with international staff able to easily obtain visas,
memorandums of understanding (MoUs) can be drawn up
with line ministries, and there are favourable tax regulations
in place (as for international NGOs in other sectors).
The HALO Trust is seeking to establish a committee for
“Explosives Hazards Management” within the government
to collectively discuss progress, challenges, and support for
Article 5 implementation in Somaliland. 27

SEMA began conducting quarterly meetings with all mine
action implementing partners in 2018, with a focus on
monitoring of operations. Operators considered this a
major step forward towards improving the cooperation,
consultation, and coordination between SEMA and the
clearance operators within Somalia. 23

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020
recognises gender and diversity as cross-cutting issues for
the national mine action programme, in line with Somalia’s
National Development Plan objectives to “implement gender
equality in education and mainstream gender in all of its
programmes with a focus on adolescent girls”. The National
Mine Action Strategic Plan stipulates that the mine action
programme must reflect gender objectives and ensure the
specific needs of women, girls, boys, and men are taken
into account, including through delivery of gender-equality
programming and adoption of a gender-sensitive approach
by consortia and implementing partners. The Plan also
recognises the importance of conducting context analyses in
areas of mine action operations to clarify important gender
and diversity issues, such as clan affiliation, movement
patterns of local populations, and barriers to participation
for different gender and age groups. 28 SEMA reported that
gender and diversity have also been integrated into the
national mine action standards. 29
In May 2019, SEMA informed Mine Action Review that
it does not have an internal gender or diversity policy
or implementation plan. It acknowledged that this was
“unfortunate”, and pledged that it would strive for gender
balance in the future, by ensuring equal employment
opportunities for qualified men and women.30
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SEMA also reported that within the federal State national
mine action NGO consortia, there was a focus on gender in
survey and community liaison teams to ensure the inclusion
of all affected groups, including women and children.31
Operators are working towards gender-balanced survey
and clearance teams. This is a challenge in Somalia as
a traditionally patriarchal society where women are not
usually encouraged to engage in physical work or to take up
leadership roles.32 SEMA confirmed that data collection was
disaggregated by sex and age, and gender taken into account
in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and
clearance activities,33 although it is unclear how gender is
being taken into account.
All operators confirmed that clan affiliation was also an
important consideration when recruiting and deploying
operational staff. It is important that the hiring process
includes people from across the different clan and ethnic
groups to ensure diversity and that there is sensitivity to
this when teams are deployed.34 Employing more women
typically enables operators to access all strata of Somali
society to gain information and take into account the views
of all relevant groups.35 In Somaliland, one third of the
population are nomadic pastoralists, with many transiting
between Somaliland and Ethiopia. HALO in Somaliland
ensures that it employs survey staff from both a rural and
urban background, and from various regions in Somaliland,
to ensure that there is a strong understanding of all sections
of Somaliland society.36

STATES PARTIES

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
In 2017, ownership of the national IMSMA database was fully transferred from UNMAS to SEMA, with support and
capacity-building from NPA.40 NPA reported that IMSMA operators within SEMA were carrying out data verification and
entry.41 Under the database reporting formats, CMR are recorded separately from other types of ERW.42 According to UNMAS,
however, SEMA’s database is neither up to date nor accurate.43 As at August 2020, SEMA was meeting with operators to discuss
synchronising operator data with the national database.44
The Mine Action Department, the mine action authority in Somaliland, manages a separate IMSMA database. The HALO Trust
stated that its data undergo monthly QA before being reported to the Mine Action Department, which uploads it onto the
central database. In Somaliland, HALO creates its own data collection forms, which it says ensure accurate collection of data
by its survey teams.45
Somalia’s national mine action strategic plan stipulates the submission of annual transparency reports for the CCM, along
with those under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). In October 2019, SEMA submitted its first CCM Article
7 transparency report, which included the limited amount of information about CMR contamination. In mid-September 2020,
Somalia submitted its Article 7 report covering 2019, reporting no survey and clearance during the year.

PLANNING AND TASKING
Somalia’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020
was developed with input from SEMA, UNMAS, international
operators, national NGO consortia, and international
institutions in late 2017.46 As at May 2020, with the strategic
plan about to expire, it was still awaiting approval by the
Minister for Internal Security.47
The plan focuses on setting “achievable” goals over the
three-year period. The strategy’s five goals, identified by
SEMA, are as follows:
■
■
■
■
■

To enhance SEMA’s ability to lead and enable effective
and efficient mine action
To develop the Somali mine action consortia into a wholly
national mine action capacity
To engage with stakeholders in order to understand, and
better respond to, their mine action needs
To achieve a mine-impact-free Somalia
To comply with treaties binding Somalia on mines and
other explosive threats.

The strategy notes Somalia’s status as a State Party to the
CCM and its reporting obligations and commits to complying
with the Convention, but does not contain specific provisions
on survey and clearance of CMR.
SEMA was developing a mine action work plan for 2020, in
cooperation with the SEMA state offices, and operators, but
it was not finished as of August. NPA is planning to support
SEMA with an implementation plan for 2021.48
In Somaliland, The HALO Trust has encountered a lack
of political will to conclude a strategic plan or handle
residual risk.49

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
There is no national mine action legislation in Somalia. UNMAS developed National Technical Standards and Guidelines
(NTSGs) for Somalia in 2012–13.50 SEMA conducted a review of the NTSGs in 2019 with technical support from NPA and
in compliance with IMAS. As at May 2020, the NTSGs were awaiting approval from the Ministry of Internal Security.51
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In 2019, NPA’s non-technical survey/community liaison/EORE teams were said to be gender balanced as was senior
management. However, no women were working in the clearance teams, apart from medics.37 In total, 25% of HALO Trust’s
workforce were women in 2019 and 18% of its operational personnel were women. In Somalia, 40% of women employed by
the HALO Trust are in operational roles, while in Somaliland it is 47%. Women also occupy several managerial roles in both
Somalia and Somaliland. In 2019, eight of the twenty new deminers hired by HALO were women.38 UNMAS have been hiring
local people on short-term contracts to assist clearance teams which has enabled a larger number of women to be hired and
has brought the average overall female participation in mine action up to 25%. Women also constituted 27% of leadership
(managerial/supervisory) positions in the UNMAS Somalia programme.39

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In 2019, one international NGO, The HALO Trust, conducted battle area clearance (BAC) operations in Somalia and Somaliland,
along with UNMAS-contracted commercial clearance company, Ukroboronservice. NPA also conducted clearance in 2019, but
only of mined areas.
Table 1: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 201952
Operator

Manual
teams

Total
deminers*

Dogs and
handlers

Machines**

Ukroboronservice
(UNMAS)

4 MTTs
6 MDTs

61

0

0

Increase from 2 MTTs and 4 MDTs in 2018
Conduct BAC and mine clearance

4

38

0

0

HALO Somalia only conducted BAC in 2019

HALO Somaliland

34

259

0

2

Decrease from 2018
Conduct BAC and mine clearance

Totals

48

358

0

2

HALO Somalia

Comments

* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.
MTT= Mobile multi-tasking team MDT= Manual demining team.

UNMAS, through its implementing partner Ukroboronservice, deployed four mobile multi-tasking teams (MTTs) and six
manual demining teams (MDTs) which are trained to carry out non-technical survey, mine clearance, BAC, EOD. In addition,
16 community liaison officers conduct non-technical survey. Operational capacity increased in 2019 compared to 2018.
In 2020, if funding from the European Union (EU) is approved, capacity may increase further.53
In 2019, The HALO Trust in Somalia conducted only BAC. In addition, HALO deployed eight non-technical survey teams totalling
20 personnel in Somalia, and two teams totalling eight personnel in Somaliland. The HALO Trust expected to recruit an
additional eight non-technical survey and clearance/technical survey teams in 2020. No changes in capacity were expected
in Somaliland in 2020. In 2019, the HALO Trust conducted tests on the application of thermite torches in Somalia and hosted
a preliminary trial of Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance (NQR) technology for explosive detection in Somaliland.54
NPA continued only mine clearance in 2019 in Somaliland/Puntland but terminated its operations in the disputed area at
the end of November 2019 and closed its office at the end of January 2020.55 In 2020, NPA was conducting mine clearance in
Puntland and non-technical survey, impact assessment and explosive ordnance risk education in Galmudug and Puntland,
entering into partnerships with each of the local NGO consortia.56

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
There was no reported release of land contaminated with CMR in 2019. No new contamination from CMR was reported.57
This was also the case in 2018.
The HALO Trust reported that they re-surveyed an area in Galmudug in 2019 which was recorded as contaminated with
CMR but after finding no evidence, they cancelled the area.58
According to SEMA, the primary reason that no national CMR survey had been carried out was a lack of funding for activities.59

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SOMALIA: 1 MARCH 2016
ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2026
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

Under Article 4 of the CCM, Somalia is required to destroy all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible,
but not later than 1 March 2026.
It is too soon to say whether Somalia will meet its Article 4 deadline though it is not currently on track to do so. SEMA has
informed Mine Action Review that key challenges which could prevent Somalia from meeting its 2026 deadline, based on
current capacity, are a lack of funding and the fact that Somalia as of yet has not conducted a general survey to have a
comprehensive picture of remaining CMR contamination.60
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Table 2: Five-year summary of CMR clearance

1

Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F; and emails from Mustafa Bawar,
Head of Programme Management Office, UNMAS, 23 August 2020; Claus
Nielsen, Country Director, NPA, 19 August 2020; and Lawrie Clapton,
Country Director, HALO Trust, 23 August 2020.

27

Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.

28

SEMA, “Somalia National Strategic Plan, 2019”, pp. 21–22.

29

Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020.

2

Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.

30

Email from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019.

3

Ibid.

31

Ibid.

4

Emails from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, Director, SEMA, 14 June 2016; and
Mohammad Sediq Rashid, Project Manager, UNMAS Somalia, 8 June 2017.
UNMAS reported in June 2017 that these items had since been cleared.

32

Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.

33

Email from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019.

34

Emails from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020; Claus Nielsen, NPA,
14 April 2020; and Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.

35

Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.

36

Ibid.

37

Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020.

38

Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.

39

Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020.

40

Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 22 March 2018.

5

Response to questionnaire by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA,
19 June 2015.

6

Presentation by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, National Director, Somali
National Mine Action Authority (SNMAA), “Somalia Weapons Contamination:
Addressing Key Challenges to Meeting Clearance Deadlines under the Mine
Ban Convention and Convention on Cluster Munitions”, African Union and
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) workshop, Addis Ababa,
5 March 2013.

7

Emails from Ghirmay Kiros, Explosive Threat Mitigation Operations Officer,
UNMAS, 27 June and 29 June 2018.

8

Year

Area cleared (m2)

2019

0

2018

0

2017

0

2016

0

2015

0

Total

0

41

Ibid.

Ibid.

42

Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 April 2019.

9

Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS, 8 June 2017.

43

10

Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SNMAA, 17 April 2013.

Interview with Qurat-al-Ain, Head of UNMAS Somalia Programme, UNMAS,
in Geneva, 14 February 2020.

11

Ibid.

44

Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 19 August 2020.

12

“Letter dated 7 October 2016 from the Chair of the Security Council
Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning
Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council”,
UN doc. S/2016/919, 31 October 2016, pp. 171–73.

45

Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.

46

Emails from Abdulkadir Ibrahim Mohamed Hoshow, SEMA, 9 May 2019;
and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 13 April 2019.

47

Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020.

13

Ibid.

48

Skype interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 February 2020.

14

Ibid.

49

Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 10 July 2020.

15

UNMAS, “UN-suggested Explosive Hazard Management Strategic
Framework 2015–2019”, undated, pp. 6 and 12.

50

Email from Terje Eldøen, NPA, 5 June 2016; and response to questionnaire
by Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 19 June 2015.

16

Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016.

51

Email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 11 May 2020.

17

Emails from Terje Eldøen, Programme Manager, NPA, 22 October 2016;
and Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016.

52

Emails from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020; Claus Nielsen, NPA,
14 April 2020; and Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.

18

Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 23 July 2020.

53

Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 17 March 2020.

19

Email from Mustafa Bawar, UNMAS, 3 August 2020.

54

Email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.

20

Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, 19 August 2020.

55

Skype interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 February 2020.

21

Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 14 April 2020.

56

22

Ibid.; and email from Lawrie Clapton, HALO Trust, 14 June 2020.

Skype interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 February 2020; and email,
27 August 2020.

23

Emails from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 9 May 2019; and Claus Nielsen, NPA,
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SOMALIA

HALO Trust echoed these concerns, stating that survey is far
from complete due to limited access, combined with the fact
that active conflict continues in the country.61 At the same
time, NPA felt it still remained possible for Somalia to meet
its Article 4 obligations in time, as contamination from CMR
is believed to be relatively low and manageable. Success is
dependent on access to suspected areas and the availability
of funding.62 These concerns were also repeated by UNMAS
who believed that it is unlikely Somalia will meet its Article 4
obligations due to lack of access, continued insecurity,
and the lack of available resources to carry out survey
and clearance.63

UNITED
KINGDOM

CLEARING CLUSTER
MUNITION REMNANTS
2020

(FALKLAND ISLANDS)

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2020
HAS FULFILLED ARTICLE 4 OBLIGATIONS

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
The United Kingdom (UK) has said that UK bombing data for the Falkland Islands shows there is no evidence that cluster
munitions were dropped on the four remaining minefields in Yorke Bay, which totalled an estimated 226,958m2 as at end of
March 2020.1 As all other hazardous areas (including both cluster munition-contaminated and mined areas) in the Falkland
Islands have already been released, there are no remaining areas in which cluster munition remnants (CMR) are suspected
or confirmed.
If any CMR or other items of explosive ordnance are found following the conclusion of the United Kingdom’s demining
programme on the Falkland Islands, the authorities have confirmed that they will be addressed by the Explosive Ordnance
Disposal (EOD) team from the Royal Air Force Armament Engineering Flight on the Falkland Islands, which has an “enduring”
military presence there.

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY
MANAGEMENT
■

■

National Mine Action Authority (chaired by the United
Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth and Development
Office (FCDO) and comprising representatives from the
Ministry of Defence, the Falkland Islands Government,
and a strategic advisor)
Fenix Insight (Demining Project Office)

NATIONAL OPERATORS
■

SafeLane Global (formerly Dynasafe BACTEC,
and land release contractor)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
■

None

OTHER ACTORS
■

None

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
There are no longer any areas known or suspected to contain
CMR in the Falkland Islands. 2
The Falkland Islands were contaminated as a result of use
of BL755 cluster bombs by British forces against Argentine
positions during the 1982 armed conflict. While the Ministry
of Defence conducted extensive battle area clearance (BAC)
of CMR after the end of the conflict, it said in 2009 that the
majority of those CMR remaining were contained within
existing minefields that would be cleared in due course.3 As
the United Kingdom had not previously specified which, if
any, of the remaining mined areas may contain CMR based
on analysis of UK bombing data, it had remained unclear
whether or not these mined areas could also contain CMR.
Mine Action Review had therefore continued to deem the
United Kingdom to have an Article 4 obligation. In May 2020,
the United Kingdom said that bombing data showed that the
remaining mined areas had not been bombed. Therefore,
the suspicion of CMR potentially remaining within uncleared
minefields has now been removed.
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Previously, in February 2009, the Ministry of Defence stated
that: “According to historical records either 106 or 107
Cluster Bomb Units (CBU) were dropped by British Harriers
and Sea Harriers during the conflict. Each CBU contains 147
BL755 submunitions and using the higher CBU figure (107),
a total of 15,729 submunitions were dropped. Using a 6.4%
failure rate assessed during in-service surveillance over 15
years, we would estimate that 1,006 would not explode. Given
that 1,378 BL755s were cleared in the first year after the
conflict and that a further 120 have been found and disposed
of since (totalling 1,498), clearly there was a slightly higher
failure rate. Even if the rate had been closer to 10% and 1,573
had failed, we can only estimate that some 70 remain but that
due to the very soft nature of the peat found on the islands,
many of these will have been buried well below the surface.
We believe that the majority of those remaining are now
contained within existing minefields and these will be cleared
in due course.”4

STATES PARTIES

The United Kingdom had previously stated that potential CMR
contamination has, in part, been taken into account during
mine clearance operations on the Islands, with two areas, Fox
Bay 8W and Goose Green 11, selected for clearance partly
based on records indicating that cluster munitions had been
dropped there. No CMR were found in these two areas.7
Since October 2009, mine clearance operations in the
Falkland Islands resulted in the destruction of a total of 21
submunitions and 1 cluster munition container.8 In 2010, the
United Kingdom reported destruction of two submunitions in
Stanley Area 3, during clearance operations across four mined
areas in 2009-10.9 In June 2015, it reported destruction of 19
submunitions during clearance operations in January to April
2015, also in Stanley Area 3.10 UK records suggest that four
cluster bombs were dropped in this area.11 In June 2017, the
main body of a BL755 cluster munition container was found in
“minefield GG08”, during BAC in the Goose Green region. GG08
has now been declared cleared of all explosive ordnance.12

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
As referenced previously, the Falkland Islands is also contaminated by anti-personnel mines (see Mine Action Review’s
Clearing the Mines 2020 report on the United Kingdom for further information) and other explosive ordnance. At the end of
March 2020, contamination had been reduced to four mined areas totalling an estimated 226,958m2, all of which are located in
Yorke Bay. All four mined areas have already been technically surveyed and the United Kingdom planned to have completed
clearance by the end of 2020.13

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
A National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established in 2009 to regulate, manage, and coordinate mine action on the
Falkland Islands. The NMAA is chaired by United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO) and
comprises representatives from the Ministry of Defence, the Falkland Islands Government, and the programme’s strategic
advisor. The NMAA ensures mine action is conducted in accordance with United Kingdom and Falkland Islands’ legislation,
and its approval is required before cleared areas are declared completed. It meets at least once every six months, and the
land release contractors (SafeLane Global; formerly Dynasafe BACTEC) and the Demining Project Office (Fenix Insight), are
invited to brief the NMAA “as appropriate”.14
In addition, there is a Suspect Hazardous Area Land Release Committee (SHALARC), which is a non-decision-making body
based in the Falkland Islands, composed of a local officials and a representative of the British military. SHALARC provides
a forum for the contractors to discuss issues of concern or interest to the committee, and includes explanation of the land
release process, including when land has been released for public use.15
Survey and clearance operations in the Falkland Islands are entirely funded by the UK Government.16 The first four phases of
demining (2009 to March 2016) cost £11 million (approx. US$14.5 million at the time),17 and an additional £27 million (approx.
US$35.5 million at current exchange rates) was committed on Phase 5 through to March 2020.18 Since 2018, the United
Kingdom has sought additional financing to ensure the Programme will be fully funded through to completion, which will bring
the total investment in demining of the Falklands from £38 million to £44 million (approx. US$54 million).19

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
The UK reported that it makes every effort to ensure that the different needs and perspectives of women, girls, boys, and men
are considered in planning and implementation of mine clearance activities on the Falkland Islands. 20
The UK government and its contractors adhere to an equal opportunities approach to recruitment for the demining
programme in the Falkland Islands. 21
The NMAA requires its contractors, SafeLane Global and Fenix Insight, to meet contractual conditions to prevent unlawful
discrimination, either directly or indirectly, on the basis of race, colour, ethnic or national origin, disability, sex or sexual
orientation, religion or belief, or age. The provisions also stipulate that the Contractor must adhere to the current relevant
codes of practice or recommendations published by the Equality and Human Rights Commission. 22
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In 2015, the United Kingdom affirmed that no known areas of
CMR contamination exist outside suspected hazardous areas
(SHAs) on the islands, in particular mined areas, all of which
are fenced and marked.5 In 1982–84, BAC was undertaken
over large areas looking for submunitions and other
unexploded ordnance (UXO). The United Kingdom conducted
CMR clearance in the aftermath of the Falklands conflict,
along with comprehensive perimeter marking of mined areas
potentially containing remaining CMR. Based on bombing
data, areas where unexploded submunitions were expected
to be found were targeted “very quickly”, and a large number
were located and destroyed. Demining operations involved
both surface and subsurface clearance.6

Fenix Insight has an organisational gender policy which it applies to its demining, though there is limited opportunity to
pursue it on the Falklands given the deployed “team” is composed of only one (male) person. SafeLane Global has an equal
opportunities policy and selects employees based on qualification and experience, without gender restrictions. Of management
level positions employed by SafeLane Global in the Falkland Islands, women occupy one third, but none of the survey or
clearance staff is female. 23 According to SafeLane Global, no female deminers presented themselves during the recruitment
phases for the Falkland Islands operations and only one female applicant applied for a surveyor position, but was unsuccessful
as she was not the most qualified candidate for the role. 24
Within the FCDO (the national authority), women are involved in the programme in key positions: Senior Responsible Officer,
Deputy Senior Responsible Officer, and Project Manager. 25

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The information management system is managed at two levels. The Strategic Advisor maintains the public statement of
progress through a “Cumulative Totals” spreadsheet (as demonstrated in the attached annex to the United Kingdom’s
2018 Article 5 deadline extension request). This forms the basis of the declarations to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention (APMBC) Meetings of States Parties. Also, the Demining Project Office and the Land Release Contractor use an
operational-level planning and information management tool which guides the work and ultimately leads to the Handover
Certificate at the conclusion of each task. 26
Historically, the United Kingdom has not collated data on area cancelled and on area reduced, 27 and does not disaggregate
land released through technical survey from land released through clearance in its reporting. 28

PLANNING AND TASKING
The United Kingdom is in the fifth and final phase of mine clearance, which includes tackling the most technically-challenging
and environmentally-sensitive minefields. 29 The United Kingdom had expected that eight mined areas would remain upon
completion of Phase 5(b) in March 2020, covering an estimated 163,460m2.30 In April 2020, the United Kingdom reported that
only four mined areas in fact remained, totalling an estimated 226,958m2, all of which are located in Yorke Bay.31
In April 2020, the United Kingdom confirmed that it had sought additional financing to ensure the Programme will be fully
funded through to completion.32

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
The United Kingdom does not have its own national mine action standards, but survey and clearance operations on the
Falkland Islands are reported to meet or exceed the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), by adapting IMAS to meet the
specifics of the situation on the Falkland Islands.33 Each project’s Statement of Requirement contains the standards specific to
the tasks being addressed.34
The United Kingdom reported that it has “followed the principles set out in IMAS 09.10 (Clearance Requirements) and is very
conscious of the statement that “The beneficiaries of humanitarian demining programmes must be confident that cleared
and released land is safe for their use. This requires management systems and clearance procedures which are appropriate,
effective, efficient and safe.” The UK and its contractors have used all reasonable effort to achieve the best practicable
outcome. On the issue of post clearance safety, the UK continues to use the principles set out in UK Health and Safety
legislation to reduce the residual risk to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) which is similar to the IMAS concept
of ‘all reasonable effort’.”35
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The Land Release Contractor in the Falkland Islands is
selected by international competitive tender prior to each
phase, as required by the European Union. SafeLane Global
(formerly Dynasafe BACTEC), was awarded the land release
contract for the current and final phase of demining operations
in the Falkland Islands, as for the previous four phases.36
SafeLane Global’s operational capacity in the Falkland Islands
in 2019 remained constant at seven manual clearance teams
totalling 56 manual deminers (excluding team leaders and
medics) and 16 mechanical assets, including sifters which are
critical to the project.37
The Demining Project Office, which implements the policies
of the NMAA and monitors the land release operations on
the Falkland Islands, is also awarded through competitive
tender. Fenix Insight has been awarded responsibility for the
Demining Project Office for all five stages of demining.38
Drones have been used for reconnaissance over large
areas not accessible behind minefield fences and for aerial

mapping. Use of drones to overfly SHAs helped to identify
mine “dump” locations, row markers, and other evidence that
might have otherwise taken a manual team several days to
locate. The United Kingdom deems the use of drones to be
an excellent addition to the demining toolbox and continues
to use them when appropriate.39 Yorke Bay, where the
remaining mined areas are located, is a very large sandy
area with dunes up to 10 metres in height. Aerial drones
provide a viewpoint that is not otherwise available.40
Technical survey during phase 5(b) helped determine the
most effective clearance methods given the unique conditions
of the four remaining minefields at Yorke Bay and have
informed the clearance plan. Technical survey identified
where block excavation down to the rock or clay layer
could take place, suggesting a combination of techniques
(mechanical and manual clearance where necessary) and
types of equipment to use, including sifting buckets, dump
trucks, and screening machines.41

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
No submunitions were found in the Falkland Islands in 2019, but 319 anti-personnel mines, 108 anti-vehicle mines, and 6 items
of UXO were destroyed during survey and clearance operations which saw the release of 15 SHAs.42

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE
CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR UNITED KINGDOM: 1 NOVEMBER 2010

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2020 (HAS FULFILLED ARTICLE 4 OBLIGATIONS)

The United Kingdom has fulfilled its obligation under Article 4 to destroy all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as
soon as possible, but not later than 1 November 2020. In May 2020, the United Kingdom confirmed that UK bombing data for
the Falkland Islands showed there is no evidence that cluster munitions were dropped on the four remaining minefields in
Yorke Bay, which as at the end of March 2020, totalled an estimated 226,958m2.43 According to the United Kingdom, bombing
data records have been analysed many times since 1982 and all known BL755 strike targets were checked by British Troops
over the years. All items found were destroyed.44
The United Kingdom had not considered itself to have an obligation under Article 4 of the CCM, and had reported that it
considered that it had made every effort to identify all cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control.
It believes any remaining CMR, if found to exist, to be “residual.”45

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Full and accessible records of all survey and clearance undertaken will be retained by national authorities in the Falkland
Islands and the United Kingdom.46 As reported above, the United Kingdom has bombing data of the cluster munition strikes on
the Falkland Islands and has cleared all cluster munition contaminated areas. The United Kingdom believes there is a very low
risk of previously unknown mine contamination being discovered post completion, but that it remains a possibility as there is
no complete record of mines laid on the Falkland Islands.
If a mine or other item of explosive ordnance is found following the conclusion of the demining programme, it will be addressed
by the EOD team from the UK’s Royal Air Force Armament Engineering Flight on the Falkland Islands, which has an “enduring”
military presence there.47
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Angola should ratify the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.

■

Angola should confirm whether it believes that cluster munition remnants (CMR) remain on its territory.

■

Angola should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR on territory under its
jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

Angola should elaborate specific land release and residual contamination targets that refer to CMR contamination.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The extent to which Angola is affected by CMR is still unclear.
There are no reports of confirmed contamination. According
to Angola’s national mine action authority, the National
Intersectoral Commission for Demining and Humanitarian
Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem
e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH), 18 submunitions were
found and destroyed in 2018, and a total of 164 submunitions
were found and destroyed in 2017 as a result of explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks and community call-outs.1
In the APMBC Article 5 implementation Workplan 2020–2025,
it is reported that 24 submunitions were found and destroyed
in 2017–19. 2 There were no reports of submunitions being
found in 2019 by either CNIDAH or operators and prior to
2017 CNIDAH had not previously reported on the discovery
of submunitions.3
CNIDAH reported that no CMR specific survey or clearance
was carried out in 2019 and the national database does
not contain any polygons pertaining to areas of CMR
contamination.4 None of the international mine action
operators working in Angola has reported finding any
significant areas of CMR contamination or submunitions since
2008.5 In 2018, in November, Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
reported that a single Russian-made AO-1-Sch submunition
was brought in for destruction by a local community member
to its operations near to Kapuluta village, Luvuei commune,
in Moxico province. As at April 2019, community liaison teams
had been sent to survey the surrounding farmlands for
further information, but MAG did not have any evidence that
additional CMR would be found.6

Previously, the last reported instance of an international mine
action NGO locating CMR was in August 2016, when The HALO
Trust found two Alpha submunitions in Cunene province. The
submunitions were reported by local residents to a HALO
Trust survey team during re-survey operations.7 Prior to this,
HALO Trust reported finding and destroying 12 submunitions
in 2012. The HALO Trust informed Mine Action Review that
these were isolated cases and noted that it had seen very
little evidence of cluster munition strikes in Angola. With
these exceptions, as at May 2019, NGO clearance operators in
Angola had not found any other CMR in more than ten years.
The HALO Trust has also reported that the majority of CMR
destroyed over the course of its operations were the result
of the disposal of old or unserviceable cluster munitions
identified by HALO Trust’s Weapons and Ammunition Disposal
(WAD) teams in military storage areas, some of which were
earmarked for destruction by the Angolan Armed Forces.
Between 2005 and 2012, HALO Trust WAD teams reported
destroying a total of 7,284 submunitions.8 In 2018, The HALO
Trust confirmed it had not been asked by the military to do any
further destruction of cluster munition stockpiles since 2012.9
CMR contamination was a result of the decades of armed
conflict that ended in 2002, although it is unclear when, or
by whom, cluster munitions were used in Angola.10

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Angola is heavily contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) other than CMR (see Mine Action
Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on Angola for further information).
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Tensions between these entities lessened significantly in
2019 as CNIDAH, over the past three years, has focused
on reorganising the mine action sector and the CED is now
more aligned with their approach and more concentrated on
getting the job done.12 As at April 2020, CNIDAH was in the
process of changing its legal status from a commission to the
Angola National Demining Agency (ANAM), which, it is hoped,
will strengthen coordination mechanisms and information
sharing between the different national bodies.13
Angola’s mine action programme has faced critical
challenges in securing financial resources in recent years.
In 2019, a draft resource mobilisation strategy was developed
and, as at April 2020, was still under review.14 According
to the National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2025 Objective
5 the resource mobilisation strategy will be developed and
approved before the end of 2020 with CNIDAH taking the lead
in its development.15

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Gender and diversity are integrated into Angola’s National Mine Action Strategy 2020-25 as a cross-cutting issue. However,
while the Strategy pledges that Angola’s mine action programme will ensure that gender and diversity considerations are
taken into consideration in the planning, implementation and monitoring phases of all mine action projects, it does not say
how this will be done and there is no mention of gender or diversity in Angola’s APMBC Article 5 Implementation Workplan
2020–2025.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Angola’s mine action programme has long suffered from significant problems with information management, in particular the
poor quality of the CNIDAH national database. Throughout 2019, the database was reconciled, updated, and quality assured.16
CNIDAH reported that, as at November 2019, the national IMSMA database had been fully reconciled with operators’ data, and
the previous data backlog and overinflated contamination figures have been cleared. As a consequence, CNIDAH and operators
now consider the national database to be a reliable source of information.17

PLANNING AND TASKING
Angola’s National Mine Action Strategy 2020–2025 was developed by CNIDAH, in 2019, with support from the GICHD. There
are five objectives within the strategy, two of which refer to explosive ordnance although there is no specific mention of CMR.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
While national mine action standards (NMAS) are in place in Angola, they do not contain provisions specific to CMR survey
or clearance.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Four international NGOs conducted demining for humanitarian purposes in Angola in 2019: APOPO, The HALO Trust, MAG,
and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). None of the operators carried out any CMR-specific survey or clearance in 2019.
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Angola’s national mine action programme is managed by two
mine action structures. CNIDAH serves as the national mine
action authority and reports to the Council of Ministers or,
in effect, to the Presidency of the Republic. Surprisingly, the
other coordination body, the CED, reports to the Ministry of
Social Action, Family, and Women’s Promotion (MASFAMU).
The CED’s main role is to coordinate and manage four
national operators: The Demining Brigades of the Security
Unit of the President of the Republic, the Angolan Armed
Forces, the National Demining Institute (INAD) and the
Brigades of the Angolan Border Guard Police. And while
Presidential Decrees stipulate the mandates of both CNIDAH
and the CED, there are clear overlaps and ambiguities as
to the exact division of labour and their related roles and
responsibilities.11

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
There was no reported survey or clearance of cluster munition-contaminated area in 2019 and no CMR were found during
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks.

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
Angola is a signatory, but not a state party, to the CCM. It was reported to Mine Action Review in April 2020 that CNIDAH
was in the process of engaging the government of Angola to ratify the CCM.18 In addition to its legal obligations as a treaty
signatory, Angola has obligations under international human rights law to clear any CMR on its territory as soon as possible.
It has not publicly reported a date as to when it might be able to declare its territory free of CMR contamination nor a strategy
for doing so.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) should ratify the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter
of priority.

■

DRC should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster munition remnants
(CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

The Congolese Mine Action Coordination Centre (CCLAM) should specify what arrangements it is making for the
long-delayed survey of Aru and Dungu territories.

■

The DRC should submit a detailed work plan, including a timeline for survey and/or clearance of all remaining
CMR contamination and prompt, regular, and comprehensive reports on the progress of survey and clearance.

■

The DRC should detail its plans for sustainable capacity to tackle previously unidentified hazards.

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
The DRC has a small amount of contamination by CMR but
has not produced an up-to-date estimate and the precise
extent remaining is not known. CCLAM reported in mid-2019
that DRC had six areas of confirmed CMR contamination in
four provinces and covering a total of 81,484m2 (see Table
1).1 Mine Action Review believes at least three of these areas
have already been cleared, but has received no further
information from CCLAM in this regard.
The first estimate of CMR contamination came from a national
survey that CCLAM said was carried out in tandem with a
survey of anti-personnel mine contamination in 2013–14.
Five confirmed hazardous areas covering 17,590m2 were
found to contain CMR, all of which have since been cleared.
The survey did not, however, cover Aru, a territory in Ituri
province, and Dungu, a territory in Haut Uele province, where
insecurity prevented access by survey teams. The DRC’s
most recent National Mine Action Strategy 2018–19, prepared
with support from the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and finalised in November
2017, said that in addition to mines and explosive remnants of
war (ERW), “some areas contaminated by submunitions have
also been reported but the areas affected remain negligible”. 2

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by province
(at end 2018)3
Province

Territory

CHAs

Area (m2)

Ituri
South Kivu

Aru

3

40,750

Shabunda

1

719

Tanganyika

Kalemie

1

37,000

Tshopo

Bangelema

Totals

1

3,015

6

81,484

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The mine action sector is overseen by the Commission Nationale de Lutte Antimines (CNLAM), a multi-sectoral body which is
supposed to meet twice a year and is composed of deputies from both parliamentary chambers, officials from four ministries,
and representatives of five civil society organisations linked to mine action.4
Management of the sector is under CCLAM, which was established in 2012 with support from the United Nations Mine Action
Coordination Centre (UNMACC) and the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS).5 It is responsible for setting strategy, accrediting
operators, information management, budgeting, and resource mobilisation. Law 11/007 of 9 July 2011 underpins the national
mine action programme.6 CCLAM took over from UNMAS as the national focal point for demining in early 2016 overseeing
accreditation, issuing task orders, conducting quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) and managing the national
database but lack of capacity remained a concern for operators.7 The government has provided funding for CCLAM’s
operating expenses, amounting to US$530,000 in 2018, but has not provided funding for operations.8
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UNMACC, established in 2002 by UNMAS, previously coordinated mine action through offices in the capital, Kinshasa,
and in Goma, Kalemie, Kananga, Kisangani, and Mbandaka. UNMACC was part of the UN Stabilization Mission in the
DR Congo (MONUSCO). In 2014, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 2147 (2014), humanitarian mine action
was removed from MONUSCO’s mandate.9 UNMAS, working in 2019 with 18 international and 18 national staff, continues
to support CCLAM in planning and implementing CCLAM’s 2018–19 mine action strategy and building CCLAM’s capacity
on information management.10

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
The national mine action strategy for 2018–19 stipulated that all mine action activities, particularly those related to risk education
and victim assistance, must reflect the different needs of individuals according to age and gender, in a non-discriminatory manner.
It also stated that the principles of non-discrimination against women as set out in the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) are to be respected, ensuring
that women are involved in all essential stages of mine action (planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation), and that
activities take into account the special needs of women and girls.11
CCLAM reported that approximately 30% of operational staff in survey and clearance teams were female in 2019, but only
around 7% of managerial or supervisory positions were held by women, reportedly due in part to barriers presented by local
customs about the employment roles appropriate for women. CCLAM reported that mine action survey teams are gender
balanced and that efforts are undertaken to ensure that all community groups, including women and children, are consulted.
It also noted, however, the need to continue raising awareness on gender equality in certain communities as local customs
can discriminate against women undertaking certain categories of work.12

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
CCLAM took over responsibility for information management from UNMAS in 2016 but has lacked the capacity and resources
to manage data and operate effectively the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.
The 2018–19 national strategy acknowledged a need to build staff capacity, improve data collection, update the database on
a regular basis, and provide data disaggregated by age and gender.13 Continuing issues in 2019 included gaps in data; lack of
maintenance; reporting on land release that did not comply with international terminology; misreporting items of unexploded
ordnance (UXO) as mines; and a lack of verification of incoming reports.14
UNMAS continued its long-running support to the database in 2019, assisting monthly updates of data to improve operational
coordination, collaborating on developing an information management work plan, and providing a range of computer and
digital hardware.15 Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) has also provided refresher training for CCLAM staff in use of IMSMA and
the associated Geographic Information System (GIS).16

PLANNING AND TASKING
The National Mine Action Strategy 2018–19, prepared with support from UNMAS and the GICHD, focused on seeking to fulfil
the DRC’s Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention’s Article 5 obligations by 2020, one year ahead of its extended 2021 deadline.17
The strategy also set out the objective of completing procedures for ratifying the Convention on Cluster Munitions by the end
of 2018, a plan which has yet to be implemented.18
The strategy identified three strategic pillars: effective and efficient management of the explosive threat; ensuring the national
programme had the capacity to manage residual contamination in a sustainable manner; and that the legal framework of
the mine action programme was strengthened through the adoption of national laws and other implementing measures and
adherence to relevant treaties.19 None of these goals was met.
Tasking continues to be challenged by the remote location of many hazardous areas and database weaknesses, including
misidentification of ERW as mine contamination and the addition of hazards to the database without robust evidence of the
presence of explosive ordnance. Instead of prioritising tasks, NPA adopted a province-by-province approach as a more
efficient way to deal with the logistical challenges and costs of tackling tasks separated by big distances. 20
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
The DRC has 24 national standards developed with support from the GICHD21 and the national strategy for 2018–19 called
for revision of the standards and awareness raising of their content through training. 22 CCLAM reported in June 2019 it had
revised the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) during 2018, amending mainly the standards relating to
demining techniques and safety of deminers. 23

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The number of operators active in the DRC has fallen in the past two years to the point where DanChurchAid, NPA, and TDI
were the only international organisations active in survey and clearance in 2019.
NPA operated with three teams conducting non-technical survey and manual mine clearance as well as explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD) spot tasks in 2019. 24 NPA continued survey in early 2020, but operations ended in February 2020 and the
programme officially closed at the end of March 2020. 25
TDI continued operating in 2019 under contract to UNMAS, working with two teams and a total of twenty-four deminers. It
carried out surveys in Ituri and Tanganyika provinces. It also conducted spot EOD and risk education in support of the UN
peacekeeping operation, MONUSCO, working in the territories of Aru (Ituri province), Kalemie (Tanganyika province), and
Shabunda town (South Kivu province). 26
UNMAS contracted three national NGOs - Afrique pour la Lutte Antimines (AFRILAM), Bureau des Actions de Développement et
des Urgences (BADU) and Groupe Africain de Déminage, Développement et Environnement (GADDE) to conduct non-technical
survey and explosive ordnance risk education in Ituri (Irumu, Djugu, Aru), and South Kivu (Kabare, Shabunda), Tanganyika
(Kalemie, Moba). 27

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
The DRC did not report outcomes of survey and clearance in 2019. In 2019, TDI, through two multi-task teams contracted by
UNMAS, released a total of 174,315m2 of battle area, including cluster munition-contaminated area. Of this total 107,194m2
was released by clearance. 28

SURVEY IN 2019
Non-technical survey conducted by TDI’s teams in 2019 cancelled 57,760m2 of suspected hazardous area in Ituri province and
reduced 9,045m2 through technical survey. They reduced another 316m2 in Tanganyika province. 29

CLEARANCE IN 2019
TDI teams cleared 107,194m2 of battle area, including cluster munition-contaminated area, in three provinces in 2019 (see Table 2),
a significant increase over the clearance of 43,000m2 reported by CCLAM for the previous year. TDI destroyed 150 submunitions
in 2019, most in the course of EOD spot tasks. A further 17,050m2 was cleared between January and 14 March 2020.30
Table 2: Battle area clearance by TDI in 201931
Province

Territory

Area cleared (m2)

Ituri

Submunitions destroyed*

Total UXO destroyed

Aru, Djugu, Irumu

30,617

12

63

South Kivu

Kabare, Shabunda

11,162

25

56

Tanganyika

Kalemie, Moba

Totals

65,415

113

272

107,194

150

391

* Includes items destroyed in the course of EOD spot tasks.
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PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
The battle area cleared by TDI in 2019 far exceeds the area thought to be contaminated by CMR, underscoring the need for
CCLAM to provide an updated summary of CMR-contaminated areas that were cleared in the last three years, the confirmed
CMR hazards still outstanding, and any areas that still require survey.
As a CCM signatory, DRC had set a target of ratifying the convention by the end of 2018 but has left that target unfulfilled and
has provided no clarity on its plans for survey or clearance of CMR nor a timeline for completion.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Azerbaijan should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.

■

Azerbaijan should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster munition
remnants (CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
The precise extent of contamination from CMR in Azerbaijan is unknown, as Armenian forces currently occupy a significant
area of the country, where the contamination exists. There may also be some residual contamination in territory under
government control.1
Large quantities of cluster munitions were dropped during the 1988 conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Following
the cease-fire in 1994, tensions flared up again in April 2016 when fighting broke out briefly along the Line of Contact
(LOC). While ground fighting was confined to areas close to the LOC, artillery fire penetrated more than 10km into
Nagorno-Karabakh, and included use of cluster munitions. The HALO Trust has calculated the four days of hostilities added
2.4km2 of CMR contamination, all of which has since been cleared. 2 However, no CMR contamination has been reported
on the Azerbaijan-controlled side of the LOC (see the Mine Action Review Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants report on
Nagorno-Karabakh for further information). In July 2020, fighting broke out between Azerbaijan and Armenia around the
Tavush region in north-east Armenia, some 300km (190 miles) from Nagorno-Karabakh. There were, however, no reports
of cluster munitions being deployed.3

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Other areas are confirmed or suspected to contain explosive remnants of war (ERW): both unexploded ordnance (UXO) and
abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). These include former military testing areas and a former shooting range.4 Azerbaijan
is also contaminated with landmines, the extent of which is unknown (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report
on Azerbaijan for further information).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA), which functions as both the national mine action authority and mine
action centre, was established by presidential decree to plan, coordinate, manage, and monitor mine action. It also conducts
demining, along with two national operators it contracts: Dayag-Relief Azerbaijan (RA) and the International Eurasia Press
Fund (IEPF). No commercial company is active in mine action in Azerbaijan.5 In March 2020, the mine action programme was
restructured and RA’s field personnel were incorporated within ANAMA while RA as an organisation will continue to provide
logistical support to ANAMA.6
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provides capacity development to ANAMA and was planning to so until
December 2020.7 As at July 2020, ANAMA and UNDP were discussing the possibility of extending the project until 2023.8
As at June 2020, Azerbaijan was still in the process of adopting a national mine action law, with draft legislation under review
by the Cabinet of Ministers.9 The process has been ongoing for six years already. Once adopted, it will regulate mine action in
Azerbaijan, governing issues such as licensing, accreditation, quality assurance (QA), and tender procedures.10
The Azerbaijani government funds 90% of ANAMA’s operating costs and 90% of all survey and clearance in Azerbaijan.11
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
ANAMA uses an old version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, and was working with
the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to upgrade to the latest IMSMA Core in 2019–20.14

PLANNING AND TASKING
The existing mine action strategy was for 2013–18.15 Its main aims were said to be to continue mine and ERW clearance in
support of government development projects and to provide safe conditions for the local population in affected regions.16
The strategy has not yet been replaced though in June 2020, ANAMA reported that a new strategy was in the process of
being developed.17 In the absence of a new multiyear strategic plan, tasks are prioritised according to the state development
plan and instructions from the government.18

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Azerbaijan has its own National Mine Action Standards (NMAS), which were adopted in 2001 and subsequently revised in 2003,
2004, and 2010 in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and best practice.19 No major modifications
to the standards were made in 2019. 20

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In 2019, the Azerbaijan mine action programme had more than 300 deminers/explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel as
well as mine detection dogs and machines. In addition, to its clearance capacities ANAMA deployed five technical survey teams
in 2019 totalling 45 personnel. 21 Mine detection dogs (MDDs) and mechanical assets are used to support reduction through
technical survey and manual clearance operations. 22

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
No CMR survey or clearance took place in 2019. Some battle area clearance (BAC) took place in the region of Garadagh with
17,744m2 cleared and 517 items of UXO found and destroyed.
No target date has been set for the completion of CMR clearance in Azerbaijan. 23 ANAMA’s long-term strategy is to be ready
to start clearance of the occupied territories as and when this is possible. 24 In May 2019, Azerbaijan stated that it will only
accede to the CCM once all of its territories are liberated from occupation by Armenia and all internally displaced persons
and refugees return to their lands. 25
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AZERBAIJAN

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
ANAMA does not have a gender policy. No women are working in any operational roles in survey and clearance in Azerbaijan.
In 2019, however, women made up 11% of mine action programme staff, mainly through administrative roles in ANAMA. They
also participate in mine risk education sessions and are consulted during survey.12 One of the goals of the UNDP-ANAMA
capacity strengthening project is to introduce a gender-sensitive approach to mine action to Azerbaijan.13
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Cambodia should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.

■

Cambodia should apply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster munition remnants
(CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

Cambodia should more accurately establish the extent of CMR contamination, through completion of the national
baseline survey (BLS) and through further systematic and comprehensive evidence-based survey of suspected
hazardous areas (SHAs) generated by the BLS.

■

The Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) should work with operators to elaborate
a specific strategy for survey and clearance of CMR, with realistic annual targets for land release and an
accompanying resource mobilisation plan.

■

The CMAA should improve CMR planning and prioritisation guidelines and implement a more targeted and
systematic clearance prioritisation process for confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs).

■

The CMAA should review existing national standards on CMR clearance.

■

The CMAA should continue to work to establish an up-to-date and accurate national database that is open to all
mine action stakeholders.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
CMR resulted from intensive bombing by the United States
during the Vietnam War, concentrated in north-eastern
provinces along the borders with the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic and Vietnam. The US Air Force dropped at least 26
million explosive submunitions, between 1.9 million and 5.8
million of which are estimated to have not exploded.1
Cambodia has extensive CMR contamination but the full
extent is not known. As the end of 2019, CMR contamination
was estimated at over 716km2 across 18 provinces: 1,748
SHAs totalling more than 638.5km2 and 374 CHAs totalling
more than 77.5km2 (see Table 1). 2 Cambodia’s National
Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 stated that known CMR
contamination covers 645km2,3 and the estimate at the end of
2018 had risen to 738km2 as progress in the BLS continued.4
A large proportion of the CMR contamination is located in the
eastern provinces close to the border with Vietnam.5
The BLS was implemented between 2009 and 2012 across
124 districts. In 2015, the CMAA introduced the land
reclamation non-technical survey and baseline survey
(LRNTS+BLS) methodology, a stand-alone process to
re-survey or re-verify SHAs identified during the BLS. The
re-survey/re-verification efforts, which are nearly complete,
have helped more accurately define the extent of remaining
mine contamination and cancel those areas currently on
the database that are found to have no evidence of mine
contamination and/or which meet the CMAA criteria for
reclamation.6 Fifty-three districts were surveyed in 2019 and
as at end of 2019 only nine districts in one province remained
to be surveyed.7 The re-survey was expected to be concluded
by the end of the year.8 The majority of the remaining districts
are in the eastern and southern parts of the country.9

In the eight provinces in the east and north-east of Cambodia,
where most of the CMR are concentrated, the Norwegian
People’s Aid (NPA)/Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC)
partnership project had completed the BLS in seven eastern
provinces (Kampong Cham, Kratié, Modulkiri, Ratanakiri,
Stung Treng, Svay Rieng, and Tboung Khmum) and the
resulting BLS reports were in the process of being added to
the national database. The NPA/CMAC project had aimed to
complete the BLS in Prey Vang province by the end of 2020,
but the impact of COVID-19 has meant that it will not be
completed before the end of February 2021.10
Furthermore, the BLS historically employed a landmine
survey methodology. Non-technical survey applied during
the BLS was sometimes limited in scope and therefore failed
to comprehensively or accurately take into consideration all
CMR evidence. Empirical evidence of the inaccuracy of SHA
polygons generated from the BLS has been demonstrated
in a number of instances during subsequent clearance of
BLS-generated polygons. The BLS often resulted in inflated
polygons, containing large amounts of uncontaminated land.
In other cases, the polygons cleared are far larger than the
original SHA polygons recorded during BLS. Furthermore,
there are numerous examples of explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) reports of CMR in Ratanakiri province in areas already
surveyed as part of the BLS and in which no SHAs were
generated as part of the BLS process.11
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NPA emphasised that as the BLS only generates SHAs, extensive technical survey will be required in all eastern provinces to
more accurately determine the extent and location of CMR contamination and to identify CHAs for clearance.12 Similarly, Mines
Advisory Group (MAG) believes that a more comprehensive and systematic survey, appropriate to CMR and incorporating best
practice from across the region, is required to better determine the scale of the CMR problem. Any such process should use the
data generated through the BLS as a point of departure and must be evidence-based.13 Standards for Cluster Munition Remnants
Survey (CMRS) methodology in Cambodia were endorsed in November 2019 and applied from the start of January 2020.
A backlog of CMAC data for entry into the national database has also impacted the results of the BLS, but is in the process of being
resolved. CMAC, with support from NPA, is working to upload over 5,000 records onto the national database. As at July 2019, a total
of 86% of the backlog had been uploaded and efforts were ongoing in 2020. The remaining records are EOD tasks conducted by CMAC
in eastern Cambodia that are missing supporting documentation. CMAC and CMAA are in the process of working out how this data
will be reported and entered.14
Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by province (at end 2019)15
Province

CHA

Area (m2)

SHA

Area (m2)

0

0

1

26,872

Battambang

34

5,795,141

216

44,378,487

Kampong Chhnang

Kampong Cham

0

0

22

3,515,933

Kampong Speu

0

0

85

12,366,578

Kampong Thom

0

0

341

59,063,686

Kampot

0

0

2

103,392

Kandal

0

0

56

5,525,570

Kratié

93

25,939,397

161

55,150,986

Mondulkiri

0

0

37

19,851,804

Phnom Penh

0

0

17

1,512,696

Preah Sihanouk

0

0

14

2,984,350

Preah Vihear

0

0

45

177,054,294

34

6,665,072

82

16,393,245

Ratanakiri

70

10,131,073

187

49,447,318

Stung Treng

20

3,860,097

170

126,764,747

Svay Rieng

38

7,788,260

178

42,132,121

Prey Veng

Takeo
Tboung Khmum
Totals

0

0

10

1,973,835

85

17,361,723

124

20,264,446

374

77,540,763

1,748

638,510,360

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Cambodia estimated that in 2018 it had around 468km2 of ERW contamination apart from CMR.16 ERW contamination, including
air-dropped bombs and ground artillery, is heaviest in the eastern provinces. Cambodia also has an estimated 817km2 of
anti-personnel mine contamination concentrated in, though not limited to, west and north-west Cambodia (see Mine Action
Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on Cambodia for further information).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The CMAA was established by royal decree in 2000 with
the mandate to regulate, monitor and coordinate the mine
action sector in Cambodia.17 It has been reported that the
CMAA has strengthened over the recent years, with roles
and responsibilities more clearly defined.18 The Cambodian
Mine Action Centre (CMAC) was established in 1992. Before
the existence of the CMAA, CMAC had the responsibilities
to regulate and coordinate the sector as well as undertake
clearance. Since 2000, CMAC’s activities have been limited
to conducting demining, risk education, and training.19 CMAC
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conducts both humanitarian and commercial survey and
clearance in Cambodia and is the country’s largest mine
action operator. 20
Provincial Mine Action Committees (PMACs) and Mine Action
Planning Units (MAPUs) were established in 2004, tasked
with establishing clearance priorities in consultation with
affected communities to ensure that clearance addresses
their housing, agricultural, and infrastructure needs.21 MAPU
planning and prioritisation units meet regularly with all mine
action operators to plan annual mine action activities.22

STATES NOT PARTY

The operating environment in Cambodia is permissive,
with the Cambodian government open to the presence of
international operators and supportive in administrative
actions such as the granting of visas, approval of Memoranda
of Understanding (MoUs), and importation procedures. The
CMAA is open to the trialling and use of innovative clearance
methods and tools to improve efficiency. 29
The UN Development Programme (UNDP), NPA, and the
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD) all support capacity development of the CMAA. NPA,
as part of a United Kingdom Department for International
Development (DFID)-funded partnership that includes MAG
and The HALO Trust, focuses on information management,
planning and prioritisation, gender mainstreaming, quality
management, and strategic planning.30

The GICHD provides information management and risk
management support to the CMAA. In 2019, GICHD support
to capacity development included stakeholder workshops
on the IMSMA Core migration; initial development of the
new database; support on developing residual capacity in
line with Cambodia’s mine action strategy; and workshops
on risk management and national mine action standard
(NMAS) development.31
The Cambodian government contributes funding towards
clearance and the management of the sector,32 which
includes covering expenses of the CMAA in 2019 and
providing funds to support planning and prioritisation, quality
assurance/quality control (QA/QC), database management,
Cambodia mine victim information service (CMVIS), and
risk education activities.33 The cost of the database unit
is, however, shared by NPA and UNDP.34 The Cambodian
government also provides a 10% in-kind contribution to any
new donor funding.35 From 2010 to 2018, the Cambodian
government has reported contributing just under 30% of
the total funding to the mine action sector (US$99.49 million
of US$340.2 million).36 Cambodia funds mine and ERW
clearance by CMAC and the National Centre for Peacekeeping
Forces Management, Mines and Explosive Remnants
of War Clearance (NPMEC) in support of infrastructure
development.37 Indirectly, tax exemptions on mine action
equipment have contributed to humanitarian demining.38
Cambodia has reported that it will need an estimated $118.9
million for CMR clearance in 2020–25.39
Cambodia is not yet a State Party to the CCM but made
accession by 2020 a goal of the National Mine Action
Strategy 2018–2025.40 In April 2019, the CMAA stated that
the Cambodian government was ready to accede to the CCM,
but “for security reasons” is not willing to do so until other
countries in the region also accede.41

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
The CMAA has developed a Gender Mainstreaming in Mine
Action Plan (GMAP 2018–2022), an objective of the National
Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, which consists of six goals.
These include:
■
■
■

Preparation of guidelines to aid gender mainstreaming
across all mine action
Capacity building of relevant stakeholders to implement
the GMAP 2018–2022
Female representation and participation in planning
and prioritisation, risk education, and in mine action
and advocacy at all levels.

The Three-Year Implementation Plan 2018–2020 sets out
activities in support of these goals.42 NPA, as part of its
capacity development, is supporting the CMAA with training
on gender mainstreaming in mine action, on implementation
of the GMAP 2018–22 and the development of associated
guidelines, and on how to use gender- and age-disaggregated
data in planning and prioritisation processes.43 Guidelines
for gender mainstreaming in mine action were approved
in December 2019. Trainings were provided to MAPU and
quality management team (QMT) staff on the new guidelines,
as well as on implementation of the GMAP 2018–22.44 Sex
and age disaggregated data (SADD) has been integrated
in all reporting forms, which can help inform planning,
prioritisation, risk education, and advocacy.45 Furthermore,

the GICHD conducted a gender and diversity baseline
assessment of the CMAA in 2019 and has a joint action plan
to support gender and diversity mainstreaming efforts for
the remainder of the GMMAP strategy period.46
A CMAA Gender Mainstreaming Team (GMT) was established
to coordinate with the TRG on Gender (TRGG), one of
five TRGs ensuring coordination of the sector. The TRGG
is composed of representatives from UNDP, Ministry of
Women’s Affairs (MoWA), Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans
and Youth Rehabilitation (MoSVY), MAPU, operators, and
international and national organisations working in mine
risk education (MRE) and victim assistance (VA).47 Of CMAA’s
employees, 23% are female, but only 5% of managerial/
supervisory level positions are held by women. Overall in
the mine action sector in Cambodia, 876 (25%) of the 3,446
staff are female, an increase from the 15% of women staff
in 2015.48
Survey and community liaison teams are said to be
inclusive and mixed gender. Women are given access to job
announcements and female candidates are given priority
during the recruitment process. Women and children in
affected communities are consulted during village meetings
and community liaison activities, including regarding
prioritisation. This commitment is reinforced by the demand
for all reporting forms to have SADD and by the provision of
training to MAPU and QMT staff.49
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The Cambodian government established the Technical
Working Group on Mine Action (TWG-MA) as a consultative
mechanism between the government and implementing
partners.23 It meets on a bi-annual basis and is attended by
the CMAA, relevant ministries, operators, and donors.24 The
Mine Action Coordination Committee (MACC) and several
Technical Reference Groups (TRGs) have been established by
the CMAA to facilitate coordination and feedback at a strategic
and technical level in areas such as survey and clearance,
risk education, victim assistance, information management,
gender, and capacity development.25 The TRG on survey and
clearance meets on a quarterly basis.26 During a TRG meeting
in March 2020, clearance operators proposed the creation of a
separate TRG for the survey and clearance of CMR, which was
agreed by the CMAA.27 The CMAA subsequently established
a TRG on CMR survey and clearance to share best practice
among operators and address challenges related to the CMRS
process. The first meeting of the newly formed TRG was
scheduled for October 2020.28

CMAC says it provides equal employment opportunities to
both men and women. As at May 2020, women made up 12.5%
of CMAC’s workforce. CMAC operates in accordance with
Cambodian Labour Law and is actively recruiting women to
reach 15% female employment. Women currently work across
all levels of the organisation, including in managerial level/
supervisory positions. Two of the six directors were women.50
During non-technical survey and pre-clearance impact
assessments, MAG deploys mixed-gender community liaison
teams to gather information on the suspected location of
mines and the impact on the community. In its survey and
clearance teams, 42% of staff are women as are 24% of their
managerial level/supervisory positions.51 MAG planned
to conduct a detailed gender analysis in 2020, at both the
programming and organisational level, in order to promote
meaningful gender equity and mainstreaming, and ensure an
increased proportion of women in operational supervisory
and management roles within the programme.52

NPA takes the needs of women and children in communities
affected by CMR-contaminated areas, into account in the
prioritisation, planning, and tasking of its survey and
clearance activities. It is working towards achieving gender
equality in Cambodia both in the composition of its survey and
clearance teams and in the consultation of all groups affected
by CMR contamination.53 Overall, 53% of NPA’s employees in
Cambodia are women, including 60% of operational staff and
65% of managerial level/supervisory positions.54
According to CMAA data, as at March 2019, NPMEC had a total
of 294 employees (290 operational), all of whom were men.55
All international operators in Cambodia disaggregate
relevant mine action data by gender and age.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The CMAA upgraded to the Information Management System
for Mine Action New Generation (IMSMA NG) in 2014. As at
June 2020, the CMAA was in the process of upgrading its
information management system to IMSMA Core.56 As part
of this process, a significant backlog of data was resolved
in 2019/20, before migration of existing data to IMSMA Core
could begin in earnest. International Mine Action Standards
(IMAS) minimum data requirements will be incorporated as
Cambodia migrates to IMSMA Core.57

The CMAA shares all available data with operators on a
monthly basis. In 2018, the DBU set up a virtual private
network (VPN), which allows operators to send their
daily data input directly into the DBU IMSMA database.
The DBU controls the quality of all submitted reports and
approves them via this online network.66 According to
non-governmental organisation (NGO) operators, the CMAA
has issued clear directives on the submission of data via
VPN into the CMAA IMSMA system.67

The CMAA’s database unit (DBU) is responsible for collecting,
storing, analysing and disseminating data in support of
planning and prioritisation.58 Improvements to information
management are ongoing in Cambodia,59 and include the
development of tools to allow for mobile data collection in
the field and which allow MAPU and QMTs to make online
data entries and verify data submitted by operators.60

CMAA have introduced a new reporting form following the
endorsement of the national standard on CMRS in November
2018.68 The new reporting form, the CMTS, in conjunction
with the standard, should aid the improvement of both the
effectiveness of the CMRS and the reporting of the survey
results to the national database.69

Strengthening the national information management
system for mine action is an objective of the National
Mine Action Strategy 2018–25.61 NPA has been conducting
capacity development activities with the CMAA under
a DFID consortium project.62 This included introduction
of a web-based application for MAPUs to enable better
prioritisation of the tasks for operators’ annual work-plans,
which is expected to increase the effectiveness of mine
clearance across the sector in Cambodia.63 It also included
the development of an NMAS on information management.
Regular TRG meetings are held with operators to share
progress and challenges.64 As part of an information
management capacity assessment of the CMAA’s DBU,
operators (CMAC, HALO, and MAG) agreed that data
collection forms are consistent.65
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Between August and December 2019, NPA/CMAC deployed 11
BLS teams in the eastern provinces, creating a huge number
of records. Due to lack of capacity, there had been a delay
in entry of the BLS reports into the national database, but
NPA confirmed in September 2020 that the backlog of 2019
had been resolved and data entry of records for 2020 was
ongoing.70
As mentioned previously, issues remain with the accuracy of
historical information on CMR contamination data, collected
under the BLS.71

STATES NOT PARTY

■
■

Plan and prioritise CMR-contaminated areas to be released
Conduct survey and release confirmed areas of CMR
contamination, develop national standards for survey
and clearance, implement the CMRS methodology and
increase survey and clearance capacity.

The accompanying Three-Year Implementation Plan 2018–20
sets out the activities and indicators that will need to be
completed in order to meet these goals and objectives. This
includes the development of the planning and prioritisation
guidelines on CMR which were finalised by the CMAA in 2018,
although according to operators, they lack clarity and are not
systematically applied.73
Since March 2018, the CMAA, NPA, and CMAC have been
working together as part of a United States (US)-funded project
to define and draft a comprehensive plan, that references the
Cambodian National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, to make
eight targeted provinces in eastern Cambodia free from the
humanitarian impact of ERW, including CMR.74 The significant
deployment of BLS teams in 2019 and early 2020 was expected
to contribute to more accurate data on the scope of CMR
contamination and to inform the third draft of the work plan.75
The third work plan was elaborated in July 2020, with
a long-term objective of reducing the effects of landmines,
CMR, and other ERW to a level requiring a reactive response
capacity only. Specific objectives include resolving data
backlogs; completing the BLS in districts allocated by the
CMAA to CMAC/NPA; capacity building of CMAC staff to conduct

updated CMRS methodology and conduct CMRS in target
provinces; and to release prioritised CMR-contaminated areas.76
The CMAA maintains the annual national clearance work
plan made up of all the provincial clearance work plans.
MAPUs are responsible for developing their own work plans
in accordance with the planning and prioritisation guidelines.
The PMACs approve the MAPU’s work plans, which are then
endorsed by the CMAA. The MAPUs use the provincial work
plan to monitor clearance performance and report progress
to the PMAC and the CMAA.77
The current planning and prioritisation practices in Cambodia
follow a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches.
The top-down approach involves CMAA establishing a list
of priority villages based on agreed criteria. The bottom-up
approach involves MAPUs coordinating at the provincial level
to develop a clearance list, again, using agreed criteria.78
However, the prioritisation process for the selection of CMR
tasks is not as well established as the prioritisation process
for mined areas, largely due to the absence of comprehensive,
verifiable CMR data. Task prioritisation begins with the
MAPU as part of the annual work plan development process.
Although the exact prioritisation criteria are not as well defined
for CMR clearance as they are for landmine clearance, the
process typically works as follows: consultation with village
leaders > commune workshop > SHA reconnaissance > SHA
prioritisation > district workshop > provincial workshop
> work plan finalisation.79 The end use for most clearance
tasks is agriculture and often the land is already being
cultivated regardless of CMR contamination. This makes
it difficult to produce clear prioritisation criteria, so the
survey and the clearance plan is based on village-by-village,
commune-by-commune, and district-by-district approaches.80
According to NGO operators, survey and clearance task
dossiers are issued in a timely and effective manner.81

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Mine action is conducted according to Cambodian Mine Action
Standards (CMAS), which are broadly consistent with IMAS
and enable evidence-based land release efforts and do not
impede any activities.82
The CMAA approved the CMRS methodology in principle in
2017 and signed a national mine action standard for CMRS
(CMAS-16) in November 2018, which is being implemented
by operators.83 CMAS-16 is based on the experience of other
programmes implementing the CMRS method across the
region. Implementation of CMAS-16 began in January 2019
and is ongoing.
The CMAA has agreed that operators can apply
evidence-based technical survey to SHA polygons generated
through the BLS, which are often inflated, in order to reduce
the area and ensure a more efficient use of resources.84
Previously, operators were expected to fully clear the
entire BLS polygon regardless of whether technical survey
had defined a much smaller CHA within the original SHA.
The CMRS methodologies were to be further discussed

during a US-funded regional CMRS workshop in August
2019.85 The CMAA said that while no changes were made
to CMRS methodology in 2019, it will consider reviewing
methodology.86 It is expected that further modifications to
standards and methodology relating to CMR will be discussed
through the CMR-specific TRG on survey and clearance.87
In 2019–21, the CMAA, with support from NPA with DFID
funding and in consultation with other mine clearance
operators, is in the process of developing new standards.88
New standards on animal detection, mechanical demining,
information management, and the environment were
elaborated in 2019,89 although final copies of all standards
had not yet been shared with operators as at April 2020.90
National standards on explosive ordnance risk education
(EORE), accreditation of demining organisations and
licensing of operations and on the monitoring of demining
organisations were still in progress as at June 2020,91 as
well as planned review of the BLS and land release chapters
in 2021–22.92
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PLANNING AND TASKING
Cambodia’s National Mine Action Strategy 2018−2025 was
officially launched in May 2018 with eight goals for clearance
of mines, CMR, and other ERW. It includes targets for tackling
CMR contamination as the second of its eight goals. It called
for “release of prioritised cluster munition-contaminated
areas of 43.4km2 of total 130.2km2 by 2025” and specified two
CMR-related objectives:72

National standards are reflected in operators’ standing operating procedures (SOPs).93 Updates to the SOPs are conducted
as and when required, such as when a need is identified through the CMAA-led TRG which has been the case for standards
relating to landmines and is expected to be the case also for those relating to CMR. Reviews are conducted in consultation
with all operators, and against IMAS and best practice.94 A comprehensive review of CMAS in 2020 was mooted; this was
also referenced in the National Strategy.95

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
CMR clearance in 2019 was undertaken by national operators, CMAC and Cambodian Self-help Demining (CSHD), and
international operators MAG and NPA (see Table 2).
Table 2: Operational CMR clearance capacities deployed in 201996
Manual
teams

Total
clearance
personnel

Animal
detection
capacity

CMAC

12

100

4 dogs (10
handlers)

1

CSHD

1

15

0

0

MAG

5

47

0

0

Excludes one team leader, one deputy
team leader, and one medic per team, plus
operational supervisory/ managerial staff.
Excludes MAG’s roving EOD capacity.

NPA

2

5

4

0

Two manual teams of five staff, with two
explosive detection dogs (EDDs) in each team.

20

167

8 dogs

1

Operator

Totals

With regard to survey capacity, CMAC had 11 non-technical
survey teams, totalling 44 survey personnel and four
technical survey teams totalling 16 personnel;97 MAG had two
non-technical survey teams, totalling four survey personnel
and one technical survey team, of ten survey personnel;98 and
NPA had one non-technical survey team, with four survey
personnel and two technical survey teams, totalling eight
survey personnel.99
NPA and CMAC have an ongoing CMR survey and clearance
partnership project in eastern Cambodia targeting the seven
provinces in the east of the country (Kampong Cham, Tbong
Khmun, Pre Veng, Svay Rieng, Kratie, Stung Treng and
Modulkiri) which are believed to account for most of the CMR
contamination. Under this project CMAC Demining Unit 5 (DU5)
teams conduct CMRS and clearance while NPA is providing
mentoring and monitoring of all aspects of the project. In
addition, CMAC conducts EOD with one team based in Takeo
province (mainly working around Takeo and Kandal provinces
around Phnom Penh, but sometimes further afield). CMAC’s
DU5 (191 CMAC staff) has been fully supported by NPA since
2014 with funding from the United States.100 The objectives
of the project were to resolve the CMAC data backlog,
complete baseline survey in the remaining districts allocated
to NPA/CMAC, develop the capacity of CMAC staff to conduct
CMRS in the targeted provinces, and to release prioritised
CMR contaminated areas in the targeted provinces.101
In 2018, with regard to both mine and ERW survey capacity,
CMAC deployed 25 non-technical survey personnel
across five teams, but there had been no plans to deploy
non-technical survey teams in 2019. CMAC also deployed
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Machines

Comments

a total of 202 technical survey personnel across 30 teams
of between five and seven staff each. In 2019, the number
of technical survey personnel was due to increase to 231
across 37 teams.102 CMAC also employs explosive detection
dogs as the primary clearance tool for CMR-contaminated
areas while machines provide support for field preparation
and brush-cutting. In 2019, a pilot was planned for dogs to
also conduct CMRS,103 but no data were made available on
whether CMAC conducted the pilot. Data on CMAC’s capacity
in 2019 was not provided upon request.
As well as having its main operational base in the west of the
country focused on minefield survey and clearance, MAG also
has an operations base in Ratanakiri province concentrating
on CMR survey and clearance. MAG uses the data from EOD
tasks to plot initial CHAs using its Evidence Point Polygon
(EPP) mapping approach pioneered in the Lao People’s
Democratic Republic.104 MAG also continues to trial advanced
detection systems for CMR survey and clearance, provided by
the US Humanitarian Demining Research and Development
programme, and uses drones to conduct non-technical
survey, task planning, and post-impact monitoring.105
NPA conducted a successful trial of explosive detection dogs
(EDDs) for technical survey in 2018, and did not deploy EDDs
for technical survey of CMR in 2019.106 NPA deploys drones for
aerial mapping of both technical survey and BAC tasks. Drones
are also used during EOD tasks and for quality assurance.
NPA has also been conducting field tests of all-terrain vehicles
(ATVs) and have found them particularly useful in transporting
personnel and EDDs in hard to reach areas.107
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
Based on data provided by the CMAA, in 2019, clearance operators in Cambodia cleared a total of over 25.2km2 of
CMR-contaminated area, destroying 5,749 submunitions in the process. A further 2,718 submunitions were destroyed during
EOD spot tasks.
A total of more than 33.3km2 was confirmed by operators through technical survey in 2019, while nearly 4.5km2 was reduced
from the baseline survey through technical survey.

SURVEY IN 2019
Table 3: CMAA data on area of CMR-contaminated area
reduced through technical survey in 2019110*

In 2019, CMAC, MAG, and NPA confirmed nearly 33.32km2 as
containing CMR (see Table 4), an increase on the 26.5km2 of
CMR-contamination confirmed through technical survey in
2018. In addition, almost 4.48km2 of CMR-contaminated area
was reduced through technical survey, primarily by CMAC
(see Table 3). This represents a decrease compared to 2018,
when and 8.2km2 was reduced.

Operator

Area reduced from BLS (m2)

NPA

MAG surveyed significantly more CMR-suspected area in
2019, compared to 2018, due to a dedicated CMRS team
established in October 2018.108

75,171

MAG

203,367

CMAC

4,197,924

Totals

4,476,462

* Submunitions destroyed during technical survey are included in the
clearance table.

CLEARANCE IN 2019
In 2019, more than 25.23km2 of CMR-contaminated area was
cleared by CMAC, CSHD, MAG, and NPA (see Table 5). This is a
marked reduction on the equivalent 39.6km2 cleared in 2018.
According to the CMAA, several reasons help to explain for the
decrease in the amount of land released in 2019 compared to
the previous year. These include the lack of area meeting the
criteria for priority clearance; high mineral content, as well
as high degrees of clutter and complexity in clearance tasks;
training to enhance staff capacity; and considerable movement
between task sites.109 These raise considerable concern about
priority setting and tasking in Cambodia.

Table 4: CMR-contaminated area surveyed and confirmed
through technical survey in 2019111*
Operator
CMAC

Area surveyed (m²)

Area confirmed (m2)

31,535,394

26,760,654

MAG

1,237,512

1,703,155

NPA

6,010,000

4,855,536

38,782,906

33,319,345

Totals

* Submunitions destroyed during technical survey are included in the
clearance table.

Table 5: CMR clearance in 2019112
Operator

Province

Area cleared (m²)

Submunitions destroyed*

Other UXO destroyed

CMAC

Kampong Cham

4,065,186

1,197

131

CMAC

Kampong Thom

529,114

135

19

CMAC

Kratié

2,547,552

490

59

CMAC

Mondulkiri

1,183,111

280

16

CMAC

Prey Veng

2,922,381

425

230

CMAC

Stung Treng

2,100,097

461

2,565

CMAC

Svay Rieng

3,879,872

756

2,613

CMAC

Tboung Khmum

3,732,056

983

173

CSHD

Kampong Thom

576,778

90

56

MAG

Ratanakiri

2,655,961

551

10

NPA

Ratanakiri

1,039,494

381

1

25,231,602

5,749

5,873

Totals
* Includes submunitions destroyed during technical survey.
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According to CMAA, during EOD spot tasks in 2019, a further 2,718 submunitions were destroyed: 261 by CMAC; 3 by CSHD;
2,147 by MAG; 252 by NPA; and 55 by the HALO Trust.113
MAG’s clearance output increased in 2019, compared to the previous year, due to one additional clearance team deployed from
late 2018.114 CMR were found in all MAG’s clearance tasks completed through standard tasking processes. MAG also cleared
five emergency tasks at the request of the government (4 x health centres, 1 x cemetery) where no items were found, with a
total area of 59,794m2.115

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
Cambodia has committed to address 80% of the total known CMR contamination by 2025: 499km2 of an estimated total
of 645km2 in the National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025. The remaining 20% of CMR will be categorised as “residual”
contamination and dealt with accordingly. To reach the clearance goal, Cambodia planned to release 62km2 every year from
2018 to 2025, of which 30% would be through land reclamation/cancellation and the remaining 70% through land release
methodology. Based on this analysis, Cambodia calculated that approximately 44km2 will need to be released annually
through technical survey and full clearance. From 2014 to 2016, Cambodia released an average of 11km2 per year through
technical survey and clearance, but it expected to achieve vastly increased clearance output through improved land release
methodology, innovative technology, and animal detection systems.116
The implementation of CMRS should mean that operators are more effective in their approach and focus clearance on CHAs
while reducing SHAs through technical survey. However, the CMAA will need to ensure that the standard is being applied
consistently by all operators and in the most efficient and effective way possible.

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Goal seven of Cambodia’s National Mine Action Strategy 2018−2025 is to establish a sustainable national capacity to address
residual threats after 2025. Reference to the issue is also included in the foreword signed by the Cambodian Prime Minister
and noted throughout the document. Objectives include reviewing by 2020 the legal, institutional, and operational framework,
strategy, and capacity needed to address the residual threats.117
In Phase I (2018−22) of the national strategy Cambodia planned to “develop a comprehensive residual threats strategy; establish a
residual threat legal and institutional framework; and establish residual threats regulatory and operational frameworks including
coordination, planning, and prioritisation, and sustained information management system”. In Phase II (2023−25), Cambodia
plans to “develop residual threat capacity in preparation to transition from the traditional mine action program; determine
resource mobilisation schemes to support the development of residual threat capacity and its future activities; and to conduct
post-programme evaluation of achievements and outcomes after the conclusion of the strategy in 2025 to evaluate performance,
lessons learned, recommendations for efficiencies and improvements in any remaining mine action”.118
In 2018, the GICHD presented a case study on the Management of Residual ERW in Cambodia, and hosted a Long-Term Risk
Management workshop and an exchange visit between the CMAA and the national mine action centre in Sri Lanka.119
The CMAA has said it is likely that the Royal Cambodian Army will be tasked with addressing explosive threats after 2025.120
Operators believe that the establishment of a residual-risk-management framework will be essential to define and manage
the long-term risk posed by CMR.121
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GEORGIA

CLEARING CLUSTER
MUNITION REMNANTS
2020

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Georgia should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Georgia is believed to be free of cluster munition remnants (CMR), with the possible exception of South Ossetia, which is
occupied by Russia and inaccessible to both the Georgian authorities and international non-governmental organisation (NGO)
demining operators.1
CMR contamination in Georgia resulted from the conflict over South Ossetia in August 2008, in which both Georgian and
Russian forces used cluster munitions. After the end of the conflict and through to December 2009, The HALO Trust cleared
some 37km2 of submunitions and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) in Georgian-controlled territory. 2 In May 2010,
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) completed clearance of its tasked areas.3 In 2016, two submunitions were reported in the Shida
Kartli region and then destroyed by the State Security Agency, as part of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) call-outs. 4 In
2017, The HALO Trust conducted survey in the Shida Kartli region to investigate each of the call-outs.5 During survey, a three
submunitions were found, which were identified as residual contamination and destroyed.6 One submunition was destroyed in
2019 (see Land Release Output section below).

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Georgia remains contaminated by other unexploded ordnance (UXO), likely in South Ossetia and also within Georgia in former
firing ranges, and by anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on
Georgia for further information).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Humanitarian Demining Control Division (HDCD), renamed after a reorganisation in January 2019, sits under the State
Military Scientific Technical Centre, known as DELTA, within the Ministry of Defence (MoD).7 The primary task of the HDCD is to
coordinate mine action in Georgia. The Georgian government funds the running costs of the HDCD as well as the Engineering
Brigade, which carries out some survey and battle area clearance (BAC).8 The HALO Trust is funded by international donors.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
DELTA and The HALO Trust each have gender and diversity policies in place. HALO Trust supports use of mixed-gender teams
to conduct survey, which allows for greater engagement with women and children.9 HALO Trust’s EOD teams in Abkhazia are
mixed ethnic Georgian and ethnic Abkhaz and comprise both men and women.10
There is equal access to employment for qualified women and men in survey and clearance teams in Georgia, including for
managerial level/supervisory positions although proportionately the number of women remains low. In Abkhazia, The HALO
Trust works with local women’s organisations to increase the visibility of its work to a female audience. As at May 2020, 30%
of its operational and management staff were female and at the end of 2019 the HALO Trust employed its first female BAC
team leader.11
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
The HDCD uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database and, according to The HALO Trust,
the data is accurate. Data archives go back to 2009 and are regularly updated, based on HALO Trust’s operations reports and
on work by the Engineering Brigade.12 The data in the national information management system is accessible to the HALO
Trust.13 HALO Trust uses its own IMSMA-compatible data collection forms that DELTA has approved while the HDCD quality
assurance/quality control (QA/QC) team also have its own forms.14

PLANNING AND TASKING
Georgia has a national mine action strategy. Its main aims and targets are focused on clearing the remaining mined areas
and other areas contaminated with ERW.15 The annual work plans for 2019 centred on BAC within the The Tbilisi Administered
Territory (TAT) does not include the autonomous republics of Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, which are outside of Georgia’s
effective control.16
In 2019, due to access not being granted to the remaining minefields, The HALO Trust had suspended all operations in
Tbilisi Administered Territory, apart from one two-month task clearing abandoned explosive ordnance at Chonto, near the
Administrative Boundary Line with South Ossetia, which it completed in July. The Abkhazia programme continued operations
at Primorsky and HALO also responded to EOD call-outs.17

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
As at May 2020, Georgian National Mine Action Standards and National Technical Standards and Guidelines were still under
development. The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and International Ammunition Technical Guidelines are being
translated into Georgian.18
The HALO Trust has standing operating procedures (SOPs) in place for all its activities, including survey, mine clearance, and
EOD. No modifications or enhancements were made to these SOPs in 2019.19

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The HALO Trust, which is the only international operator working in the country, conducts survey and both BAC and mine
clearance. 20 In 2019, the HALO Trust deployed 33 personnel to conduct BAC at Primorsky. 21 DELTA retains a small demining
and EOD capacity in Tbilisi Administered Territory.
In Tbilisi Administered Territory, quality management (QM) is conducted by DELTA. In Abkhazia, The HALO Trust is responsible
for its own QM. 22

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
No CMR survey or clearance took place in 2019. One submunition was destroyed during an EOD spot task but this was found to
be residual contamination not evidence of a broader problem. 23
It is believed that, with the possible exception of South Ossetia, Georgia is now free from CMR. Georgia has reported that, in the
areas cleared by The HALO Trust in Abkhazia which are currently outside its control, external QA/QC could not be completed.
Georgia, therefore, cannot confirm whether this land is free of contamination. 24

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Georgia is said to have a residual risk capacity for CMR with plans in place for dealing with residual risk and liability. 25
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IRAN

CLEARING CLUSTER
MUNITION REMNANTS
2020

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Iran should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.

■

Iran should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster munition remnants
(CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

Iran should report publicly on the extent and location of CMR and prepare a plan for their clearance and
destruction.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The extent of CMR contamination in Iran is not known. Some contamination is believed to remain from the Iran-Iraq war in
1980–88,1 when cluster munitions were widely used in Khuzestan and to a lesser extent in Kermanshah. Iraqi forces used
mostly French- and Russian-made cluster munitions in attacks on oil facilities at Abadan and Mah-Shahr, and Spanish-made
cluster munitions in attacks on troop positions at Dasht-e-Azadegan. Air Force explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams
cleared many unexploded submunitions after attacks but contamination remains around Mah-Shahr and the port of Bandar
Imam Khomeini, according to a retired Iranian Air Force colonel. 2

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Iran also has areas containing anti-personnel mines (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on Iran for
further information).

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Iran Mine Action Centre (IRMAC) was established as the national mine action centre in 2005, taking the place of a mine
action committee within the Ministry of Defence. IRMAC is responsible for planning, data, managing survey, procurement, and
the accreditation of demining operators. It also sets standards, provides training for clearance operators, concludes contracts
with demining operators, and ensures quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) of their operations. It coordinates mine
action with the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Interior, the Management and Planning Organisation of Iran,
and other relevant ministries and organisations, and handles international relations.3 Several IRMAC staff are believed to be
serving or former military personnel, including its Director, while others are civilians employed by the Ministry of Defence.
IRMAC is said to have a branch in every affected province. Available demining assets, such as mechanical assets, vary from
province to province.
In March 2019, Iran hosted a three-day international roundtable on “humanitarian mine action: challenges and best practices”,
attended by representatives from other states, national and international demining organisations, the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). The aim of the roundtable was to share
knowledge and experience on mine action, challenges, and best practices.4
In November 2019, Iran opened its first international humanitarian demining training centre in Tehran.5
Iran is believed to have dedicated significant resources and effort to clearing areas on its territory contaminated by
mines, CMR and other explosive remnants of war (ERW), but the results of survey and clearance have not been made
publicly available.
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IRMAC reported that it has a geographic information system (GIS), web-based, integrated information management system,
which integrates information on quality, safety, and the environment.6

LAND RELEASE
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
IRMAC combines the roles of regulator and operator,
with demining teams and support staff deployed in the
five affected provinces. In Kurdistan province, IRMAC is
conducting verification, mainly through mechanical clearance.
IRMAC also responds to calls from the local community
reporting items of explosive ordnance. Demining capacity
in Kurdistan province is believed to stand at around 12
personnel, a reduction on earlier capacity.7
Commercial operators include AOM, Immen Sazan Omran
Pars International, Immen Zamin Espadana, and Solh
Afarinan-e Bedoun-e Marz (SABM). Three other companies,
Imen Gostaran Mohit (IGM), Moshaver Omran Iran, and ZPP
International, undertake QA/QC.8
Petroleum Engineering and Development Company (PEDEC),
the development arm of the National Iranian Oil Company
(NIOC), contracts and monitors commercial operators
conducting clearance of Iran’s oil and gas producing areas
which are concentrated in mine-affected areas of western
and south western Iran bordering Iraq.9

Commercial mine and ERW clearance in Iran is conducted
to ensure that land is free from explosive ordnance before it
is used for economic purposes or developed. It is separate
to humanitarian demining of areas known or suspected to
contain explosive ordnance in order to make the land safe
for civilian use, which comes under the remit of IRMAC. In
a number of countries, commercial demining is applied to
areas whether or not there is firm evidence of a threat from
explosive ordnance.
The Iranian Army and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
assisted demining efforts to support the response to the
flash flooding which affected Iran in March and April 2019.10
International operators are not believed to have been active
in Iran since 2008.
There is no available information on quality management
procedures. In the past, very high levels of casualties were
recorded during demining in Iran. IRMAC reported that since
its establishment, in 2005, 200 deminers have been killed or
injured during clearance of mines and ERW, which equates
to one accident for every 15,000 mines or ERW detected.11
According to IRMAC, more than 2 million mines and over
1 million items of ERW have been destroyed since the start
of its programme.12

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS
No data was available on CMR survey or clearance in 2019, as was the case in the previous year.
As at August 2020, 18 submunitions had been discovered in the first seven months of the year, during ERW clearance of
some 7km2 in a commercial clearance project in Khuzestan province in the south-west of Iran.13 As part of the project, which
is almost completed, the Pasargad Energy Development Company (PEDC) has a demining department and subcontracts a
demining contractor and QA/QC.14
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
IRMAC actively maintains a national mine action database but it is not known to what extent it is comprehensive, up-to-date,
and able to disaggregate CMR contamination and clearance output from that of other explosive ordnance.

LIBYA

CLEARING CLUSTER
MUNITION REMNANTS
2020

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Libya should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.

■

Libya should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster munition remnants
(CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

All parties to the conflict in Libya should ensure that forces loyal to them do not use cluster munitions.

■

As soon as political conditions permit, Libya should enact mine action legislation, establish an interministerial
national mine action authority, and adopt a national mine action strategy.

■

Libya should, at the earliest opportunity possible and as soon the security situation permits, conduct a baseline
survey to identify the extent of contamination from CMR and begin systematic clearance.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
CMR contamination in Libya is largely the consequence of
armed conflict in 2011 and renewed conflict since 2014, but
the extent of contamination is unknown. In 2011, armed
forces used at least three types of cluster munition, including
MAT-120 mortar projectiles, RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M cluster
bombs, and DPICM-like submunitions delivered by 122mm
cargo rockets.1 Additional contamination by CMR occurred as
a result of kick-outs from ammunition storage areas bombed
by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in 2011. 2
Since the overthrow of Qaddafi in 2011, Libya has remained
mired in conflict as tribal and armed groups struggle to take
over power. In early 2015, fighting between Libya’s rival armed
groups saw reported use of cluster munitions, including
RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M bombs, in attacks on Bin Jawad near
the port of Es-Sidr in February, and in the vicinity of Sirte in
March. The Libyan Air Force, controlled by the internationally
recognised government of the time, had bombed both
locations, though it denied using cluster bombs.3 According to
Cluster Munition Monitor, there are indications that additional
attacks may have occurred since that time, including in 2016,
2017, and 2018.4 According to the Monitor, further evidence of
cluster munition use may have gone unrecorded due to a lack
of media and independent reporting from the ground, and the
Monitor was unable to independently verify and confirm this
evidence of possible use.5
Since April 2019, Libya’s governance has been divided
between the two entities engaged in an armed conflict,
the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (or GNA)
and the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA), led by
commander Khalifa Haftar, who laid siege to Tripoli
beginning in April 2019.6

In May 2019, LNA forces loyal to General Haftar were accused
of using cluster bombs in attacks in and around Tripoli.7 On
15 and 16 August 2019, aircraft of forces affiliated with the
LNA/aligned to Khalifa Haftar used cluster munitions in an
attack on Zuwarah International Airport, according to the UN
Panel of Experts report from December 2019.8 According to
reports by Human Rights Watch, forces aligned to Khalifa
Haftar also used cluster munitions in an airstrike in a
residential area in Tripoli on or around 2 December 2019.
Human Rights Watch visited the site on 17 December 2019
and found remnants of two RBK-250 PTAB 2.5M cluster
bombs, as well as evidence that high-explosive air-dropped
bombs were also used in the attack. The area was not known
to be contaminated by cluster munitions before the attack.9
As at March 2019, Humanity and Inclusion (HI) reported being
aware of three areas of CMR contamination through its own
operations. One cluster munition-contaminated area was
confirmed in 2017, through non-technical survey in the Nafusa
mountains region, near the town of Kikla, in north-west Libya.
Then, in 2018–19, further cluster munition strikes were also
discovered by HI in Tawargha and Al Karareem.10
According to the Libyan Mine Action Centre (LibMAC), cluster
munition contamination in Libya has been largely removed
and remaining contamination is limited to a small number of
areas.11 Most recently, LibMAC confirmed it had evidence of
RBK-250-275 cluster bomb use in three areas: Al-Hira Bridge
(Al-Sawani); the Bir al-Ghanam area south-west of Tripoli
(Nafusa Mountains); and Aziziya (south of Tripoli).12

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Libya is also contaminated by other unexploded ordnance (UXO), anti-personnel mines including those of an improvised nature
(see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on Libya for further information), and by other improvised explosive
devices (IEDs).13 According to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), ongoing conflict has resulted in significant
explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination in cities across Libya.14
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In January 2019, most UN staff returned to Tripoli, but due
to the hostilities that commenced in April 2019 and the
deterioration of security, most subsequently returned to
Tunis to operate remotely again. In 2019–20, UNMAS was
providing non-technical survey, risk education, and EOD
response in various locations across Libya, including in
Tawargha, Tripoli and Benghazi, to facilitate humanitarian
activities, early recovery, and to prepare for the safe return
of displaced people. 21

LibMAC was mandated by the Minister of Defense to
coordinate mine action in December 2011.15 Operating under
the UN-backed Government of National Accord, LibMAC’s
headquarters are in Tripoli, in the west of the country,
and it also has offices in Benghazi16 and Misrata.17 The
operating costs and salaries for LibMAC are funded by the
United States Department of State and administered by ITF
Enhancing Human Security (ITF).18

UNMAS prioritises capacity enhancement of Libyan mine
action actors and supports LibMAC in coordination with
Implementing Partners. Since 2015, UNMAS has trained
more than 70 National Safety Authority (NSA) operators
and Military Engineers in advanced EOD; 30 officers from
eastern Libya in non-technical survey; provided advanced
medical first responder training to 72 EOD operators from
Benghazi; and trained several operators to address the
threat from explosive hazards in Sirte. UNMAS also provided
EOD equipment to national actors and assisted LibMAC in
developing the Libyan Mine Action Standards which are now
being implemented. 22 In 2017/18, the United States Office of
Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA) and the United
Kingdom financed training of 70 IED operators in Sirte,
conducted by JANUS, and with participants from the NSA
and Military Engineers). 23

ITF also provides capacity building support to LibMAC.
In order to further increase LibMAC capacity, a new ITF
operations technical advisor was deployed on 1 February
2019, primarily to advise LibMAC’s Chief of Operations
and provide advice on improvement of internal LibMAC
procedures. In early April 2019, however, ITF was forced to
evacuate its technical advisor due to the lack of security.19
UNMAS has largely been operating from Tunis since
November 2014, from where it provides institutional and
operational capacity-building, training, including in explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD), and coordinates with national
authorities and implementing partners to carry out mine
action activities to mitigate the threat posed by ERW and
provide technical advice and advisory support on arms and
ammunition management. The UNMAS Libya Programme
is an integral part of the United Nations Support Mission
in Libya (UNSMIL). 20

In 2019, The HALO Trust worked closely with LibMAC to build
their capacity to quality assure and accredit mechanical
clearance. HALO Trust ran a workshop in the LibMAC Tripoli
office, covering all aspects of mechanical clearance. In
addition, HALO provided translated quality assurance
forms for quality assuring task sites and for accrediting
the armouring of mechanical assets; and also conducted
armour testing of different materials to provide a baseline
of information for LibMAC. 24

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
LibMAC is not thought to have a gender and diversity policy
for mine action in place. Of the twenty employees at LibMAC,
three are women, including one in the Risk Education (RE)
department (whose responsibilities include providing RE
to women and children), one in logistics, and one in an
administrative role. 25
The HALO Trust reported that its Libya programme seeks
to comply with HALO’s general gender and diversity
policy. However, due to rigid gender norms that largely
impede women’s free movement and ability to work in a
mixed-gender office setting, particularly reinforced in
areas with strong Islamist influence such as Sirte, HALO
has reported that the recruitment of women, including
for non-operational roles, has proved difficult. In 2019,
four of HALO’s thirty employees in Libya were women
(one international staff and three national staff), including
one female community liaison officer in Sirte. 26
HALO’s approach to community liaison, including
door-to-door risk education prior to clearance, targeted
risk education task sites, and specific events to reach out
to women in particular, is designed to reach out to women
and men equally. This is especially important, given that

women are largely absent from public life. In particular,
the introduction of pre-clearance focus group discussions
with women and men separately helps to ensure that
subsequent community liaison/risk education activities are
targeted to the needs of all beneficiaries. 27 With regards to
diversity, in Sirte, HALO Trust recruits equally among the
tribes and seeks to consult all ethnic groups during survey
and clearance processes. HALO makes task prioritisation
recommendations based on humanitarian need, although
all task orders are issued under the authority of LibMAC. 28
The HALO Trust disaggregates relevant mine action data by
gender and age. 29
HI reported in 2019 that it had a gender policy in place and
disaggregates data by sex and age.30 HI’s risk education
team, which also conducted community liaison, was gender
balanced. Two of HI’s project managers and two project
officers were female, but women were not employed in
survey and clearance, as this was deemed culturally
unacceptable for now.31 HI stopped mine action operations
in Libya in April 2019.32
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Mine action exists in a fragmented and violent political
context. Following years of armed conflict, a new UN-backed
“unity” government, the GNA, was formally installed in a
naval base in Tripoli in early 2016. It has subsequently faced
opposition from two rival governments and a host of militia
forces. In April 2019, Khalifa Haftar, a military commander
based in the west of the country, launched an offensive
to take control of Tripoli and topple the GNA, and fighting
continued into the first half of 2020.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
LibMAC receives technical support for IMSMA from the Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and UNMAS. In
March 2019, HI reported that LibMAC had recently announced details of a new effort to bring the IMSMA database up to date
and ensure the data are reliable.33 With support from the GICHD, LibMAC planned to transition from IMSMA to IMSMA Core
in mid 2020.34
IMSMA is accessible to clearance organisations and data collection forms are reported to be consistent and enable collection
of necessary data.35
Since early 2019, The HALO Trust has been working closely with LibMAC to cover mechanical clearance in the Libyan IMSMA
database. The planned transition to IMSMA Core will allow data entry for mechanical clearance.36

PLANNING AND TASKING
No national mine action strategy is currently known to exist for Libya.
LibMAC does, however, prioritise survey and clearance operations and is responsible for issuing task orders. Prioritisation
is, in part, informed by data collected and reported to LibMAC by operators such as the Danish Demining Group (DDG), during
non-technical survey or EOD, and by reports from the local community.37 According to HI, LibMAC generally tasks according
to geographic area and the nearest available assets.38
HALO Trust reported that prioritisation is based on humanitarian need with residential areas, community infrastructure, and
key access points taking precedence. In Sirte, this means the two neighbourhoods where fighting was heaviest in 2016. In
preparation for future clearance along the Tripoli frontlines, areas with significant verified evidence of fighting (as determined
by HALO Trust’s Tripoli ERW Hazard Mapping and Information Management (IM) project) will be prioritised for survey.39
The Tripoli ERW Hazard Mapping and IM Project uses open-source data collation and geolocation techniques to map potential
ERW contamination along the Tripoli frontlines by collecting information on active fighting incidents, weapons systems, and
ammunition used, and ERW-related accidents and displacement. The online data collection portal, linking to a live database
that is shared with LibMAC and other stakeholders, is used to track historical data starting from 4 April 2019 up to recent
events. Mapping ERW contamination along the frontlines enables LibMAC to coordinate and direct specialist clearance
capacity as well as risk education teams to the most highly contaminated areas.40

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
There is no national mine action legislation in Libya, but National Mine Action Standards (LibMAS), in Arabic and English,
have been elaborated with the support of the GICHD and UNMAS, and were approved by the GNA in August 2017. The LibMAS
are available on the LibMAC website.41 According to international clearance operators, the national mine action standards
are aligned to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), reproducing it word-for-word in many parts.42
While the LibMAS are broad and not overly restrictive, they may, however, be open to different interpretation by various
stakeholders and do not necessarily reflect local circumstances and conditions, including the specific context of clearance
in urban areas. An example of this is the lack of urban specific characteristics of direct versus indirect evidence, which may
lead to more general consideration of evidence and result in less accurate task boundaries.43

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Mine action operations have been conducted by the army engineers, a police unit, and the Ministry of Interior’s NSA, also
known as Civil Defence.44 Military engineers reportedly lack mine detectors and are working with basic tools.45 The NSA is
mandated to conduct EOD in civilian areas.46 These institutions liaise with LibMAC but are not tasked or accredited by them,
nor do they provide clearance reports to the Centre.
The deteriorating security situation resulted in the withdrawal of UNMAS and international mine action operators from
Libya in mid 2014. International clearance operators active in Libya include DanChurchAid (DCA), DDG, and HALO Trust.47
HI’s survey and clearance operations stopped in April 2019 and the project formally ended in June of that year.48 National
non-governmental organisation (NGO) operator, Free Fields Foundation (3F), was also operational and another national
operator, the Libyan Demining Group (LDG), was in the process of becoming established as at February 2019.49 LDG is believed
to have been accredited by LibMAC, but was not currently operational as at the time of writing. Local organisations Peace
Organization from Zintan and World Without War (3W), from Misrata, which had been trained by HI in 2016 and received
accreditation for non-technical survey,50 subsequently had their operations suspended for not fully following standards and
in addition, neither organisation had secured funding.51
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DDG set up in Benghazi in December 2017. It had hoped
to expand non-technical survey and EOD capacity in
Benghazi from the late summer of 2018. In Sabha, DDG had
one non-technical survey team and one EOD team, which
it was managing remotely. Security issues in the south
continue to disrupt mine action operations and prevent
continuous operations. In Tripoli, DDG works through its
national implementing partner, 3F. 3F operates under DDG’s
accreditation and standing operating procedures (SOPs),
and has an operational contingent of 37, composed in three
EOD teams and one non-technical survey team.53
GCS, which finished its operations in 2019, was working
in partnership with Libyan NGO 3F to clear ERW from an
ammunition storage area on a military airbase in Misrata.
The area comprised 37 bunkers destroyed by NATO airstrikes
in 2011.54 As of March 2019, GCS and 3F had collected a
cumulative total of more than 200 tons of ERW and scrap
metal of which 40 tons were successfully destroyed through
bulk demolitions and burning. An estimated 12,500m2 of
battle area clearance (BAC) was also conducted around the
ammunition storage area.55
The HALO Trust has been present in Libya since November
2018, and has offices in Misrata, Sirte, and Tripoli. HALO
deployed one four-strong survey/community liaison team in
2019, in partnership with DCA. In September 2019, LibMAC
accredited the first mechanical clearance teams in Libya, with
clearance at HALO’s first task site beginning in October. HALO
deployed two mechanical clearance teams, each consisting of
one team leader, one operator, and two deminers. The teams
shared a single mechanical asset in 2019, while awaiting
physical delivery of additional assets. As at July 2020, HALO
Trust was training non-technical survey teams in Tripoli and
aimed to introduce mechanical clearance in 2020 in response
to newly suspected mined areas in southern Tripoli.56
The HALO Trust and DCA are currently working in partnership
in Sirte under a joint three-year European Union (EU)
Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (ICSP)
contract, which started in February 2019. Under this contract,
HALO provides three mechanical clearance assets and two
mechanical clearance teams (MCTs). In January 2020, the
first EU-funded MCT was deployed in Sirte. The first of three
mechanical clearance assets, a medium-range front-loader,
was procured and upgraded locally in Libya in January 2020.57

A separate 18-month UK Conflict, Stability and Security Fund
(CSSF) contract in which HALO Trust had also partnered
with DCA in Sirte ended on 31 March 2020. During this
project HALO had led on mechanical clearance and DCA had
provided the supporting EOD capacity, along with a joint
non-technical survey team and mine risk education team.58
HALO Trust and DCA conducted a socio-economic assessment
of Sirte and a field assessment for areas of possible mine
and ERW contamination which potentially require mechanical
clearance.59 CSSF continue to provide funding in Sirte to
HALO who provide mechanical clearance teams as well as
non-technical survey and community liaison teams.60
Humanitarian access to Libya for survey and clearance
operations, remains challenging for all operators. HALO, for
example, experienced delays in the granting of multiple-entry
visas and limited movement between locations due to
ongoing conflict and changing frontlines. In Libya, the
provision of security is highly localised; tribe-affiliated
armed groups, with oftentimes shifting allegiances, control
cities and towns down to neighbourhood level. This in turns
requires humanitarian actors to have good knowledge of
armed group conglomerates on the one hand and to liaise
with many interlocutors on the other hand. The risk of
arbitrary detention for local staff is high, either due to tribal
background or due to suspected affiliation with opposing
armed groups.61
HALO is mitigating security risks to its staff by maintaining
working relationships with key interlocutors in both East
and West Libya, including LibMAC, ministries, and municipal
authorities. Community liaison in Benghazi, Misrata, Sirte,
and Tripoli is key to ensuring community acceptance. In
Sirte specifically, HALO recruits equally among the tribes.
International staff are sometimes needed to cut across tribal
lines when negotiating access.62
HI conducted EOD spot tasks in 2019 in Tawerga, Misrata,
but was hindered by security issues. It stopped survey and
clearance operations in April 2019 and the project formally
ended in June 2019, although its victim assistance work in
Libya continues.63
A number of other Libyan civil society organisations are also
reported to carry out mine action operations, but they are not
accredited by LibMAC.
UNMAS provides institutional and operational
capacity-building, training, including in EOD, and coordinates
with national authorities and implementing partners to
carry out mine action activities to mitigate the threat posed
by ERW and provide technical advice and advisory support
on arms and ammunition management. The UNMAS Libya
Programme is an integral part of UNSMIL.64 (See Programme
Management section for further details).

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
There were no reports of planned CMR clearance during 2019 although several operators engaged in EOD operations.
In 2018, HI reported clearing 4,151m2 of CMR in an area in Tawerga, in Misrata.65
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DCA is operational in Libya clearing residential, commercial,
education, medical, and agricultural sites of mines and ERW,
and providing training in clearance, search, and EOD, to help
strengthen the capacity of national authorities. DCA also
conducts risk education. Now in its ninth year of working in
Libya, DCA has offices in Al-Bayda, Benghazi, Misrata, Sirte,
and Tripoli.52

SURVEY IN 2019
There were no other known reports of survey of CMR during 2019, although data from LibMAC, UNMAS, and several clearance
operators were not made available.
In 2018, HI confirmed a total of 110,430m2 as CMR-contaminated, which it reported to LibMAC.66
According to ITF’s annual report, in 2019, LibMAC personnel opened 84 new tasks mostly for risk education and non-technical
survey activities performed by international and local NGOs in Benghazi, Sirte, and Tawargha where LibMAC personnel
conducted 52 QA/QC missions. LibMAC also conducted 23 accreditation procedures for international and local NGO teams
to perform non-technical survey, risk education and EOD activities/tasks.67
According to a January 2020 report of the Secretary-General on UNSMIL, “The Mine Action Service project in Benghazi,
[mandated] to conduct emergency clearance and map explosive hazards, has removed 40 items of unexploded ordnance and
completed non-technical surveys of 24 sites. The surveys will inform future clearance operations and support the protection
of civilians and stabilization.”68 The report did not, however, specify the type of unexploded ordnance.

CLEARANCE IN 2019
There were no known reports of clearance of CMR during 2019, although data from LibMAC, UNMAS, and several clearance
operators were not made available.
In 2018, HI cleared 4,151m2 of CMR contamination, in an area in Tawerga, in Misrata, during which 11 submunitions
were destroyed.69

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LibMAC describes the following challenges to implementation of mine action operations: the high level of contamination;
ongoing conflict and the continued presence of Islamic State; the difficulty in convincing internally displaced persons to delay
their return until the ERW threat is addressed; security and access to priority areas; the limited ERW and EOD capacity in
Libya; the vast geographical area; and limited governmental and international support.70 Security conditions continued to
pose a challenge to mine action in Libya.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Serbia should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.

■

Serbia should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster munition remnants
(CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

Serbia should consider using its armed forces to conduct clearance of CMR as they are already clearing other
unexploded ordnance (UXO).

■

The Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC) should conduct non-technical and technical survey, rather than full
clearance, in instances where survey represents the most efficient means to release part or all of areas suspected
or confirmed to contain CMR.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2019, Serbia had 10 areas confirmed to contain CMR covering almost 1km2, while a further three areas over
almost 1.4km2 were suspected to contain CMR (see Table 1).1 This was a decrease of 0.12km2 of total CMR-contaminated area
at the end of 2018, 2 following clearance operations in the municipality of Niš. Some CMR contamination in Raška and Sjenica
municipalities recorded as SHA in 2018, was recorded instead as CHA in 2019, following confirmation of CMR.3
Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by municipality (at end 2019) 4
Municipality

Village

Bujanovac

Borovac

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

2

210,881

1

281,169

Raška

Lisina

1

190,359

0

0

Sjenica

Čedovo

4

163,924

0

0

Sjenica

Vapa

3

432,912

0

0

Tutin

Istočni Mojstir

0

0

1

514,682

Užice

Bioska

0

0

1

585,268

10

998,076

3

1,381,119

Totals
CHAs = confirmed hazardous areas SHAs = suspected hazardous areas

CMR resulted from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air strikes in 1999. According to Serbia, cluster munitions struck
16 municipalities: Brus, Bujanovac, Čačak, Gadžin Han, Knić, Kraljevo, Kuršumlija, Niš City-Municipality of Crveni Krst Niš
City-Municipality of Medijana, Preševo, Raška, Sjenica, Sopot, Stara Pazova, Tutin, and Vladimirci.5

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Serbia is also contaminated by other UXO, including aircraft bombs, both on land and in its internal waterways, and by
anti-personnel mines6 (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on Serbia for further information).
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SMAC was established on 7 March 2002, with a 2004
law making it responsible for coordinating survey and
clearance; collecting and managing mine action information
(including casualty data); and surveying SHAs. It also has a
mandate to plan demining projects, conduct quality control
(QC) and monitor operations, ensure implementation of
international standards, and conduct risk education.9 As
from 1 January 2014, according to a Government Decree
on Protection against Unexploded Ordnance, the Sector for
Emergency Management, under the Ministry of Interior, is
responsible for accrediting demining operators. Previously,
SMAC was responsible for doing so.10
A new director of SMAC was appointed by the Serbian
government in July 2019.11 There are seven people employed
at SMAC: five SMAC employees, plus an Assistant Director
for Legal Affairs and Operational Support and an Assistant
Director for Economic Affairs, International Cooperation and
European Integration.12
SMAC is fully funded by Serbia, including for survey activities,
development of project tasks for clearance of contaminated
areas, follow-up on implementation of project tasks, and
quality assurance (QA) and QC of demining. Around €160,000
per year is allocated to the work of SMAC from the national
state budget.13 In addition, the UXO disposal work of the
Sector for Emergency Situations of the Ministry of Interior
is also state funded.14 Furthermore, in 2019, Serbia also
contributed national funding towards the establishment of
an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training centre.15

Since 2015, Serbia has also been allocating national funds for
survey and clearance, with roughly €100,000 allocated per
year.16 In 2018, the Serbian Government allocated double the
amount of national funds previously dedicated to demining
operations to €200,000 (which were matched with United
States and South Korean funding and tendered through
ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF)). Serbia continues to
seek additional international funding.17 At the request of
the national authorities, national funding was increased to
€350,000 for survey and clearance operations in 2019.18 The
same amount had been allocated by the Serbian government
for demining operations in 2020,19 but this was subsequently
reduced by 20% due to the COVID-19 crisis and efforts by
the Serbian government to tackle it. Serbia will try to match
national funds with donor funds through the ITF. 20 However,
for the time being, and due to funding restraints, SMAC will
continue to prioritise its national funding to mine survey and
clearance, rather than CMR, to contribute towards meeting
its obligations under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention (APMBC). 21
SMAC also provides expertise in risk education and in
training in survey and clearance, pursuant to Article 30 of the
Law on Ministries, and in late 2019, the Serbian government
approved funds for the establishment of a Training Centre
within SMAC. In cooperation with representatives of the
Ministry of Education – Institute for the Advancement of
Education, SMAC has developed a training programme for
educators (instructors) for mine and ERW education, which
will be officially verified. Together with experts from the
Ministry of Interior, SMAC plans to provide different training
modules, including on ERW recognition, international mine
action standards, and medical aspects. 22

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
SMAC does not have a gender policy in place and does not disaggregate relevant mine action data by sex and age. However,
it does ensure women and children are consulted during survey and community liaison activities, and SMAC cooperates
closely with the local authorities and other relevant stakeholders in this regard. SMAC also ensures ethnic or minority
groups are consulted. 23
There is said to be equal access to employment for qualified women and men in survey and clearance operations, but
country/operator-wide, only 15% of those employed in survey and clearance teams in Serbia are women. 24
At SMAC, 70% of employees are women, of which 65% of managerial/supervisory level positions are held by women. 25

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
SMAC uses its own information management system. Following on from initial discussions several years ago, in early
2020, SMAC informally discussed the possibility of the installation of the Information Management System for Mine Action
(IMSMA) with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and planned to intensify discussions in
the forthcoming period. 26
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
According to a Government Decree on Protection
against Unexploded Ordnance, the Sector for Emergency
Management, under the Ministry of Interior, acts as the
national mine action authority (NMAA).7 The NMAA is
responsible for developing standard operating procedures
(SOPs); accrediting demining operators; and supervising
the work of SMAC.8

PLANNING AND TASKING
The Government of Serbia adopts SMAC’s annual work plan. 27 The 2020 work plan includes plans to address both
anti-personnel mines and CMR. 28
Serbia prioritises the release of areas which directly affect the local population, such as those close to settlements where local
people have abandoned their houses and stopped cultivating land due to fear of landmines. 29 SMAC also noted that donors
themselves sometimes also influence the choice of the areas which will be demined first, depending on availability and amount
of their funds.30

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
According to SMAC, survey and clearance operations
in Serbia are conducted in accordance with International
Mine Action Standards (IMAS).31
National mine action standards (NMAS) were said to be in
the final phase of development as at September 2015.32 In
April 2017, SMAC reported that, along with the relevant
national authorities, it was in the process of establishing
a commission to develop national standards and SOPs to
define methods and techniques for survey and clearance in
Serbia.33 However, this process has been hindered due to
lack of capacity,34 and as at April 2020, the development of
the NMAS was still only “in progress”.35
Under new directorship in late 2015, SMAC reassessed
its land release methodology to prioritise full clearance

over technical survey of hazardous areas.36 This does not
correspond to international best practice and is an inefficient
use of scarce clearance assets. In February 2016, a new
director of SMAC reported to Mine Action Review that while
SMAC supports the use of high-quality non-technical survey
to identify areas suspected of containing CMR, it will fully
clear these areas, rather than using technical survey to more
accurately identify the boundaries of contamination.37
As at April 2020, SMAC’s position on its preferred land release
methodology remained the same under the current Director,
though there is an acknowledged willingness to conduct
technical survey in a form “adjusted to the context of Serbia”,
in response to the stated preference of international donors
for technical survey above clearance, where appropriate.38

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
SMAC does not itself carry out clearance or employ deminers but does conduct survey of areas suspected to contain mines,
CMR, or other explosive remnants of war (ERW). Clearance is conducted by commercial companies and non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), which are selected through public tender procedures executed by ITF, supported by international funding.39
The Ministry of Interior issues accreditation to mine action operators that is valid for one year. In 2019, 23 companies/
organisations were accredited for demining, but only one, the NGO Stop Mines (Pale, Bosnia and Herzegovina), conducted
clearance of CMR-contaminated area. Stop Mines deployed two clearance teams totalling 15 deminers.40
An EOD department within the Sector for Emergency Management, in the Ministry of Interior, responds to call-outs for
individual items of ERW, and is also responsible for demolition of items found by SMAC survey teams.41

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of nearly 0.12km2 of CMR-contaminated area was released in 2019, all through clearance.42

SURVEY IN 2019
No CMR-contaminated area was released by survey in 201943 or in 2018.44

CLEARANCE IN 2019
A total of 119,334m2 of CMR-contaminated area was cleared in 2019, in the village of Crveni Krst in the municipality of Niš,
during which four submunitions were destroyed. Clearance was conducted by the Bosnian-registered NGO, Stop Mines.45
Clearance output in 2019 was an increase on 2018, when no CMR clearance was conducted in Serbia.46
SMAC did not have available data on the number or type of individual items of ERW destroyed by the EOD department within
the Sector for Emergency Management during spot tasks in 2019.47
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Less than 1km2 in total has been cleared in the last five years
(see Table 2), which is ascribed to a lack of funding.
In its last APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request, dated
31 March 2018, Serbia had included a work plan for completion
of all ERW clearance by 2023, at a predicted total cost of
€20 million. CMR were not disaggregated from other ERW.48
Progress in CMR clearance is said to be contingent on funding.
Serbia predicts that if adequate funds for implementation of
survey and clearance projects were secured, CMR clearance
could be finished in two or three years.49
SMAC had developed four clearance projects for 2019,
totalling release of 742,615m2, which were submitted to
ITF for the selection of a contractor through its tender
procedures.50 However, only the project in Niš (119,344m2),
was actually funded and implemented in 2019.
SMAC did, however, envisage an increase in CMR land release
in 2020, with two clearance projects approved in Sjenica
Municipality (94,496m2) and in Raška Municipality (190,359m2),

funded by the United States and South Korea through ITF.
SMAC confirmed in August 2020 that both clearance projects
had been completed.51 In addition, SMAC expected ITF to
launch tender procedures for four additional projects funded
by the United States: three clearance projects in Sjenica
municipality (totalling 502,340m2) and a technical survey
project in Tutin municipality (515,000m2). 52
Table 2: Five-year summary of CMR clearance
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2019

0.12

2018

0.00

2017

0.18

2016

0.25

2015

0.18

Total

0.73

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
SMAC envisages that it will most likely need both national and international capacity to deal with any residual contamination,
discovered following completion.53 Serbia is already dealing with residual ERW contamination and investing significant funds
for ERW clearance, which is expected to be ongoing.54
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SOUTH SUDAN

CLEARING CLUSTER
MUNITION REMNANTS
2020

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

South Sudan should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in line with the decision taken by the
Council of Ministers announced in September 2017.

■

South Sudan should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster munition
remnants (CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

South Sudan should revise survey requirements for CMR-contaminated areas in its national mine action standards
to ensure the production of more accurate polygons.

■

South Sudan should increase its financial support for mine action operations. Greater assistance from the
government and international partners should be provided to the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)
to strengthen its capacity to develop and implement effective policies to address explosive ordnance.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2019, South Sudan had a total of just over 141 hazardous areas with a total size of 6.4km2 contaminated with
CMR, of which 5.5km2 was confirmed hazardous area (CHA) and 0.9km2 was suspected hazardous area (SHA).1 Seven of South
Sudan’s former ten states have areas suspected to contain CMR (see Table 1), with Central and Eastern Equatoria remaining
the most heavily contaminated. This is an increase from the just over 5.3km2 across 123 hazardous areas contaminated with
CMR at the end of 2018. 2
Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by state (at end 2019)3
No. of
CHAs

Area of
CHA (m2)

No. of
SHAs

Area of
SHA (m2)

Total
CHAs/SHAs

Total area (m2)

Central Equatoria

38

1,634,952

3

544,570

41

2,179,522

Eastern Equatoria

74

3,445,849

3

186,927

77

3,632,776

State

Jonglei

4

50,460

2

0

6

50,460

Upper Nile

4

133,067

0

0

4

133,067

Warrap

1

33,946

0

0

1

33,946

West Bahr El Ghazal

2

45,277

0

0

2

45,277

Western Equatoria
Totals

9

150,285

1

175,698

10

325,983

132

5,493,836

9

907,195

141

6,401,031

In 2017, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) initiated a review of the national Information Management System
for Mine Action (IMSMA) database and consequently initiated a process of targeted re-survey aimed at better defining the
estimated size of SHAs. Further re-survey of CMR-contaminated areas is required, but these areas cannot be accessed due
to insecurity. It is planned that manual clearance teams will carry out re-survey once the security situation allows. 4
South Sudan’s national mine action programme has greatly improved the accuracy of estimates of explosive ordnance
contamination. The total estimate of mine, CMR, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination remaining in
the country decreased from nearly 89km2 at the end of 2017 to 24.6km2 at the end of 2019.5 Despite continued land release,
however, CMR contamination has increased over that time as a review of existing records in the database and re-survey
resulted in three main changes that have proved especially significant with regard to CMR contamination: a number of existing
task records had been wrongly recorded and were re-classified as CMR-contaminated areas; several overly conservative
estimates of existing CHAs in the database were increased to better reflect the actual extent of contamination; and previously
unrecorded areas containing CMR were added to the database.6
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Cluster munitions were used during the decade-long war between Sudan and the SPLA/M that ended in 2005. From 1995 to
2000, prior to South Sudan’s independence, Sudanese government forces are believed to have air dropped cluster munitions
sporadically in southern Sudan.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
South Sudan has a significant problem with mines and especially ERW, resulting from large-scale use of explosive weapons
during armed conflicts in 1955–72 and 1983–2005 (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on South Sudan
for further information).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The South Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA)—since renamed
the NMAA—was established by presidential decree in 2006
to act as the national agency for planning, coordination,
and monitoring of mine action in South Sudan.8 There is no
national mine action legislation in place.9

in administration and management, land release, quality
management, and gender equality and mainstreaming. In
addition, a resource mobilisation strategy will be developed
along with the creation of an explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) response capacity to manage residual contamination.12

In 2011, UN Security Council Resolution 1996 tasked UNMAS
with supporting South Sudan in demining and strengthening
the capacity of the NMAA. UNMAS (with the NMAA) has
been overseeing mine action across the country through its
main office in Juba, and sub-offices in Bentiu, Bor, Malakal,
and Wau. Together, UNMAS and the NMAA accredit, task,
monitor, and evaluate mine action organisations; conduct
route verification and clearance; provide escorts for convoys
on high-threat routes to enable the delivery of humanitarian
assistance; and collect data and map hazardous areas.10

UNMAS and Danish Demining Group (DDG) are the
co-coordinators of the mine action sub-cluster. The
sub-cluster coordinates with the national- and state-level
Inter-Cluster Working Groups. This enables information to
be shared on mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), for UN
agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to
inform mine action actors about their own priority locations
for clearance; and for information on mines and UXO to be
integrated into the annual Humanitarian Needs Overview and
the Humanitarian Response Plan.13

While it is planned that the NMAA will eventually assume
full responsibility for all mine action activities, according to
UNMAS the NMAA continued to face serious financial and
technical limitations preventing it from doing so effectively in
2019. It requires substantial resources and capacity building
assistance if it is to manage the mine action programme.11

In 2019, the Government of South Sudan funded the costs of
NMAA staff salaries and its sub-offices across the country,
Malakal, Wau, and Yei. As at March 2020, the Malakal and Yei
offices were suspended due to the security situation.14 The
NMAA did not, however, provide any funding for survey or
clearance. The government’s total support was reported as
US$75,000 for the year.15

UNMAS, mine action operators, and South Sudanese
government departments are providing capacity
development to NMAA and other national mine action
organisations in a project that runs from January 2019 to
December 2020. The objectives are to develop the managerial
and operational capacity in key functional and technical
areas to enable national authorities to assume long-term
coordination and policy-making roles in mine action; and to
strengthen the capacity of the NMAA to plan and monitor
all aspects of mine action, in support of South Sudan’s
obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
(APMBC). It is planned that NMAA staff will attend training

In South Sudan’s 2020 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension
request, it is estimated to cost US$116.9 million to complete
all clearance by July 2026, although when costs are broken
down by year the total amounts to $128.5 million.16 In 2019,
South Sudan received more than US$41 million for mine
action which exceeds the costs needed if current levels of
support are maintained. It is worth noting, however, that
much of the funding received by UNMAS, which on average
has contributed around 75% of all sector funding, is used to
support the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).17
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In 2019, 41 hazardous areas covering a total of 1,998,915m2 of previously unrecorded CMR contamination was added to South
Sudan’s information management database. In addition, there was an expansion by 2,734,216m2 of existing hazardous areas
which had been recorded in the database but the estimates of size were overly conservative and so they were increased to
better reflect the expected true extent of contamination.7 This means that despite nearly 3.7km2 of land release in 2019 the
amount of contamination increased by 1.1km2 from the end of the previous year.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
South Sudan’s second national mine action strategy for
2018–22 includes a section on gender, focusing on how
different gender and age groups are affected by mines and
ERW and have specific and varying needs and priorities.
Guidelines on mainstreaming gender considerations in mine
action planning and operations in South Sudan are also
incorporated in the strategy, including on the collection of data
disaggregated by sex and age.18 UNMAS reported that the
programme was also implementing the UN Gender Guidelines
for Mine Action, monitored by a gender focal point.19
South Sudan’s National Technical Standards and Guidelines
(NTSGs) contain provisions requiring all community liaison
teams to tailor activities on the basis of the gendered needs
of beneficiaries, and to address the specific risks faced by
women and girls.20 All teams are reportedly gender balanced
in composition and trained to be inclusive, for example by
ensuring outreach through non-technical survey and risk
education is done separately for different age and gender
groups, and taking local cultural practices into consideration.21
At the same time, UNMAS reported that task prioritisation was
predominantly dependent on security and that resources were
concentrated on tasks within limited geographical areas rather
than on the basis of gender needs.22 Ethnic identity is taken
into account within survey and clearance teams to ensure safe
access and acceptance by the respective local communities.23
In 2019–20, UNMAS was providing workshops for the NMAA
and mine action partners on gender equality, gender-based
violence (GBV), and gender mainstreaming programming
in mine action with the aim of GBV prevention practices

being mainstreamed in mine action and there being equal
opportunity in decision making regardless of gender. 24
As at July 2020, these had not yet happened. 25
UNMAS has said there is equal access in employment
opportunities for qualified men and women in survey and
clearance teams across the organisations operating in
South Sudan. 26 However, redressing the gender balance
is a long-term challenge and is dependent on whether
new vacancies arise. In 2019, however, only 7% of staff in
operational roles were women, and women accounted for 5%
of managerial or supervisory positions among international
staff positions, while no women were occupying managerial
positions among the national staff. 27
All of the community liaison teams within Mines Advisory
Group (MAG) are mixed gender and MAG reports that it
consults with all affected community members, including
women and children. MAG also holds women-only focus
groups to ensure that their voices are heard. MAG also aims
to recruit team members from the more than 60 ethnic
groups within South Sudan and tries to ensure that at least
one team member speaks the local language of the planned
area of deployment. As at October 2019, approximately 25%
of all operational roles within MAG were held by women. This
follows a concerted effort by MAG to increase the number of
women in operational roles. There is one international staff
member who holds a senior managerial position within MAG
who is female but none of the female national staff members
holds a managerial position, although women are employed
as national staff at a supervisory level. 28

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
A comprehensive review of all data in South Sudan’s IMSMA database began in 2018, along with re-survey of recorded SHAs
and CHAs thought to be exaggerated or erroneously recorded. Through the database review it was found that past efforts to
upgrade the IMSMA software package led to serious data loss, which inhibited efforts to present an entirely accurate record of
the history of mine action in South Sudan. The ongoing database review has resulted in significant gains in the understanding
of mine and ERW contamination. UNMAS informed Mine Action Review that, wherever possible, the database disaggregates
mined areas, CMR-contaminated areas, and other ERW-contaminated areas, including spot tasks. 29
In 2020, despite not having acceded to the CCM, South Sudan submitted a voluntary Article 7 report for the first time,
covering 2019.

PLANNING AND TASKING
South Sudan’s most recent National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2022, developed with support from the Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and using funding from Japan, was officially launched in September 2018.30 A
mid-term strategic review of the plan, goals, and objectives was conducted in January 2020.31 According to UNMAS, the
strategy has three strategic goals with related targets:32
GOAL 1:
Advocacy and communication of South Sudan’s mine/ERW problem continues through national and international
awareness-raising and adoption and implementation of international conventions to facilitate a mine-/ERW-free South Sudan.
GOAL 2:
The extent of mine/ERW contamination is clarified and confirmed and the problem addressed through appropriate survey
and clearance, ensuring safe land is handed back to affected communities for use.
GOAL 3:
Safe behaviour is promoted among women, girls, boys, and men to reduce mine/ERW accidents and promote safe
livelihood activities.

158 Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2020

STATES NOT PARTY

In its 2020 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request South Sudan presents a work plan to 2026, split by region. South Sudan
estimates that the overall clearance requirement for mechanical clearance teams is 2.88km2 of cluster strike area. In addition,
there will be a requirement to clear 141 cluster strikes and 30 battle areas extending over 6.4km2.35 These numbers are slightly
different from the figures presented in the annual clearance tables with nearly 3km2 of mechanical clearance of CMR and 5.02km2
of manual clearance although this does include a contingency to clear an additional 10% of contaminated area as a margin of
safety. It is also unclear from the table how much of this clearance refers to CMR and how much to other UXO.36
Table 2: Planned mechanical and manual clearance of CMR- and UXO-contaminated area37
Year

No. of teams

Area cleared (m2)

Area remaining (m2)

Tasks remaining

2020

6 manual
2 mechanical

264,000 manual
176,000 mechanical

6,933,471

165

2021

6 manual
2 mechanical

1,056,000 manual
704,000 mechanical

5,173,471

123

2022

6 manual
2 mechanical

1,056,000 manual
704,000 mechanical

3,413,471

81

2023

5 Manual
2 Mechanical

880,000 manual
704,000 mechanical

1,829,471

44

2024

5 Manual
2 Mechanical

880,000 manual
704,000 mechanical

245,471

7

2025

5 Manual

880,000 manual

-634,529

-13

According to its 2019 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request to be considered by the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties
in November 2020, South Sudan intends to address all contamination from anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, CMR, and
other ERW by its requested 2026 APMBC Article 5 deadline. To that end, aside from those tasks where specific humanitarian
interventions are planned, the intention is to be pragmatic in the sequencing of tasks and to deploy clearance teams through a
prioritisation process that aims to balance security, logistical requirements, and concentration of effort. South Sudan believes
that this combination will lead to the most efficient clearance that allows for optimal monitoring of clearance efforts.38

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
South Sudan’s NTSGs, which outline the technical
requirements expected of all demining operators working
in South Sudan, are adapted from the International Mine
Action Standards (IMAS). The NTSGs are annually reviewed
and revised by UNMAS and the implementing partners
and then approved by the NMAA.39 These standards and
guidelines also contain provisions specific to CMR survey
and clearance.40
In 2019, revisions were made to the NTSGs for Animal
Detection Systems, Site Preparation, Marking, Quality
Management, and Medical Procedures to keep them in line with
changes to IMAS. An NTSG on “Stop-Operations Policy” was
also introduced. This policy mandates that any party can and
should suspend an operation whenever it believes a demining
situation or operation is becoming unsafe.41 The NTSG
amendments were made in consultation with the implementing
partners.42 Amendments were also made to the NTSGs
for Survey, Battle Area Clearance, and Land Release. The
revision of the NTSG for Battle Area Clearance included the
redefinition of the minimum clearance depth for CMR; survey
and assessment of the cluster munition strike’s footprint
related to the physical evidence and size of the polygon; and
quality management of CMR clearance adding layers of Quality
Control (QC) and a comprehensive recording system.43

However, both UNMAS and MAG have reported that
a significant number of initial survey reports of
CMR-contaminated areas have underestimated the extent
of the contamination. MAG reported that areas were often
recorded based on the minimum amount of clearance that
would be required to comply with the NTSGs, which require a
50 metre fade-out. In MAG’s experience, however, the actual
CMR-contaminated area has often proved to be significantly
larger, making it difficult to accurately plan for the time and
resources needed to address each task.
MAG begins CMR clearance with the expectation that the
task area will reach at least 60,000m2 and at times has
encountered CMR tasks that had to be expanded by more
than 100,000m2 compared to the original estimate. It further
reported that the fade-out requirements of the NTSGs
sometimes resulted in handover of cleared land while
simultaneously creating a new “hazardous area” comprising
the fade-out distance.44 UNMAS reported that often in a
recorded strike area, multiple cluster munition canisters are
found, with the consequence that the overall contaminated
area extends well beyond an expected standard footprint.45
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UNMAS operations staff generate an annual operational clearance plan where priority tasks are identified.33 According to
UNMAS, the operational focus for 2019–20 was on further clarifying contamination remaining in the database, with re-survey
of hazards thought to be exaggerated in size.34

UNMAS noted that the NTSGs require all mine action teams to conduct regular internal quality assurance (QA), along with QC
sampling of 10% of each area cleared. UNMAS conducted additional external QA through visits to each clearance task in 2018,
as well as upon the completion of a clearance task.46 As part of the capacity development project of the NMAA from 2019 to
2020, 30 QA officers were due to receive training in quality management through workshops and field placements with the aim
of the NMAA taking ownership for QA of mine action operations.47

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In 2019, UNMAS reported that 29 teams from 4 organisations
conducted CMR survey and clearance tasks: two international
demining non-governmental organisations (MAG and
DanChurchAid (DCA)), and two commercial companies
(G4S Ordnance Management (G4S) and The Development
Initiative (TDI)). It estimated the number of operational
personal involved in CMR survey and clearance at 224
during the year. The clearance teams (see Table 3) were not
deployed exclusively on CMR tasks, they also conducted
EOD, manual mine clearance and/or non-technical survey.
In addition, G4S deployed four teams totalling 28 personnel
solely for non-technical survey.48

Table 3: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 201949
Manual
clearance
teams

Total
clearance
personnel

Mechanical
assets

G4S

2

20

0

G4S

6

36

0

Operator

TDI

8

64

0

MAG

5

40

0

MAG

2

20

2

DCA
Totals

2

16

0

25

196

2

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of a nearly 3.7km2 of CMR contaminated area was released through survey and clearance in 2019; of which 0.36km2
was cancelled through non-technical survey, 0.01km2 was reduced through technical survey, and 3.29km2 was cleared.

SURVEY IN 2019
In 2019, a total of 359,388m2 was cancelled through non-technical survey in Eastern Equatoria and Western Equatoria, see
Table 4.50 This is an increase from the 10,400m2 of suspected CMR contamination cancelled through non-technical survey
in Jonglei state by G4S in 2018.51
In addition, 13,614m2 was reduced through technical survey
in Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Western Equatoria
and Unity, see Table 5.52 This is a decrease from the
147,300m2 reduced by technical survey the year before.53
Table 4: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 201954
State

Operator

Area cancelled (m²)

Eastern Equatoria

G4S

344,357

Western Equatoria

G4S

15,031

Total
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359,388

Table 5: Reduction through technical survey in 201955
State

Operator

Central Equatoria

G4S

533

Eastern Equatoria

G4S

3,729

Eastern Equatoria

TDI

61

Unity

TDI

1,889

Western Equatoria

G4S

7,402

Total

Area reduced (m²)

13,614
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In 2019, a total of nearly 3.3km2 of CMR-contaminated area was cleared with 2,586 submunitions destroyed (see Table 6).56
This is a decrease of 35% from the 5.1km2 cleared in 2018.57
Table 6: CMR clearance in 2019
State

Operator

Area cleared (m²)

Submunitions destroyed

Other UXO destroyed

Central Equatoria

G4S

25,233

1

67

Central Equatoria

MAG

1,920,222

1,880

48

Eastern Equatoria

DCA

87,420

86

2

Eastern Equatoria

G4S

274,107

143

18

Eastern Equatoria

MAG

129,578

77

0

Eastern Equatoria

TDI

323,282

169

7

Jonglei

G4S

212,283

129

9

Jonglei

MAG

97,677

57

0

Unity

TDI

9,500

1

0

Western Bahr El Ghazal

TDI

79,477

19

0

Western Equatoria

G4S

128,108

24

0

3,286,887

2,586

151

Totals

In addition, three CMR were destroyed during anti-personnel mine clearance, 57 submunitions were destroyed during
clearance of anti-vehicle mined area and 87 submunitions were destroyed during EOD spot tasks.58
According to UNMAS, the significant decrease in CMR clearance output in 2019 was due to the impact of widespread violence
in Equatoria, which has the highest concentration of CMR contamination and where the National Salvation Front was
particularly active.59

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
South Sudan is not yet a State Party to the CCM and therefore
does not have a specific clearance deadline under Article 4.
Nonetheless, South Sudan has obligations under international
human rights law to clear CMR as soon as possible.
South Sudan has announced its intention to accede to the
CCM, which is also a specific objective in the National Mine
Action Strategic Plan 2018–2022.60 In May 2019, UNMAS
reported that documents relating to South Sudan’s accession
to the Convention were under review by the national
parliament.61 As at September 2020, the legislation was still
before parliament for adoption.62
Previously, primarily due to the ongoing conflict, it was
impossible to predict when South Sudan might complete
clearance of CMR, nor even assess the true extent of
contamination.63 However, with improvements in the security
situation, progress in land release of CMR-contaminated
areas, and a comprehensive database review, in 2019, the
situation in South Sudan began to look a lot more positive.

According to South Sudan’s 2020 APMBC Article 5 deadline
extension request, it is expected that South Sudan will
complete clearance of all CMR-contaminated areas by the end
of 2025. In addition, the extension request clearly sets out the
primary assumptions and risk factors in the implementation
of land release targets which is contingent on having
access to contaminated areas and no resumption of fighting.
Logistical challenges will also need to be overcome due to
the poor state of South Sudan’s infrastructure and the effects
of the seasonal rains, which mean that clearance in much
of the country is only possible for eight months of the year
given widespread flooding. Furthermore, the methodology
previously used to clear roads was flawed as several mines
have recently been discovered on roads that had been
declared safe resulting in the need for re-clearance. This has
diverted resources from clearance of CMR.64
South Sudan has also been affected by the COVID-19 outbreak,
which has led the government to ban all public gatherings and
introduce social distancing and lockdown measures. As at April
2020, operators had stood down teams, which will undoubtably
impact on survey and clearance output.65
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CLEARING CLUSTER
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Sudan should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.

■

Sudan should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster munition remnants
(CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

Sudan should make every effort to address the last remaining area suspected to contain CMR as soon as possible
and should elaborate a work plan with how this will be achieved.

■

Sudan should ensure that reporting disaggregates submunitions from other unexploded ordnance (UXO) and
that mine action data is recorded and reported according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land
release terminology.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
As at April 2020, Sudan’s National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) informed Mine Action Review that only one area suspected to
contain CMR contamination remained in Sudan.1 The NMAC reported that the area, with an unknown size in South Kordofan
state, was located in an area not under government control. 2
The NMAC previously reported that at the end of 2017, a total of two areas suspected to contain CMR contamination remained
to be addressed in Sudan, the area in South Kordofan and another in West Kordofan.3 In June 2018, NMAC informed Mine
Action Review that it had deployed a team to address the remaining hazardous area in West Kordofan, located in Aghabish
village, Lagawa locality, which it later reported was cancelled during the year as no evidence of CMR was found. 4
In 2017, NMAC, which assumed full national ownership for implementing mine action activities upon the United Nations Mine
Action Office’s (UNMAO’s) closure in June 2011, reported that of the nine open areas reported by UNMAO in 2011, seven were
cleared in 2011–13.5 In March 2018, NMAC informed Mine Action Review that the size of the seven areas cleared during this
period totalled 15,318m2 and that 13 PM-1 submunitions were found and destroyed during clearance.6 NMAC has not reported
any survey or clearance of CMR since 2013. It stated that no new CMR contamination was recorded in 2016–19.7
In the 1990s, Sudanese government forces are believed to have sporadically air dropped cluster munitions in its civil war
with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Government forces were reported as having used several
types of cluster munitions, including Spanish-manufactured HESPIN 21; US-manufactured M42 and Mk118 (Rockeye),
and a Brazilian copy; Chinese Type-81 dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM); Chilean-made PM-1; and
Soviet-manufactured PTAB-1.5 and AO-1-SCh submunitions. In 2012 and 2015, use of cluster munitions was recorded in five
separate attacks on villages in South Kordofan state. Each attack involved air-dropped RBK-500 cluster munitions containing
AO-2.5RT submunitions.8
In April 2017, the African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) reported the presence of two AO-1-Sch
submunitions in North Darfur (at Al Mengara village in Al Liet locality). The villagers reported that the bombs were dropped
in 2008, had been identified by UNAMID at that time, and that the military had stated that they would dispose of the items.9 The
Sudanese Armed Forces Engineers destroyed the items in February 2018 and no further CMR were reported or identified.10

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Sudan also has a significant problem with anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, and UXO, primarily as a result of the
more than 20 years of civil war that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and South Sudan’s independence
in July 2011 (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on Sudan for further information).
Since South Sudan’s independence, new conflicts in Abyei and in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states have resulted in
increased UXO contamination in Sudan.11 The extent of mine and ERW contamination within the disputed area of Abyei and the
Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ) between Sudan and South Sudan is unknown due to security and political issues.12
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Sudanese National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and
the NMAC manage Sudan’s mine action programme. Upon
the independence of South Sudan, the NMAC assumed full
ownership of national mine action with responsibility for
coordinating and supervising the implementation of all
mine action activities, including quality assurance (QA),
accreditation, and certification of clearance operators.
After starting an emergency programme in 2002, UNMAS
re-established activities in Sudan in 2015, following an
invitation from the Sudanese Government, in an advisory
and support capacity.13 As part of its mandate, UNMAS
provides organisational and individual capacity development
to the NMAC.14
Sudan is part of the Arab Regional Cooperation Programme
(ARPC) and as part of this programme, which is coordinated
by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD), the NMAA attend regional trainings and
workshops. In December 2019, the NMAA attended the ARPC
annual conference where they discussed and approved
recently translated IMAS into Arabic and shared experiences
of their own national mine action standards (NMAS).15

In 2019, the Government of Sudan contributed a total of
US$2 million to the running costs of NMAC and for demining
activities. It has consistently funded the national mine action
programme at this level for the past four years.16 In addition,
international donors contributed US$5.84 million through
UNMAS for mine action in Sudan. UNMAS reported that, in
2020, a total of $15.8 million would be required to meet mine
action needs in the country, including demining in South
Kordofan and Blue Nile states and ERW response in Darfur.17
In 2018, Sudan reported that as a result of enhanced
cooperation, both nationally and internationally, in particular
stemming from a meeting on Sudan of the APMBC’s Committee
on the Enhancement of Cooperation and Assistance’s
“individualised approach” initiative in 2017, a number of
positive developments had resulted. This initiative, Sudan
reported, alongside nationally convened mine action events
and donor field visits to mine-affected areas, had resulted in an
increase in earmarked funds to the mine action programme.18

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
In 2019, NMAC reported that it has a gender and diversity
policy in place and that gender is mainstreamed in the
national mine action strategic plan for 2019–23 and in the
national mine action standards. It stated that under those
standards, all survey and community liaison teams are to be
gender balanced, and that women and children are consulted
during survey and community liaison activities. It said
that gender is also taken into account in the prioritisation,
planning, and tasking of survey and clearance, as per the
national standards and the new standard IMSMA forms.19
Mine action data are disaggregated by sex and age. 20 UNMAS
reported working with NMAC and implementing partners to
improve this aspect of mine action reporting and information
management because sex and age disaggregated data of land
release beneficiaries were not being captured in IMSMA. 21

The NMAC says it always encourages women to apply for
employment in the national programme, whether at the office
level or in the field. Positively, it reported that almost 40%
of NMAC staff employed at the managerial or supervisory
levels are women and 50% of non-technical survey teams
are female. The first female deminer has also been employed
but the NMAC acknowledged that there are obstacles to
hiring women due to “local customs and traditions”. 22 UNMAS
reported that, as at May 2020, around 55% of the new
non-technical survey teams are female. One female deminer
started in late 2019, and it is hoped to increase the number
of female deminers in the future. 23

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
As at April 2020, NMAC informed Mine Action Review that it was using the IMSMA legacy version in parallel a newer version:
IMSMA New Generation (NG). 24 In 2018, NMAC began a process of upgrading the IMSMA software to the newer NG version,
with assistance from the GICHD. Significant efforts to correct errors in the database were also undertaken. 25 In 2019, IMSMA
training was delivered to the suboffices and operators on the new reporting system and reporting forms. 26

PLANNING AND TASKING
In May 2019, NMAC reported that a new national mine action strategic plan for 2019–23 had been finalised and was awaiting
approval. The plan aims to fulfil Sudan’s APMBC obligations, and was developed in coordination with the GICHD to replace its
previous national strategy for 2016–19. 27 NMAC stated that detailed annual work plans had been developed for each year under
the new strategic plan. 28 As at April 2020, the strategic plan was still awaiting approval. 29
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
In May 2019, NMAC reported that a review of Sudan’s NMAS had been completed and the revised standards were awaiting
endorsement.33 As at August 2020, this was still the situation.34
During 2019, NMAC completed 46 accreditations and 33 QA visits. During 2019, the accreditation of Global Aid Hand was
reviewed and survey and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) were added to their existing explosive ordnance risk education
(EORE) accreditation.35

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In 2019, no international NGOs were demining in Sudan. National operators are JASMAR for Human Security (JASMAR),
National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD), the Friends for Peace and Development Organization (FPDO),
and Global Aid Hand.36
Table 1: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 201937
Operator

Manual clearance teams (MCTs)/
Multi-task teams (MTTs)

Total deminers*

Dogs and handlers

Machines

FPDO

2 MCTS

16

0

0

NUMAD

4 MCTs
5 MTTs

32
20

9 dogs & 3 handlers

0

JASMAR

3 MTTs

12

0

0

14 teams

80

9/3

0

Totals
* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers.

Table 2: Operational survey capacities deployed in 201938
Operator

NTS teams

Total NTS
personnel*

TS teams

JASMAR

3

6

Clearance capacity is also technical survey capacity

NUMAD

0

0

Global Aid Hand

7

14

Totals

10

20

Total TS personnel*

NTS = Non-technical survey TS = Technical survey
*Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers

According to the NMAC, there was no change in operational capacity from 2018 to 2019 until November when additional
non-technical survey capacity was deployed by JASMAR and Global Aid Hand.39 According to UNMAS, the MCTs and MTTs
were not only working on anti-personnel mine clearance but also on priority areas contaminated with anti-vehicle mines
and ERW. This is because most of the anti-personnel mined areas are located in Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North
(SPLMN)-controlled areas.40 The clearance capacity was not all operational throughout the year with the FPDO deployed only
until May 2019. In addition, two of the NUMAD MTTs were tasked with investigating residual risk in Kassala state, which was
announced free from known mined areas and ERW in 2018. Some of the teams only became operational in October 2019 as the
season in most of Sudan, especially in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, runs from October to June the following year.41
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In Sudan’s 2018 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request there was no specific mention of remaining CMR or plans for
survey and clearance of CMR-contaminated areas. The extension request did contain a detailed work plan with annual survey
and clearance projections on a state-by-state basis with a total planned release for all types of ordnance of 224 hazardous
areas with a size of 26.5km2 by 1 April 2023.30 In 2020, in accordance with the terms of its latest APMBC Article 5 deadline
extension, Sudan submitted an updated work plan for 1 March 2020–31 March 2023, though again this make no mention of
CMR.31 Sudan reported to Mine Action Review that clearance of remaining CMR contamination would be possible by 2021 if
there was a change in the security situation and the last known registered cluster munition-contaminated area was under
Sudanese Government control.32

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
There was no reported survey or clearance of CMR-contaminated areas conducted in 2019. In 2018, one recorded area of
suspected CMR contamination in West Kordofan was cancelled by NUMAD after no evidence of cluster munitions was found
in the area.42

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
Sudan is not a state party to the CCM and therefore does
not have a specific clearance deadline under Article 4.
Nonetheless, it has obligations under international human
rights law to clear CMR as soon as possible.
In May 2017, NMAC informed Mine Action Review that Sudan
was “with the spirit of the Convention on Cluster Munitions”
and that the national authorities were aware of the convention
and Sudan’s current status as not yet having joined.43 In April
2020, NMAC stated that there had been no developments with
regard to Sudan’s accession to the CCM in 2019.44

In June 2020, Sudan’s transitional government and the head
of one of the two factions of the rebel group, Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), signed a preliminary
peace deal. The transitional government and rebel groups
have until February 2021 to finalise a comprehensive
deal.46 This would improve accessibility for the mine action
programme but, Sudan reports, it would also pose a
challenge as roads and other routes will need to be cleared
before people can move safely and humanitarian assistance
can be provided and Sudan does not currently have the
capacity to do this.47

The main impediment to mine action operations is the
security situation and the lack of access to most of the known
impacted communities in Blue Nile and South Kordofan
states.45 During 2019, access to South Kordofan and Blue
Nile improved, which allowed for roads to be assessed and
cleared opening access for humanitarian assistance and
population movement. It is hoped that with the establishment
of the transitional government and the onset of peace talks
between government and opposition groups this may lead to
a comprehensive nationwide peace agreement.

In addition, Sudan reported that obstacles to completion
include: inadequate funding for mine action, outdated
demining equipment that is not fit for purpose, poor
infrastructure which also impedes access, and difficult
climatic conditions.48 A further significant impediment to
progress is the lack of clearance capacity formerly provided
by international operators. Sudan has made numerous
requests for technical and logistical support and appeals
for international operators to return.
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SYRIA

CLEARING CLUSTER
MUNITION REMNANTS
2020

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Syria experienced multiple attacks with cluster munitions by pro-government forces in 2019. The United Nations Mine Action
Service (UNMAS) reported that the government had agreed to the participation of international demining organisations in
mine action.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Syria and Russia should immediately halt the use of cluster munitions.

■

Syria should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.

■

Syria should apply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster munition remnants
(CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
Syria’s civil war saw continued use of cluster munitions in 2019 and 2020, adding to what is already believed to be widespread
CMR in addition to dense contamination by other explosive remnants of war (ERW), including conventional mines and those of
an improvised nature (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on Syria for further information). The extent of
contamination by any particular category of device is not known. The United Nations estimated in October 2019 that explosive
ordnance contaminated more than 2,560 communities and 11.5 million people and had caused an average of 184 explosive
incidents a day throughout the year.1
Syrian government and Russian air forces intensively bombed Idlib governorate and other areas of north-west Syria during
the first half of 2019, regularly using cluster munitions. 2 First responders cited by Human Rights Watch documented 10
attacks by pro-government forces in May 2019 using Uragan cluster munition rockets in north west Syria.3 The United
Nations Commission of Inquiry monitoring Syria documented use of cluster munitions in a surface-to-surface missile attack
by pro-government forces on a camp for displaced persons near the border with Turkey in November 2019.4 Pro-government
forces struck a school in Idlib governorate with a missile armed with submunitions in January 2020 inflicting heavy civilian
casualties5 and in February 2020 struck densely populated area of Idlib with what were believed to be URAGAN 9M27K-type
cluster munitions fired from BM-30 “SMERCH” multiple-barrelled rocket launcher system.6 The Syrian Network for Human
Right reported at least 24 attacks employing cluster munitions between September 2018 and April 2019, attributing 23 attacks
to Syrian forces and one to Russian forces.7
Syrian Civil Defence (SCD) has reported clearing large numbers of unexploded submunitions over the past three years in
Idlib governorate and to a lesser extent in Dar’a, Hama, and Quneitra over the past two years.8 SCD and other operators
report encountering mainly Russian-made cluster munitions, including SHOAB-0.5, AO-2.5RT, 9N235, AO1-SCH, and PTAB-1M
and 2.5M submunitions.9

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Syria does not have a national mine action authority or a national programme for survey and clearance. Mine action has been
conducted by a wide range of organisations, largely determined by the forces controlling different regions.
In areas under government control, these have included mainly Russian and Syrian military engineers and civil defence
organisations. International and national demining organisations conducted clearance in north-east Syria controlled by the
Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces. Turkey reported its security forces cleared mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
in areas of northern Syria it occupied in October 2019.10
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UNMAS signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Syrian government in July 2018 under which it deployed two
staff to Damascus in October 2018. After meeting Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Mikdad in Damascus in October 2019, UNMAS
Director Agnes Marcaillou reported the government had agreed to the involvement of international demining organisations.
They would be registered by the government and coordinated by UNMAS, which stated that discussions were underway on
plans for survey, marking, and clearance.11 As of May 2020, however, no international demining organisations had registered
with the government and UNMAS remained focused on training Syrian partners for risk education and community survey.
Between January and July 2019 teams surveyed 365 areas in Aleppo, northern Hama, and Idlib governorates, marking 370
explosive items.12

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Russia deployed several hundred military deminers from
its Armed Forces Demining Centre from 2017 onwards,
conducting clearance with manual teams supported by
mine detection dogs and Uran-6 mine detection robots.
Russian troops also provided training courses for Syrian
army engineers at Hmeimim air base and at training centres
established in 2017 in Aleppo and Homs. By the start of
January 2018, Russian armed forces reported they had
trained 900 Syrian engineers.13
Russia started to withdraw troops, including deminers, from
Syria in 2018 but its Ministry of Defence continued to report
mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) in
Syria in 2020.14 Russia appealed to other countries in 2018 to
provide support. Armenia responded by sending an 83-strong
team to Syria in February 2019, planning to focus its work on
the northern governorate of Aleppo.15 Armenia rotated a new
team to replace the first after four months.16
National operators included SCD, widely reported as White
Helmets, which worked with six clearance teams and three
community liaison/survey teams in north-west Syria in 2019.
Three clearance and two survey teams operated in Idlib
province, a focal point of conflict in 2019, with two clearance
teams and one survey team working in Aleppo and one

clearance team in Hama province. Teams mostly destroyed
CMR and tackled a wide range of other unexploded ordnance
(UXO). In January 2019, five SCD staff took part in a two-week
course delivered remotely in humanitarian response to IEDs,
focusing on search, identification, and threat assessments to
increase safety in daily search and rescue.17
AFAK, a Syrian NGO working in partnership with The HALO
Trust, conducted clearance in the southern provinces of Dar’a
and Quneitra in the early part of 2019 until a Syrian army
offensive took control of the area.18
In areas outside government control in the north-east,
humanitarian demining organisations and commercial
companies have conducted large-scale clearance in areas
recaptured from Islamic State. Tetra Tech worked operated
in Raqqa, Deir Ezzour, and, after its recapture in 2019, in
Barghuz. Funded by the United States (US) Department of
State, Tetra Tech focused on critical infrastructure such as
hospitals, schools, water pumping stations, and electricity
generating plants. A small national organisation, Roj Mine
Control Organization (RMCO), was conducting clearance in
north and north-east Syria but reportedly sustained heavy
casualties among its deminers attempting clearance of
improvised devices.19

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
Syria’s continuing conflict prevented progress towards
a coordinated national programme of mine action.
Comprehensive information on outcomes of survey
or clearance in any areas was unavailable.
SCD reported conducting 753 tasks in three governorates
in 2019 which resulted in destroying 887 CMR and 143 items
of other UXO. 20
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Table 1: Syrian Civil Defence CMR clearance 2019
Province

Tasks

Submunitions
destroyed

Other UXO
destroyed

Idlib

327

428

51

Aleppo

289

372

46

Hama

137

87

46

Totals

753

887

143
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TAJIKISTAN

CLEARING CLUSTER
MUNITION REMNANTS
2020

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
The national estimate of cluster munition remnants (CMR) contamination increased significantly in 2019. The Tajikistan National
Mine Action Centre (TNMAC) has approved a pilot project by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) to introduce the Cluster Munition
Remnant Survey (CMRS)/technical survey methodology and subsequently approved NPA’s procedures for use by all operators.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Tajikistan should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.

■

Tajikistan should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR on territory under
its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

The TNMAC should conduct survey to clarify the extent of remaining CMR and ensure timely clearance and release
of the contaminated areas.

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
Tajikistan does not have a comprehensive baseline estimate
of the extent of CMR contamination but reported more than
1.5km2 affected by CMR at the end of 2019 (see Table 1), an
increase of two-thirds on the estimate a year earlier. TNMAC
said this followed the addition of three confirmed hazardous
areas (CHAs) totalling 616,191m2.1 NPA, the main operator
addressing CMR, identified one CHA in 2019 in Darvoz’s
Sagirdasht municipality covering 288,191m2. The Union of
Sappers of Tajikistan (UST) confirmed two other hazards
covering a total of 528,000m2, also in Sagirdasht. 2
CMR are concentrated in central provinces used as summer
pasture by local communities and for that reason are
considered high impact. Initial surveys identified hazardous
areas largely on the basis of recorded accidents and
local community reports that did not specify the types of
contamination, underscoring the need for resurvey.3

Tajikistan traces its CMR contamination back to the civil war
of 1992–97 but has not clarified who was responsible for
using cluster munitions. 4 Most of the submunitions cleared
are from the Russian RBK 500 series, model AO 2.5RT/RTM.5
Table 1: CMR contamination (at end 2019)6
Province

CHAs

Area (m2)

Rasht

3

531,000

Darvoz

6

762,231

Sh. Shohin

1

60,000

Sangvor
Totals

1

200,000

11

1,553,231

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Commission for the Implementation of International
Humanitarian Law (CIIHL), chaired by the first deputy of the
Prime Minister, and containing key representatives from
relevant line ministries, acts as Tajikistan’s national mine
action authority, responsible for mainstreaming mine action
in the government’s socio-economic development policies.7
TNMAC is the executive arm of CIIHL and the body
coordinating mine action, responsible for issuing task orders,
information management and quality assurance (QA)/
quality control (QC).8 It was set up by government decree
in January 2014 replacing the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre
and taking over the process of managing transition to a fully
nationally-owed programme.9 In 2016, Tajikistan’s Parliament
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adopted a Law on Humanitarian Mine Action, which covers
all aspects of mine action, and in 2017 it approved a national
mine action strategy for 2017–20.10
With transition in place, UNDP formally concluded its Support
to Tajikistan Mine Action Programme (STMAP) project in
September 2019.11 Any future support will be provided
remotely from UNDP’s regional hub in Istanbul.12 The end
of the programme resulted in loss of trained capacity for
TNMAC as most STMAP staff were on UN salaries and left
when the programme ended rather than continue on lower
national salaries. It also raised questions as to whether
TNMAC had sufficient staff capacity to fulfil its roles, notably
in relation to planning and developing strategy.13

STATES NOT PARTY

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
TNMAC adopted a gender programme in October 2018
that was prepared by the Geneva Mine Action Programme
(GMAP, now a programme of the Geneva International Centre
for Humanitarian Demining, GICHD) and is committed to
improving the situation of women in the mine action sector.16
A UNDP evaluation concluded TNMAC had made progress
mainstreaming gender and diversity in mine action but
the strategy has not yet been systematically implemented.
Areas for further action included ensuring that training of
trainers for risk education was gender balanced, introducing
women QA/QC officers and developing a code of conduct and
complaints mechanisms.17
Women account for around one fifth of personnel in survey
and clearance teams in Tajikistan, and around one quarter
of managerial/supervisory level positions. TNMAC plans to
diversify survey teams to help reach a wider audience and
more sources of information. Relevant mine action data are
disaggregated by sex and age.18
TNMAC acknowledged it would be a challenge to achieve
gender balance in view of the predominance of men in the
military, where service is compulsory for men and voluntary

for women. TNMAC said where it could identify key positions
that can be filled by female candidates, such as paramedics
and/or QA/QC officers, this will be discussed and prioritised.
In addition, TNMAC will seek to increase female civilian
capacity in coordination with other implementing partners.19
The OSCE, which funds three demining teams, also seeks
to promote gender awareness by collecting comprehensive
relevant information. 20 Meantime, the Ministry of Defence’s
Humanitarian Demining Company (HDC) multi-task teams
report to consult with all groups, including women and
children, during survey and community liaison. 21
NPA has a gender and diversity policy integrated into its
Tajikistan project proposals and operations. Three of its six
support staff are women but its 59 operational staff include
only 13 women (22%) with more men than women in its
survey and community liaison teams. NPA ensures that all
groups are included during community consultation activities,
and says it has a gender balanced community liaison team to
help ensure this. NPA disaggregates mine action data by sex
and age. 22

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
TNMAC completed an upgrade of its national mine action database from Information Management System for Mine Action
(IMSMA) version 6.0 to IMSMA Core, which became fully operational in May 2019 making it easier to input, edit, and retrieve
data. TNMAC also introduced new data collection forms intended to simplify data entry and improve data quality. 23 The closure
of UNDP’s support programme led to loss of trained staff and raised concerns it would be difficult to maintain information
management standards. 24

PLANNING AND TASKING
Tajikistan’s Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in March 2019 forms
the basis of its operational planning, superseding the National Strategy on Humanitarian Mine Action 2017–2020. The request
said land release would concentrate on the Central region and the Tajik-Afghan border, especially the Shamsiddin Shohin
district as the area most contaminated with anti-personnel mines. 25
Tajikistan does not have a strategic plan that addresses cluster munitions but TNMAC said in May 2020 it targeted completion
of CMR clearance by 2023. 26

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Tajikistan’s revised National Mine Action Standards (TNMAS) were approved by Decree No. 162 on 1 April 2017. The revised
standards have been translated into Russian and English.27
TNMAC agreed to an NPA proposal to introduce the CMRS/technical survey methodology to Tajikistan and conducted a pilot
project in the central region of the country in July 2019. 28 It has approved NPA’s CMRS standing operating procedures (SOPs)
for use by all operators. 29
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The Ministry of Defence (MoD) plays a major role in Tajikistan’s mine action sector, in particular by conducting demining
directly,14 but is not engaged in CMR clearance. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Programme Office
in Dushanbe (OSCE POiD) has supported the MoD to update its multiyear plan, entitled “Ministry of Defence of the Republic
of Tajikistan Co-operation Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2023.”15

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Tajikistan’s overall operational capacity in 2019 consisted of the Ministry of Defence’s five HDC multi-task teams employing 50
deminers,30 and NPA’s five multi-purpose teams with 38 deminers. Only NPA conducted survey and clearance of CMR in 2019.
NPA established a non-technical/targeted technical survey team in 2019 with four surveyors, one paramedic, and one task
supervisor, as support to TNMAC’s survey of mined and CMR-contaminated areas.31 NPA employed CMRS for the first time in
Darvoz district confirming a hazard of 288,191m2 in 2019 and conducting a second CMRS task in 2020. Central areas affected
by cluster munitions are only accessible in summer months between July and September.32
UST started to conduct CMRS in 2020 working with NPA on a task in Darvoz district’s Sagidasht municipality.33 UST, a national
not-for-profit organisation, is accredited to conduct non-technical survey, risk education, and victim assistance, but is not yet
accredited to conduct clearance.34

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
Tajikistan released 724,420m2 of CMR-affected area through a combination of survey and clearance in 2019, 78% more than the
previous year when only clearance occurred.35

SURVEY IN 2019
TNMAC reported release through survey of 201,809m2 in 2019, all of it in reduction through technical survey by NPA.36

CLEARANCE IN 2019
The only CMR clearance in 2019 was in Darvos district where NPA released a little over half a square kilometre (see Table 2),
up from 407,571m2 in 2018, and destroying 89 submunitions, compared with 63 the previous year.37
Table 2: CMR clearance in 201938
Operator

Province

NPA

Darvos

Areas released

Totals

Area cleared (m2)

Submunitions destroyed

UXO destroyed

1

522,611

89

2

1

522,611

89

2

UXO = unexploded ordnance other than submunitions

TNMAC has given priority to clearance of anti-personnel mines and meeting its APMBC Article 5 clearance obligations and it
has not elaborated a detailed plan for CM survey and clearance but said it expects to complete clearance to be completed by
2023.39 Tajikistan’s government was reportedly preparing to establish a working group in late 2020 to consider the possibility
of acceding to the CCM, bringing greater attention to this sphere of operations.40
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Ukraine should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.

■

Ukraine should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster munition remnants
(CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

Ukraine should undertake a baseline survey of CMR contamination in areas to which it has effective access.

■

Ukraine should formally establish a national mine action authority and a functioning national mine action centre
to manage clearance of CMR and other explosive ordnance.

■

Ukraine should elaborate a strategic plan for mine action, including for CMR survey and clearance.

■

Ukraine should systematically collect data on contamination from mines, CMR, and other explosive remnants of war
(ERW), as well as progress in survey and clearance, and establish a centralised database for planning purposes.

■

Ukraine should consult with mine action stakeholders and elaborate standardised national criteria for the
prioritisation of CMR clearance.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
The extent of contamination from CMR in Ukraine is not known. Ukraine has said that many unexploded submunitions
contaminate the Donetsk and Luhansk regions,1 with the most intensive use of cluster munitions said to have occurred in
and around the city of Debalcevo in Donetsk oblast. 2 In 2017 and again in 2020, Ukraine estimated, implausibly, that total
contamination by mines and ERW (including CMR) could extend over 7,000km2.3 The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence (MoD)
has accepted that this is a “rough” estimate.4
It is further suggested that up to one fifth of the explosive contamination is from mines while the rest is from different ERW,
including CMR.5 But Ukraine cannot reliably estimate the specific extent of CMR contamination until a baseline survey has been
completed.6 The heaviest mine and ERW contamination is believed to be inside the 15km buffer zone between the warring
parties, also called the Grey Zone.7 Non-technical and technical survey are being conducted in the government-controlled area
(GCA) in eastern Ukraine but ongoing conflict means that evidence-based survey is not possible in the Grey Zone.8
In 2019, the HALO Trust added 74,035m2 of previously unrecorded CMR contamination to the database; Danish Demining Group
(DDG) did not report any newly discovered areas of CMR contamination in 2019.9
Multiple reports from 2014 and 2015 indicated that both government forces and pro-Russian rebels used cluster munitions in
the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine. This included Smerch (Tornado) and Uragan (Hurricane) cluster munition
rockets, which deliver 9N210 and 9N235 anti-personnel fragmentation submunitions; 300mm 9M55K cluster munition rockets
with 9N235 submunitions; and 220mm 9M27K-series cluster munition rockets.10

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Ukraine is contaminated by considerable quantities of other ERW as well as by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines used
during the current conflict (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on Ukraine for further information). It is
also affected by unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) remaining from the First World War
and Second World War11 and Soviet military training and stockpiles. In February 2016, Ukraine said that 32 former military
firing ranges and the many other areas contaminated with explosive items from past wars covered 1,500km2.12

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
All mine action in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including CMR survey and clearance, are currently planned, coordinated,
and controlled by the MoD, which operates the Kamyanets-Podilsky Demining Centre.13 Other national bodies involved in the
sector include the Ministry of Internal Affairs, under which sits the State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU); the Security
Services; the Ministry for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories; the State Special Transport Services (SSTS)
of the MoD; the National Police; and the State Border Service.14
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Ukraine’s parliament adopted a national mine action law on
6 December 2018, which was signed by the President on 22
January 2019.16 However, the law could not be implemented.
It was held to be incompatible with the Constitution of Ukraine
because it gave authority to Parliament to create mine action
institutions such as the national mine action authority (NMAA),
which, as a “state body”, is the responsibility of the Cabinet of
Ministers. Following presidential and parliamentary elections
in September 2019, a working group was set up comprised of
representatives from relevant government ministries and the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), NATO (the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization), and the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe, Project Co-ordinator in
Ukraine (OSCE PCU) to prepare amendments to the law. In
June 2020, the “Law on the Amendments to the Law on Mine
Action in Ukraine” passed its first reading. UNDP, the OSCE
PCU, The HALO Trust, and DDG drafted comments on a number
of problematic issues in the draft, including the training and
insurance of deminers; the possibility for international operators
to use explosives to destroy items found during clearance
(currently, only the MoD and SESU can blow up ordnance);
handover procedures; and liability of actors after handover.17
Adjustments are expected to be made to the draft of the
revised Law taking these comments into account before
its second reading. The amended Law was expected to be
adopted in October 2020, before the adoption of the national
budget for 2021.18 The Law establishes a framework for
humanitarian demining, allocates responsibilities among
state institutions, and envisages the creation of an NMAA
and, strangely, two national mine action centres (NMACs).
One NMAC will operate under the MoD Kamyanets-Podilsky
Demining Centre while the other will be under SESU’s
“Special Humanitarian Demining Centre”. Each centre will be
accredited and have its own quality management capacity.
Demining responsibility will be divided territorially between
the two NMACs. The NMACs will be coordinated by the
NMAA, an interagency body to be chaired by the MoD while
“special conditions” exist in Ukraine. Thereafter, the Ministry

of Interior will take charge. National mine action standards
(NMAS) and the national mine action strategy will be adopted
by the NMAA.19
Operators participate in monthly mine action sub-cluster
meetings, chaired by UNDP, which are attended by
representatives of the MoD, SESU, and MOFA. In addition,
the OSCE PCU organises regular roundtable meetings on
specific mine action topics. 20
National funding is provided for mine and ERW clearance and
quality control. 21 The MoD and the Civil-Military Cooperation
Directorate (CIMIC) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have
supported operator survey and clearance on all matters
related to security and, in particular, have supported the
deployment of HALO Trust’s teams in the 15km buffer zone. 22
Ukraine also receives support from foreign partners (OSCE
and NATO) for clearance equipment. 23
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD) has been working with the OSCE PCU and the
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) to
help foster mine action institutions. 24 In 2019, the GICHD
supported the development of new mine action legislation
and the NMAS; provided training in quality management and
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)
Core; facilitated a regional roundtable on Explosive Ordnance
Risk Education (EORE) communication approaches; and
organised a visit to the Lebanon Mine Action Centre for the
head of the three training programmes. 25 The OSCE PCU has
received funding until December 2021 to support Ukraine
in establishing an NMAA and an NMAC; elaborating national
standards and mine action legislation; developing the IMSMA
database in co-operation with the GICHD; organising training
in quality management, non-technical survey, and IMSMA;
and procuring demining equipment for the MoD and SESU. 26
DDG provided capacity development to SESU in 2019 and,
as at April 2020, was supporting equipment procurement;
the development of standard operating procedures
(SOPs); deployment/operational activity (mine clearance,
non-technical survey); and quality assurance (QA)/
quality control (QC). In addition, DDG provided training on
non-technical survey, clearance, and data management. 27
In 2019, The HALO Trust provided information management
support and quality management training to the MoD. In 2020,
HALO Trust was providing training to SESU on non-technical
survey, medical support, geographic information systems
(GIS), risk education, clearance, and quality management. 28

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
As at June 2020, no information had been provided on whether there is a gender policy and associated implementation plan
for mine action in Ukraine. 29
DDG has a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan. It ensures that all affected groups, including women and
children, are consulted during survey and community liaison activities. However, as at April 2020, only 10% of operational
roles were filled by women. With regard to managerial/supervisory positions, the Head of Programme and the Information
Management Officer are both women, and in early 2020 DDG promoted a woman deminer to a Team Leader position.30
The HALO Trust uses mixed gender non-technical survey and community liaison teams. HALO Trust began recruiting women
for clearance roles in 2017, employing the first female deminers in Ukraine.31 As at April 2020, 16% of operational survey and
clearance staff were women along with 24% of managerial/supervisory staff.32
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The MoD has organisational control of operations, while SESU
and STSS is generally responsible for conducting clearance.
SESU established a “Special Humanitarian Demining Centre”
in 2015 in Kiev. The centre’s remit includes coordination of SESU
pyrotechnical teams (akin to rapid-response explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD) teams) involved in technical and non-technical
survey, demining, internal quality control (QC) of SESU units,
information management, and handover of land cleared by SESU
to local authorities, as well as risk education.15

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
There are two functioning IMSMA databases in Ukraine, one
managed by SESU and the other by the MoD, both of which
collect and analyse contamination and land release data from
national operators and NGOs.33 The databases are, though,
claimed to be complementary, as they are separated based
on region, thematic area, and operational purpose.34 In 2019,
the GICHD facilitated the transition of the databases to IMSMA
Core.35 The GICHD and OSCE PCU facilitated the first regional
IMSMA Core Implementation workshop in Kyiv in September
2019.36 As at July 2020, in order to ensure the two databases
are compatible, the GICHD was working with SESU and the
MoD on a minimum data standard. Once the amendments
to the Law are adopted, the databases will be coordinated
by the NMAA’s secretariat (the ministry of the chairman of
the NMAA).37 The NMAA will be supported by OSCE through
equipment and training to combine the data from the two
databases and will be responsible for the official reporting on
the survey and clearance of landmines, CMR, and other ERW.38

An online map of explosive contamination has been published
by the MoD with technical support from The HALO Trust,
using data from DDG, Swiss Foundation for Mine Action
(FSD), The HALO Trust, and a commercial company, Demining
Solutions.39 Operators submit survey and clearance data
to the MoD on a monthly basis and each submitted a report
at the end of 2019 on all survey and clearance data for the
year.40 Despite all the capacity development support that
Ukraine has received on information management the
quality of official reporting remains poor. The lack of an
operationalised mine action law has left Ukraine in a legal
vacuum which makes it very difficult to obtain information
on operational capacities and outputs. It is hoped that this
will change once the amendments to the mine action law
have been adopted. 41

PLANNING AND TASKING
Ukraine does not have a national mine action strategy and, as at May 2020, there were no plans to develop one.42 Ukraine
submitted its “Annual Action Plan for humanitarian demining in liberated areas in Donetsk and Luhansk” for 2019 in May
of that year, as requested by the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC.43
There are currently no standardised criteria at national level for task prioritisation.44 Until an NMAC is established, all tasking
of operators is managed by the MoD in line with its annual action plan.45 Local government have been helping the MoD to
prioritise tasks based on humanitarian criteria.46 The MoD approves annual survey and clearance work plans submitted by
operators. Operators prioritise clearance according to humanitarian impact and in discussion with the local community.47

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
NMAS were finalised by the MoD in September 2018 after multi-year input and review from key stakeholders.48 The NMAS were
published in April 2019, but will only become compulsory once the new mine action legislation is passed; until then, they are
not applied.49 In addition, The HALO Trust reported that the NMAS will require further development as many of the terms and
definitions are not in line with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).50
In April 2019, the Cabinet of Ministers approved Resolution 372 on “Regulations on marking mine and ERW hazards”, which are
said to follow the provisions in the IMAS.51 The lack of an NMAC also means that operators’ SOPs are not currently accredited.
Operators are therefore working in line with IMAS and donor contractual obligations rather than NMAS.52

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The MoD and several other ministries continue to deploy units that undertake clearance and destruction of mines and ERW.
This includes engineer-sapper units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine; the National Guard of Ukraine; the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, which conducts clearance through SESU and also has an engineering department that conducts EOD; the Security
Service; the State Special Transport Service, which is responsible for demining national infrastructure; and the State Border
Service, which conducts demining in areas under its control on land and in the sea.53 In its 2020 extension request, Ukraine
reported that 60 “local administrations” are involved annually in demining in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.54
Three international demining organisations—DDG, FSD, and The HALO Trust—are operating in Ukraine.55 FSD suspended
demining operations in 2019 due to lack of funding, though they have been actively looking for opportunities to continue
their programme.56 In addition, the Ukrainian organisations Demining Team of Ukraine and Demining Solutions are active
in demining in the east of the country.57 In its 2020 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request, Ukraine reported that 41
demining “groups” with a total of more than 500 people were involved in mine action from these organisations.58
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Manual
teams

Total
deminers*

Dogs and
handlers

Machines**

HALO

23

276

0

3

Increased from 2018 by 7 manual demining
teams (91 staff) and 2 mechanical support teams
(remotely controlled vegetation cutters – 10 staff)

DDG

2

23

0

0

No change from 2018.

Demining Solutions

1

7

0

0

26

306

0

3

Operator

Totals

Comments

* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.

In 2019, the HALO Trust also deployed 12 non-technical survey personnel across 3 teams and 12 technical survey personnel
across 2 teams. DDG did not deploy any survey personnel in 2019. The HALO Trust increased its clearance capacity in 2019
compared to the previous year thanks to increased funding and intended to maintain that capacity in 2020 while increasing the
number of technical survey teams to three.60 All DDG’s deminers are trained to conduct technical survey and will do so “as and
when required”. DDG also has three non-technical survey teams totalling six people who conduct non-technical survey during
the winter stand-down. DDG was due to increase its clearance capacity in 2020 to five teams totalling 34 deminers, also the
result of increased funding.61
Another step forward in 2019 saw the MoD establish QC inspection teams. They began conducting post-clearance inspection
visits, which enabled official handover of land to take place for the first time.62

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
HALO Trust cleared more than 68,000m2 of CMR-contaminated area in 2019. Neither the HALO Trust nor DDG conducted any
survey of CMR-contaminated areas in 2019 (or in 2018).
DDG did not conduct any clearance of CMR contamination areas in 2019 nor 2018 but cleared 445,009m2 of area that was
suspected to contain anti-vehicle mines and UXO, destroying nine anti-vehicle mines and three items of UXO.63
The HALO Trust cleared 68,230m2 of CMR-contaminated area in the village of Svatove in Svativskyi district and found and
destroyed four submunitions. HALO Trust also destroyed one submunition during a spot task.64 This is an increase from the
49,010m2 HALO cleared in 2018, along with the destruction of two submunitions.65
Table 2: CMR clearance in 201966
District/Village

Operator

Svativskyi/Svatove

HALO Trust

Totals

Area cleared (m²)

Submunitions destroyed

UXO destroyed

68,230

4

103

68,230

4

103

UXO = Unexploded ordnance excluding submunitions

No target date has been set for the completion of CMR clearance in Ukraine. Although it is understood that, in addition to
clearance conducted by operators, some clearance of CMR contamination has been undertaken by the MoD the extent is
unclear as that information has not been made available by the national authorities.67
Access to CMR contamination is a problem in certain areas either because of security concerns or because of their proximity to
active military sites.68 In addition, Ukraine has not had full control over parts of its territory with suspected CMR contamination
since conflict erupted in 2014.
Russia has obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR as soon as possible, in particular by virtue of
its duty to protect the right to life of every person under its jurisdiction, in any areas of Ukraine over which it exercises
effective control.
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KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Vietnam is currently in an important period for increased attention towards mine action, as the national programme develops
its legal framework, structure, policies, and standards. With the adoption of a new national mine action decree in 2019,
followed up with a more detailed Guiding Circular in February 2020, the Vietnam National Mine Action Centre (VNMAC) has now
been officially empowered to start coordinating humanitarian mine action in Vietnam. Progress has already started towards
establishing a fully functioning national information management database, and national quality management (QM) capacity,
and there were plans to update national mine action standards in 2020 to bring them more in line with the international mine
action standards (IMAS).

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Vietnam should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.

■

Despite not yet being a State Party to the CCM, Vietnam has obligations under international human rights law
to clear cluster munition remnants (CMR) in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

In collaboration with implementing partners, VNMAC should elaborate a new national mine action strategy
and annual workplans for CMR, with clear targets for survey and clearance.

■

VNMAC should expand non-technical and technical survey and establish a nationwide baseline of CMR
contamination.

■

National Technical Regulations (QCVNs) and National Mine Action Standards (TCVNs) should be updated in line
with IMAS.

■

VNMAC should accelerate development of a fully functional national information management database and
make Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) data available to all clearance operators and
relevant stakeholders.

■

VNMAC should publish comprehensive annual reports on the results of survey and clearance by all operators.

■

VNMAC should more actively engage in regional sector discussions aimed at accelerating the progress of CMR
survey, particularly on survey efficiencies and effectiveness.

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
Vietnam is massively contaminated by CMR but no accurate estimate exists, even to the nearest hundred square kilometres.
An explosive remnants of war (ERW) impact survey, started in 2004 and completed in 2014, was only published in 2018. It said
that 61,308km2 or 19% of Vietnam’s land surface area was affected by ERW, but did not specify the area affected by CMR. It
found, though, that CMR affected 32 of Vietnam’s 63 provinces and cities.1
In Quang Tri, reputedly Vietnam’s most contaminated province, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) is carrying out a province-wide
survey. 2 Estimates of CMR-contaminated area are increasing sharply as survey progresses. As at May 2020, NPA had
completed non-technical survey of all villages (76% of the total number of villages) made available for non-technical survey
in Quang Tri province; and technical survey by NPA had confirmed 429km2 (or 9% of the total area of Quang Tri province) as
contaminated by CMR. It planned to complete technical survey of the remaining villages by April 2021.3
In Quang Binh province, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has used a desk-top non-technical survey methodology – Evidence
Point Polygon (EPP) mapping – to map initial confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs). The EPP technique, pioneered by MAG,
uses historical and ongoing operational data from GPS-recorded explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks involving
submunitions to plot what are termed Initial CHAs (iCHAs). Based on extrapolations of available data, as at June 2019, MAG
estimated that its historical data would lead to more than 42km² being defined as contaminated. However, because MAG’s data
does not cover the whole province, overall contamination levels for Quang Binh will be higher than those being defined through
EPP mapping. From April 2019, MAG deployed one technical survey team in Quang Binh province to complement EPP mapping
data and to define CHAs for clearance and survey the areas in between adjacent iCHAs, to merge them into one larger CHA.4
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In Thua Thien Hue province, in collaboration with VNMAC and the provincial authorities, NPA has been implementing CMRS
in four districts. Initial technical survey to-date has shown that at least 45km2 is contaminated by CMR in the western district
of A Luoi. EOD and non-technical survey operations by NPA in the province have located potential hazardous areas that need
technical operations to further define the contamination.5
The United States (US) dropped 413,130 tons of submunitions over Vietnam between 1965 and 1973, reportedly striking
55 provinces and cities. Vietnam’s Military Engineering Command has recorded finding 15 types of US-made submunitions.
Most submunition types were air-dropped, but artillery-delivered submunitions were also used in central Quang Binh and
provinces to the south.6 Most of the CMR that international operators encounter in Quang Tri are BLU types 26, 29, and 61,
and occasionally Mk 20 Rockeyes,7 as well as BLU 63 in Quang Binh province.8 In Quang Nam, almost all the CMR cleared by
Danish Demining Group (DDG) were M83 submunitions.9 The Military Engineering Command encountered substantial amounts
of cluster munitions abandoned by the US military, notably at or around old US air bases, including eight underground bunkers
found in 2009, one reportedly covering 4,000m2 and containing some 25 tons of munitions.10

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Vietnam has huge unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination and an unquantified mine problem (see Mine Action Review’s
Clearing the Mines 2020 report on Vietnam for further information). The ERW impact survey identified the most heavily
contaminated regions as the central coastal provinces, the Central Highlands, the Mekong River delta, and the Red River delta.11
The experience of international operators in central Vietnam points to wide variations in contamination types from district to
district. International operators report encountering mainly projectiles, mortars, grenades, and some aircraft bombs.12

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
The Vietnam National Mine Action Centre (VNMAC) was
established in 2014 by Prime Ministerial decision (No. 738
of 2013) to strengthen the direction of mine action and
provide a focal point for mine action operations,13 although
management and operations continued to depend largely
on the Armed Forces.
In a positive development, Vietnam’s mine action programme
is now undergoing significant restructuring, following the
Decree on the Management and Implementation of Mine
Action Activities, issued in February 2019 (Decree No. 18)
and subsequent approval of a Guiding Circular which came
into effect in February 2020 (Guiding Circular No. 195).14
Under Decree No. 18, while the Ministry of National Defence
(MoD) will continue to elaborate and preside over the
national mine action programme, as the lead authority, in
coordination with other relevant ministries and sectors,15
VNMAC will, under the direction of the Prime Minister and
management of the MoD, “monitor, coordinate and implement
mine action tasks”.16 Guiding Circular No. 195, which details
a number of articles and methods regarding implementation
of the Decree, also officially appoints VNMAC as the national
coordinator of mine action activities in Vietnam.17 Therefore,
this is an important period for VNMAC, as the national
programme develops its legal framework, structure, policies,
and standards.
While there is still a need for greater transparency from
VNMAC, international mine action organisations reported that
their coordination and collaboration with VNMAC improved
throughout 2019, most notably with VNMAC’s engagement
with the Landmine Working Group (LWG). The LWG, which
is co-chaired by NPA and the International Centre (IC), is
a platform for humanitarian mine action stakeholders in
Vietnam to meet quarterly to share and discuss updates that
impact the sector, although in 2019 the LWC only met twice
and in 2020 as at June, no LWC had yet taken place. In 2019,
VNMAC participated and engaged in this forum, specifically
calling on LWG members to help it develop Decree No. 18 and
Guiding Circular No. 195.18 During 2020, the LWG was due to
be involved in the planned update to the national regulations
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and standards. International operators hope that VNMAC will
use the LWG forum for collective discussions on continued
improvements in coordination and collaboration of mine
action in Vietnam.19
In addition, VNMAC’s coordination and collaboration with
the already well-established Quang Tri Mine Action Centre
(QTMAC) is also starting to develop, and the respective
provincial and national database units are both working to
synchronise historical data. VNMAC now produces an annual
mine action calendar covering the work and activities of all
international mine action organisations, and in 2019 VNMAC
initiated a biannual operations report covering the activities
and results of all international NGOs in Vietnam. 20
MAG, NPA, PeaceTrees Vietnam (PTVT), the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), and Golden West all
provide capacity development support in Vietnam.
MAG and NPA facilitated and hosted familiarisation visits by
VNMAC to their offices and task sites, to study operations,
information management, and quality management (QM). 21
In Quang Tri province, MAG and NPA continued to support
QTMAC and in particular, provided inputs to establish
Vietnam’s first provincial mine action centre, to enhance
its managing and coordinating role, finalise clearance
prioritisation forms and processes, and they also facilitated
visits to field operations for piloting the process. Various
capacity development initiatives were conducted or
provided for QTMAC staff, including sharing state-of-the art
technologies in the sector like the use of ArcGIS Online and
drones for data collection an operations management. 22
During 2019, MAG also worked with the provincial authorities
and the military in Quang Binh province to coordinate
operations, and supported the development of a provincial
Mine Action Strategy. A joint proposal between MAG,
NPA, and PTVN was signed and approved in May 2020,
and includes survey, clearance, EOD, risk education and a
capacity development component regarding establishing a
provincial coordination committee and mine action database
in Quang Binh province. Operations commenced in June. 23

STATES NOT PARTY

In addition, as part of the UK Department for International
Development (DFID)’s global mine action programme (GMAP)
II project in 2019, led by MAG, NPA has the responsibility to
train four members of the VNMAC’s Consultancy, Survey and
Quality Management Centre to become the first national QM
team. The training was completed at the end of March 2020
and the VNMAC personnel will be certified as QA officers,
with additional training and mentoring provided during
2020. 25 MAG believes that coordination and collaboration with
VNMAC has been strengthened as a result of this project. 26
PTVT undertakes joint efforts to support and help enhance
the management and coordination of QTMAC and VNMAC. In
partnership with Golden West, PTVT hosts field mentoring visits
of VNMAC and visits and trips of QTMAC and VNMAC to enable
them to study operations, information management, and QM.27

VNMAC, the Korea International Cooperation Agency
(KOICA), and UNDP are collaborating on a US$30 million
project for ERW survey and clearance (KV-MAP), and to
support information management resources, risk education,
and victim assistance in two central provinces (Binh Dinh
and Quang Binh) for three years (2018–20). A Joint Project
Management Unit (JPMU), with representatives from
each of the three organisations, is responsible for project
management, supported by a UNDP chief technical adviser
who joined in March 2018, and meets weekly. 28 A Joint Project
Coordination Committee (JPCC), comprising representatives
from the MoD, VNMAC, UNDP, and KOICA, provides overall
strategic guidance and oversight and meets twice a year. 29
Golden West is providing IMAS-compliant EOD training
to Provincial Military Commands in Ha Tinh, Quang Binh,
and Quang Tri provinces to provide a sustained clearance
response, as well as advising VNMAC on technologies and
training and supporting US military-to-military EOD training.
Vietnam was serving as chair of ASEAN and of the ASEAN
Regional Mine Action Center (ARMAC) in 2020.30 Vietnam is
also a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) for 2020–2021.
There is a well-established process for granting work
permits and visas to international mine action staff and for
procurement of demining equipment, although the importation
of equipment can be lengthy, depending on the nature of the
items.31 The memorandum of understanding (MoU) approval
process was reported to be inconsistent between provinces.32
However, it is hoped with the adoption of Decree No. 18 and of
Guiding Circular No. 195, processes that enable effective mine
action at a central level will improve.33

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
As at June 2020, Vietnam had not provided information
on whether it has a gender policy and implementation plan
for mine action or on the proportion of female employees
at VNMAC.
DDG has a gender policy and implementation plan and
promotes equal access to employment opportunities. DDG
used community meetings, focus group discussions, and
household interviews to ensure that consultation with local
people during survey activities is inclusive. Survey teams
were for the most part made up of both men and women.34
Of the three operators, DDG had the highest proportion of
women employed,35 but ceased operations in Vietnam in
January 2020 due to lack of funding.36
MAG has a gender policy, which is also incorporated into
other policies and procedures. It encourages diversity and
inclusion within its recruitment, training, and promotion
procedures, ensuring equal opportunities for all staff.37 As
at June 2020, MAG was employing 727 staff in Vietnam.
Women account for 25% of MAG’s total operational capacity in
Vietnam and 22% of managerial/supervisory level positions.38
MAG’s community liaison teams are gender balanced and
trained to involve all groups, including women and children.39

NPA follows Vietnamese law in regards to providing equal
opportunity and non-discrimination in employment. NPA
continues to work towards gender equality in the recruitment
process and in the work place. Women are actively
encouraged to apply for roles and to pursue development
opportunities once employed.40 NPA employs a total of 278
staff in Vietnam, of whom 29% are female, including 22% of
operational staff and 26% of management-level positions.41
NPA’s non-technical survey teams are gender balanced to
engage with affected populations regardless of gender or
age. NPA has found this inclusive process effective for later
technical survey within the Cluster Munition Remnant Survey
(CMRS) process.42
PTVN had gender policies in place and encourages diversity
and inclusion within its recruitment, training, and procedures
for promotion, ensuring equal opportunities for all staff. It has
127 staff in Vietnam, 23 of whom are women, including 39% of
management-level positions and 15% of operational staff. PTVN
also has six ethnic minority staff in its operational teams.43
MAG’s, NPA’s and DDG’s operations data are disaggregated
by sex and age.44
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NPA is implementing three capacity-development
projects with VNMAC. The first project provides an
NPA Senior Technical Advisor who works with VNMAC
senior management on issues related to their strategic,
organisational, and individual development as well as on
donor liaison and resource mobilisation. The second involves
the provision of an NPA Information Management Technical
Advisor to VNMAC, to assist VNMAC in its establishment
of a national information management system, including
mentoring of VNMAC’s Information Management Unit,
which runs the national database. Lastly, NPA provides
a Capacity Development Advisor who supports QTMAC
management in coordination between all mine action actors
in accordance with the QTMAC policy, as well as supporting
operational planning/prioritisation and policy and procedural
development. 24 The NPA-VNMAC technical survey project is
an evolving process to formulate a technical survey standing
operating procedure (SOP) for Vietnam.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Data quality and accessibility continues to be a major
challenge in Vietnam. VNMAC is responsible for national
information management and uses the IMSMA. However,
information is not currently shared with mine action
operators.45 The ERW impact survey report released in 2018
noted that “regulations on reporting demining activities
have not been strictly followed”. Authorities had, however,
received clearance data for Ha Tinh and Quang Tri provinces,
where international donors have supported operations.46
VNMAC also receives data from the 2018–20 joint KV-MAP
project, between VNMAC, KOICA, and UNDP in Binh Dinh
and Quang Binh provinces.47

At the provincial level, during 2019, QTMAC, MAG, NPA, and
PTVN hosted a number of visits by VNMAC to share experience
in project management, including information management
and operational databases. In Quang Tri province, the
QTMAC database unit has been running well and is able to
autonomously collect, collate, analyse, and task operators
based on information shared by all mine action stakeholders in
the province (domestic and international, civilian and military.
Access to the Quang Tri IMSMA database is free and accessible
to all mine action stakeholders (online website) while ensuring
data protection.51 The database provides a basis for planning
and tasking, as well as victim data.

However, deficiencies in national-level information
management are now starting to be addressed by VNMAC,
made possible by Decree No. 18 and Guiding Circular No.
195, which makes clear that VNMAC is responsible for the
management and development of the national mine action
database. The Director General of VNMAC is responsible for
regulating the scope, content, and nature of mine action data
that is allowed to be shared and accessed by the information
users. As at April 2020, VNMAC was in the process of
determining how information management will be collected
nationally and shared.48

Data hosted at QTMAC’s DBU are believed to be accurate,
up to date, and reliable, have been the catalyst for greater
coordination across all stakeholders within the province.52

A number of data collection forms are used in Vietnam by
different mine action actors. However, following the adoption
of Guiding Circular No. 195, it is expected that national
regulations and standards will be updated to allow for the
approval of one set of standardised data collection forms
across Vietnam.49
NPA is working with VNMAC at the national level to establish
information management units (IMUs) to collect and collate
information from across Vietnam and give transparent
access to available data. Throughout 2019, VNMAC’s IMU
worked to input historical data stored on other databases
and available data from the provinces; a process which was
expected to be completed in 2020.50

Development of information management is an aim of the
KV-MAP project, the goal of which is to improve available
information for the UXO/mine action sector to support
informed policy making and task prioritisation.53 In 2018,
Database Centers for Mine Action were established in
Quang Binh and Binh Dinh provinces with training provided
to provincial staff. As at June 2019, these centres manage
the data from the KV-MAP project which is then fed into the
VNMAC database. But the aim is for the KV-MAP DBU to
report to the provincial DBU to be established at the DOFA.54
In October 2019, MAG initiated a partnership with NPA and
PTVN, which includes support to the Quang Binh provincial
Department of Foreign Affairs to establish a central database
in the province, based on the Quang Tri database unit model.55
NPA planned to support the creation of the Thua Thien Hue
Department of Foreign Affairs database (DOFA) unit from
June 2020.56

PLANNING AND TASKING
VNMAC would benefit elaborating a national mine action
strategy and annual workplans for CMR, with clear targets
for survey and clearance. Vietnam does not yet have a
strategy specifically targeting CMR. Decision 504, approved
by the Prime Minister in April 2010, set out a National
Mine Action Plan for 2010–25. The plan aimed to “mobilize
domestic and international resources in making efforts to
minimize and finally create impact-free environment for social
economic development.” It called for clearance of 8,000km2
of ERW between 2016 and 2025.57
As at June 2020, no information had been formally provided
by VNMAC on the realisation of its 2019 goals or on its goals
for 2020.
As at June 2020, there was no national prioritisation system
for CMR clearance. However, in Quang Tri province, there is
a prioritisation plan in place and an effective system for task
allocation.58 The prioritisation processes and accompanying
forms were piloted in 2018 and were rolled out in May 2019,
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with QTMAC now managing the province-wide clearance task
prioritisation process.59 The criteria are established based on
consultation and agreement between QTMAC and operators.
The QTMAC tasks all mine action operators in the province
and annual workplans are approved by provincial authorities,
in cooperation and dialogue with operators.60
In Quang Binh province, there is no survey or clearance
tasking by national or provincial authorities.61 MAG has
first been applying its own procedures and process to
prioritise clearance tasks based on scores of consent,
hazard assessment, and community benefits.62 From the
adoption of the prioritisation process in Quang Tri, MAG
has been applying the same procedures and process in
Quang Binh in agreement with provincial authorities. This to
ensure consistent approach across provinces and to foster
standardisation.63 In Quang Binh, MAG produces its own task
dossiers to the same standard as those in Quang Tri. These
will be submitted once Quang Binh has a functioning mine
action coordination body.64
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In Thua Then Hue province, tasking for NGO operators is decided by provincial authorities in accordance to the provincial
socio-economic development plan.66

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Vietnam has both National Technical Regulations (QCVNs), which are legally binding and similar in content to standing
operating procedures SOPs, and National Mine Action Standards (TCVNs), which despite being standards are considered
optional by VNMAC and the MoD.67
The existing QCVNs and TCVNs are outdated and not in line with IMAS.68 According to NPA, the current QCVNs are drafted with
the MoD in mind and without consideration of other operators’ SOPs, equipment use, land release methods, or structure and
composition of teams. There are issues with the terminology used in TCVNs, chapters contradict themselves, and they read as
a combination of SOPs and standards.69 However, in a positive development, VNMAC plans to update the QCVNs and TCVNs in
2020 to bring them in line with IMAS.70 As part of this process, VNMAC will update the SOP on QM and the SOP on technical and
non-technical survey, and although consideration was given on whether to merge the QCVNs and TCVNs into one document,71
as at August 2020 the QCVNs were being updated separately.72 Work commenced in May 2020, with the aim to complete the
required updates by the end of the year, but it will likely take longer to elaborate and approve the new circulars needed.
Updates will reportedly be made in consultation with LWG members and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD).73

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
Most clearance in Vietnam is conducted by the Army
Engineering Corps and military-owned commercial
companies; coordination for which does not fall under the
remit of VNMAC (although Engineering Command teams are,
however, also deployed as part of the joint KV-MAP project).
Outside the central provinces, the current strength and
deployment of military-related demining is unknown.
Since 2016, the Golden West Humanitarian Foundation,
supported by US funding, has been training and mentoring
the Provincial Military Commands (PMC) EOD teams in
Quang Tri, Quang Binh and Ha Tihn. The Quang Tri PMC EOD
team is now fully integrated into the tasking structure of the
QTMAC as a valuable asset to the province. The Quang Binh
PMC are coordinating closely with the KOICA project and
offering support to them. Officials have previously reported
that it had 250 mine clearance and battle area clearance
(BAC) teams nationally. Vietnam reportedly has more than 70
military-owned companies undertaking clearance related to
infrastructure and commercial and development projects.74
International operators active in 2019 included DDG, working in
Quang Nam province; MAG, working in Quang Binh and Quang
Tri provinces; NPA, working in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Hue
provinces; and PeaceTrees Vietnam, who have been working
in Quang Tri province since 1995. DDG ceased operations in
Vietnam in January 2020, due to lack of funding.75
DDG deployed two non-technical survey teams in 2019,
totalling four personnel and two clearance teams, totalling
20 personnel. DDG only operated in Quang Nam province in
2019, as it was not able to secure funding for its operations
in Thua Tien Hue province. It subsequently ceased operations
in Vietnam in January 2020. 76

MAG deployed 39 clearance teams, totalling 390 deminers
in 2019, and 1 technical survey team, totalling 10 personnel
from April 2019. This represented an increase of five teams
compared to 2018.77 In 2019, MAG received permission from
the Vietnam People’s Army Department of Operations for the
deployment of drones to support its operations in designated
areas in Trieu Phong and Hai Lang districts, Quang Tri
province from May 2019. The permission is renewed every
three months with the Department of Operations.78
In 2019, NPA had 11 non-technical survey teams (10 pairs of
survey personnel in Quang Tri and 1 pair in Thua Tient Hue
province), totalling 22 survey personnel; 25 technical survey
teams totalling 125 personnel; and 3 manual clearance teams
totalling 36 deminers (26 in Quang Tri and 10 in Thua Thien
Hue province).79 NPA planned to start up non-technical and
technical survey operations in Quang Binh province in 2020.80
The operational data feedback loop and sharing of knowledge
between MAG and NPA as part of their partnership in Quang
Tri continues and will also be replicated in Quang Binh,81 once
NPA becomes operational there in 2020.
PTVN operates in Quang Tri province and most of its
operations are in the two mountainous districts of Huong Hoa
and Dakrong. It undertakes EOD, clearance, and integrated
risk education, but does not conduct CMRS. In 2019, PTVN
deployed 6 clearance teams (totalling 72 technicians/
deminers), 2 EOD teams (totalling 16 technicians), and 2
clearance support teams of 15 personnel. This represented
an almost doubling of capacity compared to 2018. All of
PTVN’s technicians are certified for IMAS EOD Level 1, and
under a capacity development partnership with Golden West,
by the end of 2019 PTVN had 11 technicians certified in IMAS
EOD Level 3 (plus 3 under mentoring) and 31 technicians
certified in IMAS EOD Level 2. PTVN’s capacity includes 2
pairs of surveyors, who focus on re-survey CHAs for the
purpose of planning and evaluation.82

mineactionreview.org 183

VIETNAM

To address the challenge of effective planning for mine action operations in Quang Binh, NPA in joint consortium with MAG,
PTVN, and PPC of Quang Binh is proposing a plan for CMRS of the whole province. The survey ambition, based largely on
non-technical and technical survey, works to delineate contaminated areas in all Quang Binh and aims to better understand
the nature and extent of contamination in the province, and help inform planning processes.65

PTVN also planned to commence operations in Quang Binh
province in 2020, together with MAG and NPA, with 4 multi-task
teams totalling 32 technicians. PTVN’s technicians will mostly
be responsible for EOD spot tasks resulting from the Quang
Binh hotline and from NPA’s survey, along with joint efforts
with MAG to conduct clearance of CHAs generated.83

teams have also been deployed to Quang Binh. According
to VNMAC data provided by UNDP, capacity in 2019 was
21 survey teams and 64 clearance teams. Technical survey
operations were completed in April 2020 and the project
then focused more on clearance, with 85 clearance teams
deployed for ERW clearance (including CMR).86

KV-MAP (between VNMAC, KOICA, and UNDP), which
was initiated in February 2018, calls for ERW survey and
clearance in the two provinces in 2018–20 to be carried out
by provincial military teams targeting survey of 200km2 and
clearance of about 80km2.84 In 2018, operations in Quang
Binh and Binh Dinh focused on survey, with 21 survey teams
deployed.85 Clearance began in 2019 and, as of June, 12
clearance teams were deployed. An additional two survey

In 2018, a Quality Management System (QMS) consisting of
eleven procedures was developed by VNMAC and the GICHD
and was piloted in KV-MAP.87 A new 2020 QM SOP was close
to being finalised as at the start of October, as part of the
revision of the QCVNs.88 As mentioned previously, under a
DFID funded project, NPA was helping to establish and train a
VNMAC QM team, with a view to receiving accreditation in the
first half of 2020 from VNMAC, with NPA and GICHD support.89

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
As at writing, national land release data from VNMAC for 2019 had still to be made available.
Based on data reported by international NGOs, in 2019, nearly 157km2 was confirmed as containing CMR by technical survey
and 6,352 submunitions were found and destroyed in the process.
A total of nearly 39km2 of CMR-contaminated area was cleared by international NGOs with 7,871 submunitions found and
destroyed. A further 1,050 submunitions were found and destroyed during spot tasks.

SURVEY IN 2019
In Quang Tri, ranked as one of Vietnam’s most heavily contaminated provinces, NPA continued to work in a partnership with
MAG, under which NPA conducted CMRS and MAG cleared the resulting CHAs. As part of the process of refining CMRS,
NPA continued to adopt a more systematic technical survey approach that included 50-metre fade-out and “skip boxes”
methodology which have significantly accelerated the process of defining CHA boundaries. A fade-out of 50 metres whenever
evidence of CMR was found was introduced in April 2016 which was augmented by the introduction, in January 2018, of
skipping two boxes in each direction of a box with a confirmed evidence point.90 NPA aimed to complete survey of Quang Tri
by April 2021.91
Table 1: Technical survey of CMR-contaminated area in 201992
Operator

Province

MAG

Quang Binh

NPA

Quang Tri

NPA

Thua Thien Hue

Totals

Area surveyed
(m²)

CHAs
identified

Area confirmed
(m2)

CMR
destroyed

Other UXO
destroyed

7,952,500

7

6,521,349

343

23

80,182,500

162

147,350,462

5,908

2,835

1,772,500

2

2,975,000

101

21

89,907,500

171

156,846,811

6,352

2,879

NPA confirmed 150.3km2 as containing CMR in 2019, an increase on the 113.4km2 confirmed as CHA the previous year, which it
said was due to an increased number of technical survey teams and the introduction of improved methodology for technical
survey (CMRS v5).93 The box-skipping methodology has significantly increased the accuracy, effectiveness, and efficiency of
survey and clearance in Quang Tri province.94
MAG surveyed 7,952,500m2 in Quang Binh, during which it found and destroyed 343 CMR and 23 other UXO.95

CLEARANCE IN 2019
Operators cleared over 38.5km2 in 2019, an increase of 46% on the 26.3km2 cleared in 2018, however, 2018 did not include PTVN
clearance data. Clearance data for the PMC in 2019 was not known, including how much CMR-contaminated area was cleared
in 2019 by provincial military teams coordinated by VNMAC as part of the KV-MAP ERW project.
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Operator

Province

Area cleared (m²)

Submunitions destroyed

Other UXO destroyed

MAG

Quang Binh

6,942,818

2,422

600

DDG

Quang Nam

88,990

23

19

MAG

Quang Tri

26,219,397

4,583

5,552

NPA

Quang Tri

1,813,572

487

680

PTVN

Quang Tri

3,156,776

198

664

PMC*

N/K

N/K

N/K

N/K

NPA

Thua Thien Hue

Totals

321,300

158

95

38,542,853

7,871

7,610

N/K = not known

A further 1,050 submunitions were found and destroyed
during EOD spot tasks in 2019: 5 by DDG, 466 by MAG,
151 by NPA, and 428 by PTVN.97
DDG deployed battle area clearance teams to areas with
suspected contamination as estimated by non-technical
survey teams. Clearance of the area then began from
evidence points collected by the non-technical survey
teams and clearance to fade-out was applied to determine
the boundaries of clearance.98
In Quang Tri, MAG conducts clearance in partnership with
NPA, which defines CHAs through technical survey. In Quang
Binh, MAG clears CHAs defined through EPP Mapping.
MAG’s total clearance of 33.16km2 in 2019 is a significant
increase on the 24.81km2 the previous year and is due to an
increase in clearance capacity from the beginning of 2019.
All CHAs cleared by MAG in 2019 were found to have CMR
contamination.99 MAG adjusted its methodology in 2019,
merging a number of CHAs close to each other into larger
CHAs in Quang Binh province.100
In 2018, Quang Tri PMC was in the process of being organised
into a functional EOD team so tasks were minimal, but
outputs are expected to increase in 2019. The Quang Binh
PMC did no clearance and responded to minimal spot tasks
in 2018. This was being addressed in 2019.101

Vietnam has not set a target date for the completion of
CMR clearance. In its national mine action plan for 2010 to
2025 it called for the clearance of 8,000km2 of ERW from
2016 to 2025102 but did not specify how much of this should
be CMR. The lack of a baseline of CMR contamination and
a lack of information at a national level about ongoing
survey and clearance across the country makes it difficult
to understand both Vietnam’s annual progress in reducing
CMR contamination and how this contributes to the
completion of CMR clearance.
In the past, the challenge for VNMAC was identifying
and implementing the legal framework that would allow
mine action stakeholders to support the decision-making
process,103 but addressing this should now be possible under
the Decree 85 and Guiding Circular 195. It is hoped that
their adoption will enable VNMAC to put in place systems
and practices to coordinate and strengthen mine action in
Vietnam, bringing national standards relating to survey and
clearance operations in line with IMAS, and establishing a
national information management database accessible to all
mine action stakeholders to more accurately determine the
extent of CMR contamination; and to set national priorities
for clearance.

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
Golden West is partnering with the GICHD in a Management of Residual Explosive Remnants of War project to study the
ERW ageing; develop standards for the collection, cutting, and dissection of ERW; and to draw up and pilot a long-term risk
management model.104
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YEMEN

CLEARING CLUSTER
MUNITION REMNANTS
2020

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
More than 3km2 of battle area were cleared in emergency clearance in 2019, along with the destruction of more than 7,000
unexploded submunitions. In April 2020, YEMAC opened a coordination centre in Aden intended to strengthen programme
management in areas controlled by the internationally recognised government.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

Yemen should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.

■

Yemen should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster munition remnants
(CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

Yemen Mine Action Centre (YEMAC) should expand support for international operators to accelerate training,
survey and clearance.

■

YEMAC should increase transparency by publishing regular, comprehensive reports on developments in its
management, planning, and implementation of mine action.

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION
YEMAC has reported the presence of CMR in six governorates but the extent is not known. Contamination is believed to be heavy
in Saada and al-Jawf governorates as well as in Amran, Hodeida, Mawit, and Sana’a governorates, including in Sana’a City.1
Yemen had CMR contamination before 2015 but the escalation of armed conflict since 26 March 2015 has significantly increased
both its extent and the threat to the civilian population, mainly as a result of airstrikes by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition.2 Human
Rights Watch said it had recorded Saudi air strikes using cluster munitions dating back to 2009.3 In December 2016, the organisation
reported that 18 coalition attacks using cluster munitions since 2015 had killed at least 18 civilians and injured 74 more.4
Human rights groups have documented the use of United States (US) BLU-63 (Sana’a City), BLU-97 combined effect
submunitions (Saada governorate), CBU-58 and CBU-105 sensor-fused munitions (Amran and Sana’a governorates), Brazilian
Astros ll munitions (Saada governorate and city), and British BL755 submunitions (Hajjah governorate). They have also
reported use of ZP-39 artillery-delivered submunitions of indeterminate origin.5
No air strikes using cluster munitions by the Saudi-led coalition have been recorded since May 2017.6 The coalition, however,
has continued air strikes into 2019, contributing to Yemen’s already significant contamination by explosive remnants of war
(ERW), including a wide range of rockets, mortars, and artillery shells.7 There is also a significant threat from anti-personnel and
anti-vehicle mines, including mines of an improvised nature (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report for details).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Management of mine action in Yemen is divided along the lines of the conflict that erupted in March 2015 between the Houthi
(Ansar Allah) movement controlling the capital Sana’a and much of the north and west, and the internationally recognised
government (IRG), operationally based in Aden and the south. The Sana’a-based inter-ministerial National Mine Action
Committee (NMAC), which previously formulated national mine action policy, is no longer recognised by the IRG, which
reported it had disbanded in 2019. In the south, YEMAC has fulfilled the double role of regulator responsible for policy and
planning while also serving as the sole national operator.8
YEMAC was established in Sana’a in January 1999 as a national mine action agency and nominally maintains a national role
today, with more than 1,000 staff working in 20 of Yemen’s 21 governorates as at late 2019.9 In practice, however, YEMAC has
split into two, centred round Sana’a and Aden. The Sana’a office employed around 500 staff, working in northern governorates
controlled by the Houthi forces. From Aden, YEMAC operated with some 550 staff mainly active in 2019 in Abyan, Aden, Amran,
Lahej, and Taiz governorates.10
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In April 2020, YEMAC opened a coordination centre in Aden
intended to strengthen programme management in areas
controlled by the IRG. The centre is intended to facilitate
cooperation with international organisations and will
have responsibility for accrediting them. It will also have
departments for planning, information management, and
quality assurance/quality control.11 The centre convened its
first coordination meeting on 9 April 2020, but is expected
to take up to 18 months to become fully operational as staff
undergo training.12
YEMAC is supported by Regional Executive Mine Action
Branches (REMABs) in Aden, set up in 1999; al-Mukalla
(Hadramout governorate), which opened in March 2004;
and Saada (April 2016).13 The extent to which they are still
operational is not clear. YEMAC also has an office in Mokha and
in 2019 opened offices in Taiz to support operations around
Hodeida and in Marib for operations in al-Jawf governorate.14
YEMAC said it had set up “skeleton” offices using its own
resources pending receipt of financial support for them from
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).15

UNDP provides technical and administrative support to
YEMAC through a project carried out by three international
and ten national staff working from a number of different
offices. The UN supported mine action in Yemen from 1999
to 2003 through a programme implemented by the UN Office
for Project Services (UNOPS). From 2003, the programme
came under full national management. UNDP deployed an
international adviser to YEMAC at the end of 2014 to support
planning and programme management. By the end of 2019,
its Sanaa office comprised two international staff, including
a chief technical adviser, and three national staff; in Aden it
had four international and two national staff. UNDP also had
national field staff in Hodaydah, Mokha and Mukalla.16
Yemen’s mine action is funded by international donors. UNDP
estimated Yemen’s annual funding needs at some US$16
million. At the end of 2019, total donor funding provided or
pledged amounted to $20.8 million up to the end of June
2021.17 Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s King Salman Fund agreed
with Dynasafe Middle East Project Management in 2018 to
finance a US$40 million demining project.18 The fund provided
a further US$30.5 million for the project for the year from
1 June 2019 to 30 May 202019 and in June 2020 said it would
fund the operation for a third year. 20

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Yemen made no reference to gender and diversity in the mine
action plans and priorities set out in its Anti-Personnel Mine
Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request
submitted in 2019.
UNDP reported placing emphasis on mainstreaming
gender principles into plans aiming for equal participation
as beneficiaries, employees, and decision-makers in mine
action. UNDP’s goals included ensuring survey information
is collected by organisations representing women and girls
as well as men and boys; that data are disaggregated by
gender and age; and that risk education materials address
the risks associated with all gender roles. 21

Among international operators, Danish Demining Group
(DDG) employed a female international as head of programme
and six women nationals among its 25 staff in 2019. Women
employees included a risk education/non-technical survey
officer and four risk education staff, three of whom were also
trained as surveyors. DDG also employed a woman medic. 23
Risk education is conducted separately for women, often
by women staff, to encourage women’s participation. DDG
has found that including women in non-technical survey/
community liaison activities is difficult as men often take the
lead in field activities and tend to overlook the participation
of women. 24

The extent to which YEMAC has embraced these ideas is
unclear. In 2019, it rejected a suggestion that women might
be included in training for demining teams. Employment of
women in mine action, however, faces significant obstacles,
in part due to their position as responsible for family care.
DDG was unable some women candidates for recruitment
in the face of resistance from family members. Women in
management positions often face bullying and disrespect
from male subordinates. 22

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
YEMAC with support from UNDP and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) was preparing a
major upgrade of its information management in 2020. YEMAC has operated an Information Management System for Mine
Action (IMSMA) database but its 2019 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request described it as “outdated” and “not usable”.25
The GICHD prepared to install IMSMA Core funded by the United States and UNDP, which added an information specialist to
its Aden staff in 2019, expecting a soft launch of the system in mid-2020. 26 In the meantime, UNDP also worked with YEMAC
on developing data collection forms. 27
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LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Yemen’s national mine action standards were based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) when they were drawn
up in 2007, predating most of Yemen’s CMR contamination. YEMAC has acknowledged that the standards were obsolete and
said standing operating procedures (SOPs) based on the standards were not consistently applied by its clearance personnel. 29
YEMAC was in contact with the GICHD on developing national standards and the new coordination centre, as one of its first
acts, started reviewing a draft of interim national standards.30

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
YEMAC is believed to have conducted most of the CMR clearance to date as the only operator working in Houthi-controlled
areas of Yemen, which are the main areas of CMR contamination. YEMAC also remained Yemen’s biggest operator, with the
number of personnel reportedly rising to more than 1,000 in 2019. They included around 500 staff in the north who were active
in Sana’a, the northern-most governorate of Saada, bordering Saudi Arabia, and northern districts of Almran governorate.31
SafeLane/Dynasafe, the only international organisation conducting clearance in 2019, with funding of US$40 million from Saudi
Arabia’s government through the King Salman Relief and Rehabilitation Fund, reported employing 19 internationals in 2019
along with some 304 national staff, mainly seconded from YEMAC.32 It expected the number of personnel to rise to around 400
in the course of 2019 and reported operating 32 multi-task teams working on the west coast and in Lahej, Marib, and Shabwah
governorates.33 SafeLane’s operating results are not recorded in YEMAC’s database and it did not respond to Mine Action
Review’s request for information.

DEMINER SAFETY
Yemen’s mine action programme personnel have sustained heavy casualties in the past two years from landmines and
improvised explosive devices. Casualties attributable to CMR are, however, not known.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
Operating in a context of continuing conflict, YEMAC gives priority to delivering an emergency response to mitigate the threat
to civilians posed by all forms of explosive hazard rather than focusing on specific devices or large area clearance.
YEMAC reportedly cleared a total area of 3,115,830m2 of mine- and ERW-affected area, including CMR-contaminated area, in
2019. In the process it destroyed 7,071 unexploded submunitions, compared with 79 reported destroyed the previous year.34
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PLANNING AND TASKING
Yemen does not have a current strategic plan or annual work plans for tackling mines, CMR, or ERW. Mine action in 2019 and
2020 continued to be conducted on an emergency basis. Yemen’s recent conflicts “have changed the extent and complexity of
contamination dramatically and in many cases, YEMAC is neither trained nor equipped to deal.”28

1

Interviews with Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, 17 February 2016; and Stephen
Bryant, Chief Technical Adviser, United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), in Geneva, 6 February 2017.

15

APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form D.

16

UNDP, “Emergency Mine Action Project, Annual Progress Report 2019”,
20 January 2020, p. 9; and interview with Stephen Robinson, UNDP, in
Geneva, 20 July 2020.

2

UNDP, Grant Progress Report for 1 October–31 December 2015,
25 January 2016.

17

3

Human Rights Watch, “Yemen: Cluster munitions harm civilians”,
31 May 2015, at: bit.ly/32sdP0x.

Ibid., p. 27; UNDP, Phase V, “Emergency Mine Action Project”, Project
Document, p. 1.

18

4

Human Rights Watch, “Brazil-made cluster munitions wound children”,
23 December 2016, at: bit.ly/32ub4vE.

Email from Chris Clark, Global Operations Director, Dynasafe MineTech,
6 August 2018.

19

5

Ibid.; Human Rights Watch, “Yemen: Cluster munitions harm civilians”,
31 May 2015; Amnesty International, “Yemen: children among civilians
killed and maimed in cluster bomb ‘minefields’”, 23 May 2016; and Legal
Centre for Rights and Development, Sana’a, “The bombing of civilians
and residential neighbourhoods with international forbidden weapons
(cluster munitions)”, undated but 2018.

“Report of the Assistance Provided by the King Salman Humanitarian Aid
and Relief Center to the Republic of Yemen”, undated but 2020, p. 89.

20

SafeLane Global, Press release, 3 June 2020.

21

UNDP, “Emergency Mine Action Project, Annual Progress Report 2019”,
20 January 2020, p. 21.

22

Email from Marie-Josée Hamel, Regional Programme Advisor – Middle
East, DDG, 16 April 2020.

6

Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “The situation of
human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September
2014”, UN doc. A/HRC/36/33, 5 September 2017, p. 9.

23

Ibid.

24

Ibid.

See, e.g., Briefing to the United Nations (UN) Security Council by Mark
Lowcock, UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, New York, 15 April 2019.

25

2019 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.

8

Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 Report (covering
2018), Form A.

26

Email from Stephen Robinson, UNDP, 27 May 2020.

27

9

UNDP, “Emergency Mine Action Project, Annual Progress Report 2019”,
20 January 2020, pp. 7, 14.

UNDP, “Emergency Mine Action Project, Annual Progress Report 2019”,
20 January 2020, p. 12.

28

Ibid., p. 21.

10

Interview with Ameen Saleh Alaqili, Director, YEMAC, in Geneva,
13 February 2020.

29

Ibid., p. 17; and 2019 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.

30

Email from Stephen Robinson, UNDP, 27 May 2020.

11

UNDP, “Emergency Mine Action Project, Annual Progress Report 2019”,
20 January 2020, p. 12.

31

12

Email from Stephen Robinson, Senior Technical Adviser, UNDP,
27 May 2020.

Interview with Ameen Saleh Alaqili, YEMAC, in Geneva, 13 February 2020;
UNDP, “Emergency Mine Action Project, Annual Progress Report 2019”,
20 January 2020, p. 28.

32

Email from Chris Clark, SafeLane Global, 17 April 2019.

13

Email from Stephen Bryant, Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP, 22 July 2018.

33

Information from SafeLane Global website, accessed at bit.ly/2Xcc8mp.

14

2019 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 5 and 22; and email
from Stephen Robinson, UNDP, 21 July 2020.

34

UNDP, “Emergency Mine Action Project, Annual Progress Report 2019”,
20 January 2020, p. 14.

7

190 Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2020

STATES PARTIES

COUNTRY

OTHER AREAS

mineactionreview.org 191

KOSOVO

CLEARING CLUSTER
MUNITION REMNANTS
2020

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

While formal accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) is not currently possible for Kosovo,
as it is not yet recognised as a state by the depository to the Convention, Kosovo should submit a letter to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) stating that it intends to fully comply, on a voluntary basis, with
the CCM.

■

This should include the submission of a voluntary Article 7 transparency report on an annual basis, as Kosovo
has proposed in its Mine Action Strategy 2019–2024.

■

The Kosovo Mine Action Centre (KMAC) should continue its efforts to ensure timely and efficient clearance of
cluster munition remnants (CMR), in line with the objectives in its latest mine action strategy and complete
clearance by the end of 2024.

■

KMAC should promote the implementation of its mine action strategy and mine action programme across the
Kosovo government.

■

KMAC and international mine action operators should increase their collaboration to seek additional funding
and greater financial stability for mine action.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
At the end of 2019, contamination from CMR in Kosovo was
estimated to cover a total of almost 14.36km2 across 45
areas, according to KMAC.1 This is a decrease compared to
the estimated 15.37km2 across 48 areas as at the end of 2018. 2
Kosovo has gained a reasonably accurate assessment of CMR
contamination remaining on its territory, as a result of two
decades of mine action activities, including surveys in 2013
and 2015. The location of most of the contamination is well
known across Kosovo’s seven districts, with the exception of
the northern district of Mitrovica, where operator Norwegian
People’s Aid (NPA) was in the process of conducting technical
survey of all tasks to convert suspected hazardous areas
(SHAs) to confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) based on
evidence points, to help determine a more accurate and
evidence-based estimation of remaining CMR contamination
in this region.3 NPA expected technical survey in Mitrovica
will result in previously unrecorded CMR-contaminated areas
being added to the mine action database.4
The HALO Trust believes Kosovo’s current baseline reflects
a relatively accurate picture of the remaining contamination,
but suggests that it would benefit from a critical review and
further assessment of the existing 2013 survey data. This
would inform future targeting of survey and clearance of
remaining contamination, in order to achieve completion
by the target date of 2024.5 HALO also believes that access
to NATO bombing data is critical to the sector as a means
of verifying clearance, without the requirement for costly,
extensive re-survey, but has experienced challenges in
obtaining it.6
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Contamination is primarily a result of conflict between
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) in the late 1990s; and between the
FRY and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in
1999.7 During Operation Allied Force, NATO aircraft bombed
333 locations between 24 March and 10 June 1999, dropping
1,392 bombs that released more than 295,700 submunitions.8
Forces of the FRY also used cluster munitions during
the 1998–99 conflict in Kosovo.9 The failure rate of the
submunitions was typically between 10% and 15%, resulting
in tens of thousands of unexploded submunitions lying on and
under the ground. A large clearance programme followed
in 1999 under a UN mandate, but this ended prematurely in
2001, leaving many CMR-contaminated areas still needing to
be cleared.10
In 2013, The HALO Trust and KMAC conducted a joint
non-technical survey of cluster munition strikes and
minefields across Kosovo, with the exception of four
municipalities in the north. The survey identified 130 CHAs:
51 cluster munition strikes, covering 7.63km2, and 79 mined
areas over 2.76km2.11 In 2015, NPA, in coordination with KMAC
and local municipality authorities, conducted non-technical
survey of the four northern municipalities.12 The NPA survey
confirmed 8.9km2 of CMR contamination in three of the
four municipalities surveyed (Leposavic, Zubin Potok, and
Zvecan). No CMR contamination was found in the fourth
(Mitrovica North).13 On the basis of available evidence, NPA
believed that 83 cluster bombs were dropped in this region,
dispersing a total of 17,041 submunitions.14 In 2020–21, NPA
was conducting technical survey of all CMR tasks in the
northern municipalities.15
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Kosovo is contaminated with anti-personnel mines (see Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on Kosovo
for further information). It also remains affected by explosive remnants of war (ERW) other than CMR.
Most ERW consists of unexploded aircraft bombs and items of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). However, explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) teams continue to encounter items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) dating back to World War II.16
Kosovo Protection Force (KFOR) and Kosovo Security Force (KSF) EOD teams regularly dispose of ERW in response to
information provided by the public and demining organisations.17

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
In January 2011, the EOD Coordination Management
Section became KMAC, responsible for managing survey
and clearance of mines and ERW throughout Kosovo.
KMAC prepares an annual work plan in cooperation with
international demining non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and coordinates their operations along with the
national demining teams of the KSF. It also coordinates
survey, quality assurance (QA), risk education, public
information, and victim assistance activities.18 KMAC’s role
and responsibilities as head of the national mine action
programme under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence
were established and institutionalised by Kosovo’s 2012
Law on Humanitarian Demining.19
In 2019, KMAC had five permanent staff: a Director, a Senior
QA Officer, a QA Inspector, a Mine Risk Education (MRE)
Officer, and a Public Information Officer. 20
Kosovo’s mine action programme is fully nationally owned,
with a strong, longstanding commitment from the national
government. The dedicated team of permanent national staff
have been employed by KMAC since its creation. This has
benefitted the programme with the retention of experience
and institutional memory. 21

NGO operators in Kosovo report having a constructive and
proactive working relationship with KMAC. HALO Trust staff
meet with the director of KMAC for monthly coordination
meetings, 22 and, in addition, KMAC’s QA officers visit HALO
Trust on a quarterly basis to discuss operations planning,
along with conducting unannounced weekly field visits
to tasks. 23
In 2019, the Kosovo government provided €990,000 in
financial support to KMAC and to the KSF for mine and CMR
clearance. 24 Kosovo’s current Mine Action Strategy 2019–24
sets out the objective of intensifying resource mobilisation
efforts in order to gain greater financial stability. 25 While
a specific resource mobilisation strategy does not exist,
operators reported that coordinated approaches with KMAC
were made to potential donors such as the United States
and the European Union. 26
Unfortunately, the misperception persists that mine, CMR,
and other ERW clearance in Kosovo was completed in
2001, whereas the reality is that significant contamination
remains. Kosovo remains a poor country and needs economic
assistance to help it complete clearance in a timely manner,
hopefully in less than five years if sufficient support is
provided. In 2019, KMAC identified funding and logistical
support as the two primary areas where it could most
benefit from assistance from international donors and
mine action operators. 27

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
Kosovo’s Mine Action Strategy 2019–24 reflects the
commitment of the mine action programme to ensure
that gender is taken into consideration in the planning,
implementation, and monitoring of all mine action projects,
with a view to promoting equality and quality. 28 The Strategy
stipulates that all mine action activities and assistance must
reflect the needs of different ages and gender in a targeted
and non-discriminatory manner, and that mine action
and community liaison data are also to be collected and
systematically disaggregated according to sex and age. 29
Both KMAC and KSF have gender policies in place. KMAC
reported that the KSF’s gender policy aims to facilitate
the consultation of all groups affected by mines and ERW,
expressly women and children. Within KMAC, one of its five
staff (the MRE Officer) is a woman. A total of 5% of KSF staff
employed in operational mine action roles were women, but
none is in a managerial or supervisory position.30

Kosovo’s mine action strategy recognises the barriers that
exist against equal employment in Kosovo society, including
significant differences in employment levels between men and
women, despite the number of men and women of working
age being broadly similar. The Strategy notes that, as at 2019,
more than four-fifths of women of working age were not
employed in Kosovo’s labour market, and less than one in
eight women of working age has been employed annually over
the past five years. The primary reasons given by women for
unemployment are child and family care obligations, which
traditionally fall on women in Kosovo society.
The Strategy notes the efforts of mine action operators to
overcome these challenges and barriers to employment, such
as through child care and parental leave, and gender-sensitive
recruitment practices that encourage women to apply for
positions traditionally seen as jobs for men. It further recalls
the importance of employment of not only multi-gender,
but also multi-ethnic survey and clearance teams and the
particular benefits of recruitment in areas affected by high
unemployment and poor socio-economic conditions.31
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In 2018, The HALO Trust developed a gender policy in
consultation with the Kosovo Women’s Network, an advocacy
network of more than 140 member organisations, including
women’s organisations of all ethnic backgrounds from
throughout Kosovo, which was adopted in February. The
policy aims both at increasing the recruitment of women,
as well as retention of existing female employees. In 2019,
HALO further developed this policy to include provision
for increased family leave and child-care allowances for
those taking care of children, in order to remove barriers
to women’s employment. Through the Dutch Government,
HALO Trust contracted the Gender and Mine Action
Programme (GMAP, a part of the Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining, GICHD) to conduct
gender sensitivity and leadership training in July 2019
to more than 20 managers in the Kosovo programme, to
address issues of unconscious bias and inclusion.32
In HALO Trust’s Kosovo programme, 17% of employees
are women, including in 14% of operational roles in survey
and clearance teams, although there were no women in
operational management positions in 2019. HALO also
ensures that community liaison teams are gender balanced
and include senior personnel fluent in relevant languages,
to ensure that community liaison activities are inclusive for
ethnic or minority groups.33
Although HALO Trust is committed to increasing the number
of women in the organisation generally and specifically
in management roles, without recruitment or expansion
opportunities, this has proved difficult. In May 2019,
however, HALO trained and promoted four women to operate
Handheld Stand-off Mine Detection System (HSTAMIDS)

detectors – a first for the programme. In 2020, HALO was
planning to train and promote Assistant Team Leaders, and
sees this as an opportunity to increase the representation
of women in operational management.34 Relevant mine
action data are disaggregated by gender and age, and data
collected post-clearance is also disaggregated to ensure the
understanding and analysis of impact of mine action activities
takes gender into consideration.35
NPA reported that a target of 25% female staff was in place,
and in 2019, 21% of its staff were women, including one
of four team leaders, two of six medics, and one of four
staff in the management team. The proportion of women
had subsequently increased to 27% by September 2020,
with more women in management positions. Women were
especially encouraged to apply for staff positions, and
given priority over male applicants with equivalent skills
and experience. NPA confirmed its survey and community
liaison teams were gender balanced and ensured that the
participation of all relevant social groups is always taken into
account when conducting activities in local communities.36
NPA’s efforts to recruit and train multi-ethnic survey and
clearance teams was also been a critical factor in allowing
the deployment of teams in areas of particular ethnic and
political sensitivities, extending the reach of mine action
operations in north Kosovo, while also building bridges
and friendships between the individual staff members and
through their community liaison activities.37
According to KMAC, Kosovo’s baseline of CMR contamination
has been established through inclusive consultation with
women, girls, boys, and men, including, where relevant, from
minority groups.38

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
KMAC uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation version for its national mine action
database. Data are disaggregated between mines, CMR, and other ERW.39 Operators were positive in their assessments of
the quality and accessibility of data contained in the database and of KMAC’s information management systems in general.
Operators report to KMAC on a weekly basis.40 However, there continued to be discrepancies between land release data
reported to Mine Action Review by clearance operators, compared to data reported by KMAC.
According to its most recent mine action strategy, KMAC intended, as a means to show its commitment to the CCM, to submit
voluntary Article 7 transparency reports on an annual basis.41 In disappointing news, KMAC subsequently advised Mine Action
Review that Kosovo would only start submitting Article 7 reports when it becomes a member of the UN.42

PLANNING AND TASKING
The GICHD supported the development of Kosovo’s new Mine
Action Strategy for 2019–24. The strategy, formally approved
in January 2019 and launched by the Ministry of Kosovo
Security Services on 4 April 2019, has three goals:
■
■
■

Mine/ERW threats managed and reduced
Communication and awareness raising
Management of residual contamination.

The strategy declares that all known mined and
CMR-contaminated areas will be addressed by the end of
2024, leaving only residual contamination to be managed
accordingly. It contains annual projections for CMR
clearance, including:
■
■
■
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all high-priority CMR tasks (four as at October 2018) will
be cleared by 2020;
all medium-priority CMR tasks (thirty as at October 2018)
will be cleared by 2022; and
all low-priority CMR tasks (sixteen as at October 2018)
will be completed by 2024.43

OTHER AREAS

of The HALO Trust.48 The mine action strategy for 2019–24
is in alignment with the objectives of Kosovo’s National
Development Strategy 2016–2021. 49

The strategy states it is based on a number of assumptions,
including that the necessary funding will be secured and that
no new mined or CMR-contaminated areas are identified. It
notes, however, that “so far each year 3–4 different affected
areas have been reported” and that should this trend
continue, capacity and progress will need to be reassessed
with regards to the 2024 deadline.45

In 2019, The HALO Trust developed a new prioritisation
system that takes into account the “community profile”
for a task. This system draws on several factors, such
as socio-economic status, planned land use, government
development plans, and demographics. All information is
collected from government and public data as well as from
extensive community survey.50

As per the strategy, KMAC will develop annual operational
work plans to implement the strategy’s goals.46 KMAC will
also request an external mid-term review of the strategy
in 2022 to evaluate progress and make any adaptations
according to contextual changes if required.47

While NPA confirmed that its operations in northern Kosovo
continued to focus on high-impacted areas, it noted that it
was also important for NPA to ensure both ethnic Serbianand Albanian-populated areas are prioritised equally, with
sensitivity towards political, cultural, and ethnic affiliations.51

In 2019, KMAC confirmed that it had developed annual
operational work plans to target anti-personnel mined areas,
according to impact-based criteria, including risk reduction,
development priorities, and poverty reduction, along with
the findings of a nationwide baseline socio-economic impact
assessment carried out in 2018 by KMAC, with the support

KMAC reported that it planned to conduct technical survey
with NPA in 2020 of 21 tasks in the northern municipalities,
in addition to clearance of eight CMR-contaminated areas.52
However, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the
resulting halting of operations for several months, means
that technical survey will continue into 2020.53

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
National mine action standards for land release are in place
in Kosovo, which according to KMAC are in accord with the
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).54
Kosovo’s national mine action standards set the standard
clearance depth for battle area clearance (BAC) at 50cm.55
There has been a discussion over whether this standard
clearance depth could be reduced to 30cm in certain forested
and stony areas, which would enable detectors to be set to a
medium- rather than high-sensitivity setting and potentially
result in fewer false indicators needing to be investigated.56
However, KMAC informed Mine Action Review in 2019 that
the BAC clearance depth of 50cm is necessary as many of the
areas targeted with cluster munitions were especially wet and
muddy, as the bombing campaign took place during a period
of heavy rain, making it possible for submunitions to penetrate
to higher than normally expected depths.57 It did, though, state
that on certain tasks where the ground was entirely stony, a
reduction in search depth could be considered.58
Data from NPA and HALO Trust largely support KMAC’s
caution. The HALO Trust’s analysis of devices found by depth
in 2008–18 show that 22% of all items found by HALO Trust
teams were at a depth of 30cm or deeper, but this included
buried cluster bomb units with submunitions still inside.59
When removing full containers from the analysis, HALO
found that 96% of items were found 30cm or above and that
the average depth of items found through clearance was
12.4cm.60 NPA’s clearance statistics show that 12% of all
submunitions found in its operations were found at depths
greater than 30cm. At the same time, NPA raised the issue of
the potential threat that explosive items located deeper than
30cm might pose and whether the expected future ground
use could be considered when setting the search depth.61
HALO agrees on this issue and has collected data on planned
post-clearance land use, including crop cultivation depth.62

A 2014 evaluation of Kosovo’s mine action programme,
conducted on behalf of the International Trust Fund (ITF)
Enhancing Human Security, concluded that an increase in
capacity and improvements to land release methodology
and equipment deployed would be necessary if Kosovo were
to complete clearance operations by 2024. Since the 2014
evaluation, a number of significant improvements have been
introduced to the mine action programme, including the
introduction of HSTAMID detectors by The HALO Trust, which
have advanced operational productivity.63 Both The HALO
Trust and NPA were also using large-loop detectors on certain
CMR tasks, which enabled further productivity increases.64
In 2018, in another significant advancement in land release
efficiency, KMAC formally approved the implementation of
Cluster Munition Remnants Survey (CMRS) methodology
by NPA to carry out technical survey activities on
CMR-contaminated areas in Kosovo. According to this
methodology, which NPA has modified to take into account
the specific conditions in Kosovo, and in line with the IMAS,
operators are permitted to enter a cluster munition strike
area and to walk on ground with subsurface contamination,
increasing the efficiency of the survey process and offering
the ability to accurately define confirmed hazardous areas.65
HALO Trust, which displayed some hesitancy to implement
a CMRS approach in 2017, reported in 2019 that it was
interested in defining evidence-based clearance standards
and felt there could be scope to explore and improve survey
and clearance standards for addressing CMR, especially
in regard to recent developments with the implementation
of CMRS methodology in South-East Asia.66 It believed,
however, that as general survey has already been conducted
in HALO Trust’s areas of operations, implementing CMRS
would duplicate work already carried out to define confirmed
hazardous areas.67
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NPA reported that it had changed its approach in 2020 to
focus on technical survey of all tasks and therefore would
not clear all the high-impact CMR tasks in 2020.44

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
In 2019, Kosovo’s national mine action programme’s capacity
consisted of two international operators, The HALO Trust and
NPA, and national operator, the KSF. HALO Trust and NPA
continued to conduct BAC in 2019, along with the KSF, which
also provided a round-the-clock EOD emergency response.68
KFOR also supports the KSF and Kosovo Police with EOD
response tasks and organising mine and ERW demolitions in
Mitrovica and the north of Kosovo, including NPA’s areas of
operations.69 The demining season is from the end of March
to the end of November, due to weather conditions.70
HALO Trust’s operational personnel are cross-trained for
mine clearance and BAC and can move readily between
activities. On average, in 2019, HALO Trust deployed three
clearance teams totalling 27 deminers to CMR clearance
tasks – an overall decrease of 1.2 teams compared to the
previous year, as a result of donor requirements.71

NPA’s area of operations cover Kosovo’s five northern
municipalities of Leposavic, Mitrovica, Podujevo, Zubin
Potok, and Zvecan.72 In 2019, NPA deployed four teams: one
six-person team dedicated to technical survey and three
six-person teams to both technical survey and clearance.
This represented a doubling of the number of teams, from
two to four, but as the team size in 2019 decreased from 8 to
6, overall operational capacity only increased from 16 in 2018
to 24 in 2019.73 NPA deploys local teams of mixed ethnicities,
making it possible for NPA to work in previously inaccessible
areas in north Kosovo and deploy teams to both ethnic
Serbian and ethnic Albanian areas through the multi-ethnic
composition of the teams.74
KSF operated five manual clearance teams in 2019, totalling
60 deminers.75 KFOR supports the KSF and Kosovo Police
with EOD response tasks and organising mine and ERW
demolitions in Mitrovica and the north of Kosovo.76

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of more than 2.2km2 of CMR-contaminated area was released in 2019: nearly 1.3km2 through clearance; 0.4km2 through
technical survey; and 0.5km2 though non-technical survey.77
KMAC reported that one CHA containing CMR, of 60,000m2 in size, was added to the database in 2019.78

SURVEY IN 2019
A total of 911,795m2 of cluster munition-contaminated area was released through survey in 2019, by NPA in north of Kosovo.
Of this, 542,100m2 was cancelled through non-technical survey and 369,695m2 was reduced through technical survey in 2019.79
The total amount of CMR-contaminated area released through survey in 2019 was an increase on 2018, when 436,685m2 was
reduced technical survey, but when no area was cancelled through non-technical survey.80
As noted above, KMAC reported that an CHA of 60,000m2 was added to the database of CMR contamination in 2019.81

CLEARANCE IN 2019
Collectively, the KSF, The HALO Trust, and NPA cleared
1.26km2 of CMR contamination in 2019, with the destruction
of 155 submunitions (see Table 1).82 One additional
submunition was destroyed by KSF in 2019, during an
EOD response task.83

According to KMAC, one CMR task cleared in 2019 was found
not to contain CMR.86
The HALO Trust saw a 13% decrease on its CMR clearance
output in 2019, compared to the previous year, due to a
reduction in clearance personnel.87

This represents a small increase on the 1.24km2 of CMR
contamination cleared in 2018, when 212 submunitions
were destroyed.84
Table 1: CMR clearance in 201985
Area cleared
(m2)

Submunitions
destroyed

Other UXO
destroyed

KSF

135,910

4

707

HALO

614,203

133

0

NPA

510,104

18

5

1,260,217

155

712

Operator

Totals
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NPA saw an increase of nearly 48% on the area of
CMR-contaminated cleared in 2018, due to increased
clearance capacity. However, the number of submunitions
found and destroyed decreased in 2019, due to NPA no longer
working in the core area of cluster munition attacks, as it
had in 2018.88
As Kosovo has robust national procedures for the
management of explosives, the KSF, with support from KFOR
in northern Kosovo, carries out the demolition of CMR and
items of UXO found by both The HALO Trust and NPA.89

OTHER AREAS

Kosovo cannot formally adhere to the CCM and therefore
does not have a specific clearance deadline under Article 4.
Nonetheless, it has obligations under international human
rights law to clear CMR as soon as possible.
As stated in Kosovo’s Mine Action Strategy 2019–24, which
sets completion of mine and cluster munition clearance by the
end of 2024, completion will only be achievable if sustained
funding is secured.90 Specific concerns are elaborated in the
strategy about the need to upgrade old equipment, including
vehicles to proceed without unnecessary stand-downs or
costly repairs.91
The HALO Trust highlighted the need for a review of the
current data on CMR-contaminated areas, including an
evaluation of survey polygons, and application of efficient
land release methodologies, in order to ensure coordinated
and cost-effective targeting of clearance.92
As at April 2020, KMAC reported that it still expects to clear all
known CMR-contaminated areas by the end of 2024.93 However,
less than 5km2 of CMR has been cleared in the last five years
(see Table 2) and international clearance operators caution
that capacity will need to be increased and sustained over the
strategy period, in order to meet the 2024 target date.94
HALO Trust was doubling its CMR clearance capacity to six
teams in 2020, starting in March 2020, primarily due to a
multi-year contract for US funding.95 Similarly, NPA was also
increasing technical survey/clearance capacity from four
teams to seven in 2019, thanks to a US contract for 2020–23,
and it also had two personnel dedicated to non-technical
survey in 2020.96

While increasing and sustaining funding remained the primary
obstacle, challenges were also posed by poor weather and
difficult terrain, according to NPA. It also noted that additional
CMR-contaminated areas were still being recorded in its areas
of operations as a result of ongoing survey.97
In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has also impacted
Kosovo’s mine action programme. From mid- March to
mid-May the entire mine action sector was closed at the
direction of KMAC, as the government implemented strict
lock-down measures across the country, resulting in lost
productivity which will impact targets. Operators were able
to partially phase back operations in early May and fully by
June 2020. HALO is also avoiding use of remote camps due
to the COVID-19 pandemic which will also affect its original
2020 work plan.98
Table 2: Five-year summary of CMR clearance
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2019

1.26

2018

1.24

2017

0.88

2016

0.47

2015

0.34

Total

4.19

Assuming the target is met, completion of CMR clearance in
2024 would be 25 years after the end of the conflict between
the FRY forces and NATO and more than 20 years after the
UN claimed that clearance was largely complete.

PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION
According to Kosovo’s Mine Action Strategy 2019–24, a separate national strategy on the management of residual
contamination will be developed by KMAC by 2023, in collaboration with other national actors. This will clarify roles
and responsibilities in order to manage what is expected to be a long-term residual contamination problem.99 HALO
Trust highlighted the importance of establishing a common definition for residual risk – an existing priority for KMAC
in its national strategy.100
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NAGORNOKARABAKH

CLEARING CLUSTER
MUNITION REMNANTS
2020

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities should make a formal commitment to respect and implement the Convention
on Cluster Munitions (CCM).

■

The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities and both Armenia and Azerbaijan should refrain from any further use of
cluster munitions.

■

Nagorno-Karabakh should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster
munition remnants (CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

Survey and clearance of CMR should resume and the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities should provide funding for the work.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
Nagorno-Karabakh has extensive contamination by CMR but
the extent has not been determined precisely. HALO Trust
reported 213 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) covering
70.48km2 at the end of 2019 (see Table 1). The total area was
marginally less overall than a year earlier, largely as a result
of correcting an error in 2018 data for Askeran, but HALO
also recorded a slight increase in the number and size of
CMR-affected areas in Hadrut.1
Cluster bombs were dropped extensively across
Nagorno-Karabakh by the Azerbaijani Air Force during the
1988 conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Following
the cease fire in 1994 tensions flared up again in April 2016
when fighting broke out briefly along the Line of Contact
(LOC). While ground fighting was confined to areas close
to the LOC, artillery fire penetrated more than 10km into
Nagorno-Karabakh, and included use of cluster munitions. The
HALO Trust calculated the four days of hostilities added 2.4km2
of CMR contamination, all of which has now been cleared.2
In late September 2020, hostilities broke out again, involving
Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan, with reports
that cluster munitions were again being fired into Stepanakert.
Amnesty International ascribed the new use to Azerbaijan.3

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by region
(at end 2019) 4
District

CHAs

Area (m2)

Askeran

56

20,017,656

Hadrut

29

10,667,696

Lachin

17

8,500,000

Martakert

45

11,701,498

Martuni

57

15,094,233

Shushi

8

4,000,000

Stepanakert

1

500,000

213

70,481,083

Totals

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
Nagorno-Karabakh does not have a national mine action centre. The HALO Trust established the Nagorno-Karabakh Mine
Action Centre (NKMAC) in 2000, which it hoped would consolidate all mine action-related information and respond to requests
from the government ministries, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and local communities. The project did not, however,
attract local support and has been moribund for several years.5
Proposals for establishing a national centre were supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in meetings with The HALO Trust
at the end of 2019 and discussions continued in 2020. HALO reported constructive talks on the issue with the State Emergency
Services and the Ministry of Agriculture.6
A mine action coordination committee is responsible for liaising between the local authorities and The HALO Trust. Regular
coordination committee meetings were held between the local authorities, HALO Trust, and the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) until 2018 when the head of the committee was moved to a new post. The position remains vacant, with HALO
Trust continuing to lobby for a suitable candidate to fill the role.7
The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities do not provide The HALO Trust with any funding to clear mined areas.8
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GENDER AND DIVERSITY
HALO’s Nagorno-Karabakh programme follows the organisation’s gender and diversity policies, providing equal access to
employment for women and engaging them in management and operational roles.9 Its most senior national staff member
is female and women have been employed in both survey and clearance. HALO appointed the first woman for non-technical
survey in 2019 but from 2020, all HALO survey teams were planned to include at least one woman. Women made up around
13% of HALO’s staff in 2019, about the same as in the previous year, and expected to hire more women, subject to the
availability of funding.10
All groups affected by CMR and anti-personnel mines, including women and children, are said to be consulted during survey
and community liaison activities. Relevant mine action data is disaggregated by sex and age.11 But gender is said to be not
taken into account in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance activities.12

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
Nagorno-Karabakh does not have a mine action information management system; The HALO Trust operates its own database.13
No central mechanism exists for systematic sharing of data on mine clearance, underscoring the value of a mine action
authority. The emergency services share information on explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) call-outs and advance notice of
demolitions.14 The Nagorno-Karabakh Army Liaison Officer shares information with The HALO Trust on items found, incidents,
CHAs, and clearance on a regular basis. HALO is not authorised to share this data with others.15

PLANNING AND TASKING
There is no national mine action strategy currently in place in Nagorno-Karabakh.16
HALO Trust’s work plan has focused on completing existing tasks, giving priority to areas where confirmed accidents indicate
the greatest humanitarian threat and where cleared areas are most likely to be put to use. HALO Trust started a nationwide
survey in 2019, focusing on Martakert as Nagorno-Karabakh’s most heavily mine-contaminated region. When new information
of contamination is received, such as a mine find or incident, HALO tasks a non-technical survey team to respond within 48
hours. Otherwise, the survey was due to continue in 2020 on a region-by-region basis.17

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Nagorno-Karabakh has no local mine action standards. The Nagorno-Karabakh police were planning to lobby the government
to develop standards while The HALO Trust planned to support calls for national standards as part of discussions on creating
a mine action authority.18
In the meantime, The HALO Trust follows its internal standing operating procedures.19

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS
The HALO Trust has been the main organisation conducting land release in Nagorno-Karabakh since it started working there
in 2000. The Nagorno-Karabakh Emergency Service, formerly known as the Rescue Service, conducts EOD spot tasks and has
reportedly conducted some battle area clearance (BAC). One Nagorno-Karabakh army unit conducts limited demining. 20
Clearance is conducted mostly in the summer months between May and October. In 2019, HALO Trust operated with a total
staff that peaked at 242 at the end of September before winding down in line with normal practice to 159 at the end of the year.
At the end of 2019, HALO had 12 manual clearance teams with a total of 79 deminers who conduct both mine clearance and
BAC together with four non-technical survey teams each with four personnel and two mechanical teams with a total of eight
personnel. Uncertainty over the level of continued United States (US) funding raised the possibility that HALO Trust would
reduce staff further in 2020 rather than build up capacity over the summer. 21
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LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
HALO Trust did not conduct any non-technical or technical
survey of CMR-affected areas in 2019 but cleared 51,160m2
in Askeran, destroying a single submunition. 22
No target date has currently been set for the clearance
of all CMR contamination in Nagorno-Karabakh. 23 HALO
Trust currently prioritises clearance of mines over CMR
in compliance with restrictions imposed by donors.
Fundraising for CMR clearance has proved challenging
due to Nagorno-Karabakh’s international isolation and the
territorial restrictions that donors often place on funding. 24
CMR has dropped dramatically since 2014 as a result of lack
of funding (see Table 2).

Table 2: Five-year summary of CMR clearance
Year

Area cleared (km2)

2019

0.05

2018

0

2017

1.06

2016

3.28

2015

2.91

Total

7.30

The outbreak of hostilities in late September 2020 raised
concerns that significant new CMR contamination could be
added, in addition to the direct and significant risk to civilians
arising from the new use of cluster munitions.
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Amnesty International, “Armenia/Azerbaijan: Civilians must be protected from use of banned cluster bombs”, 5 October 2020, at: bit.ly/30DvCl3.
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NAGORNO-KARABAKH

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

WESTERN
SAHARA

CLEARING CLUSTER
MUNITION REMNANTS
2020

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
■

The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) should reaffirm its written commitment to respect and implement
the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and to clear all cluster munition remnants (CMR) contamination east
of the Berm as soon as possible.

■

The SADR should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR on territory under
its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.

■

A resource mobilisation plan should be developed with the aim of attracting international donor support.

■

Greater support should be provided to the Saharawi Mine Action Coordination Office (SMACO) to enable it to
continue to coordinate mine action in Western Sahara, east of the Berm, and to ensure that capacity development
efforts are not lost.

■

Mine action in Western Sahara must not become forgotten or overlooked by the international mine action
community. Support must still be given to address remaining mine, CMR, and other explosive remnants of war
(ERW) contamination.

■

SMACO should revise its strategy to include a more realistic date for completion of clearance of CMR with annual
survey and clearance targets, and a detailed budget.

UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION
According to the United Nations Mine Action Service
(UNMAS), at the end of 2019 Western Sahara east of the
Berm1 had a total of 40 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs)
containing CMR, with a total size of 1.64km2. 2 This is a
significant decrease in confirmed CMR contamination from
the 79 areas totalling 2.8km2 reported by UNMAS as
remaining at the end of 2018.3

The Royal Moroccan Armed Forces used both artillery-fired
and air-dropped cluster munitions against Polisario Front
Military forces during their conflict in Western Sahara from
1975 to 1991. According to SADR, the Royal Moroccan Armed
Forces employed BLU-63, M42, and Mk118 submunitions at
multiple locations in Bir Lahlou, Dougaj, Mehaires, Mijek,
and North Wadis.7

Both the north and south of Western Sahara east of the
Berm are still affected, as summarised in Table 1.4

While CMR clearance had been projected to be completed
by the end of 2012,8 discovery of previously unrecorded
contaminated areas meant this target date was not met.
According to UNMAS, new strike areas continued to be
identified in 2013–19 as mine action activities continued and
additional information was received from local populations.9
In 2019, 20 CHAs totalling 0.52km2 of previously unrecorded
contamination were found and added to the database.10

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area east of the
Berm (at end 2019)5
Region

CHAs

Area (km2)

North

21

0.35

South

19

1.29

Totals

40

1.64

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) reported completing clearance
of all known and accessible CMR contamination in its areas of
operations in Bir Lahlou in December 2018.6

Of the 40 CHAs, 6 cluster munition strike areas with a total
size of 0.5km2 are located inside the buffer strip and are
inaccessible for clearance.11 The size of these six areas may
increase if restrictions on access to the buffer strip are lifted,
allowing survey and clearance to be conducted.12 Clearance
of mines and ERW in the buffer strip, restricted areas,
and the berm itself is not foreseen in MINURSO mission
agreements, which according to the UN, considerably limits
the ability of MINURSO military observers to patrol.13

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES
Western Sahara also remains significantly affected by mines and ERW other than CMR due to the conflict (see Mine Action
Review’s Clearing the Mines 2020 report on Western Sahara for further information).
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In 2019, UNMAS Western Sahara had a grant of $53,937 to cover capacity building and some operating expenses for SMACO.
UNMAS also supported SMACO to develop its own internal strategy for 2019–23, which includes a communications and
resource mobilisation strategy.15

GENDER AND DIVERSITY
UNMAS has reported that gender policies are implemented in accordance with UNMAS, the UN Office for Project Services
(UNOPS), and MINURSO guidelines, as well as with direction from the Polisario Front.16 UNMAS also reported that gender has
been mainstreamed into Western Sahara’s national mine action work plans and the SMACO 2019–23 mine action strategy.17
During survey, efforts are made to consider the needs of men, women, girls, and boys to ensure more effective and efficient
operations, despite challenges presented by conducting survey activities targeting Bedouin populations.18
UNMAS reported there is equal access to employment for qualified women and men in survey and clearance teams in Western
Sahara, east of the Berm, including for managerial level/supervisory positions. In 2019, 9% of operational roles in SafeLane
Global (UNMAS’s contractor) were held by women; at a managerial level, this fell to 7%. In SMACO, there is one woman at
managerial level out of five positions.19

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING
According to UNMAS, the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database for Western Sahara, east of
the Berm, improved as a result of an ongoing data audit initiated at the end of 2015. 20 The Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has also provided ongoing support to correct database errors, and an upgrade to the latest
database software version, IMSMA Core, was scheduled to take place in August 2019. 21 This did not occur. As at June 2020,
the updating of standard operating procedures (SOPs) for information management and the gradual shift to IMSMA Core had
been suspended because of COVID-19 lockdown. 22

PLANNING AND TASKING
In 2019, SMACO developed its strategy for mine action in Western Sahara, east of the Berm, covering 2019–23 in line with the
newly published global UN Mine Action Strategy 2019–2023. UNMAS reported that, as at August 2020, a strategy for CMR
clearance was in development.23 There are no specific objectives related to CMR in the strategy for mine action in Western Sahara,
east of the Berm, but SMACO has established the following general objectives in order to achieve a Western Sahara free of the
impact of mines and ERW:
■
■
■
■
■
■
■

to implement efficient and effective communication with national and international organisations by 2019.
to establish an effective mechanism for data collection of accidents and victims which will be shared with partners
according to the SMACO Data Protection Policy by 2019.
to establish sustainable and constant funding of SMACO by 2020.
to ensure availability of human resources to comprehensively manage mine action by 2020.
to fully implement a professional management structure within SMACO by 2021.
to create a discussion platform (think tank) for a national victim rights protection policy by 2022.
to establish a national employment policy for mine action activities by 2023. 24
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NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
UNMAS Western Sahara, formerly the MINURSO Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC), facilitates MINURSO monitoring of
the ceasefire and ensures the safe passage of UN personnel. On 30 October 2019, MINURSO’s mandate was extended for an
additional 12 months until 30 October 2020 under UN Security Council Resolution 2494 (2019). UNMAS Western Sahara serves
as the UN focal point for mine action activities within the MINURSO area of operations. Its contracted teams work only in areas
east of the Berm. The Royal Moroccan Army conducts its own demining in areas west of the Berm. In 2013–14, the Polisario
Front, with UN support, established SMACO, which is responsible for coordinating mine action activities in Western Sahara
east of the Berm, excluding the buffer strip.14

As at June 2020, it was not known if Western Sahara, east of the Berm, achieved its objectives for 2019. UNMAS reported only
that there was no mine action work plan for 2019 or 2020 and that UNMAS Western Sahara mine action activities continued to
be in support of MINURSO’s mandate. 25
UNMAS and SMACO identify priorities for clearance of both minefields and cluster munition strikes east of the Berm in conjunction
with MINURSO. Priorities are identified based on humanitarian needs for the safety and freedom of movement of local populations,
while UNMAS Western Sahara facilitates the ceasefire and ensuring the safe passage of UN personnel.26

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM
STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY
Local mine action standards were developed and finalised in 2016 by UNMAS, together with SMACO, and in coordination with
mine action partners. A first annual review of the standards was completed in November 2018 with a review board consisting
of representatives from UNMAS, SMACO, and all implementing partners. No significant changes were made, and UNMAS
reported in June 2019 that translation of the standards into Arabic had been completed and shared with SMACO. 27
An external quality management system was in place from 2018 and implemented by UNMAS and SMACO to the east of
the Berm. 28

OPERATORS
Table 2: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 201929
Operator

Manual teams

Total deminers*

Dog teams

Mechanical assets

SafeLane Global
(for UNMAS Western Sahara)

2

24

0

0

Totals

2

24

0

0

Comments
Decrease by 50%
from 2018

* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers.

SafeLane Global (formerly Dynasafe MineTech Limited, DML) was the implementing operator for UNMAS Western Sahara,
conducting survey and clearance in 2019. There was a decrease in overall operational capacity from 2018 due to a decrease
in funding and because Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) had made the “difficult decision” to close down its programme, effective
on 1 January 2019, after releasing the last known contaminated areas in Bir Lehlou province in August 2018.30

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2019
A total of almost 1.59km2 of CMR-contaminated area was released through clearance in 2019 with 923 submunitions destroyed.

SURVEY IN 2019
According to UNMAS, no non-technical survey or technical survey of CMR-contaminated area occurred in 2019 or 2018.31

CLEARANCE IN 2019
In 2019, a total of 1,589,492m² was released though clearance in Tifariti in the North region of Western Sahara, east of Berm
with 923 submunitions found and destroyed.32 This is a huge decrease from the just over 4.8km2 cleared in 2018, albeit with
the destruction of only 833 submunitions.33
Table 3: CMR clearance in 201934
Operator

Region

SafeLane Global (for UNMAS Western Sahara)

Tifariti (North region)

Totals

Area cleared (m²)

Submunitions
destroyed

1,589,492

923

1,589,492

923

No CMR were reported destroyed in spot tasks in 2019.35 UNMAS stated that the reasons for the decrease in CMR clearance
output in 2019 was the decrease in operational capacity following the withdrawal of NPA staff and a decrease in funding.36
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Western Sahara is neither a State Party nor a signatory to
the CCM and therefore does not have a specific clearance
deadline under Article 4. However, the SADR submitted a
voluntary CCM Article 7 transparency report to the UN in
2014, stating that: “By submitting its voluntary report, the
SADR would like to reaffirm its commitment to a total ban
on cluster munitions as well as its willingness to accede to
the Convention on Cluster Munitions and be bound by its
provisions”.37 The SADR has obligations under international
human rights law to clear CMR as soon as possible.

to be free of the impact of mines and ERW by 2023.40 UNMAS
Western Sahara needs to maintain its level of funding of
$3.265 million per year and to secure an additional $2 million
per year to clear all known mine and ERW contamination
in the territory of Western Sahara, east of the Berm, and
outside the buffer strip, restricted areas, and the Berm itself
by this date.41

Under Western Sahara’s draft mine action strategic plan,
all recorded cluster munition strike areas to the east of the
Berm, outside of the buffer strip, were to be released by
2019.38 UNMAS expected to complete clearance of all CMR
contamination in the Northern Sector (Bir Lahlou, Mehaires,
and Tifariti districts) east of the Berm by the end of 2018.39
This did not happen, however, and in SMACO’s new mine
action strategy 2019–23, the vision is for Western Sahara

In 2019, with the loss of NPA as a key mine action
implementer, along with the end of both German and
Norwegian funding for clearance, the future of Western
Sahara’s mine action programme was uncertain. Additional
resources and capacity, along with support to SMACO, need
to be secured urgently. There was a massive decrease in
clearance output from 2018 to 2019 in Western Sahara and
UNMAS reported that as at June 2020, operations had been
partially suspended due to the outbreak of COVID-19, putting
the already unrealistic 2023 completion date even further out
of reach.42

1

A defensive wall (the Berm) was built during the conflict between the Royal
Moroccan Armed Forces and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia
el Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario Front) forces, dividing control of the
territory between Morocco on the west, and the Polisario Front on the east.
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ANNEX 1:

ARTICLE 4 OF THE
CONVENTION ON
CLUSTER MUNITIONS
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ARTICLE 4: CLEARANCE AND DESTRUCTION OF CLUSTER
MUNITION REMNANTS AND RISK REDUCTION EDUCATION
1. Each State Party undertakes to clear and destroy,
or ensure the clearance and destruction of, cluster
munition remnants located in cluster munition
contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control,
as follows:
(a) Where cluster munition remnants are located in
areas under its jurisdiction or control at the date
of entry into force of this Convention for that State
Party, such clearance and destruction shall be
completed as soon as possible but not later than
ten years from that date;
(b) Where, after entry into force of this Convention for
that State Party, cluster munitions have become
cluster munition remnants located in areas
under its jurisdiction or control, such clearance
and destruction must be completed as soon as
possible but not later than ten years after the end
of the active hostilities during which such cluster
munitions became cluster munition remnants; and
(c) Upon fulfilling either of its obligations set out
in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph,
that State Party shall make a declaration of
compliance to the next Meeting of States Parties.

2. In fulfilling its obligations under paragraph 1
of this Article, each State Party shall take the
following measures as soon as possible, taking
into consideration the provisions of Article 6 of this
Convention regarding international cooperation
and assistance:
(a) Survey, assess and record the threat posed by
cluster munition remnants, making every effort to
identify all cluster munition contaminated areas
under its jurisdiction or control;
(b) Assess and prioritise needs in terms of marking,
protection of civilians, clearance and destruction,
and take steps to mobilise resources and develop
a national plan to carry out these activities,
building, where appropriate, upon existing
structures, experiences and methodologies;
(c) Take all feasible steps to ensure that all cluster
munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction
or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and
protected by fencing or other means to ensure
the effective exclusion of civilians. Warning signs
based on methods of marking readily recognisable
by the affected community should be utilised in the
marking of suspected hazardous areas. Signs and
other hazardous area boundary markers should,
as far as possible, be visible, legible, durable and
resistant to environmental effects and should
clearly identify which side of the marked boundary
is considered to be within the cluster munition
contaminated areas and which side is considered
to be safe;
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(d) Clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants
located in areas under its jurisdiction or control;
and
(e) Conduct risk reduction education to ensure
awareness among civilians living in or around
cluster munition contaminated areas of the risks
posed by such remnants.

3. In conducting the activities referred to in paragraph 2
of this Article, each State Party shall take into account
international standards, including the International
Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

4. This paragraph shall apply in cases in which cluster
munitions have been used or abandoned by one State
Party prior to entry into force of this Convention for
that State Party and have become cluster munition
remnants that are located in areas under the
jurisdiction or control of another State Party at the
time of entry into force of this Convention for the latter.
(a) In such cases, upon entry into force of this
Convention for both States Parties, the former
State Party is strongly encouraged to provide,
inter alia, technical, financial, material or human
resources assistance to the latter State Party,
either bilaterally or through a mutually agreed
third party, including through the United Nations
system or other relevant organisations, to
facilitate the marking, clearance and destruction
of such cluster munition remnants.
(b) Such assistance shall include, where available,
information on types and quantities of the cluster
munitions used, precise locations of cluster
munition strikes and areas in which cluster
munition remnants are known to be located.

5. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to clear
and destroy or ensure the clearance and destruction
of all cluster munition remnants referred to in
paragraph 1 of this Article within ten years of the
entry into force of this Convention for that State
Party, it may submit a request to a Meeting of States
Parties or a Review Conference for an extension
of the deadline for completing the clearance and
destruction of such cluster munition remnants by a
period of up to five years. The requested extension
shall not exceed the number of years strictly
necessary for that State Party to complete its
obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article.
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6. A request for an extension shall be submitted to a
Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference
prior to the expiry of the time period referred to in
paragraph 1 of this Article for that State Party. Each
request shall be submitted a minimum of nine months
prior to the Meeting of States Parties or Review
Conference at which it is to be considered. Each
request shall set out:
(a) The duration of the proposed extension;
(b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the
proposed extension, including the financial and
technical means available to and required by
the State Party for the clearance and destruction
of all cluster munition remnants during the
proposed extension;
(c) The preparation of future work and the status of
work already conducted under national clearance
and demining programmes during the initial ten
year period referred to in paragraph 1 of this
Article and any subsequent extensions;

7. The Meeting of States Parties or the Review
Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors
referred to in paragraph 6 of this Article, including,
inter alia, the quantities of cluster munition remnants
reported, assess the request and decide by a majority
of votes of States Parties present and voting whether
to grant the request for an extension. The States
Parties may decide to grant a shorter extension than
that requested and may propose benchmarks for the
extension, as appropriate.

8. Such an extension may be renewed by a period of up
to five years upon the submission of a new request, in
accordance with paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of this Article.
In requesting a further extension a State Party shall
submit relevant additional information on what has
been undertaken during the previous extension
granted pursuant to this Article.

(d) The total area containing cluster munition
remnants at the time of entry into force of this
Convention for that State Party and any additional
areas containing cluster munition remnants
discovered after such entry into force;
(e) The total area containing cluster munition
remnants cleared since entry into force of
this Convention;
(f) The total area containing cluster munition
remnants remaining to be cleared during the
proposed extension;
(g) The circumstances that have impeded the ability
of the State Party to destroy all cluster munition
remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction
or control during the initial ten year period referred
to in paragraph 1 of this Article, and those that may
impede this ability during the proposed extension;
(h) The humanitarian, social, economic and
environmental implications of the proposed
extension; and
(i) Any other information relevant to the request for
the proposed extension.
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS
AND ABBREVIATIONS
AIM		

LIS		

Landmine Impact Survey

AP mine Anti-personnel mine

MAG

Mines Advisory Group

APMBC

MDD

Mine detection dog (team)

AV mine Anti-vehicle mine

MoU

Memorandum of Understanding

AXO

Abandoned explosive ordnance

MRE

Mine risk education

BAC

Battle area clearance

MTT

Multi-task team

BiH		

Bosnia and Herzegovina

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

CCM

2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions

NGO

Non-governmental organisation

CCW

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

NMAS

National Mines Action Standards

CHA

Confirmed hazardous area

NPA

Norwegian People’s Aid

CMR

Cluster munition remnants

NSAG

Non-state armed group

CMRS

Cluster Munition Remnants Survey

NTS

Non-technical survey

DCA

DanChurch Aid

OAP

Oslo Action Plan

DDG

Danish Demining Group

OAS

Organization of American States

EDD

Explosive detection dog (team)

EO		

Explosive ordnance

OSCE
		

Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe

EOD

Explosive ordnance disposal

PPE

Personal protective equipment

EORE

Explosive ordnance risk education

QA		

Quality assurance

ERW

Explosive remnants of war

QC		

Quality control

EU		

European Union

QM		

Quality management

FSD

Swiss Foundation for Mine Action

SHA

Suspected hazardous area

GICHD
		

Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining

SOP

Standing (or standard) operating procedure

TS		

Technical survey

GIS		

Geographic information system

TWG

Technical working group

HI 		

Humanity and Inclusion

UN 		

United Nations

ICRC

International Committee of the Red Cross

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

IED 		

Improvised explosive device

UNICEF

United Nations Children’s Fund

IMAS

International Mine Action Standards

UNMAS

United Nations Mine Action Service

IMSMA

Information Management System for Mine Action

UXO

Unexploded ordnance

IP		

Implementing partner

VA		

Victim assistance

ITF		
		

International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing
Human Security

VTF

Voluntary Trust Fund (United Nations)

Abandoned Improvised Mines (Afghanistan)

1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
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